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Communist China's Foreign Policy

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COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

THE PROBLEM

To analyze the principles and forces which shape the formulation and conduct of Communist China's foreign policy and to estimate the probable course of that policy over the next two or three years.

CONCLUSIONS

A. We believe that the principal aims of Chinese Communist foreign policy over the next few years will be as follows: (a) to eject the West, especially the US, from Asia and to diminish US and Western influence throughout the world; (b) to increase the influence of Communist China in Asia; (c) to increase the influence of Communist China throughout the underdeveloped areas of the world; (d) and to supplant the influence of the USSR in the world at large, especially in the presently disunited Communist movement. (*Para. 1*)

B. These objectives, and the method and style with which they are pursued, are shaped by ideology, by Chinese tradition, by the apparatus of power which the present Chinese Communist leaders can bring to bear to achieve their ends, and by the personalities and experience of these leaders. As a result, their foreign policy in some ways resembles an international guerrilla struggle which attempts to wear down the enemy's strength by attacking the weak points. (*Paras. 2-16*)

C. For both ideological and nationalistic reasons, China regards the US as its primary enemy. Peiping's immediate security interest and the short reach of its military power lead it to concentrate its main foreign policy efforts on undermining the US position in the Far East, though in other parts of the world the Chinese Communists are also using such means as they have to weaken the US. Among other "capitalistic" nations, which Peiping sees as in some sense victims of

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US exploitation, Peiping tries simultaneously to build up recognition of China as a major power and to weaken the US position of leadership. (Paras. 17-20)

D. The USSR has come increasingly to rival the US as a dominant problem for Chinese foreign policy. China recognizes the USSR as a pioneer Communist nation and as the most powerful member of the Communist camp. Yet nationalistic and ideological factors join to create a strong enmity. The Chinese leaders will continue to seek the overthrow of the present Soviet leadership, but without great hope of seeing the emergence of new men who would follow the Peiping line. Elsewhere in the Communist world, Peiping will seek to dilute or supplant Soviet influence and to win over or split Communist parties and front movements. (Paras. 21-24)

E. Peiping has chosen the underdeveloped, ex-colonial world as its most advantageous arena of conflict. In this "Third World," the Chinese not only aim to erode US strength but to displace Soviet influence; they seek to establish themselves as the champions and mentors of the underdeveloped nations. The greatest impact of Peiping's policy is felt in Southeast Asia. The theater of primary interest is Indochina, where Peiping is seeking a decisive and humiliating defeat of the US. To date, the Chinese leaders have not made risky countermoves to the limited US attacks in North Vietnam, and they almost certainly seek to avoid a wider war. Nevertheless, they have been making preparations for at least limited engagement, and we believe that they would be prepared to risk a major military conflict with the US should they feel China's vital security interests threatened by US actions. (Paras. 25-28)

F. In the rest of Southeast Asia, unless the situation alters sharply, Peiping is likely to support policies designed to maintain and increase pressure against the US. Peiping seems to look on Africa as a second great area of opportunity and is likely to increase both its overt and subversive efforts on that continent. (Paras. 29-33)

G. As long as the present group of leaders remains in control, which is likely to be well beyond the period of this estimate, Peiping's dynamic and aggressive attitudes will persist. Moreover, though we have little information concerning the next generation of leaders, there are many reasons to believe that China's foreign policy will be assertive and uncompromising for a long time to come. (Para. 39)

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DISCUSSION

I. THE BASES OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY

1. The ultimate aim of Chinese Communist foreign policy is to establish a Communist world according to Peiping's militant revolutionary brand of Marxism-Leninism. But this is a distant objective; it is more a hope and a faith than an end or aim of immediate action. The more immediate aims seem to us to be as follows: (a) to eject the West, especially the US, from Asia and to diminish US and Western influence throughout the world; (b) to increase the influence of Communist China in Asia; (c) to increase the influence of Communist China throughout the underdeveloped areas of the world; (d) and to supplant the influence of the USSR in the world at large, especially in the presently disunited Communist movement.

