


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
*Policy and Politics in the CPSU Politburo:
October 1964 to September 1967*

(Reference Title: CAESAR XXX)

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POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO:
OCTOBER 1964 TO SEPTEMBER 1967

This working paper of the DDI/Special Research Staff examines the internal politics of the highest policy-making body in the Soviet Union--the politburo of the CPSU central committee--and examines the policies advocated by the various politburo leaders.

Although this study has not been coordinated with other offices, the authors, [redacted], are grateful to colleagues in other offices of the Agency for their suggestions and, in particular, for the review of the draft [redacted] both of OCI.

The DDI/SRS would welcome further comment on the study, addressed to [redacted] or to the Acting Chief of the Staff, [redacted].


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POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO:
OCTOBER 1964 TO SEPTEMBER 1967

<u>Contents</u>	<u>Page</u>
Conclusions.	i
INTRODUCTION.1
PART ONE: PATTERNS OF POLITICAL ALIGNMENT IN THE POLITBURO.	
Power And Policy Orientations.	3
Conservatism In The Party's General Line.	6
Brezhnev And The Power Struggle.	10
Kosygin's Problems.	10
Shelepin's Unsuccessful Struggle.	13
Suslov's Influence.	16
Brezhnev's Prospects.	17
PART TWO: PATTERNS IN POLITBURO LEADERS POLICY REMARKS.	
Brezhnev: Hostility Abroad, Discipline At Home.	20
The Hard Line Toward The United States.	21
Defense And Vigilance At Home.	32
Kosygin: Cooperation Abroad, Reform At Home.	36
Improving Relations With The United States.	37
Balancing The Domestic Economy.	53
Podgornyy: Firmness Abroad, Well-Being At Home.	57
Hostility Toward America, Cooperation With Europe.	58
Personal Prosperity And Production.	61
Suslov: U.S. Main Foreign Danger, Party "Impurity" Main Domestic Danger.	67
Shelepin: Militancy Abroad, The Hard Line At Home.	71
Polyanskiy: Reform At Home, Caution Abroad.	75
Voronov: Production And Pragmatism.	78
Mazurov: Ideological Discipline and Conservatism.	79
Shelest: Organizational Discipline And Defense.	82
Kirilenko: Reform And Well-Being "Now".	83
Pelshe: The Cautious Newcomer.	84
Candidate (Non-Voting) Members: Andropov, Demichev, Kunayev, Grishin, Mzhavanadze, Rashidov, Shcherbitskiy, Ustinov, Masherov.	85
CONCLUDING OBSERVATION.	93

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List Of Illustrations

Brezhnev And Kosygin.	11
Shelepin.	14
Podgornyy.	58
Suslov.	67
Polyanskiy And Voronov.	78
Mazurov, Shelest, Kirilenko, And Pelshe.	80



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POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO:
OCTOBER 1964 TO SEPTEMBER 1967

Conclusions

A majority of the politburo members have echoed General Secretary Brezhnev's position on most foreign and domestic policy matters. The emphasis in Brezhnev's overall position is on the persistence of international dangers. He has pictured U.S. "imperialism" as on the offensive in various parts of the world, and has stressed the need to build Soviet strength to increase the effectiveness of Soviet policy in the external world. Some members of Brezhnev's politburo majority have enthusiastically taken up his platform, others have lent him only lukewarm support. However, the salient feature of this majority is its complex mixture. That is, while certain leaders support Brezhnev on major policy matters, the same leaders have chosen to back up certain key segments of Premier Kosygin's domestic and foreign policies. Kosygin has struck optimistic notes on long-term international trends. He has tended to leave more room for further improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations, as a condition favoring major efforts at overcoming economic imbalances at home.

Divergent treatment of the nature of the Vietnam war highlights the contrasting world outlooks of Brezhnev and Kosygin. Brezhnev has pictured the Vietnam war as only one of many obstacles blocking any substantial improvement of relations with the United States. In his various speeches he has presented the Vietnam war as a symptom rather than a cause of what he regards as a historical period of "danger" and "complications" in international affairs. On the other hand, the Vietnam war has been the central problem for Kosygin's line on foreign policy in general, and policy toward the United States in particular. The implementation of his major foreign and domestic policies has suffered reversals which have coincided with the intensification of the Vietnam conflict. These goals, such as a reduction in the Soviet military's share of the budget and a substantial expansion

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of U.S.-Soviet trade, which he outlined during his first months as premier, have been sidetracked. During the first few months of his incumbency, Kosygin's statements on Soviet aid to North Vietnam fitted his detente-oriented outlook, while Brezhnev's displayed a tendency to minimize prospects for improving relations with the United States. For example, in December 1964--before the stepped-up U.S. military effort in North and South Vietnam--Kosygin's line on aiding the North was made conditional on what unspecified "aggressors" might do; Brezhnev's line pointedly threatened to render military assistance to the North on the basis of what U.S. aircraft and naval vessels had already done in early August and mid-September 1964. Subsequently, Brezhnev repeatedly debunked U.S. efforts to bring the Vietnam issue to the negotiating table, while Kosygin expressed favor for the exploitation of opportunities to commence talks. This past spring, Kosygin was indirectly criticized for being "naive" on this score by Brezhnev--a consistent advocate for Soviet defense interests.

Regarding the matter of Soviet defense allocations, Kosygin has employed the Khrushchevian argument that an East-West war "would inevitably be" thermonuclear and fatal for many countries. Brezhnev has argued that such a war "could become" thermonuclear and he has stopped short of spelling out the consequences. Brezhnev's argument is the one used by the Soviet military high command in justification of its effort to expand the conventional branches of the Soviet defense force rather than reduce those forces which (in Kosygin's view) would not be put to use in the East-West cataclysm. Accordingly, Brezhnev has placed great emphasis on the priority development of the heavy industry-defense sector of the Soviet economy and has regarded consumer well-being as a future consequence of industrial and agricultural successes. Kosygin on the other hand, has generally placed consumer welfare before defense and heavy industry in listing the domestic tasks of the party.

The complex character of Brezhnev's majority is manifested by the other politburo leaders' treatment of

-ii-

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the sensitive matter of resource allocations.* Thus, while Podgorny, Polyanskiy and Kirilenko have (with varying degrees of warmth) generally hewed to Brezhnev's hard line toward the United States, those same three leaders make an about-face with regard to Brezhnev's line on the preferential development of the heavy-defense industries sector. On the issue of industrial priorities, six of the eleven politburo members have clearly expressed favor for the continued dominance of the heavy industry sector--Brezhnev, Suslov, Shelepin, Voronov, Mazurov, and Shelest; four have favored a more balanced economy--Kosygin, Podgorny, Polyanskiy, and Kirilenko; only one, Pelshe, has skirted the problem. And while Voronov has sided with the "metal eaters" on this domestic issue, he has voiced, along with Podgorny and Polyanskiy, Kosygin's emphasis on the influence of domestic economic example for the "world Communist revolution."

The composition of Brezhnev's policy majority becomes further complicated on examining each individual leader's support for certain politically-related issues, such as the apparent effort to circumscribe the executive authority of Kosygin's Council of Ministers by strengthening

*The chief responsibilities of the other politburo members are as follows: Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (the titular head of state); Polyanskiy, one of two First Deputy Chairmen on Kosygin's Council of Ministers (Polyanskiy's chief responsibility is agriculture); Kirilenko, member of the secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee in charge of RSFSR party affairs; Suslov, a secretariat member in charge of foreign affairs and ideology; Shelepin, a secretariat member demoted in July this year to head the Soviet trade union organization; Voronov, a member of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Soviet Union's largest republic, the RSFSR; Mazurov, the other First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Mazurov's chief responsibility is industry); Shelest, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian party; and Pelshe, in charge of party control (discipline).

-iii-

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Podgorny's parliament, the Supreme Soviet. On this score, for example, only five of the eleven full politburo members--Brezhnev, Podgorny, Shelest, Suslov and Pelshe--have on the record endorsed proposals to increase the role of the Supreme Soviet in its dealings with the Council of Ministers. The line-up in the oligarchy on the parliament-versus-ministry matter perhaps best illustrates one type of restraint imposed on Brezhnev's drive for power. That is, that Brezhnev must act with caution because any move that would result in sudden and major gains in his personal power could precipitate adverse and (politically) fatal reaction by a majority in the "collective" leadership.

The fact of the matter remains that Brezhnev has a strategic advantage organizationally over his actual and potential competitors. All the signs suggest that he has gradually strengthened his position. The signs also suggest that Brezhnev, at least for the near future, will continue his hard line toward the United States (but avoid high risk in genuine crises) and continue his effort toward Western Europe aimed at (1) removing the U.S. presence from Western Europe, (2) fragmenting NATO, (3) strengthening the Soviet position and influence in the Warsaw Pact, and (4) expanding CPSU influence through the agency of local parties in West European politics. In this connection, Brezhnev has been speaking of the applicability of the peaceful coexistence concept to the European continent, despite his tendency to downplay the concept in general and in particular with regard to U.S.-Soviet relations.

