

AIR POUCH

HUL-A- 269

~~SECRET/RYBAT/PBSUCCESS~~

24 MAR 1954

Chief of Station, Guatemala

LINCOLN

Info: WASH

Operational

HEIDIGER's Reports

Being forwarded for your information are the enclosed reports by Donald O. HEIDIGER on Project ESPIONAGE. Please return the enclosed reports in the next pouch from your Station to LINCOLN.

JAMES C. FINLEY

Enclosures:

2 reports in single copy

Distribution:

- 2 - Guat(w/2 atts, 1 copy each)
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gfb  
22 March 1954

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
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~~SECRET/RYBAT/PBSUCCESS~~

C/P

[ ]  
As per your request,  
attached is Hediger's  
report of activities.

OC/8

An excellent portrayal of what ESSENCE is  
all about and serve to clarify BISA's status  
other more must be learned of its true nature.  
If the situation today resembles anything like  
[ ] described it when he left there certainly  
remains a great deal of unexploited PB capability  
in this world. Request an informal digest of the  
[ ] style be prepared for your providing  
guidance on how to make the most of ESSENCE;  
directly distribution channels into specific targets  
and prepare to adopt more definite clandestinity  
throughout to survive and produce effectively.

C/PP

[ ] [ ]  
~~SECRET~~/RYBAT

PT-1/A/Ab

To:- Robert FORD

From:- Donald O. HEDIGER

4 February 1954

Subject:- (a) ESPLANADE-B, Activity of HEDIGER in;  
(b) Personnel suggestions.

(A) ESPLANADE-B / HEDIGER

1.)

HEDIGER's activities on ESPLANADE-B, so-called, as they related to LINCOLN project were as follows and under the following conditions:-

a.) HEDIGER was preceded in that station by an agent under cover-name of HUNKINS, who had established considerable contacts in the Comite Civico Nacional (C.C.N) and with [

b.) Initially, HEDIGER [

active only in establishing minor contacts for miscellaneous intelligence and rumors as related, chiefly, to KMFORGET activity; assisting Station with material and ideas for KMFORGET items which were fed to the [

original ESPLANADE group under HUNKINS, and similar material for HDA. consumption (such as clippings, misc. information, photos, etc).

c) HEDIGER carried on other contact activity, also, but these did not bear directly on ESPLANADE

d.) At about the time of HUNKINS's relief from the station, several of his people were picked up and thrown out of the country, others fled "voluntarily". This was followed by the SALAMA affaire, which virtually wiped out the ESPLANADE organization — all the effectives dropped out for one reason or another (exile, forced or voluntary; etc), and C.C.N. and its associate C.E.U.A. (Comite de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas) with their minor affiliates became almost totally inactive in any overt sense.

e.) During this period, HEDIGER was unable, due to the either pro-Communist or apoliticalness of the "Humanidades" body, to re-establish any workable contacts with

the anti-communist groups. One student of the Law Faculty, one [ ] (this full compound constitutes the patronymic), was coming in to the station and passing some information to one of our agents who was under the appropriate cover there. HDA, due to the limitations in conversation imposed by this station-assistant's cover, instructed that HEDIGER take over and try to develop the informant.

f) Contact was arranged; HEDIGER followed-up, and made tentative approaches to the subject. Subject was an ex-member of the CEVA and a sincere anti-Red; he proved to be, however, to be a "weak sister", an opportunist and self-seeker; he was also young, inexperienced, very nervous, and inclined to talk. This was reported in detail to station (and, presumably, to HDA) and it was agreed, as HEDIGER insisted, that this person be dropped. Meanwhile, however, HEDIGER had utilized this person to make a contact with a man who showed definite promise:-

# COVER names identified on other sheet attached.

D.O.H.

g) This person, identified within the Station as Oscar H. CARTER, was given the same cover story as [ ] but it was gradually intimated to him that we were prepared to support more definite action than had been mentioned to [ ] This latter was dropped and allowed to believe the proposition was discontinued; HEDIGER and CARTER began the reorganizational work.

h) Station and HEDIGER became aware, from things let slip by CARTER, that CARTER was connected with the exile groups. However, at this time we were not "part" of this PM activity and were instructed to "keep away from it" and "not to imply any connection outside the country". These MDA instructions were scrupulously followed. However, within limits, HEDIGER found it necessary (in order to conduct organization- al and PW work effectively) to elicit some information and bluntly ask for other in this connection — we did not/could not press for names, dates, specific details. Thus,

while we attempted to coordinate activity, it was often difficult. As late as December 1954<sup>3</sup> we had little or no specific data on the overall project — NDA had to be advised on any plans we made, and in turn just told us "yes" or "no" on the basis of whether it would or not conflict with LINCOLN. This limited us, due to time factors, to considerable extent — this, however, appeared to be what NDA wanted for the sake of better control.

i) In this condition and under these limitations, NEDIGER and CARTER began to organize what is now called "ESPLANADE-B".

