

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003

K-program

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. C. Esterline

27 June 1954

SUBJECT: PROPOSAL TO BURN [ ]

1. Guat 973 indicates that [ ] will not be of any advantage to PBS since he apparently is willing to move only when Callegeris has already won. It also increases my personal suspicion that he may be playing us for suckers and really be helping Arbenz.
2. In view of his small value and of the possibility that he may be using us, I recommend that an operation be run against [ ] to make him desperate. This can be accomplished by having someone—not known to him to be connected with PBS or US—tell him he knows about some recent meeting or meetings [ ] has had with PBS representatives and threaten to expose him to Arbenz if he does not deliver \$50,000 with 24 hours.
3. The above recommendation is made in ignorance of possible station capabilities in this regard, and of course, other possibilities would probably suggest themselves to Guat Station.
4. The result should be beneficial to PBS by clarifying whether [ ] is on our side or not by seeing who he goes to. If he is unconcerned by the threat, he is not really our man. If he is made desperate he may act where previously he has waited for someone else. He may make a bold bid to move the army to his control, assassinate Arbenz, or take asylum. Any of these courses would be good, because in the last case he would not be in a position to complicate things when the Callegeris forces are successful.

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