

~~RYBAT/PBSUCCESS~~

Washie J. ...

HGG-A-814

AIR

~~SECRET~~

MAR 30 1954

Chief, Lincoln

Chief of Station, Guatemala []

INFO: Washington

Operational

Weekly KUGOWN Operational Report

Reference - HGG-A-793
HGG-A-794

1. A thorough review of all matters pertaining to the ESSENCE operation will be completed by 26 March 1954 and pouched to Lincoln no later than 30 March 1954. The review will consist of pertinent comments on operational problems, Lincoln guidance received to date, and suggestions for future operations. Meanwhile, the operational report for this period will consist of the transmittal of RAZMARA memoranda and minimal station comments.

2. KUGOWN Task PT/1 (ESSENCE):

Sub-paragraphs a through g below relate to reports submitted by RAZMARA in connection with PT/1 activities:

- a. Enclosure No. 1 contains initial responses to Lincoln guidance and comments sent to RAZMARA as an attachment to HUL-A-195. Although the replies are somewhat pessimistic you will note that they were written before RAZMARA had received and studied the comments sent as an enclosure to HUL-A-237. The latter comments will undoubtedly provide RAZMARA with excellent background for overcoming many objections previously voiced by ESSENCE. The contents of both references (HULA-195 and -237) have been carefully reviewed with RAZMARA and he is preparing specific replies and requests for support items.
- b. Paragraph 4 of enclosure No. 2 relates to the telephone team discussed in HUL-A-134. This initial effort was obviously not satisfactory, but as will be noted in the review referred to above we feel certain that better results will be obtained as a consequence of proposed remedial steps. Please note carefully the opinions expressed about Clemente MAUROQUIN Rojas in paras. 11, 12 and 13 of Encl. No. 2 (see also Encl. No. 8 below). Para. 14 is a report on the Guardia Judicial diary mentioned in HUL-A-131.
- c. Enclosure No. 3 is a self-explanatory by-product intelligence report. If pertinent, the information should be sent to CALLIGERIS. Action on the vehicle requested in para. 5 of Encl. No. 4 is not recommended, pending completion and study of the review referred to in para. 1 above.

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2003

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

- d. Please clarify para. 4 of Encl. No. 5. The person referred to therein is identical with [] (see para. 3f of HGG-A-793 and GUAT 246).
- e. Enclosures No. 6 and No. 7 are miscellaneous information reports forwarded as matters of possible interest.
- f. Enclosure No. 8 is additional information on Clemente MARROQUIN Rojas (see also Encl. No. 2).
- g. Enclosure No. 9 (for Lincoln only) is a communist leaflet publicizing the latest MALENKOV peace balloon. This item was submitted by ESSENCE as an example of current communist propaganda.
- h. Miscellaneous matters:
- (1) The list of anti-BGYPY newspapers transmitted as an enclosure to HUL-A-236 has been delivered to ESSENCE for placement on the group's mailing list.
 - (2) The recruitment outlined in HUL-A-193 has not been accomplished by reason of the absence of ESCOBILLA from WSBURNT (see GUAT 241).
 - (3) RAZMARA was briefed on 19 March 1954 regarding exploitation of the negative WSBURNT vote on the anti-racial discrimination resolution (LINC 1131). No report has yet been received.
 - (4) Exploitation of the situation in the Escuintla cemetery (as outlined in LINC 1011) is also pending due to the absence of ESCOBILLA (see GUAT 241).
 - (5) RAZMARA will be briefed on 25 March 1954 regarding the "hoof-and-mouth" provocation operation described in LINC 1202 and previous references.
 - (6) According to Esconson-2 there has not been any official ban on the broadcasting of religious programs as previously reported in paragraph 2 of HGG-A-794; therefore it appears that the matter cannot be exploited as we had originally considered.
 - (7) GUAT 236 contained information requested in LINC 891 regarding [] KUGOWN prospect for Lincoln.

(8) RAZMARA orally reported on 24 March 1954 that the subject of LINC 1138 had been approached by ESSENCE and readily accepted the recruitment proposition. Further details cabled.

