

UNCLASSIFIED

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

~~CIA~~ HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

NO. HUL-A-624
DATE MAY 10 1954

TO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
	REC'D	FWD'D		
1. []		10 May	[]	<p>RYBAT/PBSUCCESS</p> <p>BY HAND</p> <p>JAKE: Note the association of DIAZ with ARBENZ in par 3 of dispatch. Should this be suppressed in view of our (JC's) defection effort? Who is Manuel? - <i>Time to Small</i> []</p> <p>Frank []</p> <p>[] point is well taken this should be referred to the superstructure.</p> <p>Don't believe para 3 should be changed</p> <p>fr</p>
2. for JAKE			[]	
3. []			[]	
4. []		12 May 13	[]	
5.				
6.				
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AIR POUCH

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FBSUCCESS / RYBAT

2 MAY 1954

Acting Chief of Station []

LINCOLN

KUGOWN - FBSUCCESS

INFO: FBSUCCESS, Headquarters

Instructions for Francis R. HEGARTY

1. Attached herewith are two letters of instruction for HEGARTY. These are to be read and returned to the Station in the usual manner.
2. Attachment A: comments and instructions on HEGARTY's reports.
3. Attachment B: a plan for a KUGOWN campaign directed against the Armed Forces of the Target Country.

JEROME M. DUNBAR

JCD/ EFL / sgw

30 April 1954

Distribution:

2 - []

2 - WASH

3 - LINC

~~SECRET~~
FBSUCCESS / RYBAT

With reference to Your Report, # 26, para 5:

We agree that only 3,000 copies of El Boletin del CEVAGE and La Voz will be printed. Please use every opportunity to impress upon Manuel that it is not so much the number of copies printed which counts but whether each copy gets into the right hands (i.e. into the target country and to the right people there --especially in the case of La Voz).

Your Report, #27, para 2:

Please instruct Manuel most emphatically that under no circumstances must General C. be given any favorable mention, either via radio or in print. This would be the surest way to bring about trouble with the local government -- which has been worried from the very beginning lest Pancho ally himself with C. Make sure that this warning is strictly adhered to.

Apart from the specific case, we feel that generally exiles ought to keep out of the politics of their host country: any participation in local politics is likely to cause trouble, but will also divert some of the limited capabilities of our friends into a direction in which we are not all interested.

Your Report, # 27, para 3:

Inform Manuel that we do not want to buy the station in question. We are convinced that we have now all the radio facilities which we can safely and competently handle.

Your Report, # 28, para 4:

We appreciate that you are taking precautions in connection with the Liberal Party convention. Especially the instruction that Pancho's men should stay out of the center of the city is quite correct: the degree to which this is complied with by his men or not might also give us a yardstick as to the state of discipline among his men.

Your Report, # 29, para 4:

This further distribution of the highly effective pastoral letter is very welcome. Encourage all practicable efforts to mobilize catholic Church officials and laymen for active opposition against communism in the factory.

ATI a tel [

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The remainder of your reports, not specifically referred to above, has been noted here with interest but does not appear to require any comment from this end.

1. During the next few weeks, beginning not later than the second week of May, we ought to aim with increasing intensity and urgency at provoking first distrust and finally, open disaffection against the present regime among the armed forces of the Target Country. We ought to use all available outlets for this purpose, in particular (a) Radio, (b) La Voz, (c) rumors which ought to be initiated through radio and press, but also passed on by direct word of mouth. We suggest that you tell this plan, as explained in more detail below, to Manuel in installment form -- that is, tell him every week only what you expect him to do in the following week or so. This would be not only good security, but it would also make it easier for us (and for you) to change details in the later phases of the plan, if the need for such changes should arise. However, we leave it to you to decide how much you may tell Manuel at any given time and to elaborate on our ideas as you will find suitable.