2.)

The actual organizational work, and subsequent operations, ran to this line:—

a) The first step, after reaching agreement with CARTER, was the "dropping" of the initial contact. This was readily done, and it is believed security was well-covered in the process.

b) We now, late spring of 53, found the previous overt native organizations virtually defunct. They still existed in name,

but all effectives had gone underground, dropped out through fear, or were in exile. False members collected monies for their own purposes, members no longer came to the organizational headquarters and the previous permanent Secretaries were unpaid as were various bills. No propaganda or other overt work was in process. After the elections of January '53 the anti-Red parties had first disintegrated of themselves, and later been disrupted by the failure at Salama'. The old membership still existed, but there was little or nothing to which they could claim membership. Any moderately active people were now badly frightened and were "covering their tracks" with amazing rapidity — considerable signs of sycophantism toward the government were to be seen, even in the independent press.

c) Station laid down a general objective and limitations on HEDIGER; from within this structure he was given a "free hand" to reorganize a propaganda and intelligence structure to replace what had been lost. Station cooperated to the utmost

with material, information, personnel checks, and also with funds from the very limited "Other Funds" account.

3.)

The great and abiding weakness of the previous structure had been the prevalence of self-seeking, of "too many riders for the horse." The stronger leaders could not or would not, despite all efforts by Agent HUNKINS, "get together." Thus, the divide-and-conquer tactics of the well-disciplined Partido Comunista de Guatemala (later, Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, P.G.T.) and its "secret" adherents in the regime were abnormally successful in a nation which was, at least emotionally, about 80% anti-Communist. This thesis of HEDIGER, in which Station was in full agreement, was put to CARTER — the point was readily apparent to him, and he and HEDIGER were in full agreement on what must be done.

4.)

The first step was to have CARTER begin to screen the remaining anti-Reds for suitable sub-leaders. Station provided us with a "skull" design, which later became our strongest motif, and HEDIGER and CARTER worked out plans for its application. CARTER was first to id to organize a small, secret group within C.E.U.A to distribute propaganda of this nature — about six were to be maximum as a starter. Since he had always enjoyed

fairly good prestige with the student groups, and now backed by a tangible piece of work (the first "skull" items), CARTER began to organize his group within C.E.U.A.

5.)

C.E.U.A. at least still existed, though it was almost entirely inactive — C.C.N. was utterly defunct except as a name to be used by "swindlers" who were pocketing funds in its name, as were the minor groups for workers, women, younger students, etc which had been minor dependencies of C.E.U.A., C.C.N. and the several political parties. Thus, CARTER began his work in C.E.U.A.. Per instruction from HEDIGER, he was to avoid chief officers, past or present, of any group and to begin with "unobtrusive" sympathizers within or without the old organizations. On this basis we organized the overt propaganda group, identified in station as WHITE (it's leader being called WHITE or WHITE LEADER). This man was/is a minor C.E.U.A. member — he actually, having the propaganda in his hands, controlled the reviving C.E.U.A. through it's overt Secretary; this latter fronted for the WHITE man in disbursing the material through C.E.U.A. members. He did not contact CARTER, as WHITE did not contact (or know of) HEDIGER, but was instructed by his "secret" chief WHITE; he was designated WHITE-B.

WHITE became CARTER's chief lieutenant in the overt propoganda chain and through his lieutenant, WHITE-B we established control over the C.E.U.A., the only organization which still even pretended to exist as an organization.

6.)

The situation had two points to the bad, opposed by two to the good:— we had lost virtually every strong personality and natural leader; the previous organizations were covered and thoroughly fractured. On the other hand, while we now had only "deadwood" and inexperienced people to deal with, we had an opportunity to raise our own controlled leaders and to form a unified organization. These were our objectives, and this we moved to accomplish.

7.)