2. These objectives, and the method and style with which they are pursued, are shaped by ideology, by Chinese tradition, by the apparatus of power which the present Chinese Communist leaders can bring to bear to achieve their ends, and by the personalities and experience of these leaders. In the following paragraphs we discuss these basic factors in more detail.

3. The Chinese leaders are dedicated, even fanatic, Communists. Belief in the righteousness of their cause, the correctness of their doctrine, and the certainty of eventual victory sustained them through the arduous and bloody 28-year struggle which brought them to control of the vast land and population of mainland China. Subsequent successes in consolidating their power at home, gaining a stalemate in Korea, challenging the USSR for leadership of the Communist movement, and humiliating India in the brief frontier hostilities of 1962 have further heightened their faith in the soundness of their interpretation of Communist doctrine. Although they have suffered a number of serious setbacks along the way, they believe that as long as these principles are correctly interpreted and applied, China can be confident of eventually gaining its long-range goal of a Communist world with its center in Peiping. This doctrinal faith gives a messianic cast to Communist China's foreign policy and provides it with great drive and staying power.

4. Peiping's world view is in large part shaped by Communist doctrine, which provides the framework for its appreciation of specific international situations. Communist ideology also influences its tactics and provides it with a particularly effective instrument for propaganda and subversion—especially important foreign policy tools for a nation which is not materially powerful on the world scene.

5. The Chinese part of the calculus brings in psychological, cultural, historic, and geopolitical factors which make Chinese Communist foreign policy a quite different thing from, say, Soviet or Polish Communist foreign policy. The Chinese leaders look back on at least three thousand years of cultural heritage. They have a strong sense of the centrality of their nation, history, and culture,

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and this feeling generates an arrogant and patronizing attitude toward other nations and peoples. It also makes them highly sensitive to any real or fancied slights or disrespect. Those characteristics, already visible in China's contacts with European "barbarians" in the 18th century, were intensified by the subsequent course of those relations. The imposition of foreign enclaves, spheres of influence, and extraterritoriality in the 19th and early 20th centuries has left scars and has led the Chinese to class themselves among the victims of colonialism and racial exploitation.

6. Peiping's policy is also shaped by what the Communists call "objective circumstances." One of these circumstances is that China is a materially underdeveloped country. Its armed forces cannot reach far beyond China's boundaries nor can they conduct the kind of technologically advanced warfare of which the US and the USSR are capable; hence China poses a direct military threat only in nearby parts of Asia. China is dependent on imports of equipment and techniques to modernize rapidly its economy and industrial technology; the virtual termination of Soviet cooperation in 1960 necessitated increased contacts with Western Europe and Japan to this end. China's agriculture has proved insufficient to feed a vast and expanding population, and this has forced Peiping to make extensive purchases of grain abroad. On the other hand, the very magnitude of China's population encourages Peiping's aspiration to become a dominant world power and enables the regime to accept manpower losses with limited qualms. This, along with the geographic size of the country, makes the Chinese leaders believe that China could, if necessary, absorb a tremendous amount of military punishment and, in the long run, still envelop and defeat an invading enemy. They have even issued optimistic statements about their ability to survive a nuclear attack.

7. The unique experience of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in fighting its way to power in over two decades of guerrilla warfare against vast odds has strongly conditioned the thinking of the Chinese leaders. Mao Tse-tung and his veteran colleagues have so adapted communism to reflect Chinese experience that in practice the Chinese and Communist ingredients are thoroughly mingled. To a considerable extent then, Peiping's foreign policy is a projection into the world arena of the principles and concepts developed in the prosecution of China's long civil war. Indeed, Communist China's foreign policy is primarily a strategy for revolutionary war. That is, it apparently is conceived in terms of conflict rather than of adjusting relations with other states by negotiations; revolutionary wars against those who align themselves with China's opponents are encouraged and supported; and any compromise or concession, except those made expedient by some tactical situation, is viewed as surrender. International politics is viewed as a great guerrilla struggle in which the opponent is to be constantly harassed and threatened.