3. KUGOWN Task PT/2: no change.

George L. Tranger

Enclosures: as noted

25 March 1954

Distribution:

- 2 - Lincoln w/encl
- 2 - Washington w/encl
- 1 - Files w/encl

18 March 1954

SUBJECT: Reply to the J.C.D. Request for Reports

1. Concerning the Spanish language material - CARTER wants this material to continue to come to him. Up to the present time the full effectiveness of this material cannot be judged since the group has only been able to use small quantities. This delay may be attributed to various causes - lack of effective collaboration (which CARTER is attempting to remedy, but the difficulties are great, as explained in previous reports), government demands for responsible signatures, fear on the part of the owner of the imprenta when an article seems too strongly worded. The independent newspapers are governed by the same fears and hesitate to publish anything which they think might actually bring down the government's wrath, or else they lack enough interest to publish some items they might publish.
2. Concerning the editorial type articles sent to CARTER for use in "El Rebelde" - until the group is in a position to maintain steadily a new-type "El Rebelde" they hesitate to "waste" the articles on the present issues. Again, this delay will be partially remedied when, and if, CARTER secures more collaborators, and an office in which to work. CARTER's main desire in regard to this type material is that they not be too "intellectually" written, too theoretical, in which case they will have the effect of driving off readers. Also, such articles should be balanced between fairly harsh articles, and more lenient ones which can be used in the paper at times of heavy government pressure.
3. Government pressure is so strong at present against "El Rebelde" that any action is almost impossible. Representatives from the Guardia Judicial are arriving daily, demanding to see all the back files, etc., interfering with the operation of the plant, instilling fear in the collaborators and the imprenta to such

Encl. #1

an extent this week's issue is being delayed and it is not known for sure when the issue will come out.

4. As stated in my report of 17 March, CARTER would like to receive an international news service (through the same system in which I pass on to him the clippings, etc.) with Communist and anti-Communist news. The local press in most instances is very sketchy, if indeed it bothers to report on this type news. CARTER states that this is mostly due to fear of the government's reaction should they publish articles, for instance of a speech by Canessa attacking Guatemala and Communism - although in instances it is just due to lack of interest. Therefore, if "El Rebelde" and the radio programs are able to come out with current news that is different from the news in the local papers reader and listener interest will be stimulated.

5. As concerns the exact issues which are of current interest and importance to the reading public, CARTER does not feel there is any particular issue which is more important for the readers than others as long as all can be reported interestingly - naturally Latin American news are received more sympathetically but this does not exclude news from all over the world, as long as they can be reported first of all, or only, by the group. If the news that the group has to report concerns, for instance, that the PRG is Communist - by the time the group's weekly gets it into print, it has been hashed and rehashed by the local dailies.

6. An instance of the interest referred to by CARTER concerns a series run by "El Rebelde" on Trotsky and his assassin. This is not current news - but at least was different from anything published in the local papers, and the people enjoyed reading it, since it wasn't a re-hash or reprint of what had already come out in "El Imparcial", etc.

7. Concerning your suggestions for a more positive program, action, etc. - this is a problem that I don't think the group is prepared to undertake in the near future. The main purpose in their eyes, is to rally all the opposition to the government - including leftists, rightists, and those in the center. As soon as they

begin to formulate a program or take a positive stand concerning such matters as social welfare, wages, etc., they are going to alienate segments of their support. Some will state they are ^{not} going far enough, others that they are worse than the Communists - and very few people will remain who are actually pleased. This would serve to disrupt the unity which they have finally achieved in which PUA, CEUAGE, Asociación Cristiana, etc., are now content to work together for the common goal of over-throwing the Communist regime.

8. CARTER realizes that anti-Communism in itself is negative, and I will continue to discuss the matter with him from time to time in an attempt to work something out - but I don't think chances are too optimistic.

9. An example of propaganda which seemed to be if anything, too effective was the Manifiesto from Castillo Armas. It aroused a response among the people, who considered it extremely well written and with enough of a promise of action that it lifted their spirits, and has set them waiting. I say possibly too effective for the reason that it raised spirits, but unless the follow-up occurs before too long, a reaction will set in that it was only one more piece of printed paper.

10. CARTER reports that the Manifiesto, along with the recent propaganda work of the group has served to arouse the people - but in most cases, while the people are even eagerly awaiting a change of government, very few of them are willing to take the personal risk, or to devote the time and effort to actively assisting the group.

11. A major problem facing CARTER (and I think possibly even including CARTER), is that of keeping up the spirits of his collaborators so they will continue to disseminate propaganda - many of them seem to have the feeling that this paper has been pouring out for years - and where is it getting us - either assure us of action from outside, and soon, or don't give us any more propaganda.

