

Air Pouch

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HUL-A-969

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~~SECRET/RYPAT/PBSUCCESS~~

30 May 1954

Chief of Station, Guatemala

LINCOLN

Operational-- K-Program
Reply to HGG-A-1167

REF: HGG-A-1167

1. In response to the Reference, the attached notes are offered for the orientation of the Station and PAGE.
2. In view of the facts reported in GUAT 705, this guidance necessarily leaves something to be desired. It is hoped that by the next pouch the situation will have become somewhat clarified, thus permitting more explicit LINCOLN advice and direction.

JEROME C. DUNBAR

JCD/JTN/eaf
30 May 1954

Attachment (1)

Distribution

- 2 - Guatemala
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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003

~~SECRET/RYPAT/PBSUCCESS~~

May 30, 1954

1. Your note of May 20 has been studied as carefully as the time between its receipt and the departure of the next mail would allow.
2. You will recall that, in one message, we asked you to enquire of Mac whether he could take a more active role, possibly even without waiting for Mr. Castle. This suggestion was prompted by the arrival of the big load, and the instinctive feeling here that the load might make such an impact that action would be possible more quickly than Mr. Castle was planning. Now we judge by your note of May 20 that, at that date anyway, this possibility on Mac's part was remote. But have events changed that situation at all? If so, any increased aggressiveness on Mac's part would be most welcome. It would also appear that the situation would favor it. Has not at least part of the catalyst that Mr. Castle's action was supposed to provide been supplied by the load?
3. We are pleased to note that the personal rivalry between Mac and Castle is no longer an obstacle. But we do not relish the prospect of Mac's making a complete swing from hostility to subservience. We want some independence within a general framework. Perhaps you can put Mac into the next cycle—namely that of individual aggressiveness and determination—now that he has run the two laps of hostility and subservience. And, if possible, we would not mind Mac's taking the lead.
4. Your surmises about the delay in part of the Castle program are correct. There has been a delay in both the movement of goods and people, until the latter part of the past week. What further effect the events of the weekend will have cannot now be estimated. However, this is under no circumstances to be communicated or even intimated to Mac. It is for your guidance in timing, and actually should spur you to press Mac to greater efforts.
5. The fact of the matter is that Mac must show what he knows and what he has. Yes, his contribution will only be part of the picture. But we must know what his unsided contribution will be, or what specific aid apart from Castle's moves he needs. A Mac who is just along for the ride is worthless. And a Mac who insists on disclosure of Castle's plans before he reveals what he has is dangerous. Further, Mac must keep us much better posted on the specifics—not the atmosphere—of Mr. Big's plans and strengths.
6. We seem now to be engaged in a round-robin, where everyone is urging the other fellow to lead. You want overt thunder and Castle action to coax Mac. But we need Mac to flesh out the Castle effort and supply a complement to the overt thunder. The only possible course, in these circumstances, is for everyone, yourself included, to concentrate on progress in his own assigned sphere, pushing that as far and fast as possible. Anyone of the three fronts—thunder, Castle, Mac—may provide the crucial spark. May the best spark ignite! But we cannot have everybody waiting for everybody else.
7. To this extent, we cannot guide you. You are supposed to provide something new, even though it is based on other factors. We count heavily on you for that independent contribution.