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


## The Spectrum of Soviet Dissent


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## The Spectrum of Soviet Dissent

Central Intelligence Agency  
Directorate of Intelligence  
May 1977

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### Summary

Problems of human rights in the Soviet Union cover an extremely broad range of heterogeneous interests. Three major groupings are discernible in Soviet dissent, overlapping but also carrying within them serious internal conflicts. In broadest terms, there are the intellectuals, the nationalists, and the religious believers.

Russians are the most visible of the intellectual dissidents and contribute the bulk of the *samtzdat*—literally “self-publication”—of the officially unpublishable works that reach the West. The crosscurrents within Russian intellectual dissidence have come to be symbolized by three men who disagree both on substance and on tactics. Andrey Sakharov and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn are heirs to the two conflicting mainstreams current among 19th century Russian intellectuals—Sakharov of the westward looking internationalists and Solzhenitsyn of the inward-looking Slavophiles. Sakharov is attracted by Western democratic processes; Solzhenitsyn places the goal of the spiritual and moral regeneration of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian peoples ahead of the pursuit of political freedom. The third man—Roy Medvedev—calls for reform of the “socialist system,” ridding it of the “distortions” imposed by Stalin. The three men have differed sharply in public, and Western expressions of interest in one may deeply disturb another who sees his own goals thereby threatened.

The full range of political positions visible in *samtzdat* is, of course, far broader than these three. Neo-Stalinists, Russian Socialists, Social Democrats, All-Russian Social Christians, Russian Patriots, Democrats, Neo-Kadets, Februarists—the political tags swirl. It is noteworthy, however, that calls for violence are rare and that acts of violence that can be attributed with any degree of certainty to Russian intellectual dissidents have been even rarer.

The major currents of intellectual dissent are extreme expressions of more moderate and more generally held views in the central party apparatus and among Moscow's establishment intellectuals. There are important differences in degree between the dissidents and their internal audiences, but

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communication is possible. When foreign interest is expressed in one cause or another, however, this communication becomes more difficult because "outsiders" are involved and because the whole political spectrum within the regime tends to shift in a defensively conservative direction.

Sukharov and Medvedev share the traditional weakness of Russian intellectuals; they lack grass-roots support. Solzhenitsyn had a natural popular audience in the Russian worker and peasant, but since his expulsion in 1974, he has in their eyes borne—however unjustly—the stigma of trying to impede relaxation of international tensions.

The grassroots support that the intellectual dissidents lack is visible, though difficult to quantify, for both nationalist and religious dissent. Very little nationalist *samizdat* is separatist; most of it consists of protests against particular actions of authorities and of special interest pressures. This insistence on separate interests precludes any real unity among nationalist dissidents, but each group, like the intellectual dissidents, can "talk to" a domestic audience.

There has been a noticeable revival in nationalist feelings among the peoples of the Soviet Union; it is symptomatic of the waning of Marxist-Leninist élan and has been fostered by the relative relaxation in the political atmosphere since Stalin's death. Moreover, native elites have emerged in the 14 non-Russian republics during this period, and these local cadres now draw on their own pasts to infuse Communism with a national hue. For these audiences too, however, intervention by an "outsider" complicates communication.

To a considerable extent, religious dissent overlaps with nationalist dissent. Each of the major republics is identified with an established religious faith, and protests, for example, from Lithuanian Catholics against individual acts of oppression may be as much Lithuanian nationalist as Catholic. In addition, however, there is evidence of conflicts within these established churches between the church hierarchies—which see themselves forced to work with government authorities—and dissident believers who feel the hierarchies have "collaborated" too much. Western interest in these dissidents undercuts the efforts and positions of the established churches.

The Evangelical Christian Baptist Church constitutes the major exception to this mix of nationalist and religious interests. Its congregations are scattered throughout the Soviet Union and are reported to be especially strong in the prison camps. It too suffers from internal conflict and has split into two groups, one working within the framework of Soviet laws and regulations and one working underground.

There is little in this picture to suggest that Soviet dissent is more than an embarrassment to the regime, but one that it must live with. To attempt to do more than muffle these voices in the short term would be to risk unleashing a domestic witchhunt that could quickly cross the fine line between the dissidents and their audiences within the regime, to say nothing of damaging the Soviet Union's international image.

## The Spectrum of Soviet Dissent

In apparently endless procession, men and women risk prison, a psychiatric ward, or exile for a brief public declaration of conscience. Sinyavsky and Daniel, Ginzburg and Galanskov, Krasin and Yakir, Grigorenko, Bukovsky, Ginzburg and Orlov, Kopelev—the protesters rise to the surface and are skimmed off by Soviet authorities. Thousands of pieces of *samtzdat*—literally “self-publication”—of the officially unpublishable circulate in typescript, some in multiple copies like chain letters, some in only a few. Three major groupings are discernible, overlapping but also carrying within them serious internal conflicts—intellectuals, nationalists, and religious believers.

### The Dissident Intellectuals

Most visible because of their access to Western correspondents are the dissident Russian intellectuals. In recent years, the crosscurrents among them have come to be symbolized by three men who have on occasion agreed, but are by no means united in their beliefs—Andrey Sakharov, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and Roy Medvedev.

Summaries of political positions can at best be no more than caricatures. The men themselves are obviously far more complex, and the varied positions held by more or less like-minded Soviet intellectuals are multitudinous. The following is, therefore, offered with apologies for some inevitable oversimplification.

