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# Intelligence Report

Office of African and Latin American Analysis

17 May 1995

## Southern Africa: Blandishments by Pariahs and Cuba Yield Mixed Results

*Pariah states--chiefly Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan--variously continue to seek diplomatic support, trade ties, or opportunities to export militant Islam to countries in southern Africa.*<sup>1</sup>

[Redacted]

- Most of these countries are focusing on South Africa and Zimbabwe, countries perceived as offering opportunities for commercial as well as political gains.
- Many countries in the region are willing to offer diplomatic support and to conclude mutually beneficial business deals but remain wary of potentially disruptive meddling by states espousing Islamic extremism.
- Inducements offered by pariah states and Cuba to build trust and assuage fears include financial support for political parties and candidates, training programs, and technical, administrative, or medical assistance. [Redacted]

*The potential for the pariahs and Cuba to gain influence with governments or populations in the region over the near term will be limited by their inability to provide significant economic assistance and investment, a foreign policy priority for southern African countries.* [Redacted]

*Nonetheless, their representatives and activities in southern Africa will remain unhelpful to US interests, at a minimum, and in the worst case, may pose a threat to US personnel and facilities.*

<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this paper, southern Africa includes Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. [Redacted]

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- [redacted] the Libyan [redacted] Ambassadors in Windhoek are suspected of past terrorist connections.

- [redacted]

**Advancing Diverse Goals**

[redacted] since January 1994 [redacted] Libya, [redacted] have been active in cultivating southern African governments; [redacted]

*Ending Sanctions and Criticism.* [redacted] Libyan diplomats have most aggressively lobbied southern African governments to support their respective interests in the UN and with key Western nations.

- [redacted]

[redacted]

- In [redacted] 1995, a Libyan envoy visited South Africa, Zimbabwe, and three other African countries to request their support in ending sanctions against Libya stemming from Tripoli's involvement in the

[redacted]

[redacted]

bombing of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772

- Libyan prodding prompted an Organization of African Unity delegation of five African countries, including Zimbabwe to meet with US, British, and French officials at the UN to urge a negotiated solution to the impasse with Libya over the bombings.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

• [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

• [Redacted]

• [Redacted]

*Spreading Islamic Political Activism.* [Redacted]

[Redacted] Libya, is continuing to promote militant Islam among southern Africans. These governments and their Islamic affiliates reportedly are building mosques, funding schools and libraries, and providing money for Muslim

[Redacted]

student associations and local clerics.

[Redacted]

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

**Offering Incentives to Garner Influence**

[Redacted]

<sup>6</sup> Muslims are a minority in the region, and only represent a significant portion of the population in Malawi-about 15 to 30 percent--and in Mozambique--between 5 and 14 percent. [Redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

**Some Constraints on Further Inroads**

The inability of most pariah states [redacted] to provide meaningful trade and aid packages probably will limit their influence in the region at least over the near term.

[redacted]

[redacted]

In South Africa, despite the ANC's declarations of solidarity with the [redacted] Libyans--which mollify militants in the ANC's constituency--mainstream leadership elements in the government are likely to continue to emphasize close relations with Western countries to garner funds and maintain South Africa's international standing. In maintaining this "two-track" policy, Pretoria will undoubtedly act against US interests on some issues, such as casting votes in support of Cuba in the UN, while actively supporting the West on others, such as an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. As long as major Western countries significantly contribute to South Africa's crucial Reconstruction and Development Program to raise living standards for blacks, the West is likely to continue to enjoy a competitive edge unmatched by the pariahs [redacted] [redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Financial pressures are likely to prompt some pariah governments to reconsider their diplomatic presence in the region, particularly in countries they deem to be of lesser importance.

[Redacted]


**Some Potential Problems for US Interests**

Even if, as we believe, cash-strapped pariahs [Redacted] continue to make only modest gains, their missions will remain at a minimum unhelpful to US interests, and at worst, a potential threat to US personnel and facilities.

- Libya undoubtedly will redouble its lobbying in southern Africa in coming months to try to secure its seat on the UN Security Council next year despite Western opposition.

- [Redacted]

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
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


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
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
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
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