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POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO:
OCTOBER 1964 TO SEPTEMBER 1967

Introduction

Israel's lightning-swift and massive victory over the Soviet-equipped Arab forces in the recent Middle East crisis was one of those sudden and illusion-shattering external events that can have a deep but unpredictable impact on the internal politics of the Soviet leadership. At the least it has already produced an unprecedented degree of turbulence and visible strain within the post-Khrushchev oligarchy. The leading group had succeeded relatively well in conveying a public image of effective, though uninspired, "collectivity" despite internal differences. Throughout the crisis, indeed, there was no change in the leadership's most notable characteristic. It was militant in theory but careful in practice, harsh in word but restrained in action. In the Middle East crisis Moscow's tough statements and hackneyed diatribes against Israel and "imperialism" were counter-balanced by Kosygin's talks with President Johnson at Glassboro and the avoidance of high-risk in the heat of the crisis. This pattern was rooted both in the closed system of politburo* politics which emerged after Khrushchev's fall and in the strong reaction in the party apparatus and the state bureaucracy against Khrushchev's brand of innovation, risk-taking and dynamism. Such factors have tended to produce a kind of conservatism marked by a revival of ideological orthodoxy but not genuine militancy, and a politics of compromise, log-rolling, and coalition among the oligarchs. The result has been action by the

*The presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was renamed politburo at the 23rd Party Congress (29 March-8 April 1966).

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leadership in those policy areas where its members have found common denominators among themselves on practical if not theoretical grounds, but also inaction and conspicuous stalemates in many other spheres of policy as well. This state of things and the prevailing mood of the oligarchy came under challenge during the Middle East crisis. Moscow party chief Yegorychev's apparent sally against the top leaders' handling of the crisis at the June 20-21 plenum--although a fiasco for this young militant, who was sacked for his temerity*--is a symptom of disagreement within the party over the direction and effectiveness of post-Khrushchev policy.

The obvious and most difficult question is whether the repercussions within the leadership of Israel's success will move Soviet politics off its present resting point. No direct answer can be given for the simple reason that it depends on the course of factional struggles within the leading group. It is a time when the intangibles of politics carry more weight than normally: when the persuasiveness of a leader, his ability to grasp unexpected opportunities, his skill in tactical maneuver and building a winning faction, his accumulated assets and liabilities, and his luck are thrown into the political balance. However, it is possible to some extent to discern

*On 27 June Yegorychev was replaced by Grishin, a candidate (non-voting) member of the politburo. Then on 11 July, Yegorychev's presumed patron Shelepin was demoted to the trade union chieftaincy (formerly held by Grishin). Another member of Shelepin's clique, KGB Chief Semichastnyy, had been removed on 18 May (i.e., prior to the Middle East war).

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the outlines of the leadership conflict, the issues at hand, the policy courses that could be taken, the strengths and weaknesses of the main contenders, and where various leaders stand in terms of policy, power and influence.

PART ONE: PATTERNS OF POLITICAL ALIGNMENT IN THE POLITBURO

POWER AND POLICY ORIENTATIONS

The struggle under Khrushchev over the question of whether "politics" and "ideology" on one hand, or "economics" on the other hand, should determine policy still remains the underlying issue in the post-Khrushchev leadership. The conflict divides the members of the leading group roughly into an ideologically-oriented and an economically-oriented wing. Where Khrushchev gave the lead to "economics" over politics, the ideologically-oriented forces--the defenders of the primacy of "politics" and "ideology" in formulating the party general line--have been pre-eminent since Khrushchev's fall. However, this broad division of the leadership into two wings is quite loose, despite its usefulness. Some further sub-divisions must be distinguished if the post-Khrushchev pattern of leadership politics is to be adequately understood.

At the extreme of the ideologically-oriented side of the political spectrum are the militants who have been led by Shelepin up to now and have included such younger figures as the hapless Yegorichev. These "young turks" have fallen on bad days of late. Next in order comes a very influential, old-line conservative element best represented in the person of the ideologue Suslov. Brezhnev has deferred to this element and has himself rather consistently adhered to a conservative, ideologically-oriented position. He has been careful not to expose himself to the vulnerabilities Khrushchev assumed when he pursued policy lines which tended to alienate party conservatives and the military. On the other side of center Kosygin has represented the economics-oriented and reform-minded elements in the leadership who are more concerned with

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the balanced growth and modernization of the national economy than with revolution abroad. The more radical Khrushchevian variant of reformism which envisaged the party rather than the government becoming the main economic manager and which promoted basic and rapid shifts in allocations favoring consumer economics has faded from the present scene. (Of course there are variations, even inconsistencies, that complicate the placement of some members of the leading group in the political spectrum. Moreover, there are a significant number of fence-straddlers.)

The caution of the leadership majority both in the Middle East crisis and in other situations is a reflection of their awareness of the realities of American power since Cuba rather than an attachment to "moderation" in policy. Excluding the militants, both the conservatives and the reform-minded members agree that this has not been a period to test the United States by force or the threat of force. Nor is the majority disposed to allow Soviet power to be drawn into a direct confrontation with the United States through the actions of its clients, as was underscored by its flat rejection of Nasser's attempt to do just this.

However, party conservatives are at serious odds with the reform-minded on what general policy line should be pursued in response to the American power advantage. For the conservative this is a time for keeping one's powder dry and a time for internal consolidation while building Soviet strength for the future. During this period the party conservatives are concerned with preventing any blurring of the hostile divide between the "enemy" and themselves. Thus, it is not a time for getting along with the United States; but neither is it a time for brinkmanship, or in Soviet parlance, "adventurism."

It is worth recalling in this connection that Molotov and even Stalin were disposed to caution. It was Khrushchev who was disposed to "adventurism." From the point of view of the party conservative, Khrushchev's risk-taking not only undermined the efficacy and credibility of Soviet policy in world politics, but in the Cuban crisis even endangered the Soviet Union itself. On the other side of the coin, Brezhnev suggested at the 23rd Congress that Khrushchev's concentration on an over-ambitious, consumer-

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oriented domestic policy also involved another kind of adventurism--the neglect of Soviet defenses. Most relevantly to the present leadership's conduct in the recent Middle East crisis, it is worth recalling that the presidium's indictment of Khrushchev in October 1964 reportedly charged him with "dangerous rashness" in the Suez crisis of 1956 for "committing the Soviet armed forces to a possible intervention, bringing the country thus to the brink of war, without having consulted with sufficient clarity the high executive organs of the USSR." It was widely rumored at the time of Khrushchev's October 1964 central committee "trial" that Suslov had delivered the indictment. In sum, conservative principles demand that militancy be tempered by a judicious weighing of available resources and of the actual opportunities in pursuing policy goals. For the party conservative the cardinal virtues are patience and careful calculation in the struggle with the "class enemy" abroad.

The ill-fitting term "moderate" makes somewhat more sense when it is applied to the reform-minded and economics-oriented wing of the leadership. Unlike the conservatives, they see internal consolidation as a prime goal in itself dictated by pressing internal needs rather than by the demands of a long-term struggle with an increasingly aggressive imperialism. They see a policy of limited accommodation with the United States and the West as desirable not so much for its own sake, but as a condition favoring major efforts at economic reform and at overcoming imbalances in economic growth. While not renouncing support of revolution in the underdeveloped world, they balk at commitments that would involve a constant drain on resources that could be used at home, and they emphasize the line on influencing the world revolution through Soviet economic "example." Kosygin has been the leading representative of this viewpoint in the post-Khrushchev leadership. Among politburo members, he was the most explicit endorser of the "mutual concessions" theme that Khrushchev employed in 1959-1960 and subsequently used to cover his backdown in Cuba; he pressed an abortive policy of "mutual example" in reducing military costs in the months after Khrushchev's fall; he has struck optimistic notes on long-term world trends while Brezhnev has stressed the persistence of international dangers; and he clearly tends to leave more room than Brezhnev for future improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations.

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CONSERVATISM IN THE PARTY'S GENERAL LINE

While the Kosygin-led economics-oriented wing of the leadership has not been without influence, it has had to work within the restrictive confines of a general party line which has largely been defined by the party conservatives. The latter have had the main say in framing major party pronouncements. They have established the broad context within which foreign and domestic policy is made. A pronounced conservative trend has been reflected in the editorials in the party theoretical journal Kommunist devoted to the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution and also in the central committee's anniversary "Theses."* The Theses provide a comprehensive statement of the party's current general line and give a clear expression in doctrinal formulas of the conservative platform. The Theses were approved at the June 1967 plenum of the party which dealt with the Middle East crisis. They were undoubtedly drawn up well in advance of the crisis--though they were obviously altered in places to take the crisis into account. It is still perhaps rather early to tell whether the impact of the crisis on leadership politics has been such as to produce significant shifts of line in one way or another. So far there has been no sign of new elements in regime statements since the crisis. Nevertheless, an acquaintance with the basic formulations of the Theses can provide a useful gauge against which future signs of change or continuity in line can be measured.

The central committee Theses mark the 50 years of Soviet rule with a rather somber picture of a world full of dangers. They offer little more to the Soviet citizenry than the prospect of a long and bitter struggle of indefinite duration with a wily class enemy. Gone from the Theses is any trace of the Khrushchevian theme that "Communism" is just around the corner in the USSR along with

*The pervasiveness of this trend is made further evident by the revision early this year of the Handbook for Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations. The revisions, in effect, instruct the low-level party secretaries to give first place to "ideology" and "politics" and not to production questions in their party activities. Nonetheless, the revisions call for "more effective" control over the economic apparatus in view of the freer hand "economic leaders" have been given under the 1965 economic reforms.

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the idea that the Soviet people would be entering an era of peace and plenty by 1980. Instead, the Theses dwell on the long drawn-out nature and the complexity of the process of building Communism. Rather than tying party policy to a blueprint for the future, the Theses reflect the leadership's stress on the "immediate" and "unresolved" tasks facing the party at home and, in effect, say that there is no shortcut to Communism.