#### Sakharov—the Pluralist

Sakharov and his “opposite number,” Solzhenitsyn, are heirs to the two conflicting mainstreams current among 19th century Russian intellectuals—Sakharov of the westward-looking internationalists and Solzhenitsyn of the inward-looking Slavophiles. Sakharov, a physicist and member of the Academy of Sciences since 1953, holds as his central belief the overriding need of mankind in the nuclear age for intellectual freedom. Initially moved by the potential dangers he saw for mankind in nuclear bomb tests, he has broadened his arguments to include

proposals for a Soviet bill of rights and the introduction of Western democratic processes and cooperation with the West in the Soviet economic system and foreign policy. Whether through discretion or conviction, he has not suggested that the “socialist system” itself is wrong, but maintains that it needs to be democratized.

His has been the one consistent voice raised as a matter of principle in case after case of individual Soviets of all nationalities and political colorations who have been in difficulties because of their personal beliefs. For example, in 1971, in the early stages of a wave of arrests of Ukrainian dissidents, leaders of the group reportedly considered organizing a committee to



Andrey Sakharov  
The Pluralist

protest a particular arrest. They decided, however, that such a committee would not be "opportune" because the arrested woman's husband had once been connected with a foreign-funded—and therefore tainted—emigre organization. Instead, they referred her case to Sakharov in Moscow. The latter protested her trial in Kiev. Her fellow Ukrainian dissidents who had feared to defend her were themselves arrested the following month, and Sakharov duly protested their arrests as well.

**Solzhenitsyn—Russian Mystic**

Where Sakharov places his faith in the mind of man, Solzhenitsyn's care is for his spirit. He is concerned with the need for the spiritual and moral regeneration of "Russia" or, more precisely, of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian peoples. The "language of politics" seems to him "inexpressive" and the pursuit of political freedom as the first and main goal a "miscalcula-

tion." The Western democratic model has little appeal for him, and he has suggested that authoritarianism, which he sees as having served Russia well throughout its history, might be a more appropriate model if only some higher spiritual values could be found to bind those in authority. In his view, "Russia" must detach itself from the distractions of the international arena and turn inward to find spiritual repentance and heal its soul. Once this spiritual regeneration has been accomplished, he predicts that the outgoing Russian character will reassert itself, and "we shall undoubtedly want to help poor and backward peoples and succeed in doing so. But not out of political self-interest."

**Medvedev—Human Socialism**

Solzhenitsyn turns to the ancient traditions of Russia, but Medvedev turns back to the 1920s before "Marxist-Leninist socialism" was "distorted" by Stalin. To eliminate the authoritarian-



*Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn*  
*Russian Mystic*



*Roy Medvedev*  
*Human Socialist*

ism and bureaucratization for which he blames Stalin, he proposes:

- Putting an end to Russian chauvinism and Russification, which, he warns, only exacerbates other nationalism.
- Stimulation of genuine democracy within the party, including the possibility of a variety of tendencies and groups within the party.
- Toleration of various currents outside the party, even if this leads to formation of other political parties.
- Transformation of the Supreme Soviet and lower bodies into real political decision-making bodies that would hold longer sessions and election reforms including a choice of candidates.
- Ensuring the genuine independence of the judiciary.
- Freedom of speech and the press, abolition of censorship.
- Recognition of the right to information.
- Freedom to choose a place of residence and to travel both inside the USSR and abroad.
- Ending "excessive" inequality of incomes.
- Retaining centralized planning for large enterprises but with an injection of real worker influence through the trade unions.
- Smaller enterprises to be run as cooperatives.

As in the case of Sakharov, intellectual freedom was the catalyst that moved Medvedev toward dissent, and in fact, the two men were early collaborators when they joined in 1964 an ultimately successful attempt to break the stranglehold of Stalin's protege, Trofim Lysenko, on Soviet biological research. Medvedev also shares with Sakharov a reluctance to abjure "socialism," anathema to Solzhenitsyn, but he seems less convinced than Sakharov that the Soviet Union—already embarked on "socialism"—has much to learn from the "capitalist" societies of the West.

### Serialized *Samizdat*

The support generated for the general positions of Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and Medvedev is reflected in very broad terms in serialized *samizdat* that has reached the West.

*Chronicle of Current Events* (Sakharov) was "published" every two months from April 1968 until July 1972, when the Committee for State Security (KGB) broke up the "publishing" ring. It has appeared sporadically since then as new editors have picked up the task. It has, by and large, been marked by allegiance to the cause of human rights and, in particular, to the right to freedom of opinion and information. It has carefully catalogued the fates of individual dissenters and the development of *samizdat* and has summarized political discussions that might not otherwise have been disseminated.

*Veche* (Solzhenitsyn) was named after the old Russian popular assembly and appeared from 1971 until 1974 when quarrels within the group producing it interrupted its appearance. In contrast to the clandestine production resorted to by the producers of the other series, the production in Moscow of *Veche* was a remarkably open process, and the name of its chief editor, Vladimir Osipov, appeared on the masthead. It carried articles on philosophical, historical, and religious themes, eschewed political questions, and was marked by strong Russian nationalism and Slavophilism. Some of its editors and contributors were linked in other forums to a fairly virulent strain of anti-Semitism, and this contributed to the final breakup of the group.

*Political Diary* (Medvedev) began in 1964, and at least 72 issues had been "published" when one of its recipients in 1971 handed 12 of them to a Western contact. We do not know whether the series has continued. The internal evidence in those issues that have reached the West suggests strongly that its producers and its readership were to be found among reform-minded party officials in fairly responsible positions.

### Diversity But Little Violence

Of course, neither these three men nor the serialized *samizdat* represents the full range of political positions visible in *samizdat*. Neo-Stalinists, Russian Socialists, Social Democrats, All-Russian Social Christians, Russian Patriots,

Democrats, Neo-Kadets, Februarists—the political tags swirl. It is noteworthy, however, that calls for violence have been rare and that acts of violence that can be attributed with any degree of certainty to Russian intellectual dissidents have been even rarer.

