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China's Wary Approach to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ☐

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☐ Chinese leaders approach Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations cautiously and with suspicions that other countries will try to use a treaty to gain advantages over China:

- Chinese negotiators also proceed with extreme caution because Beijing has minimal experience in developing arms control regimes and a limited number of arms control specialists.
- ☐ China's prior negotiating behavior suggest to us that the leadership has waited to review other countries' proposals before finalizing their negotiating positions. ☐

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in October that China would not support conclusion of the treaty by a specific date but added that China will honor its commitment to work toward completion of a treaty by the end of the year. China plans to conduct more nuclear tests in 1996 than it has ever completed in one year so that it can finish testing nuclear warheads for missile systems under development. ☐

Chinese negotiators are trying to prohibit the use of National Technical Means (NTM) as a trigger for on-site inspections (OSI) and to proscribe what Beijing would view as unnecessary, excessive, or overly intrusive inspections. Based on Beijing's approach to a CTBT and other arms control regimes and statements by a Chinese nuclear weapons industry arms control expert, Chinese leaders are concerned about uneven enforcement of arms control regimes and attempts to collude against China:

- Chinese arms control negotiators' statements show that Beijing does not want NTM to be used as a trigger for OSIs because it views NTM as discriminatory. The Chinese are concerned that the United States can monitor other countries' tests at lower yields than any other nation, as well as evade the monitoring capabilities of other countries,

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Geneva. Beijing instead advocates developing the CTBT's International Monitoring System so that it has the capabilities necessary to ensure adherence.¹ China's approach to the CTBT suggests to us that Beijing, at most, would accept NTM's use if Beijing could veto inspections that are triggered by NTM information.

- China continues to support the "green light" approach to on-site inspections.² Beijing's objective of guarding itself from "excessive" or "intrusive" inspections suggests to us that it might allow a "red light" approval process if China could block inspections based on NTM information. []

Based on Chinese Conference on Disarmament negotiators' positions and Chinese arms control experts' statements [] we view Beijing as determined to preserve its nuclear deterrent by maintaining the reliability of its nuclear stockpile and to constrain other countries' ability to improve their nuclear capability relative to China. According to Chinese Conference on Disarmament negotiators' statements, Beijing is still evaluating the US zero-yield testing proposal. The Chinese nuclear weapons industry representative on the Conference on Disarmament delegation, however, noted the similarity of zero-yield to China's position of "no release of nuclear energy" and stated that Beijing will agree to the proposal:

- China is concerned because the United States has more testing experience, and it judges Washington has solved its safety and reliability problems and can take better advantage of hydrodynamic tests, [] control experts.
- [] China would agree to the US zero-yield proposal if Washington shares stockpile maintenance technology to improve warhead safety and reliability.

¹ The International Monitoring System will be established under a CTBT and will contain an international network of technical sensors--such as seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound--to monitor CTBT adherence. The CD delegations are still working out an agreement on what type of sensors will be included and where they will be located. []

² The "green light" approach requires CTBT Executive Council approval before initiation of OSIs. Under the "red light" approach, requested OSIs are conducted unless the council specifically disapproves. []

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3 [] China does not expect Washington to share this information and therefore plans to propose further restricting the zero-yield formula by also banning all nonnuclear tests of nuclear weapons. []

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[] Beijing is advocating a provision allowing Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) because it wants to retain the option of using such explosions for civilian purposes. Chinese officials have suggested to US experts that China would accept a ban on PNEs if there were provisions for its future renegotiation--indicating that Beijing might actually provide other concessions in exchange for a temporary ban. []
[] Beijing realizes its PNE proposal has no international support and will ultimately back away. []

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[] that China is more concerned about the reliability of nuclear weapons than their safety.
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