The general outline of the control in C.E.U.A. is shown above. We now began, fronting through WHITE-B, to bring back the membership of C.E.U.A. and make it strong again. This done, a new "C.C.N." secretariat was formed; these were selected old minor members of C.C.N. plus a control of C.E.U.A. men — the two groups were actually one but the C.C.N. name was retained for the morale of the public. On HEDIGER's instruction, CARTER moved to have C.C.N. sign over (by a legally notarized document) its few pieces of property, its "funds" (actually about \$180—in debts), and its membership lists, etc. C.E.U.A., through us, paid off

the debts of C.C.N. (on a mimeograph, typewriter, and its Secretary's salary) in return for this document and a "joint statement" that C.E.U.A. was the new civic leader and central organization for the National Anticommunist Front. Similar steps were taken to take over under absolute control (involving no cash expenditures) of the Comite Obrero Anticomunista (C.O.A.), Comite Feminino Anticomunista (C.F.A.), Alianza Juvenil Anticomunista (A.J.A.); the two principal political parties, P.I.A.C.O. and P.U.A. were taken in by an "accord" and the activity divided thus:-

a) C.E.U.A. becomes the central overt entity for all propaganda of any type and the "non-political" guide for all the others; as direct affiliates of this were C.O.A., C.F.A., C.C.N., A.J.A. and some smaller groups — all these under control.

b.) P.I.A.C.O. was "absolutely associated in all things" with C.E.U.A. Technically only "associated", rather good control exists by the actual request of its Secretary Gen'l. who is aware of his limitations and who voluntarily puts himself and his groups at C.E.U.A. disposal. This is the only recognized party for the western part of the country.

c) P.U.A. was given propaganda and other support (as was PIACO) in the Fall '53 elections, as well as our own "C.E.U.A." material set up by CARTER under HEDIGER's guidance. This is recognized as the only party in the eastern part of the country. (P.U.D., an old party, is a force — absorbed, largely, by P.U.A.)

d.) These three principal entities were to be organized into one unit under one name for public relations purposes. HEDIGER designated "FRENTE ANTICOMUNISTA NACIONAL (F.A.N.)" and this is used. No group or person is recognized outside of F.A.N.; three members act in accord and under this name; F.A.N. Central Committee is composed of two C.E.U.A. members and one each from the others — this was agreed to to make C.E.U.A. the "umpire" in any dispute.

e) A standing invitation is made to any "splinter" groups to come in — those that don't we attempt to choke off (with some success, too); The object is to have unity, only one approved list of candidates and leaders — and to let P.U.A. throw its weight behind PIACO.

(or vice versa) in their respective areas — that is, previously "splinters" of the other party would set up a separate candidate in it's "friends" area; they couldn't, being cut off from the main body, vote for their central committee's man, and they wouldn't vote for the "friend"; any candidate from now on is to be a F.A.N. candidate, and all will vote for him and him alone in their respective areas (we hope!).

8.) These organizations are the overt groups. WHITE is the propaganda group, under CARTER, to support these groups and other overt groups. WHITE serves two purposes:—

a) It provides, controls, coordinates overt anti-Red propaganda for all groups — "general" or "party" material, or both.

b.) AS the control on propaganda and the source of a unifying plan, WHITE utilizes itself (through C.E.U.A.) to establish and maintain discipline.

9.) With these groups now re-organized and under fairly sure control (with the "strongmen" gone it's easier — they want someone to think for them), HEDIGER began utilizing them for other purposes:—

a) Through the various friends and

contacts of these groups, which included in many cases "official" party-men, CARTER was able to provide miscellaneous intelligence of limited value;

b) We organized, separate from WHITE and chiefly from the 17-19 year olds of A.J.A., a little "disciplinary" group to eliminate the swindlers who'd been siphoning off anti-Communist funds. This was done by the gathering of data for publication in the press, and for a little "strongarm" where necessary. This group is small, but effective — it's called "ACCION"; it is not to be confused with any sort of "stormtroop" or "pistolero" group (which we were ready to organize, but told to "let be"), but is just what's it's described as: — internal discipline.

10.)

HEDIGER had originally desired to organize a small group for BLACK PROPAGANDA, for COURIER, and another for "GOON SQUAD" work. However, we were informed that, verging on the P.M. types, these should be left to LINCOLN (LINCOLN was/is referred to in all the CARTER-HEDIGER-STATION exchanges as "OUTSIDE" for security in avoiding any apparent connections, if CARTER might have heard the terms, between the two sections of the master project)

Thus, these groups were not set up by us within ESPLANADE-B.