One such case involved a Leningrad group—the All-Russian Social Christians—that was avowedly dedicated to the armed overthrow of the regime. Founded in 1964, its links extended to such disparate places as Moscow, Tomsk in Siberia, and Siauliai in Lithuania. It was uncovered by the KGB in 1967, and 21 members received prison sentences ranging from 10 months to 15 years.

No official announcement has been made concerning the results of the authorities' investigations of the bomb explosions in the Moscow subway in early January and the fire in Moscow's Hotel Rossiya the following month. Moscow dissident circles reportedly believe that the real culprits have been identified as young men from a town outside Moscow that was, like many outlying areas, suffering from an acute shortage of food products. The young men had been accustomed to come to Moscow every weekend to stock up. The bombs were allegedly an expression of resentment over their loss of access to Moscow food stores, some of which had been closed on Sundays since the poor harvest of 1975 began to affect food supplies.

Whatever the final results of their investigation may be, Soviet authorities—in contrast to their handling of the 1967 trials of the All-Russian Social Christians—seem determined to minimize both the fire and the bombings. Sakharov's early somewhat panicky charge that the bombs were a "provocation" by the authorities to give them an excuse to unleash a broad crackdown was sharply denied, and Sakharov was warned against making such charges. Now, three months after the bomb explosions, there is little evidence of tightened security measures in Moscow.

A Soviet weekly newspaper has recently published an article on the Hotel Rossiya fire, the first extended discussion in the Soviet media of the event. The measures to be taken, by implication to avoid a repetition of the destruction and loss of life, include the installation of additional firefighting equipment and fire alarms, construction of smoke-free stairwells,

wider use of fire resistant materials, and more intensive fire drill training of hotel personnel. There is no hint that the authorities believe that the fire was anything other than accidental.

### Old Wine in New Bottles

Intellectual dissent in the Soviet Union is essentially a function of the stance of the leadership, not of the ideas expressed. At the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 Khrushchev proposed that a monument be erected to the victims of Stalin's purges a proposal that was warmly seconded by the second secretary of the Moscow city party committee. Plans for the particular memorial were quietly shelved when Khrushchev was ousted. Last fall, four Leningrad intellectuals became "dissidents" when they tried to start a movement to erect such a memorial.

In the political "thaw" that followed Stalin's death in 1953, a range of nonconformity emerged similar to that now being expressed by the dissidents. It was phrased more discreetly but nonetheless unmistakably in official publications by respected members of the intellectual establishment. There was harsh public criticism of the authors, and chief editors of offending journals were removed, but Khrushchev himself sporadically encouraged the ferment, using it as a political weapon against his more conservative colleagues.

Novelists, poets, and artists led the way (Yevtushenko, Voznesensky, and Lyubimov, for example); historians played a vital role in Khrushchev's destruction of Stalinist shibboleths. Economic quarrels ranged from Yevgeny Liberman's proposals for market socialism to V. M. Glushkov's vision of totally centralized planning and management by computer. The newly established discipline of sociology—so new that it is still not possible to earn a higher degree in it—challenged long-held tenets of Marxism-Leninism on the basis of its pragmatic research.

Quarrels among the "hard" scientists and technologists have had less direct political implications. One knowledgeable former participant in the ferment has warned that they have been so alienated by required courses in Marxism-Leninism that they are naively apolitical and vulnerable to the appeal of centralists who promise order and efficiency in return for tight political controls. Nevertheless, Sakharov sprang

from this community, and among the signers of the early post-Khrushchev protest petitions to the regime were internationally respected names from these fields.

With the removal of Khrushchev's often arbitrary authority in 1964, discretion in publication decreased, and such reliable newspapers as *Pravda* and *Red Star* began airing remarkably unconventional ideas from members of the party establishment. By the fall of 1965, some Soviet leaders had had enough, and after hard fighting in the Kremlin a lid was put on the ferment.

In February 1966, satirists Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel received prison sentences for "defaming" the Soviet Union through the mouths of their fictional characters. The shock of the trial and sentences to party officials and intellectuals alike was enormous. Public discipline was reimposed, and dissent in its current form was born. It is essentially an appeal to like-minded people at home and abroad.

Its first appearance took the form of petitions addressed to the leadership. They were responsible, often statesmanlike, and signed by respected figures in the arts and the Academy of Sciences. These were leaked to the Western news media, which publicized them widely abroad and replayed them into the Soviet Union. The authorities' response—a carefully controlled mixture of official pressures, firings, and arrests of junior figures—eventually closed off the flow of petitions. Nonconformist energies were diverted to *samtzdat* and to personal declarations of conscience that use Western correspondents in Moscow as a sounding board.

### The Domestic Audience

Not surprisingly, given their differing political positions, Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and Medvedev appeal to different elements in the domestic audience. These elements cannot be quantified, but on the basis of divergent policy trends, individual positions revealed in the years of more open ferment,  a rough political spectrum can be developed for the central party apparatus and Moscow intellectuals. It should be emphasized that this spectrum can only be posited for the Moscow area. Regional party officials and intellectuals deal with different problems from different perspectives and cannot be assumed to follow the Moscow pattern.

The spectrum, like the political beliefs of the dissidents, can only be presented in simplified terms. The cleavages among the positions are not, in fact, as sharp as they look, and the descriptions that follow are stereotypes. Individuals who conform to them can be found, but most people do not run true to the stereotypes. More important, the trade-offs inherent in the Soviet political process demand that the higher an individual rises in the hierarchy, the less consistently he can adhere to any one set of beliefs. Nevertheless, the spectrum does broadly represent the divergent tendencies visible among party officials and intellectuals.

