

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003

*File*

VIA: COURIER  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO [ ] .1190

~~SECRET PBSUCCESS RYBAT  
CLASSIFICATION~~

JUN 1 1954

TO : LINCOLN

DATE

FROM : Chief of Station, Guatemala [ ]

INFO: Chief, WHD, TEGU

SUBJECT: GENERAL— K-Program

SPECIFIC— [ ]

Attached herewith is a report prepared by PAGE.

[ ]

Earle N. Bannister

Attachment: report

31 May 1954

ENB/sgl

Distribution:

- 2-Linc w/att
- 2-Wash #/att
- 1- [ ] w/att
- 1-files w/att

3 JUN 1954

~~SECRET PBSUCCESS RYBAT  
CLASSIFICATION~~

30 May 1954

Subject: K-Program  
[ ]

1. The meeting on 29 May yielded some data relative to the arms shipment which were cabled to you that same day. There was one additional piece of information which we forewent passing on because it struck us as either incorrect or garbled. [ ] claims that the shipment included "700 cases of ammunition per rifle".
2. SMILAX was involved four or five days ago in an incident with [ ] at [ ] Both had been dining together. [ ], in a rather inebriated state accused SMILAX of being "muy tibio en desarrollo en su trabajo". Insults were swapped and SMILAX according to one version reached for his gun. He had to be disarmed. [ ] thinks that SMILAX was merely hitching his pants, a motion which is very typical of him and which is similar to reaching for a gun). The [ ], Colonel [ ] told [ ] that SMILAX "se esta mostrando muy incapaz". [ ] on the basis of this information, is wondering whether the Army High Command is laying the groundwork for firing SMILAX, but doesn't think that they are in a position to do it just yet.
3. The broadcast delivered by SMILAX had been written for him (ESQUIRE: the implication being that it was a Government handout). No special significance should be read into his having delivered it. Being the [ ] he was the right man for the job.
4. [ ] promised to make another attempt at talking SMILAX into a meeting with a consejo representative as soon as the opportunity offers. He will tell SMILAX in substance that it not intended to compromise him or force his hand. All the consejo wants him to do at this stage, is to listen.
5. [ ] had a long talk with [ ] after the latter's return from Puerto Barrios. During this talk [ ] developed certain theories on what might happen in

the future and - given certain contingencies - what role [ ] might be  
be called upon to play. [ ] found [ ] in a "do nothing" frame of mind,  
apathetic and indifferent. In reference to the shipment and the circumstances  
surrounding its arrival in Guatemala, [ ] asked [ ] what he would  
have done in [ ] position. In a different context [ ] dropped  
the following remark: "Do you know what we are afraid of? That the Army may turn  
against us". [ ] also mentioned that the [ ]  
had taken dynamite to Puerto Barrios which was later used in a sabotage attempt  
against a freight train moving the armaments to Guatemala City. [ ]  
characterized this as a rather stupid way of doing business. "After all, they  
could have gotten other types of people to do this job for them". According to  
[ ] the morale of the Army is very high, presumably as a result of  
the arms shipment. [ ] feels certain that these arms will never get  
out of the hands of the Army. ARBENZ understands the Army's attitude and would n  
dare order them to act otherwise).

6. [ ]  
[ ]  
[ ] In 1949 the group  
conspired against [ ] As many as fifty officers met in [ ] house on  
that occasion. During the uprising following the assassination of [ ] it was  
[ ] who was supposed to take over [ ]  
[ ]  
[ ] After the upr: [ ]  
influence that [ ] retained the position [ ]  
[ ] conduct yielded him a great many personal enmities. One of his  
sworn enemies is [ ] a delegate to the [ ]  
[ ] in Washington DC. [ ], however, a friend of ARBENZ).