11.)

As we came to the problem of setting up our distribution system, we found the need for contact with C.E.U.A.G.E. CARTER was told to arrange for this — embodying the distribution not only of our own material to "OUTSIDE", but of theirs within our area, we would designate this BLACK. Our internal distribution was already functioning under WHITE. AT this point CARTER made his contact with the man we designated BLACK LEADER (or, simply, BLACK); shortly thereafter it became apparent that this was a man in LINCOLN's purview and "OUTSIDE" would handle this as we'd been informed. Thus, we designate the man as BLACK and deal with him, but this is a LINCOLN function and control — we do not "move in" on him.

12.)

At this point, a project was set up at HDA, on HEDIGER/station outline, for this activity and funds allotted for a six-month's "show". Although the activities are "new" in the sense of total reorganization, they still continue the work started under ESPLANADE — thus, "ESPLANADE-B". The "new" project carries on the functions of the "old" — same "bases", new "leaders". The question of whether or not it's "seperate" seem highly unim-

portant to HEDIGER. [The important point is the job.]

13.)

A number of items were put out through WHITE to this point: — posters, stickers, etc. The original "skull" item was re-printed in double quantity; material and guidance support was handled for the Fall '53 municipal elections; new overt overt affiliates were formed for each of the "front" groups; the WHITE organization was expanded in the provinces (and was still expanding when HEDIGER cleared the station in January '54); cooperation was established with the non-government "independent" press for favorable items and much material was released through them; HEDIGER had prepared six folios of "Communist quotes" and CARTER had made up six "interim" posters — these items to be released biweekly, alternately, to begin in January; some Communist slogans, designed to embarrass the government were being stamped on money; disturbances, through ACCION volunteers, had been made at the National Fair; the "skull" item was being shown on theatre slides throughout the country in limited quantities; several minor "one shot" items were handled.

14.)

When funds became available through the "new" project, an overt paper under "C.E.U.A." aegis was published — this paper, EL REBELDE, is now a weekly but due to go semi-weekly very shortly. Though an overt

activity and under C.E.U.A. "cover", this is handled by another of CARTER'S men, separate from WHITE. Sales run to 10,000 per issue (and could be double that with ease!); HEDIGER instructed, to stimulate the sales, that the paper which retails at 5¢ be sold to vendors at 2¢ -- this really "pushes" the sale and makes a special distributing organization unnecessary. (Papers "sell out" in the capital in under two hours, usually, from the time they hit the street.) Paper is supported by the Station by an approximate 25% of-cost subsidy and with KMFORGET material — HEDIGER sorted and "edited" this for use in cases of "special interest", and also wrote some article-outlines. CARTER also writes articles and editorials for the paper (always signed "O.H.C.") — [

]

The paper is referred to as "PAPER" in station/HEDIGER communications — sometimes by name (orally).

15.)

CARTER was partially financed on a trip to "OUTSIDE", and on his return gave limited (due to the cover relationship between he and HEDIGER) information on this activity, among these things were the news that "OUTSIDE" would cover "black", "courier", and "poon squad"

activity at their discretion. CARTER also reported that "OUTSIDE" had requested some "secret" radio time be set up. We had already approved an overt program of propaganda (again separately operated, but under C.E.U.A. "front"); we now authorized 15 minutes of music as a "reserve" time. The RADIO schedule is this: -

a) All programs currently on "Radio Internacional", 810 Kc on the medium-wave band (580 M):-

b) 1330-1345 daily (except Sunday) — this is "RESERVE"; 15 minutes of unsponsored "Juchon music" — it can be used, if desired, for secret signalling through its music; where other programs are "jammed" (as one now is) it can serve for a "call to arms" on "BERTAG"

c) 1345-1400 daily (except Sunday) — this is anti-Red propaganda under regis of "Mora I Rearmament" (non-political type material) and so far has not been "jammed".

d) 1915-1930 daily (except Sunday) — the overt "C.E.U.A." program; currently being jammed by a station reportedly located in the garage of the Guardia Civil (7 Ave between 13 & 14 sts) — it can

be heard over the "jamming" and this very noise serves to aid our case on "oppression" — CARTER has been told to "play up" this jamming of the overt program.

16.)