### *The Conservative Ideologue*

At one end is the conservative ideologue. His view of both foreign and domestic affairs is through the prism of Marxist-Leninist (and often Stalinist) writ. The international interests of the USSR seem to him to lie in a strong international Communist movement that is defined by loyalty to the ideas of the founders and led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. "Imperialism" and "capitalism" are an ever present threat, not only ideologically but also physically. The conservative ideologue manages—with difficulty—to swallow detente since it promises benefits for the homeland of "socialism," but he is deeply troubled by the threat of slackened vigilance in Soviet defenses (both ideological and military) it poses and by the complications it raises in Eastern Europe and among foreign Communist parties. With each development in international affairs he reweighs his conflicting priorities.

In domestic affairs, strong central party control, the "dictatorship of the proletariat," and ideological purity are his watchwords. Nationalism, in its domestic sense of Russian or Armenian national feeling, is highly offensive. The substitution of economic for political values—for example, economic incentives rather than the honorifics of medals and titles for the labor force—seem to him to threaten the party's goal of social engineering. Politburo member and party secretary Suslov is often considered a prototype, although there is evidence of his flexibility when the occasion demands. S. P. Trapeznikov, head of the CPSU Central Committee's Department of Science and Educational Institutions, and I. I. Kovalenko, chief of the Japanese Sector of the

International Department, are examples of the conservative ideologue.

#### *The Soviet Nationalist*

The ideologue's dream of a "new Soviet man" has not materialized, but a Soviet nationalist does seem to be emerging, bred in the unifying experience of World War II and encouraged by the growth of the Soviet Union to great power status. He is a nationalist in foreign affairs but an internationalist at home. Like the conservative, he is deeply concerned about control and order, and sees domestic nationalism—in the sense of Armenian or Georgian patriotism—as deeply disruptive. He lacks the conservative's ideological inhibitions, however, and instead of social engineering, he emphasizes "rationalization" of the system and managerial "efficiency." He is quite willing to use the skills of the social scientists, especially economists and sociologists, however much they may implicitly challenge the conclusions reached by Marx and Lenin.

In foreign affairs, he also keeps a balance sheet, but his priorities are different from those of the conservative ideologue. A Soviet policy in the Middle East that does little to advance the cause of the "working class" in the Arab countries but does advance Soviet influence in the area poses no problems for him. Detente, on the other hand, requires that he weigh the advantages—including acquisition of Western technology—of cooperation with the West on common goals against those of competition with the West in the international arena. Aleksandr Shelepin, dropped from the Politburo in 1975, was an example of the Soviet nationalist. Grigory Romanov—party boss of the Leningrad area—may well be another, although the geographic limitations of his power base may tempt him toward a Great Russian variant of Soviet nationalism.

#### *The Party Reformer*

Like the conservative ideologue, the party reformer is an internationalist, feeling a sense of unity with foreign Communists and the "working class" abroad, but he also feels that some effort must be made to learn from the history of the past 60 years. Whatever the future may hold, he is not convinced that "imperialism" and "capitalism" present an imminent threat, and he finds detente appealing because it promises a less

stressful period when attention can be turned to learning from past mistakes and improving the "socialist system."

Many of these mistakes seem to him to have sprung from the watchwords of the centralists. In his view, strong central control has led to intolerance of competing ideas and rejection of experiment and change. He is not much interested in learning from Western "capitalism," but he finds other models of "socialism" worth looking into. He understood the 1968 Prague "spring" and keeps an interested eye on such experiments as Yugoslavia's worker participation in industrial management. He shares the conservative's distrust of domestic nationalism, but is more tolerant of its manifestations, seeing them as rooted in the mistakes of too rigid a system.

A. M. Rumyantsev, a career apparatchik who rose to be chief editor of *Pravda*, fits this pattern. While he was able to do so, he collected around himself others of the same mind, most notably Feodor Burlatsky, who followed him to *Pravda* and thence into sociological research. Aleksandr Bovin, formerly in the Central Committee apparatus and now an "Observer" for *Izvestia*, is another; Aleksey Belyakov, former first deputy chief of the International Department and more recently deputy director of the International Institute for Peace in Vienna, is yet another.

The fine line between dissidents and the establishment among these party reformers is illustrated by the publicly expressed community of interest between Len Karpinsky, a former national level Komsomol secretary and *Pravda* correspondent (where, incidentally, he coauthored articles with Burlatsky), and Vladimir Cherny, first secretary of the Tambov oblast party committee. In a 1972 article, Karpinsky quoted at length from a 1970 speech by Cherny on the importance of worker self-management from both the economic and sociological points of view to bolster his own arguments in that direction.

Karpinsky reportedly collected around himself like-minded people, described as "party ideologists and propagandists." His group came to the attention of the KGB in 1975 because of their well-advanced plans to establish a *sami-dat* periodical aimed at further developing Marxism, discussing concrete problems, and offering considered answers to ideological opponents such as

Solzhenitsyn. Some were expelled from the party, others given sharp reprimands, and all were either demoted to insignificant jobs or exiled from Moscow. Perhaps fortuitously, Cherny's performance as oblast first secretary was the subject of criticism in a Central Committee decree shortly thereafter. Nevertheless, he was promoted from candidate to full member of the Central Committee at the party congress the following year.

### *Great Russian Variants*

Both the party reformer and the broad Soviet nationalist have Great Russian counterparts who play a significant role at the center and must be considered a part of the domestic audience of the dissidents. These Great Russians differ sharply from the Soviet nationalists however, in their willingness to use the Russian language, Russian traditions, and Russian ethnicity in achieving their internal goals. From their points of view, such tactics make good political sense; other nationalities as well or better educated than the Russians—for example, those of the Baltic republics—are too small to exert leadership at the national level, while the Central Asians, whose birth rate greatly exceeds that of the Russians, still have too low a level of education.

