

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 25 JUNE 54

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ROUTINE	
1	4
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TO : DIRECTOR

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

FROM : []

RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003

ACTION: WH (PBS) (1-3)

INFO : WH (4), DCI (5), D/DCI (6), DD/P (L) (7), SA/PC/DCI (8)

[] (IN 22057)

1346Z 25 JUN 54

PRIORITY
PRECEDENCE

TO: /DIR (PRITY)

INFO: (PRITY) SLING,
(ROUTINE) SGUAT, []

CITE: []

RYBAT PBSUCCESS

FOLLOWING BEING SENT AS JOINT EMBASSY-KUBARK MESSAGE TO AVOID DUPLICATION.

MASTER

1. FROM CHARGE TO STATE. [] AND I HAD LONG CONVERSATION THIS EVENING WITH []. HE DESCRIBED HIS RECENT TRIP TO CENTRAL AMERICA AND CUBA AS FOLLOWS:

2. REMON INCENSED AGAINST U.S. OVER INABILITY SECURE SUFFICIENT CONCESSIONS IN NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH READY GO ALONG WITH U.S. ON A MEETING OF CONSULTATION ON GUATEMALA DUE LACK OF ALTERNATIVE. HE IS CONSIDERED UNRELIABLE AS REGARDS GUATEMALA AND ALSO BECAUSE OF HIS COOPERATION WITH COSTA RICA. THIS ATTRIBUTED TO FIGUERES OFFER TO SUPPORT REMON IN NEGOTIATIONS.

3. [] IS UP TO HIS NECK IN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES AGAINST ARBENZ GOVERNMENT AND OPEN SECRET THAT LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMAMENTS HAVE BEEN FLOWN THROUGH MANAGUA AIRPORT AND THAT [] LOCATED THERE. [] PARTICIPATED IN MEETING WITH [] AND CASTILLO ARMAS WHEN REVOLUTIONARY PLANS WERE DISCUSSED.

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4. A VISIT TO HONDURAS AND CONVERSATION WITH [] AND [] REVEALED SIMILAR DETERMINATION TO DO ALL NECESSARY TO OVERTHROW ARBENZ GOVERNMENT. [] GREATLY INCENSED OVER STRIKES.

5. SITUATION IN CUBA DESCRIBED AS CONFUSED WITH BATISTA PREOCCUPIED OVER INTERNAL SITUATION.

6. [] AWARE OF D-DATE FOR REVOLUTIONARY ATTACK WHICH HAD BEEN TIMED TO PRECEDE MEETING OF CONSULTATION IN WHICH NOBODY HAD ANY CONFIDENCE. [] AND [] HAD BEEN UNDER IMPRESSION COUP WOULD HAVE QUICK SUCCESS IN VIEW CASTILLO ARMAS ASSURANCES IMPORTANT SUPPORT WITHIN GUAT ARMY. FAILURE OBTAIN SUCH SUPPORT ATTRIBUTED ARBENZ AWARENESS PLOT AND PRESUMED DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM OF PLOTTERS CHIEFLY IN SALVADORAN EMBASSY. CASTILLO ARMAS BELIEVED BE ADEQUATELY SUPPLIED WITH ARMS COSTING TWO TO THREE MILLION DOLLARS PURCHASED LARGELY FROM WORLD WAR TWO STOCKS IN EUROPE.

7. [] DESCRIBED [] AS DISAPPOINTED FAILURE ACHIEVE QUICK DECISION AND AS HAVING ENCOURAGED VENEZUELAN CONTRIBUTION OF MILITARY PLANES. PRESIDENT PEREZ JIMENEZ NOT RESPONDING TO THIS PLEA IN BELIEF VENEZUELA SHOULD HUSBAND RESOURCES FOR POSSIBLE ACTION AGAINST COSTA RICA WHICH IS THE REAL ENEMY. ALTHOUGH NOT STATED IT QUITE CLEAR VENEZUELA HAD PARTICIPATED AT LEAST FINANCIALLY IN REVOLUTIONARY OPERATION.