2. As a first step, the general themes of propaganda against the Arbenz regime should be sharply focused upon the military audience (details to be worked out with the advice of Manuel and of the military men writing for La Voz, etc.) , based on the fundamental argument that the honor and the personal as well as the professional future of a soldier or officer depends upon the deeds (and misdeeds) of the regime under which he serves. Such general themes will include, for instance:

Guatemala is being turned into the beachhead of international communism in the Western Hemisphere (Radio Moscow applauds every speech by Toriello, every step taken by Arbenz);

Taxpayers funds are being spent for communist propaganda (see press items on propaganda exhibit about Caracas conference in Guatemala City) and for extensive travels of communist leaders to Moscow and elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain, while the government is less and less able to pay even its own employees, let alone to fulfill its other obligations;

Freedom is being suppressed, censorship tightened, independent newspapers and radio stations terrorized;

And so forth.

3. As a next step, members of the armed forces ought to be made increasingly aware that they are about to be misused for aggressive communist purposes. One way of starting this might be to assert that Arbenz and Diaz

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have consented to have the Caribbean Legion supplemented not only by arms and equipment from the regular Guatemalan Army but by regular army personnel as well. One of Manuel's sources inside the army (or inside some suitable government office) may have come across evidence -- a secret document, or the record of a conversation between Arbenz and a likely communist leader, presumably Fortunny. According to that document (it might also be presented as an interview), Moscow is very dissatisfied with the failure of the attempt against Somoza, feels that the Caribbean Legion will never fulfill its purpose unless it is bolstered by regular, trained military personnel and demands therefore that selected groups of officers and EM of the regular Army be assigned to Legion "commando" - type enterprises, naturally not openly, but under appropriate cover. (This theme lends itself primarily to dissemination by rumors.)

4. The next step might be a direct, formal warning to all military personnel against penetration of the Army by the Communist Party and against political snooping by these cells. Based on the fact that all Communist Parties anywhere, since the very foundation of the Communist International, have been under the strictest orders to penetrate the armed forces of their respective countries, it is only natural that the Guatemalan CP follows the same pattern. You might mention in this connection that Communist Parties have been known to use the charms of the female members of their youth groups to make contacts with military personnel (if you and Mammel assume that such a charge against the AJDG will be believed , you might put this very specifically, quoting actual incidents). He might also broadcast or print an interview with a CP defector who discloses party activities in forming cells inside the armed forces.

5. This campaign should reach its climax around 1 June with the disclosure that Arbenz has concluded a secret pact with the CP (perhaps directly with an emissary from Moscow or at least in his presence) about the bolshevization of the armed forces, providing for the appointment of political commissars in all units and for the arrival of a Red Army (possibly: Czechoslovak Army) training and indoctrination mission -- perhaps to be disguised as a trade or "cultural exchange" mission, but conceivably also quite openly. This development would correspond to the changes which the armed forces underwent in all countries in which the communists have seized power. You might add that the pact also provides for an extension of military conscription and that those conscripts for whom there will be no arms immediately available (especially since the Caribbean Legion and other aggressive, revolutionary enterprises will have priority -- see para 3 above) will be organized into labor battalions for the construction of military

airfields, border fortifications and other work resulting from a communist foreign policy for Guatemala. This announcement should be made in a spectacular manner, based on either an intercepted official document, the letter of a high CP official or the statement of a defector from either the CP, the armed forces High Command or from Arbenz' own office (whatever your local experts may consider more effective and more likely to be believed). It should be publicized in a special broadcast, interrupting all regular programs and to be repeated several times, as well as in a special edition of La Voz -- possibly with an additional number of reprints of that special item, provided distribution inside the armed forces can be assured.

6. You are aware that this is a highly sensitive proposition: its black character must under no circumstances become known beyond Manuel and, if technically unavoidable, one or two of his closest and most trustworthy associates. All other personnel involved in producing and distributing the items required for the campaign outlined above must be made to believe in the genuine character of these disclosures, in order to avoid any possible leaks or "backfiring".

7. Please advise us soonest what you think about the chances of implementing the above program, how Manuel reacts to it and keep us currently informed about the progress made along these lines. If you feel it essential, call on us for any additional background information (experience with communist impact upon the armed forces in other countries, etc.) which we might be able to give you within the limited time left -- but we are not sure whether many details of that sort will be really needed.

ATT B To
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