The postponement of the Communist utopia at home is implicitly but unmistakably connected in the Theses with the burdens of the class struggle abroad. According to the Theses the increased aggressiveness of imperialism the world over, American imperialism in particular, is responsible for a period of intensified international tension. The Theses do not suggest that this condition is temporary but that it arises from a fundamental historical factor--namely the sharpening of the general economic crisis of world capitalism. According to this theme, the imperialists are led to take desperate measures to prevent further deterioration of their positions. As a consequence, they pursue "adventurist" policies in world politics. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam is cited as a symptom of the crisis. While the Theses speak of imperialism's increasing inner weaknesses, the document does not suggest that the enemy has become an easy mark. Rather, according to the Theses, capitalist monopolies have united and joined their power to that of the state and have been able to mount menacing counter-attacks on the revolutionary movement at various points around the world.

On the basis of this perspective, the Theses unambiguously subordinate welfare goals to the main business of increasing the economic and military "might" of the country. The Theses reassert the line that narrowing the gap between consumer and heavy industrial production remains dependent on the preferential development of heavy industry. One of the "main conclusions" of the past 50 years, according to the Theses, is the primary importance of building Soviet military strength as a "real counterbalance" to an aggressive imperialism. Where Khrushchev

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once emphasized building Communism at home--to such an extent that Molotov accused him of neglecting the party's world-wide revolutionary goals--the Theses stress the "indivisibility" of the party's international and national aims. Hence the Theses closely tie building Communism in the USSR with tipping the balance of forces against imperialism and providing the basis for the world-wide victory of socialism abroad.

The conservative tenor of the Theses is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in their revised formulation of the "state-of-the-whole people" (or "all peoples' state") doctrine originally introduced under Khrushchev at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961. Khrushchev intertwined that doctrine with the prospect of increasing internal relaxation and decreasing external danger as the Soviet Union moved toward Communism. At the time of the 23rd Congress last year there were clear signs that the doctrine was under critical reappraisal. It was conspicuously ignored at the congress and in the May Day slogans. The Theses now present a reformulation of the doctrine which fits in more harmoniously with the present political line.

The Khrushchevian version of the all-peoples' state was focused almost entirely on its domestic functions. The present version gives equal emphasis to the Soviet state's external and revolutionary functions. The Theses add the themes that the all-peoples' state "continues the cause" of the dictatorship of the proletariat and "wages class war" together with other socialist states against imperialism in the international arena. Thus the continuity of the doctrine of the all-peoples' state with the dictatorship of the proletariat doctrine is underscored rather than the Khrushchevian idea that the Soviet state had entered a new stage which marked the end of the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR.

The influence of Suslov's thinking in the revision is unmistakable. He was at odds with Khrushchev on the question of the Soviet state before the 22nd Congress. He had promoted the concept that the USSR and bloc functioned as a dictatorship of the proletariat for the world

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revolutionary movement but failed to get this notion into the new Party Program at the 22nd Congress. However, he did have some success in toning down Khrushchev's line that the Soviet state was now "withering away" insofar as its internal role was concerned.* Now in the Theses Suslov seems to have gained both points. The Theses re-emphasize the Soviet state's revolutionary mission abroad and say nothing about the withering away of the state at home. Rather, the Theses stress the argument that the state must be further developed as the way to "public self-rule"--a line that bears kinship with what the Yugoslav's ridiculed as Stalin's theory of "the state that doesn't wither."

In harmony with the renewed emphasis on the external revolutionary function of the Soviet state as well as on the need for a strong state internally is a diluted neo-Stalinist formulation on the contemporary ideological struggle. (In the 1930's, Stalin introduced the thesis that the domestic class war increases in intensity as the Soviet Union proceeds toward the building of socialism. Stalin's thesis, which was used to justify his purges in the 1930's, came under harsh attack by Khrushchev in the 1956 "secret" speech and again at the 1961 Party

*At the 1961 Congress, both Suslov and Khrushchev stated that the dictatorship of the proletariat had fulfilled its mission of building "socialism," and that the proletarian dictatorship had been transformed into the "state of the whole people" whose mission was to build "Communism." But Suslov concluded (1) that state apparatus would be strengthened during the period of the "state of the whole people" and (2) that the state would create the "material and technical base of Communism." Khrushchev held (1) that the existing state apparatus would wither during the period of the state of the whole people and (2) that the party would be called upon to create the material and technical base of Communism. The party program, adopted at the 1961 Congress, reflected Suslov's more conservative conclusions on the "state of the whole people."

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Congress by Mikoyan, a former confidant of Khrushchev's who lost his presidium membership and Supreme Soviet chairmanship in December 1965.) The Theses, asserting that the ideological struggle has become "extremely acute" in the external world, warn that the greater the successes of socialism the more insidious become the efforts of the imperialists to lure the people away from Marxism-Leninism and infect them with "bourgeois ideology." Hence the party faces a "serious" task in fighting the influence of "alien morals and traditions," and overcoming "negative manifestations in the consciousness and behavior of the people." Here, of course, is an indication of the deep disturbance within the party apparatus over Western influence in the USSR. The above formula also obviously relates to the regime's troubles with the uncowed liberal intellectuals who are seen as being corrupted by "individualism" and "apolitical attitudes."

BREZHNEV AND THE POWER STRUGGLE

Kosygin's Problems


The predominance of conservative themes in the Theses underscores once more the handicap Kosygin faces in leadership politics. At present Kosygin and his supporters do not hold the high ground which gives its occupiers the prime advantage in defining the party line. This ground of course is the CPSU central committee secretariat and is now held by Brezhnev and Suslov. The Theses were undoubtedly drafted under their direct supervision--as the contents of the document suggests. While this does not mean that Kosygin has not succeeded in having any of his positions on specific questions incorporated into party documents--for example, the Theses section on "economic reform"--it does reflect the fact that Kosygin's views have taken a distinctly secondary place. But if his views are to make real headway, command the attention of the officialdom, and be adopted in other than piecemeal fashion, he and his supporters must be in a position to shape the basic formulations of the general line as well. Such incidents as the

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"hardening" by TASS through editorial alterations of Kosygin's statements at a 25 June 1967 press conference in New York--most likely under guidance from the secretariat--underlines his predicament.*



Brezhnev



Kosygin

*See ahead, page 42 and 43, for a discussion of the highlights of the TASS censorship of Kosygin's press conference remarks.

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Many observers (and they may be correct) have been persuaded that Kosygin as a long-time technocrat has neither acquired the skill nor is disposed by character to alter the situation by factional political struggle and to aim at ultimately acquiring Brezhnev's job. Indeed, there have been few signs that he has been engaged in such an effort.

However, Brezhnev has often acted as if he regarded Kosygin as a competitor rather than a trusted collaborator. (Evidence for this proposition is examined at length in part two of this report.) Further, quite aside from the personal motives of Brezhnev and Kosygin, the division of executive authority between them is a source of cleavage within the leadership structure itself. Add to this the many indications that the two leaders do not see eye to eye on policy and the fact that Kosygin is a leader with his own base of power and not a dependent of Brezhnev, and the potential for conflict is intensified. Khrushchev solved the problem of shared rule by downing Malenkov, then backing Bulganin's appointment to the post, and finally taking on the post himself in addition to his party job, after Bulganin had gone over to the "anti-party" opposition in 1957. Brezhnev might be tempted to do the same, but here he would have to move carefully so as not to arouse the fear and provoke the opposition of his fellow oligarchs in the "collective leadership" against his drive for power. While it must remain conjectural, Brezhnev may have already contemplated a step in this direction last year, but then thought better of it, when rumors were circulated in Moscow on the eve of the August Supreme Soviet that Kosygin was ready to resign.*

*Rumors that Premier Kosygin is to be removed were reportedly circulating again in high government circles in Moscow, according to a late July piece of information

[REDACTED] Accord-
ing to the report, Kosygin's expected removal is due to severe differences (which the report did not elaborate upon) between Kosygin and Brezhnev occasioned by the (footnote continued on page 13)

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The fact of the matter remains, however, that Brezhnev holds the main track in the political arena of the leadership. He has something of a strategic advantage organizationally over his actual and potential competitors. If anything, all the signs suggest that he has steadily strengthened his position, especially in view of the manifest decline of Shelepin and his entourage in the past eighteen months.

Shelepin's Unsuccessful Struggle


Up to now, at least, Brezhnev rather clearly has regarded Shelepin rather than Kosygin as a more immediate and more dangerous rival for power. Some of the major reasons for Brezhnev's judgment are quite evident. Shelepin represented a threat from within the party apparatus, not from without as is the case with Kosygin. He had emerged from Khrushchev's fall--in which he played a key role--in a position of strength second only to Brezhnev's within the party. He had a foot in both the presidium (now politburo) and the secretariat, was deputy premier

(footnote continued from page 12)
former's recent visit to the United States. Despite the fact that the sources of rumors cannot be easily pinned down, it should not be forgotten that rumor-spreading is a time-worn device in factional politics. The former Bulgarian Premier Yugov and his faction, for example, were accused by the victorious Zhivkov faction of having spread rumors of Zhivkov's impending fall at a certain juncture. It is tempting to speculate, therefore, that Shelepin's faction was behind another flurry of rumors in the summer of 1965 that Brezhnev was about to fall.

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of the Council of Ministers and chief of the party-state control apparatus (a unique organization with a great potential for exercising power over both the officialdom of party and state) and had a protege (Semichastnyy) installed as head of the KGB as well as a coterie of followers in influential positions in the party apparatus.