At least in domestic matters, former Politburo member Gennady Voronov, who was dropped from the leadership in 1973, fitted the pattern of the Great Russian reformer in his interest in the "links" system in agriculture, in their equivalent in construction—the "wild brigades"—and in his quiet encouragement of restoration of Russian historical monuments, including churches. His foreign policy views were never clearly defined. On that score, however, former minister of the petroleum industry Shashin, who died this spring, made no bones about his opposition to the alienation of Russia's natural resources, whatever the benefit to his industry in equipment modernization.

### *Internal Dialogues*

The intellectual dissidents are drawn from this spectrum, and the major currents of intellectual dissent are extreme expressions of more moderate and more generally held views. There are important differences in degree between the dissidents and their internal audiences, but communication is possible.

Obviously none of the major dissidents would hope for sympathy from the conservative ideologues. Sakharov speaks to the party reformers. Depending on their degree of alienation in the current political climate, they are either heartened or disturbed by his public appeals to foreign authority, and not all of them would follow him all the way in his proposals for democratization. Medvedev speaks even more directly to them, and both men speak, somewhat less clearly, to the Soviet nationalists. The latter want a better flow of information to the policymakers and better application of intellectual skills in the interests of "efficiency;" to the extent that the nationalists realize that intellectual freedom is essential to the development of these skills, Sakharov and Medvedev find an audience among them.

Both Sakharov and Medvedev suffer from the historical weakness of Russian intellectuals; they lack popular support. To the Soviet worker and peasant—deeply fearful of war and concerned with earning a living—their principled arguments are too abstruse to be meaningful. To the extent that either man can be credibly, if unjustly, portrayed by his opponents as an "instigator of war," he is vulnerable to a strong popular backlash.

Solzhenitsyn's appeal is to the two Great Russian prototypes—reformers and nationalists. His emphasis on enduring Russian traditions strikes a strong chord among them. He has very real limitations, however. His call for "higher values" is idealistic enough to be heard by the reformers, but they are antagonized by his visibly strong belief in the Russian Orthodox Church as the source of these values and by his flat rejection of "socialism." His belief in the appropriateness of authoritarianism as a model for Russia appeals to the nationalists, but his mysticism conflicts with their desire for "efficiency." Unlike Sakharov and Medvedev, he has had a popular audience—the Russian worker and peasant. Since his expulsion in 1974, however, he has been cut off from them because they are generally outside the *samtzdat* circuit and because in their eyes he bears the stigma of a man who tries to impede the relaxation of international tensions.

### *Differences Over Tactics*

Compounding their differences over substance, sharp differences have arisen among the three

men over tactics. In 1973, immediately after General Secretary Brezhnev's visit to the US, Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn—in a rare display of cooperation—carried on an antiphonal series of "interviews" with Western correspondents, warning the West of the dangers of a "pseudo-detente" unaccompanied by significant changes in the Soviet system. Sakharov, in particular, urged that the US Congress withhold most favored nation status and trade credits from the Soviet Union until that country allowed emigration for all applicants.

Confronted by this appeal to foreign authority, the two "centralist" elements in the internal political spectrum coalesced, and the regime responded with a public letter-writing campaign condemning both men, pressures on their families and friends, and public veiled threats of reprisal. This was accompanied by a general tightening up in internal discipline.

Popular criticism of the two may not, in fact, have been too difficult to organize. Brezhnev, his enthusiasm for detente cresting, at this point was portraying this policy as bringing not only peace but prosperity for the Soviet economy. Solzhenitsyn's call for higher moral values and Sakharov's principled stand on freedom of emigration could not have aroused much enthusiasm in a population fearful of war and hoping for a higher standard of living.

Shortly afterward, Medvedev "published" a long *samizdat* article on "the problem of democratization and the problem of detente," noting with distress that in the more conservative internal political climate, dissidents under pressure "begin to express more and more extreme views and put forward less and less constructive proposals, guided more by emotions than by considerations of political efficiency." There can be little doubt that he was expressing the views of the party reformers who saw in the more conservative domestic climate a setback to their hopes for reform. This March, Western expressions of concern over human rights in the Soviet Union and Sakharov's appeal to Western authorities became the subject of an even sharper exchange between the two men.

Medvedev's tactics in reaching his foreign audience—essentially East and West European Communist parties—differ considerably from those of the other two. He eschews the spectacu-

lar public appeal to foreign governments but manages nonetheless to reach outside the Soviet Union. For example, last December an Italian Communist Party delegation reportedly paid him a quiet visit in his Moscow apartment, presented him with an Italian edition of one of his works, and signed a contract for the publication of another by an Italian Communist publishing house. There has been no Soviet outcry against him, despite the Soviet Union's continuing efforts to damp down Eurocommunism.

### Nationalist Dissidence

In contrast to the intellectual dissidents' lack of grass-roots support, mass appeal is visible, though difficult to quantify, for both nationalist and religious dissent. Indeed, Soviet nationality laws to a certain extent encourage the continuing importance of nationalism in the Soviet Union, as does the political structure of the country.

The Soviet Union recognizes the existence of more than 100 nationalities within its borders. Each Soviet citizen, on reaching maturity, assumes the nationality of his parents and carries that nationality on all his official documents for the rest of his life. The child of two Russians whose forebears have lived in the Ukraine for two or three generations is nonetheless a Russian; the child of a mixed-nationality marriage may select the nationality of either parent.

The Soviet political structure is organized in terms of nationalities, with the major ethnic groups represented in the 15 republics, and smaller ones accorded "their own" provinces. Russians represent approximately half the total population of the Soviet Union, and the Great Russian strain in *samizdat* is visible not only in Solzhenitsyn but also in the titles chosen by small dissident groups—Union of Patriots of Russia, the All-Russian Social Christian Union, Russian Socialists.

