

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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AIR POUCH

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Chief of Station, Guatemala

LINCOLN

INFO: Headquarters, PBSUCCESS

K-Program
Notes for Graham L. PAGE

Please pass the attached 3-page memorandum in sterile form to
Graham L. PAGE.

JEROME C. DUNBAR

Attachment: K-Program Notes(3 pages)

Distributions:

- 2 - Guat(w/2 att)
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- 3 - Files(w/3 atts)

Jeremy T. HUTTING/gfb
6 June 1994

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1. It may be useful at this time to recapitulate the arguments available for your work, at least as they appear to us.
2. The one argument is Mr. Castle and his coming. This is essentially a threat. The threat can be measured in varying degrees:
 - a. Mr. Castle has so much strength that anyone who wants to survive had better get on his hands and knees.
 - b. Mr. Castle has plenty of strength but could use a little more, so that some kind of partnership is possible and practical.
 - c. Mr. Castle has enough strength to cause turmoil, which might require others to restore order in such a way that the roots of turmoil will be removed.

These approaches all looked practical and sensible. Apparently, to the extent that they could have been tested, they have not set up any dancing in the streets. It would appear that the irrational aversion to Mr. Castle blurred rational consideration of the threat. Or, it may be that a certain dull, cumbersome fatalism inured the recipients of threats to them. You can surely adduce other possible reasons. No the least, to be sure, may be the by now fairly well established notional character of the threat, at least insofar as it has hitherto shown itself. Mac put us on notice a long time ago that he and his friends would be impotent until the 11th hour, at least as far as throwing in their lot with the Castle threat was concerned.

3. The alternative line which you have then pursued, and rightly so, was that of the threat from the United States. You have confronted your interviewees with the prospect of this threat, and they have reacted in two ways: they were either disappointed that the threat was not already more visible and effective, that the US was not imposing economic sanctions already, etc., or they were apparently frightened that the threat left them no way out, that they would be swept in some kind of new application of the "collective guilt" principle. We interpret Mac's reaction to be the former one, the two men to whom the Swallow spoke to have exhibited the latter one. On reflection on these two sets of reactions, they appear entirely natural, because of the image that foreigners have formed of the United States. On the one hand, foreigners consider that the US vacillates too long, where they would like to see rugged action (which they are unwilling to undertake); on the other hand, foreigners feel that the US, when it moves forcefully, moves too sweepingly and bull-in-a-china-shop fashion, especially when it comes to the application of the "collective guilt" concept. In other words, foreigners often become puzzled, frazzled, frightened and mystified by what looks to them like an American dichotomy between force and reason, and an American tendency to switch precipitately from one to the other. Our friends often seem to be disheartened by our patience, our enemies confirmed by our bluntness.

4. Now we are stuck with that foreign estimate of the US, at least as far as the task in hand is concerned. So, there is proffered here, solely for your consideration (and perhaps solely as an intellectual exercise) a procedure

whereby it may be possible to capitalize on that foreign impression of the US. The gist of the procedure is simply this: abruptly switch the pitch to the two reaction groups. For example:

a. Tell Mac that you have just about lost your patience. You have been treating him as a reasonable man, who would see the necessity for action and decision. This is the way Americans always treat people, for just so long -- then, suddenly, their temper snaps. He feels that the Americans vacillate too but the reverse side of the coin of vacillation is drastic, no-holds-barred action. You have asked him to do something and he has passed the ball back to you; perhaps that makes sense to him, since the US is much bigger and more powerful but logic does not rule the world, and especially not what he considers his logical appraisal of the relative obligations to act now of the US and his people. The US will expect indigenous action. If that is not forthcoming, the US will act itself, but not only against the enemies, but also against those indigenous elements that failed to rise. If he does not act, he is inviting his inclusion on the prescription lists of a new "collective guilt" campaign. Drive this personal, not the patriotic, point home. Maybe he will sink into total apathy and fatalism, but he is hardly exhibiting much more initiative now. In short, drop the carrot to Mac and wield the stick.

b. As for the fellows to whom the Swallow spoke, and especially P, pass the absolutely explicit message to them that contact with them is being sought not in their capacity as representatives of or intermediaries to Mr. Big, but in their capacity as individuals with a promising future. Tell them, or have them told, that they are considered clean of all guilt so far. The only ones that are guilty are Mr. Big, S-1 (the one that Mac wants out of the way), the two top cops, various politicians and all leading Reds. This unpleasant coterie could easily be replaced by such outstanding men as the Swallow's friends, plus a few honorable others whom it is not prudent to name. In other words, drop the stick and dangle the carrot.