Not only Brezhnev, but probably other senior leaders, saw a common danger in the youthful, militant and ambitious Shelepin. Shelepin apparently had not taken his colleagues' concern sufficiently into account and moved too quickly and boldly to gain power. During the summer of 1965, in any case, the rumors that Shelepin



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was scheming and intriguing to get Brezhnev's job were followed by leadership action curbing his (Shelepin's) power. In December 1965 the party-state control agency which he had headed was abolished and by the time of the 23rd Party Congress he was deprived of a direct role in cadre appointments in the party.

The circumstantial evidence suggests that Shelepin was a principal in what was evidently a bold but abortive attack on Brezhnev's handling of the Middle East crisis at the June 1967 plenum. This affair led not only to the ouster of Shelepin's presumed ally Yegorychev as head of the Moscow party but to his own demotion to chief of the trade unions--an action that most probably portends his removal from the secretariat, and, possibly, his eventual downgrading from voting-member status on the politburo. However, the Yegorychev affair may have been less a prime cause than a pretext for Brezhnev to take one step further in his gradual effort to dispose of his adversary. Before the Middle East crisis broke Brezhnev had already succeeded in forcing Semichastnyy out as KGB chief--here Svetlana Stalin's defection came as a windfall--and moving an (apparent) ally, the party specialist in Soviet bloc affairs, Andropov, into his place. The latter action not only strengthened Brezhnev's grip on the police apparatus, but along with Andropov's elevation into the politburo as a candidate member, raised the political status of that agency to its highest point since 1953, when it suffered a major reduction of its powers after Beria's execution. Thus, in this connection, it is difficult to credit the idea offered recently by some Western analysts that Brezhnev still faces a major threat from the Shelepin forces other than perhaps in the sense that they may survive to fight another day. Rather, Brezhnev seems to have succeeded to a large degree in defusing the threat from his most dangerous challenger.

It is important to keep in mind that while there has been a distinct cleavage in the policy outlooks of Brezhnev and Kosygin, the notable aspect of the Brezhnev-Shelepin rivalry has been that both sought to occupy much the same political ground--with the difference that Shelepin

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has taken a more clear-cut militant stand, Brezhnev a fuzzier position. In short, Shelepin has been holding out the promise to the ideologically-oriented wing of the party that he could do what Brezhnev was claiming to do with greater dynamism and efficacy. Brezhnev has repeatedly represented his policy as one which would increase the "effectiveness" of party efforts in the struggle against "imperialism" and in building economic and military strength at home--implying a contrast with the alleged ineptitude of Khrushchevian policy. Yegorychev's apparent sally against the leadership's cautious actions in the Middle East crisis--undertaken, perhaps, with Shelepin's blessing--added up to accusing Brezhnev himself of ineffectiveness, of propounding a hard line without teeth. Vulnerability to this complaint of the party militant remains a basic weakness of the kind of cautiousness Brezhnev has adopted so far. While Brezhnev nonetheless has strengthened his grip on the organizational positions in the leadership, he is undoubtedly seeking for ways of making more credible his emphasis on making party policy "effective."

With the successive defeats the Shelepin faction has suffered, Brezhnev would now seem to enjoy more elbow room and be in a better position to consolidate his conservative line. But how he shall move remains in question. Involved in the answer are both the disposition of forces with which Brezhnev must reckon within the leading group and the very difficult matter of his own motives and inclinations as a leader.

Suslov's Influence

Despite Shelepin's decline, there remains the powerful influence exercised by Suslov on the side of traditionalism. While probably not a direct contender for Brezhnev's position, he can act as a strong restraining influence on the general secretary from his position in the secretariat. While Suslov would be close to the young militants on broad ideological grounds, he probably considers them immature and adventurist as other senior leaders who also

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may agree that they need to be held in check. On the other hand, he probably does not want them driven completely from the field, inasmuch as the young militants may be considered a useful check to Brezhnev's expansion of power. Moreover, he also stands guard against any dilution of the basic conservatism of the overall party political line. Brezhnev may also be currently held back by a purely tactical consideration--much as was Khrushchev in his struggle against Malenkov in 1954 and early 1955. To move too obviously away from this conservative-leaning stance, would inevitably make it appear as if he were "me-tooing" Kosygin. Further, the strength of conservative opinion within the party, may make it imprudent in Brezhnev's eyes to change line.

Finally, Brezhnev's rather consistent identification with the ideologically-oriented wing of the party since Khrushchev's fall may arise from personal conviction as well as from his judgment of the balance of forces within the regime. So far, at least, he has shown no sign of shifting from his positions as a result of his defeat of Shelepin and concurrent gains in organizational strength. His July 1967 speech to military graduates some two weeks after the June plenum was an emphatic restatement of his previous line. He fitted the Israeli-Arab war into the picture he has drawn of coordinated attempts by the "imperialists," especially the Americans, to regain lost positions through counter-attacks against the revolutionary movement. He rejected the notion that the crisis was the result of national strife between Israel and the Arab states. He professed to see it as another engagement in the world-wide class struggle and asserted that the "arrogance" of the imperialists required "still greater" attention to building Soviet military strength.

Brezhnev's Prospects

Brezhnev, in any case, has three broad options for his future course: (1) a turn toward a high risk militancy in foreign affairs, (2) continuing his present hard line toward the United States but avoiding brinkmanship in genuine

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crises, and (3) seeking a more relaxed relationship with the United States and giving greater attention to internal problems.

The first course has been rejected by Brezhnev and the pressures in its favor have been reduced for now by Shelepin's steady decline. Correspondingly, movement toward the third option is now easier for Brezhnev but the fact that Kosygin has so far preempted this line acts as a deterrent as long as he remains premier. The prospect at least for the near future actually seems to favor a continuance of the second course perhaps with some veering to one side or the other. At the same time, this course leaves some room for flexibility in developing strategies for various local situations. Brezhnev has evidently been trying to develop such a strategy toward Western Europe aimed at drawing Europe away from its associations with the United States and increasing Soviet political leverage in the area. In this connection, Brezhnev has been speaking of the applicability of the peaceful coexistence concept to the European continent, despite his tendency to downplay the concept in general and in particular with regard to U.S.-Soviet relations.

Brezhnev's problem as a leader, even more so now than before, has been his difficulty in maintaining forward momentum for his foreign and domestic programs. He rode to power on the wave of reaction in the oligarchy to Khrushchevian leadership, but the time has long since past when Khrushchev provided a convenient whipping-boy. Brezhnev must take the rap when things go wrong.* It is just

*As if he were in search of a scapegoat, Brezhnev went out of his way to defend politburo policy during the Arab-Israeli war; he did not defend past Soviet policy for the Middle East in his 5 July address. In this connection--and in what appeared to be a classic KGB effort to try to shift the blame of a glaring failure from their ultimate boss, Brezhnev, to his competitor, Kosygin--a known KGB agent claimed in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war that the dismal failure of the UAR to meet Soviet expectations "may put Kosygin in a bad position." One month later the same KGB agent seemed to provide an apologia in Brezhnev's defense. The agent stated that the USSR "would prefer an Egypt which is defeated but remains a socialist country to a victorious Egypt which would become a capitalist country and no longer need Soviet aid."

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as true of a Soviet Communist leader as other leaders--if not more so--that he must sustain the appearance of forward movement in his policy. Otherwise he can become prey to other pretenders to power around him. (Khrushchev's fall, for example, came after his own program had been foundering. His Cuban venture, two years earlier, itself was a desperate attempt to restore momentum to his leadership.) While the Middle East setback was not his "Cuba," the outcome of that war did not help Brezhnev. The problem of forward movement remains.

PART TWO: PATTERNS IN POLITBURO LEADERS' POLICY STATEMENTS

The following textual analysis of the public speeches of Soviet leaders reveals basic differences on major foreign and domestic policy issues. The analysis reveals a remarkable degree of consistency in the individual treatment of major issues by the leaders. Patterns emerge which permit the identification of distinct policy preferences of the individual Soviet policy-maker, which, in turn, throws light on Kremlin policy cleavages. (The patterns also serve a vital political function within the Soviet power environment--that is, the communication of an individual leader's line to the lower-ranking party and government members.)

It is apparent that, as in the past, speeches are frequently subjected to coordination by members of the politburo. The early November revolution anniversary addresses appear to be heavily coordinated. But other speeches, in particular the annual election speeches for the Supreme Soviet (parliament) speeches at the party congresses and plenums and at Supreme Soviet sessions display considerably divergent formulations on various issues. And on the whole, the conscious effort at presenting a coordinated line makes the differences that do appear the more noticeable.

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The following section, which concentrates primarily on policy issues--rather than on political alignments per se--examines the patterns derived from the politburo leaders' remarks since the fall of Khrushchev.

BREZHNEV: HOSTILITY ABROAD, DISCIPLINE AT HOME

From the outset of his incumbency Brezhnev has developed his policy lines around the theme that the Soviet Union must face a world full of dangers for an indefinite future. He thus has tacitly but unmistakably dissociated himself from Khrushchev's optimistic themes of a steady, if uneven, trend of declining danger of war and the prospect of "removing war from the life of society." Brezhnev has sought to give new life to the sense of external danger which has animated Soviet politics but which was dulled by Khrushchevian doctrines. While not going so far as to renounce Khrushchev's pronouncement that the "capitalist encirclement" of the USSR has ended, he has sought to provide something of a functional equivalent of that discarded doctrine by stressing that the Soviet Union remains in "a hostile capitalist environment."