A minor, but important activity is held under "F.A.N." as a WHITE activity. This is two "INSPECTORS" (pseudo), for two men (usually C.C.U.A, A.S.A., or C.F.A. women) who travel on a pre-set circuit weekly to supervise WHITE functions done overtly by the Departmental affiliates of all groups in F.A.N. They also, as a "confidential" item, prepare lists of leaders and members in the Depts., and collect misc "intelligence" on prepared forms; checks are made to avoid wasted effort, on govt/Red activity, on "swindlers" and advice and support is given local leaders. Travelling expenses only are paid for these sub-agents — no "salary".

17.)

Infiltration, for control, was directed by HEDIGER and carried out by CARTER (only begun as of December '53) in the so-called "Union Nacional de Trabajadores Libres" (U.N.T.L.). Two sub-agents were worked in, but had not yet established influence as of early January '54.

18.)

WHITE sub-agents, working separately, have shown considerable discord among the "official"

parties, especially in the Depts. The recent troubles within the P.R.G. (especially attacks by the Communist-front F.U.D.) were at least partially due to this activity; the "nullification" of several elections in the Depts, where only two "official" parties were involved, were in most cases either begun or aggravated on WHITE instruction to the local F.A.N. groups. There are standing instructions to continue such efforts.

### (B) PERSONNEL SUGGESTIONS

19.)

Due to the limitations of the cover used by HEDIGER with CARTER, HEDIGER was completely out of touch with CARTER's sub-agents. Thus, while it is known that CARTER had many contacts in "OUTSIDE" (LINCOLN) activities, and some in the government and official parties, it is possible to make selection from only the few principals in ESPLANADE-B. [One other possibility, outside this entire project, is included a Iso.] Possible personnel for consideration for LINCOLN training are these:—

# # # #

#### I. Oscar H. CARTER (pseud)

HEDIGER had previously reported to station that

this man impressed him as a possibility for a  
 [ ] CARTER shows a good intelligence, an  
 adaptability for covert work, and clearly shows the  
 effects of more than six years in revolutionary  
 work — during which time he was never caught.

He appears sympathetic to the U.S.A., and  
 at least is a strong anti-Red. The chief objection  
 to his use would be in replacing him in the  
 current ESPLANADE-B activity. Even if not desired,  
 or unobtainable [ ] he will certainly  
 readily jump at any training for the LINCOLN project.

## II. BLACK Leader (Pseudo)

This man is currently "under cover" within  
 the target country working with LINCOLN's people  
 there. HEDIGER does not know him except by reputation  
 and CARTER's recommendation.

It occurs that he may already be trained  
 by LINCOLN — if not, he is a possibility. More infor-  
 mation will be available through LINCOLN's own channels  
 regarding this man.

## III. (F.N.U.) [ ] (WHITE)

This man is CARTER's chief assistant in

the WHITE activity. HEDIGER does not know the man personally. It can be said that he has done his part well, and seems to have preserved his security; CARTER expresses trust in this man.

However, before actually using the man, it is suggested that CARTER's opinion be sought in the matter — he knows his men, and his opinion is inclined to be reliable.

#### IV. PAPER (pseudo)

HEDIGER does not remember the name of this man — the information is available from an earlier report to Station. This man is the actual [ ] A native of the target country, he was prepared in newspaper work in Spain. He performs his job well, is reported a sincere anti-Red and trustworthy on security. A good possibility for propaganda work; a possible [ ]

#### V. [ ] (a temporary pseudo — here only)

This man is not part of this project. He was suggested to us as a long-established anti-Red for substitution for another agent [ ] we developed in connection with a "labor" project — at time of

MEDIGER's departure, he was not under development.

The subject is well-educated, lacking only the official state exam for a law degree. He is a [ ] by birth, the last Aprista in the target country save one or two who went over to the Reds. He is an [ ]

[ ] His current economic status is rather low, but he has resisted all government and Communist blandishments.

Subject has considerable experience in covert work and political manipulation. He can very likely be picked up as a [ ] — station has, through MEDIGER, already provided this man with a contact-cards arrangements made through another [ ] who was our [ ] (prospective) there.

MEDIGER has met the man and is favorably impressed with his appearance, manner, speech and apparent intelligence. A good possibility.