5. In this connection, if a channel for conveying it can be found, it might be useful to give these gentlemen a lecture on political reality. The facts of life, as far as they are concerned, are:

a. They are in the United States sphere of influence

b. If they think that a people of 3,000,000 is going to win in a showdown with 160,000,000, they need psychiatric help.

c. If they think that the US will never come to a showdown, they don't understand gringos. It might be useful to explain gringos in the way that foreigners see them (Para 3 above) and point out that force is the follower of reason, in the American pattern.

d. If they think that the Soviet Union can bail them out of this predicament, they once more require psychiatric help.

e. If they think that the Soviet Union will or even wants to bail them out, it should be made perfectly clear to them that the Soviet Union is exploiting them only to create a diversion in the US backyard while Indochina is hot, and that the Soviets will drop them in a hurry when the going gets tough. The only help they will get in a pinch will be Soviet propaganda, and that won't stop it

f. If they are unhappy about being in the US sphere of influence, they might be reminded that the US is the most generous and tolerant taskmaster going, that cooperation with it is studded with material reward, that the US permits much more sovereignty and independence in its sphere than the Soviets,

g. If they wish to commit political suicide, that is their own business.

h. If they wish to be sensible, a perfectly honorable and mutually satisfactory arrangement can be made. Otherwise, there will be such an arrangement with Mr. Castle alone, whether he does the job or whether he only rides in on the coattails of power.

6. This may all be academic and is proffered only for whatever adaptation you may be able to make of it.

7. Incidentally, the US threat is not notional, no matter what the papers or the diplomatic maneuvers may indicate. It is only a question of time, as the foreigner would look at it, until reason expires and Mars takes over.

8. At the very least, your presence has caused great and good turmoil and conscience-searching. Sheer agitation has its value, and the latest reactions from Mac seem to go beyond that. We hope, as always, that you can secure some firm commitments and plans with which we can mesh -- for example, could Mac use an airdrop of gear, where, when, etc. But the psychological data you are absorbing, the turmoil you are creating and the seeds of discontent and initiative you are planting are major achievements in the current context, and we hope these things will progress even if the total objective of the program is not attained.

9. Further on the subject of para. 7: You surely will have noticed how U.S. subs are stopping all shipments to Guatemala, how U.S. personnel are searching ships' cargo, how U.S. vessels are patrolling the sea approaches. The news of the C-124s delivering arms and ammunition to Honduras and Nicaragua is certainly familiar to you. For your information and discreet use, the Venezuelans are presently conducting very encouraging negotiations with Mr. Castle; Trojill radio is blasting; [] has been in Cuba, is going to Venezuela and also to Colombia. All this shows mounting external pressure, not only from the U.S. but from the hemisphere. But for the present we would like to see this pressure serving the purpose of engendering indigenous action. Certainly as far as the U.S. is concerned, it is certainly willing and only too anxious to have the Guatemalans put their own house in order. This should be made an appeal to the army's pride, throwing in the reference that the U.S. will help the Guatemalans to help themselves.

10. As far as specific approaches are concerned, we still wonder whether the personal friend that Mac is so unwilling to sacrifice is not too weak a fish to trust, on the other hand, P., if he is really on the skids in his official position may be a receptive to a plan of action by which he could not only save his position but probably improve it. The original objective still stands, namely, to develop a high level clique to act simultaneously or in concert with Mr. Castle; the extent of the success of this clique would determine the extent of their ultimate control once Mr. Castle arrives. To the extent that this indigenous energy can be exploited, it will be wise to move somewhat off the "threat from the U.S." platform.

11. As regards the use of the U.S. platform, we do wish to avoid the inflexibility that may come with saying or believing that this is the only lever that is now effective. It may be appropriate to do a little more varied probing on the psychology of the target personalities before we reject all means of inducement or persuasion except the U.S. club. We hope that your continued testing will help us all finally to determine which club(or clubs) looks best.

12. You will probably have noted that words and actions from our side are being slanted along the line that we consider the military basically with us and that the targets are only the Communists and those who support them.

13. Many thanks for all your efforts.