Where Khrushchev turned the party toward internal ideological goals focussing the new party program more on building Communism at home than on revolution abroad, Brezhnev so far has chosen a more traditional course. He has tried to draw the party's attention back towards its external ideological purposes--toward the "anti-imperialist struggle," to restoring unity in the Communist movement and among bloc states. Correspondingly, he stresses the primary need to develop the economic and defensive "might" of the Soviet Union in order to cope with the "world-wide aggressiveness" of imperialism, especially of the United States.

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A. The Hard Line Toward the United States

Unlike Kosygin, Brezhnev pictures the Vietnam war as only one of many obstacles blocking any substantial improvement of relations with the United States. In his various speeches he has presented the Vietnam war as a symptom rather than a cause of what he regards as a historical period of "danger" and "complications" in international affairs. The underlying cause in Brezhnev's view is U.S. "imperialism" which he pictures as being on the offensive in various parts of the world. The recent Arab-Israeli war is seen simply as another front in the current imperialist offensive. In short, Brezhnev has taken radically different situations and made them fit into his simplistic conception of an imperialist master plan.

Brezhnev has displayed a consistent tendency to minimize prospects for improving relations with the United States. This tendency was evident even prior to the stepped up American involvement in Vietnam in early 1965. Within three weeks of Khrushchev's political demise, Brezhnev devalued the coexistence theme. The peaceful coexistence line so heavily stressed and singled out by his predecessor now appeared far down the list on a six-point foreign policy formula which subordinated coexistence to other Soviet external goals. This major change was introduced under the guise of continuity, but it involved a significant reshuffling of priorities in policy in which the themes of anti-imperialist struggle and national liberation rose while the theme of preventing a world war fell. Brezhnev called for:

guaranteeing peaceful conditions for constructing socialism and communism, for strengthening the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries, their friendship and brotherhood; a course directed towards support of revolutionary liberation movements, toward every possible development of solidarity and cooperation with the independent states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, toward affirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence with capitalist states, toward the deliverance of mankind from world war.

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Brezhnev's six-point "general course" of Soviet foreign policy was repeated almost verbatim two-and-one-half years later in the CPSU central committee Theses on the 50th anniversary of the Communist revolution.

A notable omission from Brezhnev's formulations on Soviet foreign policy has been any assertion of the Khrushchevian corollary that the policy of coexistence involved mutual concessions. Rather, Brezhnev has been disposed to give the doctrine of coexistence a militant cast. And in December 1964 he began to redefine the theme of coexistence in a defensive, negative form: "Just because we are convinced supporters of peaceful coexistence, we resolutely and implacably speak out against those who want to violate this peaceful coexistence. We give a rebuff to the provocations of the imperialists and to their encroachments on the peaceful life of the peoples of the socialist countries, on the freedom and independence of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America." The tone of militancy was present in his first major foreign policy speech (6 November 1964); he stressed that "in implementing the policy of peaceful coexistence we base ourselves on the might of the countries of the socialist camp." He combined this statement with the assertion that "we shall maintain our defense potential on the highest possible level"--the strongest presidium-level pledge for support to the Soviet military during 1964. These statements set the pattern for Brezhnev's position on foreign policy right up to the present.

Renewed Emphasis On The World Revolution

Brezhnev's upgrading of the line on supporting national liberation movements was combined with his failure to mention Khrushchev's strictures against attempts to export revolution.* Within a month of his assumption

*This line has not disappeared entirely. It has appeared in the key "consensus" speeches, that is, in Polyanskiy's 6 November 1965 revolutionary anniversary speech (in the wake of the abortive Indonesian coup) and Pelshe's 6 November 1966 speech on the same occasion.

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of power, he followed up his formulations with actions which clearly portended a deterioration of relations with the United States. And during this period he sounded the call for a "single anti-imperialist front" to counter what he said were U.S. "encroachments" on socialist states and underdeveloped states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. (3 December 1964 Kremlin speech)

The most obvious move in this direction at the time was Moscow's decision to send military support to the Congolese rebels allegedly in response to the U.S.-Belgium rescue effort at Stanleyville (now Kisangani) in late November 1964. The only generally comparable previous Soviet move to directly aid indigenous forces came during the 1960-1962 phase of Khrushchevian bellicosity toward the West when military equipment was sent to combatants in Laos. The aid to the Congolese rebels was accompanied by a vitriolic anti-U.S. propaganda attack as well as by Soviet-staged demonstrations at the U.S. embassy in Moscow. In his 3 December speech Brezhnev made the first presidium-level attack by the post-Khrushchev leadership against the Johnson Administration. Brezhnev charged that "the bloody slaughter perpetrated in Congolese towns by the Belgian paratroops, brought in U.S. aircraft with the blessing of the White House and with the approval of the NATO Council, is a striking example of the collective piracy by the colonialists." He went on to allude to Soviet armed support of Africans, who, he said, were no longer "unarmed" in the face of the imperialists.

An emerging divergence between Brezhnev and Kosygin on the question of world revolution was reflected in Kosygin's comments in late 1964 on the Congo crisis. In his comprehensive discussion of Soviet foreign policy at the Supreme Soviet on 9 December 1964, Kosygin, unlike Brezhnev, made no allusions to strengthening the Congolese rebels and claimed only that the "world"--rather than the USSR in particular--was "profoundly indignant" over the actions of "certain [unnamed] Western powers." (This was the same speech in which Kosygin called for a policy of mutual example between the United States and the Soviet Union in reducing military budgets.)

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That these early differences were not merely tied to a specific situation but entailed distinct outlooks was underscored at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966.* Kosygin assumed a more pragmatic, Brezhnev a more orthodox position regarding the goal of world revolution. Kosygin cited Lenin as authority for the statement that the Soviet Union "exercises its chief influence on world revolution through its economic policy," and he predicted that success in the 1966-70 economic plan would "secure further changes on the world scene in favor of peace and socialism" and would "unquestionably exert a far-reaching influence on the world situation." Diverging from Kosygin's emphasis on winning the world by "example," Brezhnev's Congress report did not refer to Soviet economic policy as the "chief" or basic contribution to world revolution. Rather, Brezhnev forecast that success in the 1966-70 economic plan would serve to "consolidate the unity of the world socialist system," would increase the Soviet Union's economic and defense might and, lastly, would bolster its international prestige.

The Congo crisis was not, of course, the only situation Brezhnev exploited to justify his developing hard line toward the United States during the first months of his leadership. (But that matter, like U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic beginning in April 1965, was used as an element in Brezhnev's portrayal of U.S. aggressiveness on all fronts.) Of course, the issue of Vietnam was soon to become another example cited by Brezhnev in support of his hard line toward the United States.

Characteristically, it was Brezhnev who initiated the post-Khrushchev condemnation of U.S. actions in North and South Vietnam (6 November 1964 speech) and who first spoke of Soviet readiness to extend military aid to North Vietnam (3 December 1964 speech)--well in advance of the

*For a good examination of this issue at the 23rd Party Congress see [REDACTED]

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actual intensification of the Vietnam war in February 1965. (The contrasts between Brezhnev and Kosygin on Vietnamese-related issues will be discussed in the section dealing with Kosygin's policy positions.)

Renewed Emphasis On The U.S. "Threat" in Europe

Brezhnev, however, has not treated Vietnam as the central issue for Soviet foreign policy. He has given particular attention to U.S. military activity and supposed intentions in Europe--rather than dwelling on U.S. activity in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. He has drummed up a picture of a "serious threat" to both Soviet and general European interests raised by U.S. collusion with West German "revanchism." This line seems to be intended to advance four goals of Soviet policy emphasized by Brezhnev: (1) removing the U.S. presence from Western Europe, (2) fragmenting NATO, (3) strengthening the Soviet position and influence in the Warsaw grouping, and (4) expanding CPSU influence through the agency of local parties in West European politics.

In an effort to justify these objectives in doctrinal terms, Brezhnev has introduced a novel amendment to Khrushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence. Brezhnev has pushed the coexistence line with regard to Western Europe--and only Western Europe--in order to "prove" that there is no need for NATO.

Removing The U.S. Presence From Western Europe:
Thus, Brezhnev in his 1967 election speech stressed that:

In its relations with the capitalist countries of Europe, the Soviet Union steadfastly follows the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

He did not, however, apply the notion to U.S.-Soviet relations. To the same effect, Brezhnev's single reference to peaceful coexistence in his 24 April 1967 Karlovy

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Vary (Czechoslovakia) speech was made in one of his interlaced arguments for the removal of the U.S. military presence and U.S. political and economic influence in Europe. Among the arguments were, for example, that the U.S. had "fabricated the myth" of Communist aggression in order to impose its will on West European governments through the NATO pact; that the "over 300 billion dollars" the European states belonging to NATO had spent on military preparations had slowed down their economic, scientific and cultural progress; that the "brain drain" of West European scientists to the U.S. was a conscious American policy; that the large areas used to quarter U.S. forces imposed a burden on the West European populace; that the U.S. had tried to poison relations between East and West Europe by building "subversive espionage and sabotage centers and broadcasting stations"; and that the U.S. presence in Europe encouraged West German "militarism" and threatened peace in Europe.

Brezhnev set forth the rationale for concentrating on Europe in his April 1967 Karlovy Vary speech. After pointing out that the United States had been unsuccessful in its "stubborn efforts" to involve its NATO allies in the Vietnam war "as occurred during the Korean war," Brezhnev argued that "tying down the forces of imperialism in Europe" limits the scope and hampers the success of capitalist ambitions on "all other continents." On the surface, Brezhnev's rationale is inconsistent, inasmuch as it appeals for the removal of the U.S. presence in Europe but goes on to imply that the military status quo in Europe works not only to the advantage of the North Vietnamese party but also to the advantage of the CPSU. However, the stress on the U.S.-West German "threat" in Europe provides both a pretext for Moscow's limited activity in Vietnam and a counter to Chinese Communist charges that the Soviets are planning to pull back from, rather than open up, a "second front" in Europe.

