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CIA/CPAS NID 92-054JX

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Director of Central Intelligence

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Friday, 6 March 1992



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
CPAS NID 92-054JX

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


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Kazakhstan: More Waffling on Reducing Strategic Weapons 6




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KAZAKHSTAN: More Waffling on Reducing Strategic Weapons

President Nazarbayev [redacted] Kazakhstan would reduce the number of nuclear weapons on its territory under treaties signed by the former USSR but only in the same "proportion" as Russia, Ukraine, and Byelarus. He predicted it would take 15 to 20 years to eliminate them but said that might be reached earlier if China, US, UK, and Russia guaranteed Kazakh borders. He reaffirmed Kazakhstan's intent to engage in future arms talks, to not take part in nuclear proliferation, and to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nuclear-weapon state. [redacted]

Comment: Nazarbayev's pursuit of border guarantees and his statements [redacted] that Kazakhstan would eliminate strategic weapons within seven years after the START Treaty enters into force are being driven by several factors. Among the foremost are an interest in keeping the West focused on his country and a perception that Kazakhstan is threatened by powerful, possibly irredentist neighbors. Nazarbayev, however, currently lacks the military force to keep Moscow from removing these weapons under START. By seeking a role in future talks and insisting on signing the NPT as a weapon state, he is also trying to gain a greater voice in CIS defense decisionmaking. [redacted]

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6 March 1992