7. [ ] got his present job without reference to [ ] simply as result of skillful political manipulations and intrigue. The members [ ] [ ] feel that his actions are completely out of line. He uses his present job as a springboard to the Presidency. In speeches before Congress he butters up the syndicates, instead of sticking to his knitting. The constitution very clearly outlines what a man holding his position is supposed to do. [ ] is definitely on the inside track for the Presidency. [ ] [ ] confirmed this. [ ] stated: "To us [ ] means nothing; he counts for nothing within our friendship". ESQUIRE inference: "If you fellows decide to bump him off, it's OK with us". [ ] is afraid of [ ] who is convinced that [ ] will sooner or later make an attempt to have him and his friends liquidated.

8. As you have gathered from previous reports, [ ] has a warm spot in his heart for [ ] who is one of his closest friends. [ ] "If there is anyone I would beg you not to harm, it is [ ]". [ ] is actively considering a plan to win over [ ] to our side, but entertains few illusions as to the likelihood of success. His reasoning is based essentially on the following estimate of the situation:

A. The Army can be controlled through [ ] and SMIBAX, once "something happens to [ ]".

B. Once [ ] is removed, [ ] automatically becomes [ ]

C. Many of the most important garrison commanders are under [ ] thumb, such as [ ] (The [ ] CO is a friend of [ ])

D. [ ] missionary work is being conducted mainly among [ ]' friends, one more reason why it wouldn't pay to antagonize ~~them~~ him.

E. Inasmuch as CALLIGERIS is an enemy of both [ ] and [ ] [ ] in making any approaches would have to stress the importance of local action and mention CALLIGERIS only as a possibility "on the horizon" if local action should fail.

action should fail.

F. [ ] is casting about for an issue enabling him to win over [ ] to the basic concept of an overthrow of the ARBENZ regime, "but without revealing anything real to him".

9. Ref Para 8 F. What [ ] has in mind is the following: [ ] can be talked to only if some external event brings home to him in a forceful and absolutely conclusive manner that the forces ranged against the regime are formidable and that Guatemala is indeed in jeopardy. Altho [ ] did not say this in so many words, any conclusive manifestation of United States determination to do away with the ARBENZ regime (something going beyond press conferences and communique) would furnish him with a convenient peg on which to hang his argument that [ ] has to assert his leadership. What [ ] has in mind can best be illustrated by passing to you a "plan" which he presented in full knowledge of the fact that its implementation might have "international repercussions": Send a plane over Aurora racetrack at say 5:45 AM when no one is around to get hurt and drop a small bomb (100 lbs) in the center of the infield.

#### 10. Miscellaneous Intelligence

SMILAX accepted : [ ] property [ ] from ARBENZ.

[ ] is the only man with whom [ ] talks completely freely.

Colonel [ ] ( [ ]'s friend) is assigned to the [ ]

[ ] 1. He holds no significant position. A little guy. About 50 years. Belongs to older generation of Army officers. Is an embittered man. Hates ARBENZ. Was [ ] 2. Removed from that post, presumably at the instigation of ARBENZ.

[ ] 1 serves on the General Staff (see ESPERANZE 5 report) . [ ] "Es un largazo, un tipo comerciante"

[ ] report about an alleged meeting between [ ] SMILAX and [ ] on the morning of 27 May is completely unfounded. No such meeting took place then or at any other time.

Field Comment: This seems to bear out the belief of the Guatemala Station that [ ] is peddling "snow".

11. The next meeting between ESQUIRE and [ ] is scheduled for Wednesday, June 2, at 1900. An alternate meeting has been set for Thursday, 3 June, at 10 AM. The results of [ ] demarche with SMILAX may be known by then.

12. [ ] comments regarding some of the issues raised in this despatch will be submitted in a separate memorandum. While your desire to see these exchanges brought down to brasstacks as soon as possible is fully shared here, the extraction of iron clad military commitments is predicated upon the prior resolution of rather involved personal and political problems which it is quite impossible to detour. The weakness of our position in approaching members of the Army High Command in quest for active support stems essentially from the fact that the interrelationship between them and CALLIGERIS has never been thought thru to its logical conclusion and that the ad hoc formula devised by the field to take care of this situation is a rather transparent expedient at best.

[ ]