The "threat" in Europe also harmonizes with the priority Brezhnev has given to strengthening Soviet leadership in East Europe. Secondly, Brezhnev has used the theme of war danger in Europe to persuade the West Europeans of the danger of a continued U.S. presence in Europe and of the desirability of a Europe detached from American--but not Soviet--influence.

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Strengthen The Soviet Bloc, Fragment NATO: Trying to have it both ways, Brezhnev has drummed up fears to keep the Warsaw pact consolidated while extending inducements to wean the West Europeans away from America. Clearly, the most important goal for Brezhnev is that of assuring national and bloc unity; the less important, gaining substantial cooperation with the capitalist countries of Europe. In his 1967 election speech he defined the objectives of the Soviet Union's European policy as follows:

First, to consolidate and to strengthen the gains of the peoples achieved as the result of the most cruel war in the history of mankind and of the radical class social changes in Europe which followed it; second, to isolate the forces of imperialist aggression, not to allow the West German militarists and revanchists to unbridle themselves, and above all to prevent them from gaining access to nuclear weapons; on that basis to strengthen the security of our western borders and the borders of the socialist countries allied with us, and to create the conditions for broad and fruitful cooperation in Europe of countries with different social systems.

Brezhnev's formulations on this theme are a mixture of old Stalinist themes and more recent detente themes. Thus on the one hand, he calls for unrealistic, extreme preconditions for European security which subordinate constructive moves toward meaningful European detente to the consolidation of the Soviet bloc. For example, he called for the dissolution of NATO by its 1969 renewal date and other one-sided propagandistic demands, such as the liquidation of military bases and the removal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean. On the other hand, he dangled before the West Europeans attractive--and double-edged--"detente" proposals, such as the construction of

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a natural gas pipeline from the USSR to Western Europe.* The gas pipeline, argued Brezhnev on 24 April, would be one measure leading to the "liberation" of Europe from the U.S. "dollar diktat." Notable among Brezhnev's other bids were general proposals for cooperation in the fields of economy, science, technology and culture on both a bilateral and an all-European basis, and specific proposals for the establishment of a unified color television system for Europe, cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy, and joint activity in river and sea purification and disease eradication.

Expanding Communist Influence in West European Politics: The Karlovy Vary conference of the European parties also marked an intensified effort on Brezhnev's part to increase CPSU influence in European politics through the agency of local parties. Brezhnev spoke of the growing role of the West European Communist parties in the recent period and implicitly claimed credit for the increasing influence of those parties during his incumbency. Thus he stressed that "the past few years have shown quite clearly that in conditions of slackened international tension the pointer of the political barometer moves left." This period of leftist progress was implicitly set off against the record under Khrushchev. Alluding to his predecessor's rocket-rattling and associated threats over Germany and Berlin, Brezhnev stated that the atmosphere of military threats had been counterproductive.

*The pipeline project had been [REDACTED] discussed with [REDACTED] as early as 1964. With the 1966 announcement of the end of the NATO embargo on wide-diameter pipe to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe the proposal was publicly aired by Supreme Soviet leader Podgorny with the Austrians in November 1966 and the Italians in January, at which time Podgorny said talks were "underway" to construct a pipeline to provide natural gas to Italy.

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for the West European Communist movement.* He went on to conclude that during the present period (which in this context he portrays as a quiet period) Communist party influence had increased correspondingly:

Certain changes in relations between communists and social democrats in certain countries, a noticeable falling off in anticommunist hysteria, and the increase in the influence of West European Communist parties is most directly correlated with the reduction in tension which has taken place in Europe.

On the matter of working with social democratic parties, Brezhnev's remarks contained cautious currents --in this particular case, endorsing in principle Communist party cooperation with the social democrats and then undercutting that call with sharp attacks on the two major West European social democratic organizations. Thus he went out of his way, as he has done in the past two years, to score the British Labor Party and the West German SPD--two major West European parties which, in Brezhnev's lights had shown themselves unwilling to "march with us."

*Accordingly, Brezhnev did not comment on the need for a German peace settlement (a call also deleted in the CPSU's 1967 May Day slogans), though he repeated the remaining six points of the European security program approved at the July 1966 Bucharest meeting of the Political Consultative Council of the Warsaw Pact (develop intra-European relations, liquidate NATO and then the Warsaw Pact, adopt several partial disarmament measures, prevent the possibility of West German nuclear armament, recognize Europe's postwar frontiers, call a conference on European security). In his Karlovy Vary speech, Brezhnev called only for the "recognition of the existence of two German states" rather than diplomatic recognition of East Germany per se--as GDR leader Ulbricht insists.

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Brezhnev's repeated critical comments on the two major socialist parties in Europe have closely conformed to the early post-WWII Cominform line on the European social democratic parties introduced in late September 1947 by Zhdanov--a Stalinist henchman praised by Brezhnev in a Leningrad speech on 10 July 1964 as "an outstanding politician and statesman." Paraphrasing Zhdanov's pejorative comments on the West German social democrats, Brezhnev in Bucharest in the latter part of July 1965 reportedly stated in private that the Soviet Union had no confidence in the leadership of the SPD because the Socialist International, of which the SPD is a member, is "a headquarters of the struggle against the socialist camp in the capitalist world." In his 29 March 1966 report to the central committee at the 23rd CPSU Congress Brezhnev, without elaboration, charged that difficulties encountered in the Communists' struggle for unity with working class movements are due "above all to the right-wing leaders of the social democratic parties." Brezhnev scored the SPD's role in the Bonn coalition government in his 1967 March election speech by seizing a quite routine matter; he told Moscow electors on 10 March that "although social democrats now hold a number of ministerial positions in Bonn, the new government has already found time to announce its intention to continue the ban of the party of the German working class"--the KPD (Communist Party of Germany).* The KPD ban was also mentioned in his next two major speeches which, in citing other spurious examples, served to expand his attacks on the SPD. In East Berlin on 18 April Brezhnev said that the SPD, the party "that calls itself the party of the working people

*This routine announcement, which has almost always been ignored in comments by Soviet leaders, was alluded to by FRG Chancellor Kiesinger in a 3 March interview with Neue Revue, and the Chancellor, who reportedly expressed his "fundamental skepticism" about a ban on extremist political parties in general, went out of his way to state that the KPD could again be legalized when the topic of reunification "enters an acute stage."

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of West Germany," had "in no way" effected a change from the FRG's "aims of revenge and war preparations to aims of peaceful cooperation and...European security." And in his 24 April Karlovy Vary speech, he attacked the SPD for refusing to adopt an independent foreign policy and for following "in the wake of the CDU, the party of the German monopolies." Brezhnev also derided the British Labor Party, the "prime example," he said, "of a party betraying the working class" for its support for NATO.*

Brezhnev topped his call for (limited) united tactics with an appeal for a novel propaganda forum--"a congress of the peoples of Europe on the broadest possible basis"--to discuss problems of peace and European security. Brezhnev's "people's congress" call explicitly excluded U.S. participation--an exclusion only implied in Brezhnev's 29 March 1966 CPSU Congress call for a "general European conference" on European security.** Kosygin's past remarks

*Kosygin has criticized [redacted] the British Labor Party leadership. In [redacted]

[redacted] 1965 Kosygin criticized Prime Minister Wilson for being "more American than the Americans" on the Vietnam and NATO nuclear-sharing issues. But he reportedly went on to stress that "it must, after all, be possible for the Communist and social democratic movements to find certain common views."

**Without naming the participants in his 1966 Congress report Brezhnev expressed the need to "initiate talks on European security; discuss the proposals of socialist and other European countries on a relaxation of military tension and a reduction of armaments in Europe and the development of peaceful, mutually advantageous relations between all European countries; convene an appropriate international conference for this purpose; and continue to look for ways of settling one of the cardinal problems of European security, that is, a peaceful settlement of the German problem by recognizing the now existing borders of the European countries, including those of the two German states, in order to completely remove the vestiges of World War II in Europe." Deleting the "cardinal problem" of Germany, the Karlovy Vary communique merely supported "the idea of convening a conference of all European states to study problems of security and the development of European cooperation, as well as other initiatives toward the same purpose."

on the Brezhnev-proposed European security conference have, in fact, reflected a more realistic effort aimed at actually negotiating East-West problems in Europe-- rather than engaging in an anti-American propaganda forum, such as Brezhnev's "peoples' conference." Thus, reflecting a high degree of seriousness underlying the idea of a security conference, Kosygin [redacted] [redacted] made the first specific suggestions for the time and means of organizing the conference. He said that the conference should be held in 1968 and that a "preparatory commission" should commence working "at once." Finally, while his statements on West European policy (discussed presently) display the desire to increase Soviet influence there, they are generally not cast in the hostile form used by Brezhnev in his arguments on the need to diminish U.S. economic influence and to cripple NATO's military capabilities.

B. Defense And Vigilance At Home

As in the case of his foreign policy formulations, Brezhnev has stayed close to the conservative lines set in his early pronouncements on domestic economic policy. And his pronouncements, reflecting his views on external conditions, have consistently favored (1) the defense and heavy industry sector and (2) the agricultural sector. Other sectors--and in particular the consumer-related sector of the Soviet economy--are subordinated.