A vivid picture of nationalist resentment is presented in "Separation or Reconciliation," an essay by Igor Shafarevich, a former ally of Sakharov who has moved from the latter's internationalism to Russian nationalism and now lives in the West. He quotes Central Asians who say: "Just wait until the Chinese come; they'll show you what's what!" His long list of charges of Russian oppression leveled by other nationalities provides eloquent evidence of the disruptive

impact of nationalism on dissident attempts to achieve unity. His "solution" in his essay, however, seems likely to fan the flames. He contends that the Russians were themselves the first victims of the "hegemony in our country of socialist ideology," not its carriers, and that all the peoples of the Soviet Union share the guilt for its imposition—"the Russian Nihilists, the Ukrainian Borotbists, the Latvian Riflemen, and many others."

#### Other Nationalism in *Samizdat*

In the *samizdat* reaching the West, materials of Russian provenance are predominant. Of the remainder, most of the material from dissidents of other nationalities consists of protests against particular actions of authorities; the political essay, comparatively common in Russian *samizdat*, is rarely met in the non-Russian variety.

Appropriately, the next largest group represented in this literature is Ukrainian. There has been some effort at cooperation between the two groups; prominent Ukrainian dissidents have publicly supported dissident groups and individuals outside the Ukraine, and Sakharov's support for the embattled Ukrainian dissidents has already been noted. Nevertheless, Ukrainian nationalism proved disruptive to dissident unity when in 1970 a serialized Ukrainian *samizdat* publication modeled after the Russian *Chronicle of Current Events* embarked on a quarrel with "the Democratic Movement" about its right to speak on behalf of "the Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic lands."

A number of *samizdat* documents concern the Crimean Tatars, deported to Uzbekistan in World War II. They were formally rehabilitated in the de-Stalinization period but have not been allowed to return to the Crimea. They have achieved remarkably high visibility in view of their relatively small numbers—approximately half a million people—in large part because of the efforts of former general Grigorenko. Their cause is highly specialized, however, and the disruption that would be involved in returning them to their homes, occupied by others since the mid-1940s, limits their appeal in the dissident movement. An even smaller national group well represented in *samizdat* in the West are the Meskhetians, a Turkic people from southern Georgia also deported to Central Asia. Their

demands are similar to those of the Crimean Tatars—to return to their homeland in the Adzharian Autonomous Republic in Georgia.

There is also fragmentary Armenian *samizdat* calling for an independent Armenia. The majority of *samizdat* documents from the Baltic countries concern religious protest and individual petitions against religious oppression of Protestants in Estonia and Latvia and Catholics in Lithuania. In contrast to the representation of the Crimean Tatars and the Meskhetians, there is remarkably little *samizdat* in the West from Central Asians.

#### Other Nationalist Audiences

Despite the paucity of other nationalist *samizdat* reaching the West, there is evidence suggesting a revival in nationalist feelings among the peoples of the USSR which, to varying degrees, has affected all the major ethnic minorities as well as the Great Russians. This nationalist mood is symptomatic of the waning of Marxist-Leninist ideological clan and has been fostered by the relative relaxation in the political atmosphere since Stalin's death.

Moreover, native elites have emerged in the 14 non-Russian republics during this period, and the role of the Russians and other Slavs in directly running the affairs of the republics has in most cases diminished accordingly. Where Russian culture and language, the culture and language of Lenin, once provided the only model for Communists in the minority areas, local cadres now draw on their own pasts to infuse Communism with a national hue.

The extent to which local interests play a part in the policies of regional leaders varies from republic to republic depending on numerous factors, among them the degree of nationalist sentiment among the people, the situation within the local party leadership itself, and the leadership's control over the local population. Where public acceptance of Soviet rule is low, for instance, local officials are too concerned with maintaining control and too dependent on Moscow to consider encouraging nationalist sentiment. Officials in the western Ukraine, for example, are considerably harsher in their handling of expressions of Ukrainian nationalism than are those in the eastern part of the republic. For others, nationalist sentiment has been a

tempting source of political power. And for those who have found themselves at odds with Moscow's politics and policies—for example, former Ukrainian party boss Petr Shelest—the temptation to use this sentiment has, on occasion, proved irresistible. On the other hand, leaders in those regions that have benefited most from Moscow's economic policies have been more cautious in encouraging nationalist sentiment.

According to [redacted]

[redacted] a study was undertaken in the early 1970s to determine how the rising generation of the intelligentsia viewed the nationality problem in the USSR. Individuals from the various republics who were then working at the postgraduate level in Academy of Sciences institutes were sampled. The survey revealed a general decline, at least among young intellectuals, in the level of anti-Russian sentiment among the minority nationalities. The sampling was, of course, done among young people who had already joined the system, and these results were to be expected. More surprising was the acknowledgement by those sampled that important interests of the minority nationalities might be better served by surrendering some cultural identity in exchange for the advantages represented by the collective national power of the USSR.

[redacted] cited, as an example, a comment by an Azerbaydzhani. More Azerbaydzhanis live in Iran than in the Azerbaydzhani Republic of the USSR. It would be in the parochial interests of those Azerbaydzhanis living in the USSR to consolidate their nationality by annexing those areas of northern Iran inhabited by Azerbaydzhanis. The small Soviet republic of Azerbaydzhani does not possess the strength to accomplish this unilaterally. The larger and more powerful USSR does have that strength, at least hypothetically, which increases the attraction of membership in the Soviet Union for Soviet Azerbaydzhanis. The researchers concluded that this type of logic appeared responsible for the evolving change in perspective on the nationality issue. (Ironically, this "dangerous" study was impounded by the party Central Committee apparatus in a major shakeup of sociological research in 1972.)