[]
ALBERTO

19 March 1954

SUBJECT: Meeting Between Oscar H. CARTER and ALBERTO

1. A meeting took place between CARTER and ALBERTO on Thursday 18 March.
2. CARTER gave ALBERTO copies of FGT propaganda "Guatemala Ante la Conferencia de Caracas" - see attachments.
3. In connection with our request, CARTER states 15 telegrams were sent to Caracas - three of these were in the names of these Comités - Obrero, PUA, and PIACO - and the balance in names of various groups such as citizens of Quetzaltenango, etc.
4. The group was successful in securing only 8 telephone numbers of officers, to CARTER's definite knowledge - the phone calls were made - but no reaction has been noted. CARTER states it is possible that some half dozen calls have been made since. The difficulty in this matter is that many officers do not have phones, those that do have to be sought out, and the lack of availability of public phones where persons can make such calls undetected. As well as persuading the boys to make the calls.
5. The balance of the "6 x 6" propaganda, as well as the Army manifiesto, will be brought out of hiding when government pressure eases up. They have not unpacked (unwrapped) this material as yet, but when they do, copies will be given to ALBERTO.
6. The pictures of the refugees will be used when government pressure eases somewhat. Copies were sent to the CEUAGE in Honduras, and to the APG (Asociación de Periodistas Guatemaltecos), in the hopes this organization would make use of them.

Encl. # 2

7. CARTER states that in many cases, even with the offer of paying for the space, the local newspapers will not touch material which CARTER tries to pass on to them.

8. The 19 page religious article will be placed in the "El Rebelde" as soon as the situation with the government straightens itself out somewhat.

9. As concerns issuing this in pamphlet form - because of the length same would probably cost around \$70 - \$80 a thousand or some \$700 - \$800 for 10,000. This figure seems extremely high for a piece of propaganda - hence CARTER states that whenever they get an office-safe-house and more assistance, they will attempt to condense the article and then bring it out in a pamphlet.

10. Concerning reaction to the rumor of the supression of newspapers - said rumor does not make much impression, at least among news circles since, as CARTER says, the local independent newspapers live constantly under this threat - and the directors of the newspapers won't let anything strong be published because of the fear they have that the police will descend upon the plants and close them down.

11. In the case of the "El Imparcial" - CARTER was told that the newspaper leans neither to the right nor to the left, and does not mix itself in politics - that it only prints straight news - and no news that will make it appear the paper favors one side or the other. Marroquin Rojas is too busy trying to juggle all three of his papers, and keep on the financially profitable side of everything. Prensa Libre seems fairly independent and for the opposition - but too many of their people have ties with the government or work for the government. CARTER believes that "El Espectador" is the only really outspoken paper - but even though this paper would like to hammer away at the government, by itself it dare not do so - and there is always the threat of the police should they keep up a two or three issue attack.

12. CARTER states that in the case of Marroquin Rojas, his only true hate and fear is directed towards Ydigoras Fuentes. MR started out after the revolution as a penniless newspaperman - yet today he has three

papers, and apparently quite solvent financially. As a sincere opposition to the government these past years, this seems rather strange.

13. ALBERTO heard these same doubts expressed about MR on Tuesday 16 March by [] who told ALBERTO he kept his contacts with MR to a minimum since [] was never sure just how much information was passed along to the government by MR.

14. Concerning the Rubén Roca Colindres diary - CARTER states he will investigate a method of approach to the widow, although he is not optimistic as to outcome of investigation. On various occasions Roca Colindres proved very helpful to the group - on one occasion he called Carter and two or three others to his office and told them that he would never arrest them - but that whenever he sent for them, he expected immediate response. Also, he warned them that should they ever be confronted with an order for arrest they could be sure it was not from him, but from the palace or elsewhere - and they should evade capture. CARTER states that on three or four occasions Roca Colindres sent a man around to warn them that the palace had issued an order for their arrest and to seek cover. Roca Colindres told them he viewed their struggle with sympathy.

15. After his death, his widow was extremely bitter towards the government - but even so, in the event such a diary exists, it will be extremely difficult to persuade her to part with same, even for financial remuneration - as her great fear would be that said offer is a government trick - or in the event the government notes the diary is being used, the consequences to her would be drastic.

