

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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DISPATCH NO. ~~CGG-A-1136~~

~~SECRET~~ PBSUCCESS RYBAT
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: MAY 21, 1954

TO : LINCOLN

FROM : Chief of Station, Guatemala

INFO: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational - K-Program

SPECIFIC— Material from Graham L. Page

There are being transmitted herewith various documents which have just been received from Graham L. PAGE for relaying to Lincoln. Due to the time element we are unable to retype these documents and they are being forwarded as received.

Cyrus E. Burnette

Closures:
From Page, as noted

May 1954

EB/cmh

Distribution:

2-Linc w/att

2-Wash 2/o att

1-Files w/o att

~~SECRET~~ PBSUCCESS RYBAT
CLASSIFICATION

3 JUN 1954

K-Program

[]
DALLIGHT may be interested in securing Subject's services. According to ESQUIRE, he is [] stationed at []
[] There are a total of five assistentes [] who are subject only to the orders of the Jefe de la Zona Militar. The assistentes are civilians and receive no special pay for their job. Their's is an appointive office. They are authorized to carry arms and hold special credentials. They cannot be arrested except on orders of the Jefe de la Zona Militar. Their job is to act in conjunction with the "authorities". Subject, according to ESQUIRE, is a militant anti-communist. ~~xxxx~~ Subject claims that his associates feel likewise. Subject's civilian occupation is that of [] []

glp

Dep art [] for [] []

To: Line Cor : W/H

K-Program

Priming Project - Discontinuation

~~ix~~ In line with an understanding reached between PAGE and NUTTING during the
latter's WSBurnt sojourn, the initiation of ~~the~~ ^{of a} priming project, designed
to firm ~~up~~ ^{certain} the alignment of/garrison personnel with PBSuccess, was to be
made dependent upon a satisfactory ~~handling of~~ ^{approach to} the SECANT complex, ~~xxxxxxx~~
assuring ~~xxxxxxx~~ its dovetailing with PAGE's activities in ~~this~~ the same field.

It is PAGE's understanding that ~~the~~ latest instructions ~~received~~ received
~~by the field~~ from Lincoln fail to provide such assurance. No further steps
will therefore be ~~ix~~ taken along the lines set forth in the original priming
instructions.

glp

19 May 1954

K-P Program

SMILEX

1. The issue of SMILEX came up again during a meeting between ESQUIRE and [redacted] on May 18th. It appears that [redacted] has been ~~recommended~~ ~~put~~ under considerable pressure by [redacted] /cryp/ to bring about a meeting between SMILEX and a consejo representative. [redacted] now believes that SMILEX is approachable. He would, however, prefer if the approach could be made ^{by} /someone else than ESQUIRE. In fact, he made a rather emphatic plea that his [redacted] name be kept out of it. Only ~~if~~ if SMILEX should ask a direct question as to whether ^{or not} the consejo is in touch with [redacted] should we admit that this be the case. [redacted] recommends that we try to contact [redacted] via ~~xxx~~ a close ~~x~~"civilian"friend, but is unable to suggest ~~xx~~ a candidate for the job. He also raised the question why SMILEX could not be talked to by a PBPRIME military representative. (Field Comment: This idea was effectively scotched by PAGE).

2. We are currently casting about for a suitable intermediary to make the initial approach to SMILEX. In view of [redacted] strong feelings on the subject, we are prepared to go along with him in excluding the use of ESQUIRE, at least during the developmental phase. ESQUIRE himself feels ~~very strongly~~ that he should ^{be used} ~~make the approach~~, despite [redacted] objections, so as to assure that both aspects - [redacted] and SMILEX - are being handled in perfect consonance. ESQUIRE assured PAGE that he had no misgivings whatsoever about undertaking a cold approach. We have taken under consideration to enlist the support of [redacted] /cryp/, provided he proves amenable to operational control. ESQUIRE's wife is scheduled to pay a social call on ^{Swallow} [redacted] /cryp/ on 21 May and developments should proceed apace from thereon. In the meanwhile we shall review other potential candidates for the job. Again, the problem of authentication may prove a hard nut to crack.

Swallow

Swallow

got in touch with [] (see our previous report) who was scheduled to leave on May 19th for [] to get in touch with CALLIGERIS. He ~~related~~ related what had transpired and asked [] to find out whether the matter was "bona fide". [] promised to take care of this matter and to cable ESQUIRE if his presence ~~xxx~~ should turn out to be of overriding importance. In the latter case, [] stated, "you'd better come, because after all he is the chief". ESQUIRE, in reporting this incident to us, requested that we inform CALLIGERIS at once that ~~he~~ /ESQUIRE was working for him in an all-absorbing task, ~~and~~ that no useful purpose would be served by his leaving Guatemala, in fact that a setback might result from his going to [] ESQUIRE is naturally anxious not to get on CALLIGERIS' blacklist.