Brezhnev's traditionalist formulation on the "prime task" of Soviet resource allocation policy was made in his first public address as CPSU First Secretary (now General Secretary): Brezhnev called for strengthening the country's defenses and stated that

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in the sphere of domestic policy the party regards it as its prime task to develop the productive forces of our society, to raise steadily on this basis the welfare of the Soviet people, to develop socialist democracy in every way.*

Brezhnev's formulation in this speech (19 October 1964) was an accurate preview of the February 1966 directive on the "main tasks" of the five-year plan which were justified, in large part, by an alleged necessity to react to the increased "aggressive" activity of American "imperialism." Thus with a similar conclusion, the current five-year plan directive--after claiming that the Soviet Union is required to strengthen its defense might in the next five years due to the "aggravation of international tension caused by American imperialism which unleashed military aggression in various regions of the world"--presents the development of the productive forces as the "main tasks" and "thanks to this [the development of the productive forces], the achievement of a substantial rise in the living standards of the people." (A similar formula was incorporated into the 1967 Theses.)

The second main part of Brezhnev's economic program--major allocations for the agricultural sector--was previewed in his 20 November 1964 Tashkent speech in which he argued for strengthening Soviet defenses, "our national and international duty," and for increasing at the same time Soviet agricultural productivity, "our paramount and nationwide task." The two tasks were not regarded by Brezhnev as being mutually exclusive, in the sense that the funds for Brezhnev's subsequent grandiose agriculture plan announced in March 1965 were not to be taken out of the military budget. In fact, in his 27 March 1965 central committee speech which introduced his plan to invest 71 billion rubles in state and collective farms, Brezhnev completely ignored the subject of military allocations.

*Emphasis supplied here and elsewhere in this study, unless otherwise noted.

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More recently, Brezhnev's bias in favor of the "productive forces" sector was prominent in his 1967 election speech. Here he called for "the strengthening of the economic and defensive might of the socialist motherland, for [note the order] the growth of the people's welfare and culture, and for durable peace the world over." While he stated that "improving the life of our people" is the "main aim of the policies of the Communist party," his formulation on the attainment of that main aim included prerequisites--such as success in agriculture and industry--which placed any significant increase in the standard of living in the future.* (It should be noted here, however, that the rate of growth of consumer production has increased somewhat during the post-Khrushchev leadership period.) And warning against complacency with regard to defense matters, he said in his 5 July 1967 speech (his first public address following the Israeli victory) that "defense is in the forefront of all our work." Thus his recent remarks sustain his two 1966 election pledges that (1) Soviet defenses "will be maintained at the very highest level...and will continue to preserve the superiority of our army" and (2) that "the priority development of heavy industry is the unchangeable principle of our economy." Reinforcing his traditionalist economic position, Brezhnev has not recently reiterated the 23rd CPSU Party Congress call for bringing together the rates of growth in the heavy and light industry sectors of the economy. (On the other hand, politburo leaders who echo Kosygin's economic views have recently reiterated the congress' line on proportional growth.)

While in the past two years Brezhnev has discussed the need for material incentives in the pursuit of Soviet national economic policy, he (like Podgorny) has given noticeable stress to "moral" incentives--that is, the effort

*Certain other politburo members (such as Kirilenko, see page 83) have recently argued that present economic conditions permit a significant increase in the standard of living "now."

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to imbue the workers with party-approved attitudes.* For example, in his 10 June 1966 election speech he called for "selfless work" in building Communism and equated that call with a World War Two political officer's slogan: "Communists, forward." In his 1967 election speech he said that this year's slogans are "shock labor in the jubilee year...not a single man lagging behind but at your side!" And he summed up his hackneyed sloganeering on incentives, as well as his overall foreign and internal views, in one concise statement:

Great persistent work and daily conquests on the labor front in combination with constant vigilance regarding the intrigues of the imperialists--this is the only key to a shining Communist tomorrow toward which our people are moving confidently under the leadership of their Leninist party.

*Kosygin, on the other hand, has given particular emphasis to the extension of material incentives through capital construction (though he has also mentioned the need for educational and cultural facilities which, presumably, serve to imbue the workers with party-approved attitudes). Interestingly, those who favor material incentives over moral incentives have come under attack. For example, Stalin's former chief theoretician Chesnokov wrote in Pravda on 27 February 1967 that "the disregard of some leaders for cultural-educational work and the broadening of the material and technical base of culture, as well as attempts to set off economic building against cultural building, can only be explained by political naivete or ignorance. Quite recently voices were heard in some places demanding that the construction of clubs and other cultural and enlightenment institutions be curtailed under the pretext of 'concern' for economic construction. Such a vulgarized approach to cultural construction violates correct Marxist understanding and the solution of the problem of balancing material and spiritual culture in the development of society."

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Preserve The "Leading" Role of the Party: Unlike his 1966 campaign performance, Brezhnev in his election speech this year did not discuss the party as a "productive" force in the life of the nation. Rather, he fell back on the more traditionalist view that the party "leads," "guides" and "organizes" the nation's productive forces. Last June, in the context of calling for a new Soviet constitution to "crown the majestic half century of Soviet power" (a project to which he has not since publicly referred) he discussed the productive economic tasks of rank and file party workers. He said in the 1966 campaign that the party is called upon to "formulate the basis of the country's economic policy, the main principles and methods of management and to put these into practice."* Brezhnev's revived emphasis on the traditionalist role of the party also occurs at a time when Soviet media have been sharply attacking developments in both the Chinese and Yugoslav parties for departing from "sound principles" and following policies which allegedly debilitate the party's leadership over the society.

KOSYGIN: COOPERATION ABROAD, REFORM AT HOME

The keynote of Kosygin's more optimistic foreign policy outlook was sounded in the introductory passages of his 6 March 1967 election speech. In evident rebuttal of Brezhnev, Kosygin explicitly placed troubles with the capitalists in the "contemporary international atmosphere" and looked to the "future [which] will bring a considerable relaxation of international tension" and will create conditions, he said, for the Communist tomorrow. Kosygin

*As the spokesman for the politburo's coordinated line on the occasion of the last revolution anniversary celebration (6 November 1966) Pelshe cited Brezhnev's 1966 party congress remark that the party "organizes and inspires" the people--rather than citing Brezhnev's less traditional 1966 election comment that the party puts economic policy "into practice."

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went on to emphasize that relaxation of international tension is a "principle," not a tactic or diplomatic game:

Our party and government, in their foreign political activity, have always proceeded and continue to proceed from a concern for strengthening peace and creating the conditions for peaceful socialist and Communist construction. We do not regard the search for ways to strengthen the security of the peoples as questions of tactics and diplomatic maneuverings. For us this is a line of principle, corresponding to the desires of hundreds of millions of people who hope that the future will bring a considerable relaxation of international tension.

Thus Kosygin has persisted in the optimistic foreign outlook mirrored in his 3 August 1966 Supreme Soviet report --that is, that Soviet foreign policy "takes into account the broad perspective of international development." Unlike Brezhnev's projections which magnify present troubles, Kosygin's forecasts have, in the main, looked beyond contemporary conflicts and have generally been capped with optimistic, pacific conclusions. Kosygin told Supreme Soviet delegates in August 1966 that

to orientate correctly in policy means not to shut oneself up in present-day events, but to see the main trends of long-term significance. If we look at things broadly, we shall see that these tendencies, despite the present tension caused by imperialist aggression, are favorable for the forces coming out for peace and international security.

A. Improving Relations With the United States

The Vietnam war has been the central problem for Kosygin's line on foreign policy in general, and relations with the United States in particular. The implementation of his major foreign and domestic policy goals have suffered reversals which have coincided with the intensification of the Vietnam conflict. These goals, such as a

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reduction in the Soviet military's share of the budget and an expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade, which he outlined during his first months as premier have been sidetracked.

Vietnam: Kosygin's Obstacle, Brezhnev's Opportunity

During the months prior to February 1965 and the bombing of North Vietnam, subtle differences between Brezhnev and Kosygin were reflected in their public remarks on Vietnam. Kosygin's more circumspect statements fitted his detente-oriented outlook, Brezhnev's, his consistently harsh view of the United States. For example, with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong on the platform, Brezhnev in his 6 November 1964 revolution anniversary speech initiated the new Soviet leadership's condemnation of the "intervention of American imperialism" in South Vietnam. Apparently with the early August and mid-September 1964 U.S. retaliatory strikes on North Vietnam in mind, he charged that "we resolutely condemn the provocations against the DRV." In his first public remarks on foreign policy after Brezhnev's attacks, Kosygin (in his 25 November anniversary speech in Ashkhabad) did not even mention North Vietnam and the acts of unnamed "imperialists" in South Vietnam were briefly passed over. Kosygin's reticence was particularly noticeable in light of the facts (1) that Moscow-Hanoi relations had greatly improved in the wake of Pham Van Dong's return from the early November visit,* and (2) that Soviet conventional air defense materiel

*Soon after Pham Van Dong's return from Moscow, an article by a DRV spokesman who had consistently engaged in anti-Soviet polemics was suddenly deleted from the November issue of the DRV party's theoretical journal (Hoc Tap), the title of the contents page was inked over, and a loose insert of a nonpolemical speech by a North Vietnamese politburo member was added. And the DRV's subsequent lack of criticism of the Soviet party stood in sharp contrast to Hanoi's unfriendly actions prior to the Soviet leadership changes, e.g., non-technical Russian newspapers and periodicals were reportedly withdrawn from circulation in the DRV and students returning from Moscow were being given political re-education courses.