Donald O. Mediger

4 Feb 1954

Name Identification

- 1.) Donald O. HEDIGER - [ ]
- 2.) OSCAR H. CARTER - [ ]
- 3.) WHITE LEADER (or) WHITE - (I.M.O.) [ ]
- 4.) BLACK LEADER (or) BLACK - [ ]
- 5.) PAPER EDITOR (or) PAPER - not remembered avail from station)
- 6.) [ ] - [ ]

D. O. Hediger

-/2/24

Donald O. Hediger's report on

PROJECT ESPLANADE

Re-written on the basis of his notes.

Info Date: 4th February 1954

Project Esplanade - B

1. History

The project was started under the aegis of the Guatemala Station by a staff agent, cover-name: HUNKINS, who had established numerous contacts in the Comité Civico Nacional (C.C.N. ) and who was in touch with [ ] HUNKINS was succeeded by Donald O. HEDIGER, [ ]

2. Initially HEDIGER confined himself to collecting minor intelligence items, mostly rumors, from low level contacts. Such items were passed to the original ESPLANADE group, or sent ~~for~~ forward to headquarters.

3. At about the time HUNKINS was relieved, several of his contacts were picked up by the police and forced to leave the country. Others left "voluntarily". Subsequently the SALAMA uprising brought about the virtual destruction of ESPLANADE. C.C.N. and the associated C.E.U.A. (Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas) as well as the minor affiliates became almost totally inactive.

4. During this period HEDIGER was unsuccessful in re-establishing workable contacts with anti-communist groups, the student body being either a-political or pro-communist.

5. During this period the Station maintained contact with a law student named [ ] through one of its undercover agents. [ ] passed him occasional pieces of information. He was an ex-member of ~~EXN~~ C.E.U.A. and a sincere anti-communist. After HEDIGER had taken over

this contact, it was found that he did not measure up to the requirements of clandestine work, being young, inexperienced, very nervous, inclined to talk, opportunistic and self-seeking. At HEDIGER's insistence this contact was dropped, having been led to believe that the project had been terminated.

6. Through [ ] HEDIGER had been able to establish contact with [ ] Guatemalan national, who showed definite promise. In contradistinction to [ ] as gradually read in on our plans.

7. From stray indications it was soon learned that [ ] maintained contact with groups of Guatemalan exiles. In compliance with headquarters instructions, HEDIGER steered ~~clear~~ clear of all ~~involvement~~ involvement in paramilitary activities, nor did he ever indicate connections outside the country.

8. As late as December 1953 HEDIGER was almost completely uninformed regarding the overall project. In his dealings with [ ] HEDIGER was in no position to press for names, dates and other specific detail. Under those conditions it was found difficult to fit the psychological warfare aspects of the project into the overall structure of PBSUCCESS. This was done by headquarters by approving or disapproving specific ~~proposals~~ proposals.

9. ESPLANADE - B

The organizational work on this project began in late spring 1953. Previous indigenous organizations, still existing in name, were virtually defunct. Effectives had either gone underground, or had been exiled, or had dropped out. Contributions for political work were being ~~collected~~

solicited by impostors. Members no longer called on the organizational headquarters. The salaries of fulltime secretaries and various other bills had not been paid. All propagandistic and other overt activities had ceased.

10. After the '53 elections and the Salama debacle the anti-communist parties disintegrated. The membership still existed, but had no leaders to turn to. Formerly active individuals were badly frightened and tried to cover their tracks.

11. HEDIGER's assignment, within certain limitations, was to reorganize the propaganda and intelligence structure of ESPLANADE. Within this purview he was given a free hand and received the fullest cooperation of the Guatemala Station which furnished propaganda material, ran checks, and provided funds.

12. The organization's salient weakness was the split in leadership. There were too many of them trying to promote their own interests. Despite HUNKINS' continuing efforts, the stronger leaders would not join forces. Conversely, the divide-and-conquer tactics of the PGT were unusually successful in a nation whose population is predominantly anti-communist. This point was made clear to SALAZAR and there was a complete meeting of minds as to remedial action.

13. Re-Organization

The remnants of the old organizations were screened for competent leaders.

[ ] was instructed to organize a small, secret group within C.E.U.A., not larger than six to begin with, to distribute propaganda. [ ] enjoyed considerable prestige with the student groups which stood him in good stead.

14. C.E.U.A. still existed, but was completely inactive, C.C.N. was completely defunct. Also defunct were the organizations formerly affiliated with C.E.U.A. and C.C.N.,

catering to workers, women, young students etc.

15. In re-activating C.E.U.A. [ ] was under instructions not to fall back upon former ranking functionaries of anti-communist groups, but to start with the recruitment of "unobtrusive" sympathizers, irrespective of whether or not they had belonged to the old groups.

