

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL

Air Pouch

2003

HIL-4-374

~~SECRET/RYBAT/FBSUCCESS~~

31 March 1954

Chief of Station, Guatemala

LINCOLN

Operational
KUGCWN Operational

REF: ECG-4-793

1. In sum, the reference dispatch portrays one of those temporary crises of morale through which every resistance organization inevitably passes. We have no wish or inclination to sound hard-hearted: but from the LINCOLN point of vantage, we cannot interpret the reference otherwise. We recommend that RAZMARA, in all his relations with ESSENCE, reflect confidence without callousness and that he remind ESSENCE of the trials and ordeals of previous and successful resistance movements. Indeed, if RAZMARA is so minded and can appropriately adapt the analogy, he can inform ESSENCE that, for example, the morale of the Nazis in the winter of 1932, just before their seizure of power in Spring, 1933, was at all-time low ebb. The same thing was true of the French revolutionaries and of the Soviet revolutionaries, on the eve of their success. These are not every examples, but they are illustrative of the emotional ups and downs that affect resistance groups and revolutionaries. What we are witnessing now on the part of the government, ESSENCE should be told, is not the strength of maturity but the frenzy of senility and decay. Nor is ESSENCE being asked to survive forever. We cannot indicate to him a definite end to oppression, but we can indicate that the end is daily drawing nearer. We consider it important that RAZMARA assume the initiative in making such "chin-up" remarks and that he not be overly tolerant with ESSENCE when ESSENCE is in the doldrums. This is the time when RAZMARA must show his mettle and his leadership. He must speak out boldly, with hope and with faith, and where these qualities are lacking in ESSENCE, RAZMARA must supply them. It is understood, of course, that the Station in turn must inject them into RAZMARA, not because he lacks these qualities, but because, in his position, he too will be looking for encouragement. For obvious reasons, it is not desirable to convey either to RAZMARA or ESSENCE those hopeful aspects of the overall FBSUCCESS PICTURE which justify the foregoing remarks. However, it is perfectly honest and appropriate for RAZMARA to tell ESSENCE, as often as necessary, that the overall picture of the anti-Communist cause is encouraging

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and that the losses now sustained do not truly diminish the overall strength, but only temporarily diminish the strength of that sector with which he is familiar.

2. The specific items mentioned in RAZMARA's informal memoranda have practically all been covered by cable. For your information, the ESSECE memorandum on the Salama problem has been transmitted to CALLIGERIS and CALLIGERIS has been asked to take appropriate KUGLW action.

JEROME C. DUNBAR

JCD/JTE/eaf
30 March 1954

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2 - Washington
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