The same type of consideration may well obtain in Armenia. In 1969 and 1970 two small nationalist groups were tried in Yerevan for

agitating for Armenian independence. The trial attracted very little attention from the Armenian population. In an earlier display of Armenian nationalism, an Armenian party first secretary had authorized the erection of a monument to the two million victims of the 1915 massacre of Armenians by the Turks. The errant secretary was removed from office, but the monument still stands, a poignant reminder of the fate of helpless Armenians.

#### Special Cases—Georgians, Jews, Germans

Little Georgian *samizdat* is available in the West. Nevertheless, Georgia for the past five years has been a troubled republic. In 1972 the local party first secretary, who had held the position for 30 years, became increasingly embroiled in the exposure of widespread corruption in his bailiwick and retired under a cloud. His replacement, a Georgian by birth who had headed the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs, had the look of "an honest cop" appointed to clean out the corruption endemic under his predecessor.

Since his installation, there have been rumors and reports of violence. The opera house in Tbilisi was burned in 1973, and this winter seven men were convicted of arson. The Georgian press accounts of the trial provided no motivation; the reports we have received concerning this and other violence have referred solely to resentment over the disruption of lucrative "arrangements." Nevertheless, there was a small-scale scandal at the Georgian Writers' Congress last spring over the publicly expressed resistance to the use of Russian rather than Georgian in academic work. From the fragmentary evidence, it is difficult to tell how much Georgian national pride has become entangled with resentment of enforced honesty. It is noteworthy, however, that the speeches delivered in Georgia by the party first secretary have focused almost exclusively on economic problems, with little or no reference to the dangers of nationalism.

The language problem has cooled in the past year, however, and Moscow shows no signs of alarm concerning its control. The Georgian party first secretary is clearly under political pressure from the Kremlin to put his house in order, but there is nothing to indicate that the Georgian authorities cannot contain, if not prevent, sporadic acts of violence.

Most of the dissidents in the USSR want to stay in their homelands under changed conditions. Jewish and German dissidents are unique in having "homelands" outside the Soviet Union. Some of the intellectual dissidents—Sakharov, for example—subsume the Jewish and German causes under the principle of the right of all peoples to emigrate if they wish. The treatment of these two nationalities as separate causes arouses little support either from dissidents or from the domestic audience.

Under Soviet law, Jews represent a separate nationality. An area in the Soviet Far East was designated by Stalin as "the Jewish province," but his scheme aroused little enthusiasm among Soviet Jews. While the province party first secretary has a Jewish name, the area has no popular identity as "Jewish," and Soviet Jews remain scattered throughout the republics.

Jewish consciousness in the Soviet Union was markedly heightened by the 1967 Six Day War, and Jewish *samizdat* made its first appearance the following year. Most of it is concerned with individual charges of discrimination, often in connection with the expression of the wish to emigrate to Israel.

This heightened Jewish consciousness and the attraction for Jews exerted by a foreign country has stimulated the strain of anti-Semitism and xenophobia characteristic of the *Veche* group. For example, in the 1972 shakeup of sociologists, the researchers were publicly accused of being under the influence of "Western ideology," a charge that carried echoes of the anti-Semitic "anticosmopolitanism" campaign of the late 1940s. The sociologist in charge of the research program, the important party reformer A. M. Romyantsev, reportedly was secretly accused of lack of vigilance in having employed Soviet Jews as researchers who, in turn, had allegedly allowed their research to be used as a cover for an Israeli espionage network. He was replaced as director of the research, and the institute was purged of party reformers. In public, however, this latent anti-Semitism has, for the most part, been limited to sporadic press attacks on "Zionism." (The subject of Jewish emigration will be treated at greater length in a separate memorandum.)

Of the 1.8 million Soviet citizens identified as being of German origin, the great majority are descendants of the Germans who settled on the

Volga in the 18th century. In the prewar years, they had the equivalent of an ethnic republic in that area. All of them were deported to Central Asia in 1941, shortly after the German attack on the Soviet Union. In the Khrushchev years they were "rehabilitated" and agitated for the reestablishment of their ethnic enclave on the Volga. When it became apparent after Khrushchev's ouster that the tide had turned against them, many began to agitate to leave the Soviet Union.

Some of these Volga Germans have married citizens of modern Germany, and the distinction between the two groups has become blurred. The Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany concluded an accord that included a protocol on emigration in 1958. The number of emigrants remained small—about 200 a year—until 1970 when it rose as relations with West Germany improved. It has ebbed and flowed since that time as hopes for a Volga homeland rose and fell and as the Soviet authorities have tightened or relaxed restrictions on exit permits for reasons of foreign policy. For example, in the three weeks before the 1972 West German national election, the gates were opened, and nearly 2,000 ethnic Germans were allowed to leave the Soviet Union. Last year nearly 10,000 emigrated to West Germany. German *samizdat* began to appear in 1972 as the success of Jews in emigrating began to be evident, and last March a group seeking to emigrate staged a brief protest in Red Square. Like the Jewish dissidents, the cause of German applicants for emigration lacks broad appeal among other Soviet dissidents and from the domestic audience.

### Religious Dissent

In the total volume of Russian intellectual *samizdat*, Solzhenitsyn's espousal of the Russian Orthodox Church is somewhat idiosyncratic, although the moral-religious issue in these documents runs deep. Most contributors discuss the religious question in a more general sense. The gist of the argument is usually that the Communist regime has removed traditional Christian values as the dominant value system of the society without providing a viable alternative, thereby producing a moral vacuum. Many authors argue that Marxism-Leninism must be "unmasked," but beyond this negative goal, discussions dissolve into nonspecific "Christian" references.

### National Religions

To a considerable extent, more specific religious dissent overlaps with nationalist dissent. Despite the years of ideological agitation and regime pressures against religion, each of the major republics is identified with an established religious faith. The largest of these are the Slavic-based Russian Orthodox Church and Islam in the eastern Caucasus and Central Asia. As noted earlier, Solzhenitsyn's attachment to Russian Orthodoxy is testimony to his Great Russian nationalism as well as to his religious faith.