4. PAGE in commenting on this interlude, complimented ESQUIRE on the way he had handled himself and promised that matters would be set straight in a manner satisfactory to all parties concerned. PAGE further commented on the lack of even elementary security precautions reflected in the mechanics of the approach, specifically upon the gratuitous blowing of SEMANTIC. PAGE took some mild exception to getting [] involved and ESQUIRE promised to abstain from all further transactions, touching on his operational work with us, involving [] PAGE also observed that the consejo would ~~be given~~ as a matter of course, give serious consideration to any request for help originating with CALLIGERIS, and would instruct ESQUIRE accordingly if it should turn out that he was the man for job and that the job could be done without detriment to his primary duties.

glp

19 May 1954

K-Program

[] /cryp/

- [] in answer to a direct question by ~~ESQUIRE~~ ESQUIRE put to him by ESQUIRE on May 18th, avowed that Subject is one of the "one or two persons" he talks to freely. According to ESQUIRE, there should be little doubt in our minds that Subject is a full-fledged associate of [] and that he is fully read in on all transactions between the ~~xx~~ latter and the consejo. You may recall that in fashioning our initial approach to [] it was decided to warn him against any precipitate moves and that this message was on the point of falling flat when our unwitting emissary, Dr K, brought up the name of Subject, convincing [] that whoever had issued the warning seemingly knew a lot. We ~~also~~ have also reported that it was presumably Subject who remonstrated with [] for not putting sufficient pressure upon SMILEX to ally himself with our cause.

[] stated that he would entertain no objections, should the consejo decide to establish a direct contact with Subject, but remarked that he saw no actual reason for this inasmuch as we could equally well deal with Subject through him.
- Your attention is drawn to the fact that both ERRATIC and CALLIGERIS claim Subject as an adherent. (see SECANT debriefing). We have no indication what if any moves have been initiated by CALLIGERIS to enlist Subject's services. We furthermore lack a very clear understanding of Subject's military ~~xx~~ role, specifically whether he is in effective control of a troop unit. For the purpose of further developing the consejo's relationship with Subject, we wish to recommend that you prepare an evaluation of Subject's PBSuccess potential, preferably in conjunction with CALLIGERIS. Nothing said so far indicates what

and how strong Subject's feelings regarding CALLIGERIS ~~should~~^{/can} be presumed to be. It may therefore well be that he is less preoccupied with the outlook of CALLIGERIS promoting himself into a position of political power, than either SMILEX or []

3. From the point of view of establishing firm operational control over Subject, it would be of great help if we could pass to him a general brief, indicating that the consejo is fully conversant with his "military potential" and outlining to him what functions he will be expected to discharge. If it is contemplated to put him in touch with an "organizer" it may be advisable at this stage to make the necessary arrangements for a secure and fully authenticated operational contact. We should further like to be advised whether there are any specific issues on which Subject should be presumed knowledgeable and regarding which he should be briefed. We see no objections from this end, and a great many advantages, in operating Subject through []

4. ~~Further research~~ It appears significant that Subject emphatically disavows all knowledge of an alleged attempt to contact the United States Embassy through the intercession of Dr P. We reserve judgement as to whether we are faced with a government-instigated provocation move, until the results of the Station's investigation are in. There can be little doubt that the activities of Dr P and possibly of Senor STAHL warrant ~~serious~~ serious scrutiny.

Dispatched re above to Head.

19 May 54

K-Program

SIDERIE

/c [REDACTED] yp/

1. [] - Info Date: May 18th - advises against making an attempt to enlist the support of Subject. He claims that Subject was sent to [] on a special personal job for the President and that his assignment should not be considered a demotion. He is convinced that Subject would do nothing for our side. He is an unconditional servant of Mr Big/cryp/. In giving this evaluation, [] stressed that he was not prompted by any personal animosity altho the past history of his association with Subject might give ^{use to} the contrary impressin. [] Mr BIG/cryp/ moved heaven and earth to have [] as Chief of Police. [] view was that Subject would not take any orders from him, but would strive to become the top man himself and he told this to Mr BIG/cryp/ in very plain terms. This got back to Subject who ever since has been grinding a powerful axe against [] who considers him an able and effective officer, but without personal following. He is definitely an anti-communist, but his feelings about ~~Mr~~ Mr BIG/cryp/ are strong and settled.

2. In the light of the above information, we should like to be advised whether the importance of Subject warrants the obvious risks involved in approaching him. It may be worthwhile to elicit the view of CALLIGERIS concerning him and ~~then~~ get his evaluation of Subject's "revolutionary potential". If it should be decided that his alignment with our cause would materially contribute to its success, plans could be laid here allowing for the contingency of compromise. Pending ~~you~~ receipt of your instructions, no further steps will be taken here.

3. Regarding the St Thomas project, you are doubtlessly aware of its political backdrop . It is Guatemala's answer to what they consider the entrenched position of the United Fruit in Puerto Barrios. Inasmuch as the brunt of this

project ~~is~~ is borne by a United States concern [7\ , it might
be worth taking under consideration whether this enterprise should not be
as an answer to
temporarily shelved ~~by way of retaliation against~~ ~~off~~ rampant discrimination
against American concerns and individuals in this country.

glp

Deleted re above to Gush.