16. The propaganda group was carried by the station under the pseudonym "White". Its leader was referred to as "White" or "White Leader".

17. The "White Leader" was a C.E.U.A. member who had formerly occupied a subordinate position. Though keeping in the background, he in effect controlled the reviving C.E.U.A. The overt representative was the secretary who passed out propaganda material through C.E.U.A. members.

18. The secretary knew only WHITE for whom he fronted; he did not contact

[ ] WHITE in turn received his instructions from his "secret" chief

[ ] WHITE did not contact or knew of the existence of HEDIGER. The

secretary was known by the pseudonym White - b. In other words: through

[ ] chief lieutenant in the overt propaganda group, WHITE, and through the latter's lieutenant, control was established over C.E.U.A., the only remaining organization.

19. While the lack of strong personalities and natural leaders was painfully felt, their replacement by "deadwood" and inexperienced individuals at least had the advantage of developing a cadre of "controlled" leaders and weld them into a unified organization.

20. The next phase in the re-organization of C.E.U.A. was to fill up its depleted ranks. This was done through WHITE - B , fronting for the actual leadership.

21. The next step was the reactivation of the C.C.N. secretariat. The secretariat was staffed with former minor members and C.E.U.A. representatives, the former as a concession to the public. In effect, however, the two groups were one and the same. The C.C.N. signed over to C.E.U.A. in notarized form all its property, its funds (debts in the amount of \$180) and its membership rosters. All outstanding debts were paid by C.E.U.A. In return, C.E.U.A. was recognized as the central organization of the National Anticommunist Front.

22. Similar steps were taken in respect to the Comité Obrero Anticomunista (C.O.A.), Comité Feminino Anticomunista (C.F.A.), Alianza Juvenil Anticomunista (A.J.A.).

23. With the two principal anti-communist parties, P.I.A.C.O. and P.U.A. an accord was reached which resulted in the following division of labor:

a. C.E.U.A. became the central organ for all propaganda activities. To this end it took under its full control C.O.A., C.F.A., C.C.N., A.J.A. and some smaller groups.

b. P.I.A.C.O. , under the terms of the accord, is "absolutely associated in all things" with C.E.U.A. In actual effect complete control has been attained, the Secretary General having ~~voluntarily~~ voluntarily placed his groups at the full disposal of C.E.U.A. As far as C.E.U.A. is concerned, the P.I.A.C.O. is the only recognized party in the western part of Guatemala.

c. C.E.U.A. (as was P.I.A.C.O.) received propaganda and other support from C.E.U.A. during the fall '53 elections. This is the only recognized party in the eastern part of the country.

d. The P.U.D. , one of the old parties, has largely been absorbed by P.U.A.

24. In order to increase the public appeal , it was decided to unite the three principal entities into the "Frente Anticomunista Nacional (F.A.N.). No group or individual outside the framework of the F.A.N. is recognized.

25. The Central Committee of the F.A.N. is composed of two C.E.U.A. members and one member each from the constituent parties. As a result C.E.U.A. casts the deciding vote and acts as "umpire" in any dispute.

26. A standing invitation has been extended to splinter groups to join up. A successful effort has been undertaken to choke off outsiders. As a result there is only one approved list of candidates in any national election. The P.U.A. is expected to throw its full weight behind the P.A.C.O. in its respective area and vice versa. It is hoped that henceforth any anti-communist candidate will be a F.A.N. candidate and that the anti-communist vote in his constituency will go to him and him alone.

27. The WHITE organization under [ ] supports the overt groups in the following fields:

a. It furnishes, controls and coordinates anti-communist propaganda in behalf of all groups.

b. It established and maintains discipline through C.E.U.A.

28. Once the reorganization had been completed and control established, ~~xxxxxx~~ [ ] was able to provide miscellaneous intelligence items of limited value through the exploitation of group contacts and through "official" party men.

29. In order to combat frauds, soliciting funds for anti-communist work, a small ,

independent (of WHITE) group called "Accion", composed of some teenagers from the  ~~ranks of A.J.A.~~ ranks of A.J.A. was organized. Its job is to enforce internal discipline, if necessary through the application of strongarm methods.

30. The planned organization of groups for black propaganda, courier work and direct action type of activities, was disallowed because it was found to ~~impinge~~ impinge on paramilitary territory. This type of activity can therefore not be handled by ESPLANADE-B.