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8. [] DISCOURAGED BY COMMUNIST SUCCESSES IN WHIPPING UP SENTIMENT THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA IN FAVOR OF GUATEMALA AND AGAINST U.S. ALTHOUGH COMPLACENT OVER HIS ABILITY TO HOLD DOWN PRO-GUATEMALAN PROPAGANDA IN VENEZUELA HE EMPHASIZED A GUATEMALAN VICTORY WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT IN ENHANCED COMMUNIST PRESTIGE AND A CORRESPONDING THREAT TO STABILITY OF MANY GOVERNMENTS. HE STRESSED THAT U.S. PRESTIGE COMMITTED TO A REVOLUTIONARY VICTORY AND THAT FAILURE TO INSURE IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS TO ALL CONCERNED.

9. [] DID NOT ATTRIBUTE ANY IMPORTANCE TO A NEWS ITEM REPORTING TORIELLO'S PLAN TO SEND AN AMBASSADOR TO VENEZUELA IN NEAR FUTURE. HE WAS APPARENTLY UNAWARE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS THREAT TO ACCEPT TORIELLO'S BID TO DESIGNATE GARCIA MONTENEGRO.

10. [] VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT HAS RECEIVED CONFIDENTIAL CABLE FROM CIUDAD TRUJILLO TO EFFECT DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT PLANNING SEND ARMS AND "VOLUNTEERS" TO AID OF CASTILLO ARMAS.

11. [] ARRIVED FROM CENTRAL AMERICA AT TAIL END OF MEETING AND LATER REPORTED FOLLOWING IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION.

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12. HE HAD JUST LEARNED FROM COMPLETELY RELIABLE SOURCES CASTILLO ARMAS WAS CONFIDENT OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS AND PLANNING TO LAUNCH AN OFFENSIVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HIS PLANS HAD BEEN DELAYED BY HEAVY RAINS AND UNEXPECTED LAST MINUTE REFUSAL [] TO ALLOW A COLUMN OF ABOUT 500 MEN TO ATTACK FROM [] THE STRATEGY DESCRIBED IS TO CONVERGE FROM SEPARATE POINTS UPON GUATEMALA CITY WITH OBJECTIVE CUTTING IT OFF FROM REST OF COUNTRY AND FORCING GOVERNMENT TROOPS TO COME OUT AND FIGHT. THIS WOULD THEN PERMIT UTILIZATION OF CASTILLO ARMAS AIR SUPERIORITY AND FACILITATE POSSIBLE DEFECTI- TIONS. CASTILLO ARMAS DETERMINED NOT BE CAUGHT IN TRAP OF STREET FIGHTING OR THE BOMBING OF GUATEMALA CITY. HE APPARENTLY WAS NOT WORRIED BY ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE ASSURANCE U.S. WOULD NOT SUPPORT SUCH ACTION AND IN HOPE U.S. WOULD UNDERSTAND THE URGENT NEED FOR SUPPLYING THE ADDITIONAL PLANES REQUIRED TO INSURE SUCCESS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

13. [] REPORTED HAVING BEEN INFORMED BY THOROUGHLY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT FOLLOWING GOVERNMENT SOON TO BE ANNOUNCED BY CASTILLO ARMAS UPON RECEIVING CONFIRMATION OF A FEW RE- MAINING ACCEPTANCES: PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT CASTILLO ARMAS.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS CARLOS SALAZAR JR. SECTY GENERAL OF GOVERN-
MENT LUIS CORONADO LIRA. INTERIOR LUIS VALLADARES AYCINENA.
DEFENSE MAJOR ENRIQUE OLIVA. COMMUNICATIONS COLONEL MIGUEL
MENDOZA. LABOR MANUEL ORELLANA CARDONA. ECONOMY DR HECTOR
GOICOLEA. AGRICULTURE JOSE LUIS ARENAS. INFORMATION JOSE
CALDERON SALAZAR. EDUCATION MIGUEL CAMACHO. TREASURY HUMBERTO
CORDOVA CERNA. DIRECTOR GENERAL PUBLIC HEALTH DAVID GUERRA.
CHIEF JURIDICAL DEPARTMENT CARLOS A. RECINOS. CHIEF OF GENERAL
STAFF COL GUILLERMO FLORES AVENDANO.

END OF MESSAGE.

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