19 May 1954

K-Program

[] and the Arms Shipment

1. We regret to report that [] had no advance warning of the shipment of arms that came to port the other day. He merely inferred that something might be in the wind when [] /cryp/ extended his stay in Puerto Barrios. [] was rather dismayed that this shipment should have slipped thru our fingers and promised to do his level best to check upon the destination of the arms. (Info Date: 18 May 1954).
2. PAGE instructed ESQUIRE to give [] the following story, "in strictest confidence": The consejo had advance ^{/notice} ~~warning~~ of this particular shipment. In fact the question broached w/ [] what he thought about the wisdom of supplying the Guatemalan Army with arms, was borne from this knowledge. The interception of the shipment had ~~not~~ been under ~~active~~ consideration, but it was finally decided that the propaganda ~~effect~~ of iron curtain arms being supplied to Guatemala would and its Latin American associates have such a profound impact upon public opinion in the United States that the risk of countenancing its delivery was well worth taking. The consejo was not particularly perturbed about the immediate effects upon the execution of its plans, inasmuch as the bulk of the arms would undoubtedly reach the Army. If, on the other hand, it should be sidetracked to the campesinos, this should merely serve to strengthen the Army's determination to cope with any communist-instigated uprising.

19 May 1954

K-Program

[]
~~xxx~~The following miscellaneous topics were commented upon by [] in the course of a meeting with ESQUIRE on 18 May 1954:

[] 1. Promocion 24 is a mutual benefit society, organized by Mr BIG/cryp/ and cryp/. The 24th class of the Escuela Politecnica contributed funds to take care of widows, worthy cases etc. among themselves. At one time it had about eighty members. ~~xxx~~ Promocion 24 is not identical with the secret association whose first loyalty belongs to "The Army".

2. [] againx stated that, "if by some coincidence the Army High Command (referring specifically to Mr BIG, [] /cryps/) is put aside, the situation becomes manageable. (ESQUIRE stresses that this is not a direct quote, but his interpretation of a series of remarks made by [] on the subject). ESQUIRE inferes from [] remarks that , once the three aforementioned Army leaders have been removed, he, SMILEX and [] can intervene decisively in Army moves.

3. [] reiterated that massive , factual propaganda without insults shou addressed at the officers' corps. There should be an appeal to reason and basic patriotism. The battle lines should be drawn on the communist issue. [] is still working on his treatise. He decided to withdraw the first version on the grounds that it too unmistakably bore the imprint of his often ~~voiced~~ /voiced ideas and might have resulted in a dead giveaway

4. [] stated very emphatically that [] could not be bought at any price.

STANDEL - 2.

5. [] believed that the intervention of the Army in a civilian uprising will depend on where and how the attack develops. He doubts whether the Army would disperse itself trying to quell an uprising in Esquintla, Chimaltenango, Jutiapa etc. simultaneously. [] believed that the government will have to anticipate major acts of sabotage. [] related that, after the assassination of ARANA he had asked for permission to organize ~~atx~~ and head an assault against the Guardia de Honor. Forty officers were assigned to him. Only between twelve and fifteen showed up.

6. [] does not believe that the police will act aggressively, but will "denudarse" and run for hiding. Of course the police command will try to assemble all police effectives inside the quartel.

7. The following evaluations ^{/of ranking} ~~were provided~~ officers (mostly priming targets), were supplied by []

- a. Not an impressive type. [] Was [] of the Tactical School.
- b. Pusillanimous.
- c. Ambitious. Would do anything to further his own ends. Was Gobernador.
- d. Don't know him. Must be a line officer.
- e. A fool. Drinks too much.
- f. A very good person. Friend of Mr BIG/crp/. Would not start anything.
- g. Line officer. Escuela graduate.
- h. Uprising was quelled by [] a friend of Colonel ARANA's.
- i. Can be influenced. At General Headquarters. Don't think he can do much.
- j. A quiet guy. [] Would act if necessary.

8. Colonel DONIS Kessler is a sick man. He works for the Estado Mayor. Don't think he can take any initiative. Also he wouldn't like to do anything.

9. Major CACERES is an unconditional adherent of ^{STANDEL-1} /cryp/. An anti-communist who would do nothing.

10. Colonel MONTERROSA. Estado Mayor. A potential enemy of Mr BIG/cryp/. A friend of ESTRAY's.

11. [] doubts whether the government is aware of the Junta. They only know CALLIGERIS. So far [] thinks that there are no specific plans in being for coping with either an insurrection or an invasion. The government cannot afford to ~~be~~ disperse its forces until the enemy's strength and disposition become known.

12. Next meeting between ESQUIRE and [] is scheduled for 21 May 1954.

~~gls~~
13. [] has told Dr. K that he had a long talk with ESQUIRE and that the ideas submitted were so utterly preposterous and unrealistic that ~~therefore~~ a further exchange of views was deemed unnecessary.

gl.