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had arrived in Vietnam in either late December or early January. In short, it is probable that the Soviet decision to reverse, at least tentatively, Khrushchev's 1963-1964 withholding of significant Soviet military support to the DRV was taken in early November, and that the decision had not evoked Kosygin's public endorsement as of late November 1964.

Constrasting comments by Kosygin and Brezhnev in December 1964 tend to strengthen this conclusion. Kosygin in his 9 December speech based his formula for a military budget cut on a "certain change for the better" in relations with the United States and pointed in this context to a U.S. pledge to reduce military outlays. Less than one week earlier (3 December) Brezhnev was emphasizing the worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations on the basis of U.S. military actions in Vietnam. Brezhnev pointedly threatened to render military assistance to the DRV on the basis of what "U.S. military aircraft and naval vessels" had already done in early August and mid-September. Kosygin's line on aiding the DRV, on the other hand, was made conditional on what unspecified "aggressors" might do.

Brezhnev's 3 December 1964
Kremlin speech

Recently DRV territory was again subjected to raids and bombardment by U.S. military aircraft and naval vessels. These acts of aggression cause indignation throughout the world. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we have already declared for all to hear that the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the fate of a fraternal socialist country, and that it is ready to render the necessary aid to it.

Kosygin's 9 December 1964
Supreme Soviet Speech

The Soviet Government is attentively watching developments in the Caribbean, in southeast Asia, and other parts of the world. After all, the actions of aggressive imperialist circles are exacerbating the situation. The Soviet Union states that it will not remain indifferent to the destinies of such fraternal socialist countries as the DRV and the Cuban Republic, and is ready to render them necessary aid should the aggressors dare to raise a hand against them.

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Kosygin's initial line on "rendering necessary aid" to the DRV--his sole reference to that country in his lengthy speech--was also diluted by including Cuba in the same formula. Brezhnev capped his anti-U.S. remarks with a warning that the policy of peaceful coexistence does not prevent the Soviet Union from "giving a rebuff" to those who interfere in the affairs of bloc nations, and in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Kosygin's remarks on imperialist aggressiveness, however, followed a passage urging a "considerable increase" in East-West trade, as well as an optimistic passage on prospects for improved Washington-Moscow relations.

Kosygin did not lend his full endorsement to DRV defense aid until February 1965. And at that time, he apparently linked Soviet military support with a negotiations effort that failed in the following month.* Then for several months in his numerous speeches he tended (unlike Brezhnev) to confine the scene of U.S. "aggressiveness" to Southeast Asia.

While continuing to stress that Vietnam was the obstacle to improved relations with the United States, Kosygin in May 1965 gradually began to expand his view of the supposed scope of U.S. "imperialism" and to switch

*It has been plausibly concluded that the Soviets were attempting (successfully) to increase their influence in Hanoi by granting military support while simultaneously urging negotiations on the Vietnam war, apparently because the DRV had been considering the possibility that the U.S. might be willing to use a conference as a cover for U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. The sustained U.S. bombing in the north shattered Hanoi's and Moscow's illusions regarding the degree of U.S. resolve.

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temporarily to the Brezhnev rationale for strengthening Soviet defenses.* His gradual--and temporary--backing away in the summer of 1965 from his own version of detente abroad and concentration on civilian economics at home may well have reflected a tentative compromise aimed at preventing a rout--such as the defeat of his economic reform plan (adopted in September amid rumors of his imminent retirement). Nevertheless, Kosygin refrained during this period from emphasizing the threat from the U.S. in Europe.** The exception to this general pattern appeared in Kosygin's atypical remarks in a 6 December 1965 interview with New York Times columnist James Reston. It should be pointed out, however, that Reston apparently provoked Kosygin with some rather blunt badgering into a bellicose position on several issues. (Thus the interview may be a less useful source for the purpose of comparing statements than are speeches written by Kosygin or his staff.) At any rate, during the interview Kosygin argued that the increase in the Soviet military budget (announced the next day) was in reaction to U.S. intentions in Europe and nuclear sharing proposals for NATO. In his next comment in the interview, Kosygin forecast that "the next few years will set the pattern for the next 10 to 15 years. One prospect is for the arms race and the increase in

*Prior to this period, the signs of political pressure on Kosygin were evident in two political slights to which he was subjected. Publication of his 19 March 1965 Gosplan speech (discussed presently) was delayed until April and then carried in the small circulation journal, Planned Economy, rather than in the larger circulation press. Secondly, a proposed April trip to Poland was, according to the Soviet press in March, to be led jointly by Brezhnev and Kosygin; in April the same media announced that Brezhnev led the delegation and gave him the overwhelming attention while slighting Kosygin on several points of protocol.

**For example, only in one speech in 1965, and then in passing, did he note that the U.S. was in Europe in a military capacity--7 May speech in East Berlin.

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military budgets." He did not comment on any other prospect. Thus, Kosygin at that time appeared to have retreated from his December 1964 positions.

His retreat was shortlived, for in early 1966 he began again to speak of the Vietnam war as the sole obstacle in the way of improved relations with the United States. In his 3 August Supreme Soviet speech last year he based the increase in the Soviet military budget (which he described as "immense...it weighs heavily on the working people") solely on one specific situation--the Vietnam war. And while he scored U.S. "interference in the internal affairs of other nations," he did not follow Brezhnev's practice of elaborating upon such charges (such as U.S. support for Bonn "revanchists," etc.) and using such specific charges as the bases for increased Soviet defense spending. In fact, Kosygin went out of his way to acknowledge the presence of "sunder tendencies in Washington." He said he looked forward to the time when "sunder tendencies" would predominate over the "present... aggressive moods."

Kosygin's characteristic position on substantial cooperation after Vietnam was most recently renewed in response to a question posed during his 25 June 1967 news conference at the United Nations. He said that

the cause of the improvement of Soviet-American relations could best be served by one first step and that is an end to the American aggression in Vietnam and to improve those relations it is necessary first and foremost to end that war and then several--quite a big group of questions and steps could be charted which could all be designed to improve those relations and these questions could be the improvement of economic ties, cultural ties, technological exchanges and the solution of various important political issues which exist in the world today and which could be resolved through cooperation between the two nations.

Significantly, Kosygin's response was censored in TASS' 26 June version of the UN press conference which rendered his remarks on improving relations in a tougher, more

strident vein. TASS recorded Kosygin as stating that "it is impossible" to count on improved relations as long as the U.S. commits "aggression" against Vietnam. (A similar line was taken in an Izvestiya editorial on 30 June.) The TASS version altered Kosygin's remark on the possibility of mutual cooperation to read "cooperation between the two nations together with other nations."* And TASS deleted Kosygin's reassuring judgment, which followed his remarks on the possibility of Washington-Moscow cooperation, that "we are equally sure that the people of the United States [like the people of the Soviet Union] do not want war."**

Negotiations on Vietnam: The divergent conceptions held by Kosygin and Brezhnev on the nature of U.S.-USSR relations beyond Vietnam have recently been set against apparent differences on the possibility of East-West negotiations on the Vietnam war. Brezhnev has harshly debunked U.S. efforts to bring the issue to the table, while Kosygin has sought to use recent opportunities to try to commence discussions.

*On the subject of cooperation with capitalist states of Europe, Brezhnev and Podgorny in their 1967 election speeches stressed the line that the Soviet Union was acting jointly with other nations of the Warsaw Pact.

**Izvestiya on 26 June carried TASS' censored version of Kosygin's press conference and also quoted from President Johnson's 25 June remarks on the Glassboro talks, but Izvestiya did not cite the President's statements that his talks with Kosygin made the world a little less dangerous. Kosygin's judgment that Americans do not want war was not the conclusion drawn in a 19 August Pravda article by its correspondent Kurdyumov. Kurdyumov, who reported that he had sampled U.S. public opinion about the Vietnam war, concluded that the "majority is probably composed of those who have been deftly sold on the idea of imperialist superiority: America has never lost a war. How can it throw in the towel to the Viet Cong?"

The contrasts between the two leaders on this issue surfaced in the wake of Kosygin's February 1967 London discussions on the possibility of settling the Vietnam war. Brezhnev, in one particularly polemical passage in his March 1967 election speech, said that "now even the most naive people realize that U.S. ruling circles deceived the world and their own people when they stated that they were striving for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam issue." As if defending himself, Kosygin in his election speech explained that in early February 1967 "there appeared a real possibility of beginning talks on the Vietnam question...[and] only one thing was demanded of the leaders of the United States: that they...unconditionally halt their aggressive actions against the sovereign DRV. The American Government, however, did not make use of this opportunity."* Brezhnev, who did not discuss such a "real possibility" and unused "opportunity" to begin talks, concluded sharply that the alleged purposefully deceptive efforts of the U.S. leaders to try to "mislead naive people have crumbled." Kosygin plaintively concluded that the U.S. destroyed genuine "hopes" with what later proved to be "empty words calculated to deceive public opinion."**

On the general subject of the efficacy of negotiations, it is interesting to note that in his 19 June 1967 United Nations address Kosygin judged the peaceful resolution of "dangerous developments" in the Middle East, South-east Asia, or any other place" as an imperative of state policy. He went on to tell the delegates that

*Pravda correspondent Yuri Zhukov stated in a late June 1967 conversation with U.S. Senator Hartke that the resumption of bombing the DRV was "costly" to Kosygin "who staked his personal prestige on the effort" to commence negotiations.

**Similarly, Khrushchev was subjected to indirect but unmistakable attack in the journal Oktyabr after the 1960 U-2 incident for having been hoodwinked into accepting President Eisenhower's "talk about peace."