The situation is somewhat complicated in the Ukraine, where, historically, the Ukrainian Uniate (Byzantine Catholic) Church was strong in the western areas and the Russian Orthodox Church in the eastern ones. In 1946 the Uniate Church was forcibly merged with the Russian Orthodox Church. Since then, the Uniate rites have been practiced underground, and the official Ukrainian church has been the Russian Orthodox Church.

No significant body of Islamic *samtzdat* is known in the West, although it may well exist in Islamic religious centers abroad. *The Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church* is the most notable representative in *samtzdat* of the other established religions in the Soviet Union. Begun in 1971, it is modeled after the *Chronicle of Current Events*, detailing individual acts of religious oppression. Protests from Estonian and Latvian Lutherans are not serialized, but like the Lithuanian Catholic protests they represent both nationalist and religious dissent.

### Internal Conflicts

In addition to protests against government actions, there is some evidence in religious dissent of conflicts within established churches. For example, in the early 1970s a young Russian Orthodox priest in Moscow came into conflict with the Orthodox hierarchy through his controversial sermons; he was first barred from preaching and then transferred away from Moscow. His supporters appealed to the World Council of Churches, accusing the Orthodox Patriarch and hierarchy of acquiescence in the Soviet regime's repression of religious life. Their protests are also beginning to appear in *samtzdat* in the West.

The charges of economic corruption in Georgia in the early 1970s that led to the forced

retirement of the republic party secretary also involved charges by religious dissidents of corruption within the Georgian Orthodox hierarchy. Fragments of this quarrel also appear in *samtzdat*. The latest issue of the *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church* carries charges against "collaborationist" clergy, including the president of the Kaunas Theological Seminary.

### An International Church

The Evangelical Christian Baptist Church constitutes a major exception to this mixture of nationalist and religious interest. Formed in 1944 by Evangelical Christians and Baptists, it was joined in 1945 by Pentecostals and in 1966 by Mennonites. An All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists serves as its administrative body, and its congregations are scattered throughout the Soviet Union, reportedly with special strength in the prison camps.

Mirroring the split in state churches between the church hierarchies—which see themselves forced to work with government authorities—and dissident believers, the "Initsiativniki" or Action Group Evangelical Christian Baptists split off from the All-Union Council in 1961 over the issue of military service, as well as acceptance of the regime's ban on missionary work and religious training for youth. Soviet authorities refused to register the Initsiativniki, who were thus forced to work underground.

The Initsiativniki appear to be the primary contributors to religious *samtzdat* and agitation for permission to emigrate. The first such attempt, which was abortive, was made in 1963 when a group of about 40 from Siberia pushed their way into the US embassy in Moscow to ask for protection and assistance. This winter an entire congregation of 500 members—about 100 families—reportedly sent a delegation to Moscow with their applications to emigrate.

Jews, as noted, earlier, are also scattered throughout the Soviet Union, and like the other established religions, have their problems with official pressures. Jewish dissidence, however, is focused primarily on emigration rather than on impediments to the practice of the Jewish religion in the Soviet Union.

Attempts to quantify religious believers in the Soviet Union usually founder on the definition of religious adherence. In the last census, the Soviet

population was 240 million. Soviet authorities usually estimate religious believers at 10 to 15 percent of adult city dwellers and 20 to 25 percent of rural inhabitants, a total of 30 to 50 million people. Western estimates are higher, ranging from 30 to 115 million Orthodox believers, 5 million Catholics, 10 to 50 million Moslems, and between 600,000 and 7.5 million Protestants and sectarians.

### Conclusions

Soviet dissidence is heterogeneous and internally fragmented. Despite its breadth, there is little to suggest that it offers more than an embarrassment in terms of its challenge to the regime, but it is an embarrassment that the authorities must live with.

The intellectual dissidents are deeply divided on both goals and tactics and, indeed, are not even united on the negative goal of opposition to the "socialist system." They are, for the most part, arguing, not plotting, and calls for violence are rare. Moreover, they lack popular appeal; their arguments do not bear directly enough on the concerns of the workers and peasants to engender mass support.

Nationalist dissent is, by its nature, a further divisive element. Separatism, that is, independence from the Soviet Union, is not a strong theme. Most nationalist dissidents promote ways to advance the special interests of a given nationality within the Soviet system. Dissent that argues for one, however, excludes the interests of the other 14 major and dozens of minor nationalities, exacerbating old rivalries.

Religious dissent, like nationalist dissent, is particularist and essentially divisive. With one exception, the major religious faiths are identified with specific nationalities. Both nationalism and religious faith can generate the emotional popular appeal that the intellectual dissidents lack, but because of their concentration in specific republics and provinces, they are relatively easy for the authorities to channel, adjusting official pressures locally or regionally as the occasion demands.

The two exceptions to the geographic concentration of religious faiths are the Evangelical Christian Baptists and the Jews. The former lack the emotional appeal of national identification. The latter labor under the historically strong strain of anti-Semitism in the Slavic areas.

The enduring strength of Soviet dissent lies in the continuum of views, differing importantly in intensity but not in direction, between the dissidents and their various internal "audiences." Individuals stepping over the fine line between the "establishment" and dissent feed the continuing flow of personal declarations of conscience. The authorities can and sporadically do increase the personal risks involved in overstepping the bounds. To attempt to do more would be to risk unleashing a domestic witch hunt that could quickly threaten the "audiences" in the "establishments"—the intellectuals and party apparatus in Moscow, the national republics, and the established churches. Memories of the destruction wrought in the bloody Stalin years, both to the life of the country and to the Soviet Union's image abroad, are still fresh, and no leader has yet appeared in Moscow who is eager to take this risk.



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