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2 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : PBSUCCESS -- Notes on Conversation with GILLRAY.

1. This memorandum will record a few of the high spots in our conversation with GILLRAY of yesterday afternoon. I am furnishing a copy of this memorandum to the Director to enable him to compare notes with what he heard in Miami, and also a copy to [] for his information and guidance.

2. GILLRAY was emphatically disinterested in our suggestion that he give favorable consideration to the offer made to him in Nicaragua which we would have been willing to consider supplementing. He rejected this suggestion on the ground that he could not work for two bosses. It will be important for us to obtain the Director's views concerning the terms of any continuing relationship with GILLRAY.

3. Ambassador Willauer did a fine job laying on the meeting with [] The conversation was entirely satisfactory as far as it went but there remains to be accomplished some very necessary follow-up action before this matter can be considered secured. Until this follow-up action is completed, GILLRAY recommends strongly against the initiation of any black flights to Honduras.

4. The reason that the two attempted approaches to [] aborted was, GILLRAY is convinced, the fact that [] although disposed to play, would not do so without some sign from the Embassy of official endorsement or approval. This was unobtainable because of two factors in the Embassy situation, viz: (a) the unreliability of Donovan and (b) the unsureness and lack of satisfactory relations on the part of the Ambassador. GILLRAY quoted [] with a statement that the extent of his contacts with [] since his arrival has been one visit and one telephone call. (This sounds very strange since I had not considered [] to be so retiring a figure.) GILLRAY stated flatly that this Embassy situation must be improved if we are to expect any help from [] This is one for the

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Director's consideration and one to be marked down for our conversation with Assistant Secretary Holland. I would recommend that this conversation be set up by the Director at the earliest possible date.

5. One alarming feature of the [] situation is the apparent fact that Rufus just hasn't got it with []

6. GILLRAY recommended strongly against attempting any black flights into El Salvador under present circumstances -- stating that this would be the surest way he could think of to mess up the entire operation.

7. Observations of a general nature. In response to a question from Colonel King, GILLRAY expressed the view that the plan can work. He said that it was a difficult and complicated plan, that everything had to come off in the right way and at the right time to succeed -- but that it can work. He further stated that short of outright and naked intervention it is about the only kind of plan that is feasible. He could not think how to improve on the plan. He warned however that it is essential to get [] properly buttoned up and that soon. He repeated that whereas [] is timid and nervous, he seems to be tempted and "can be had." He thought there was some chance for a cooling off or reversal on the part of [] if we didn't succeed in tying up the other two pretty soon.

8. Finally GILLRAY observed that some of our people are showing signs of overwork and strain -- especially those at LINCOLN. He commended the energy and force of the LINCOLN team but thought they were driving themselves so hard that they could crack up if they continue at their present forced pace.

SIGNED

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: DCI
C/FP

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