31. Through [ ] contact with CEUAGE (the outside organization) has been established, an arrangement providing for the distribution of C.F.U.A. propaganda material outside of Guatemala and of material prepared on the outside to be distributed inside of Guatemala.

32. The man responsible for "Outside" propaganda work is carried under the pseudonym "Black Leader". "WHITE" maintains direct liaison with him, but no attempt is made to control his activities.

33. The following activities can be credited to WHITE:

- a. The manufacture of posters and stickers;
- b. Re-printing of the original "skull" item;
- c. propaganda material and political guidance during the municipal elections in Fall '53.
- d. Formation of new affiliates for each of the "front" groups;
- e. Expansion of the "WHITE" group into the provinces, a process still underway;
- f. establishment of contact with the "independent" press, in order to effect the release of propaganda material;

g. printing of communist slogans on Guatemalan paper money, designed to embarrass the government;

h. The creation of disturbances during the National Fair, committed by ACCION volunteers.

34. With funds becoming available, an over~~l~~weekly called EL REBELDE, was published under C.E.U.A. aegis. This paper is edited outside of WHITE by another of [ ] *Ine.* The paper has a circulation of 10 000 which could easily be doubled. The paper which retails at 5 cents is sold to vendors for 2 cents, which obviates the setting up of a special distribution net.

35. [ ] regularly contributed articles and editorials. [ ]

36. After a trip abroad, SALAZAR informed HEDIGER that "Outside" was going to handle black prppaganda, courier and goon squad activities. .

37. At the request of "Outside", "secret" radio time has been set aside. This is in addition to an overt propaganda program which is controlled by C.E.U.A.

38. The ESPLANADE radio schedule is as follows:

a. All programs currently going out over "Radio Internacional" (810 kc and 580 m);

b. "15 minutes of secret radio time daily (except Sunday) from 13:30 till 13:45). The program during that time is unsponsored "luncheon music". This program is available for the transmission of secret code and for overt announcements on D-day,

c. 13:45 till 14:00 daily (except Sunday): Anti-red propaganda disguised as "Moral Rearmament", non-political and thus far not jammed.

d. 19:15 till 19:30 daily (except Sunday) set aside for the overt C.E.U.A. program. This program is being jammed by a station reportedly located in the garage of the Guardia Civil (7th Avenue between 13th and 14th Street). It can be heard through the jamming.

39. A pre-arranged circuit is being travelled weekly by two so-called "Inspektors". They are usually C.E.U.A. , A.J.A. or C.F.A. members. They supervised the execution of propaganda activities in the field. These activities are being conducted by the Departementa 1 of all groups affiliated in F.A.N. They also prepare lists of leaders and members in the departamentos and collect intelligence which they put down on prepared forms. They check on waste, on the activities of the Government and the communists and on impostors. They render support to local leaders. They draw no salary, but are reimbursed for travelling expenses.

40. In the beginning of December 1953 [ ] acting under HEDIGER's instructions, ~~he~~ infiltrated two ~~propaganda~~ agents into the "Union Nacional de Trabajadores Libres" (U.N.T.L.). The purpose of this move was to establish ~~ing~~ centers of C.E.U.A. control in the union.

41. A harrassment campaign is being conducted by WHITE agents. Their job is to sow discord between the coalition parties, especially in the provinces. Recent trouble in the P.R.G., especially attacks by the communist front organization F.U.B. were partially due to WHITE instigation.

42. As a result of limitations imposed by HEDIGER's cover, he was completely out of touch with [ ] sub-agents. HEDIGER knows that [ ] has several contacts in the Government and in coalition parties.

43. [ ] He is intelligent and adaptable to conspiratorial work, the result of more than six years of work in that field. During this time he was never caught once. He appears to be sympathetic toward the United States and is a convinced and strong anti-communist. It will be difficult to replace him in his current position.

44. The "Black Leader" is unknown by HEDIGER. [ ] recommends him. His name is [ ]

45. (F.N.U.) [ ] is the true name of White. He is [ ] chief assistant. HEDIGER does not know him personally. He is trusted by [ ] and has performed well in his job. His security seems to be good.

46. HEDIGER does not know the editor of EL REBELDE. He is Guatemalan and learned his trade in Spain. He is reportedly a sincere anti-~~communist~~ communist, secure and competent in his job.

Redolfo Rehebat