16. The next meeting between CARTER and ALBERTO is scheduled for Monday 22 March.

[]

ALBERTO

19 March 1954

1. The following information comes from the [] of the Guardia de Honor, 2nd Regimiento de Armas Pesadas.
2. There is hard feeling (están molestos) between the personnel of the Guardia de Honor and the Base Militar de la Aurora.
3. The Primer Jefe has told those of the Guardia to be ready because they have no confidence in the personnel of the Base.
4. The Sargento reports that the troops are only waiting for a conflict between the jefes in order to retaliate against those from the Base, because the Base personnel have threatened and molested them a great deal during practices.
5. The Third Regiment (Tercer Regimiento) which made a trip to the south coast a while back (and who left without arms) have now returned with seven ametralladoras calibre 30, and six ametralladoras cal. 35 - six morteros, dos cañones calibre 75. The ametralladoras which these troops carried in their hands bore Russian (or at least slavic language) markings. His companions report that the same is true for the other arms which were brought back.
6. To each soldier of the group who went to pick up these arms, was given a present of \$10.00.
7. These arms were given to them in the puerto de San José.
8. The Guardia de Honor is armed with Check rifles and carabinas. The total troops there amount to 800 men.

[]
A.

19 March 1954

1. CARTER took ALBERTO on an inspection tour of the city to see the coverage by anti-Communist propaganda. The group has done a very good job throughout the entire city among the middle class and poorer districts. The Malenkov posters are beginning to appear now - the first issues of the "6 and 6" propaganda are well posted - the 32 stamps, the octopus, etc., are everywhere, although in a great many cases the posters have been partly or almost wholly defaced.

2. CARTER states that the Communists usually send a team of six following the group's pegadores, and the job of this team is to rip down or deface. In spite of this, the city remains well covered.

3. The group cannot touch the center of town (Sexta Avenida and area) because of government opposition (arrest of the pegadores - and because of the great difficulty in replacing pegadores the group cannot run the risk) - and also because the very merchants help the Communists - the merchants immediately send their employes out to take down the anti-Communist posters, because they state that if they leave them up, the Communists are liable to break their windows (but the merchants have no such qualms when it comes to leaving up the Communist posters)

4. Also, the group does not make too much effort to poster the wealthier residential districts - because as CARTER states, if the rich aren't already anti-Communists, the posters aren't going to effect them much - and if they are anti-Communists, it is a waste of the pegadores time to tramp through the more thinly populated areas.

5. The pegadores do all this work on foot, which involves a great deal of walking and time spent. CARTER states that he has previously suggested that a used JEEP be secured, but no answer was forthcoming. ALBERTO would

Encl. # 4

appreciate a renewed consideration of this request.

6. CARTER states that the group would like to be able to poster the highways, such as that between the capital and Antigua, etc., but that without a means of transportation this is impossible. On one occasion the group rented a car, but when the owner later found out to what use the car had been put, he has refused since to rent them others. Furthermore, the car was dirtied up with glue, etc. which the pegadores use to stick up the posters. With a Jeep of their own, these two problems are eliminated.

7. Also with a Jeep or similar vehicle they can load up with propaganda items, etc., and make flying trips into the interior.

8. It is ALBERTO's suggestion, that if Hqs. thinks such a purchase of a used vehicle at all feasible, that permission be given to CARTER to secure same. ALBERTO believes such vehicle would be of considerable assistance to the group in their work.

[]

A.

23 March 1954

SUBJECT: Meeting Between CARTER and ALBERTO

1. A meeting took place between Oscar H. CARTER and ALBERTO on Monday 22 March.
2. After one broadcast, the program of the Comité Obrero was taken off the air, under threat of the Guardia Civil of closing down the radio station. The comité is trying to solve this matter, but up to the present time, has had no success.
3. A [] arrived in Puerto Barrios in name of [] Jones along some orders to [] of that pueblo. [] will pass through the capital in a few days.
4. PANCHO has also ordered [] out of Guatemala, leaving CARTER, for the time being at least, in charge of everything.
5. A person of the group's confidence in Puerto Barrios is [] He seems to have a great deal of influence among the people of that area. He can be reached in []
6. A ship has been unloading material in Santo Tomás. None of the regular stevedores, etc., of Puerto Barrios have been permitted to go there, but instead, persons have been brought from Livingston to unload. The group has not been successful in finding out anything more in this matter.
7. The government has the problem of contraband fairly well controlled at the port. Everyday the

↓
Puerto Barrios

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gates are closed for a quarter of an hour while all the apartados, etc., are searched.

8. There are certain houses in Puerto Barrios where, everytime there is an alarm, the Communists have placed persons for their defense. It is supposed that the Communists have arms in these houses.

9. These are some of the houses in Puerto Barrios where it is possible the Communists have arms.

House of J. Domingo Segura (PGT) - between 10th and 11th Streets and 10th Ave - short distance from the first oil tank - it is a house of two floors, with a roof of manáca and lámina - it is between the houses belonging to Eusebio Morales and Adolfo Galdames.

House of Carlos H. Flores, between 10th Avenue and 10th - 11th Streets, past the Puente # 1. The property is between the railroad line and a bridge of Amaca over the river.

House of Alejandra Rojas, 4th Avenue, between 10th and 11th Streets. It is a house with two floors, of wood, well-constructed. Is next to the house of Santiago Potter.

Biblioteca Futuro, in the house called "Rancho Grande", belonging to Sra. Maria Morales.

10. Communist propaganda distributors -

Manuel Villafuerte - 10 Street, between 11th and 10th Avenues.

María Eulalia Siu, owner of the Baratillo Chinta, is suspected.

a Ruperto (?) who lives between 17th and 16th Streets, near the yards of the Frutera.

A Sra. Rosita (?) who was the wife of Luis Pagliara (jefe of Aviatega in Pto. Barrios) and her

present husband apparently are the ones in charge of passing Communist propoganda from Guatemala to Honduras and Salvador.

ALBERTO

23 March 1954

1. The following information comes from San Mateo Milpas Altas.

2. On 18 March 1954, around 6:00 in the evening, a pick-up with persons from PAR and PRG arrived in town and contacted the directiva, whose Secretario General is Macedonio Vicente. They turned over to him a box (some yard -vara- long, by 2 feet by 2 feet) containing 38 cal. pistols, Checa mark, and an escuadra cal. 45 for the Secretario Gral.

3. The visitors told the directiva to prepara for a convention the 26, 27, and 28 of March - and that immediately after the convention the arms would prove useful, and therefore to take good care of them. The pistols were passed out to the afiliados that same evening. The one who was given the escuadra cal. 45 didn't know how to operate it, and was in the cantina of the town later that night, asking if anyone knew how to operate it - and bragging that the directiva had now armed all their people.

4. CARTER's group are trying to find out if arms have been passed out in other parts, since it could mean the Communists are ready to create an incident for the purpose of declaring martial law and cracking down on the opposition.

A.

23 March 1954

1. The owner of Radio Station "Capitol" (Dougherty?) is also interested in starting an airplane service to the coast - his application has been approved up to the time it reached Fanjul. Fanjul rejected it, and Dougherty sought an interview with Fanjul.

2. Dougherty said his company would in no way compete with Aviateca to the disadvantage of Aviateca, etc. Fanjul then told him that while he (Fanjul) occupied the ministry, he would do everything he could to clear out U. S. capital in Guatemala, and insulted the United States, its investors, etc., in such a manner that even the other employes in the area remained astenished.

3. Dougherty sought an interview with Arbenz, and was granted same. Explained his aviation case, but Arbenz told him that would have to be resolved. As concerns the troubles with the radio broadcasts - Arbenz told him that as far as he, Arbenz, was concerned, the opposition could publicly attack his government and he, Arbenz, would not interfere - but that he was not going to permit the opposition to attack any of the personnel of the government.

A.

Encl. # 7

23 March 1954

1. CARTER reports the following talk he had this past week-end with [

] as further warning that the group should be extremely wary of dealing with Marroquin Rojas.

2. Both [] and [] hotly defended the government, and assured CARTER that they supported the government completely. [] said he was not a Communist because he was a Catholic, but that he was determined to do what he could to support the government - and that this government (the type of regime, not Arbenz) would last for a very long time. He said he was sure that the government was making great accomplishments, even though there is some injustice. He was sure the pueblo supports the government, and that the next presidential period will also belong to this government. He strongly attacked all capitalists and persons of the right-wing.

3. [] stated that on many occasions, when [] is out of town, indisposed, or too busy, it is [] who writes the articles and signs [] name. [] and MR are great friends, and [] can copy MR's style so no one can distinguish between them.

4. CARTER states that the foregoing is interesting in that it perhaps gives an indication of []'s ideas. CARTER also says that it is possible that should [] sell Impacto (as previously rumored) [] will probably head it.

5. [] is a decided partidarist of the Communists. She claimed that the day will arrive when the pueblo rises up and uses the machete on all the "chancles", etc. who

Encl. # 8

think they are masters of Guatemala. She publicly insults those persons exiled from Guatemala.

6. Herparents do not share []'s ideas - they are well-to-do merchants. However, [] is a great friend of many persons in the government.

A.