8. The Chinese Communists have amply demonstrated their ability to concentrate on long-range goals in the face of seemingly hopeless odds and often at the expense of short-term gains. At the end of their Long March, when their forces had dwindled from over 300,000 to about 25,000, they kept working

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toward the day when they would control all China. They emphasized the concept of protracted struggle, holding that a unified and determined group following correct principles could in time wear down a divided and less dedicated enemy, no matter how great his initial superiority. They believe that a succession of defeats inflicted at points of enemy weakness will gradually erode his strength and eventually reduce him to absolute inferiority. This policy of patience and long-range perspective reflects both Communist and traditional Chinese ways of thinking.

9. An important concept which helps sustain the Chinese will in the face of indefinitely protracted struggle is expressed in Mao's admonition to have contempt for the enemy strategically but to respect him tactically. This means that the weaker force must have complete confidence in ultimate victory—it must have contempt for the will and staying power of the enemy. But in all actual engagements with the enemy on the road to that ultimate victory, the weaker force must be constantly conscious of the immediately superior strength of the enemy. Following this line, Peiping's foreign policy has grand and dangerous ambitions but is almost always cautious and realistic in practice.

10. The Chinese leaders acquired their present power through decades of violence, which leads them to lay great stress on the efficacy and necessity of using violence in pursuit of national aims. They feel that it is ineffective to modify the present world order; it must be destroyed and replaced by a Communist (Chinese-style) world order. Mao has said: "All power flows from the barrel of a gun." Having no stake in either the Western or Soviet systems of world order, the Chinese are relatively free to encourage and exploit chaos wherever they are able to do so. So far, they have not been able to organize much of the world on their pattern. This leaves them with limited responsibilities, free to pursue a guerrilla offensive—sniping, harassing, and exploiting the difficulties of those who defend the *status quo*. They are in the position of political "outs" attacking the "ins," blaming them for all the evils of a very imperfect world.

11. The Chinese Communist leaders view the nations of the world as falling into three groups: the Communist world, comprising China and the other Communist states; the capitalist world, comprising the US, Western Europe, the white nations of the British Commonwealth, and Japan; and the Third World, comprising the underdeveloped, ex-colonial, mostly nonwhite nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Eschewing traditional balance-of-power politics, Peiping has chosen to challenge the US and USSR simultaneously. Out of respect for their greatly superior material strength, Peiping strives to avoid a head-on military confrontation with either of them, choosing rather the Third World as its primary arena of contention. This also reflects a concept developed in the Chinese civil war, when the Communists conducted their struggle in the underdeveloped countryside rather than in the cities.

12. In the Third World, Peiping uses the full gamut of foreign policy instruments, selecting and mixing them according to local circumstances. The Chinese

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apparently place particular hope on the use of insurgency in this arena, holding that it is there rather than in the advanced capitalist countries that significant revolutionary pressures can be generated under present conditions. They try to promote and assist local "wars of liberation" wherever practicable. The Chinese have raised Mao's concept of guerrilla warfare to the level of a "law" of the process of world revolution.

13. The especial virtue of this method is that it can usually be pursued at low cost and little risk to Communist China. It uses local manpower and, as far as possible, local or captured equipment. Peiping provides training, advice, a limited amount of material, and massive propaganda support. With a small investment, Peiping has caused great trouble to anti-Communist forces in Africa and in Southeast Asia. The Chinese role in the Congo has been such that, should the insurrection there collapse, Peiping could disengage with little loss. In Vietnam, a number of other factors, including geographic proximity come into play, and the risks to Peiping are much greater.

14. As a totalitarian nation, Communist China pursues a total foreign policy; every act is seen as a political act. At the same time, it remains acutely aware of the pluralistic nature of most nations and uses its policy instruments selectively against different targets within each country. Diplomacy, trade and aid, propaganda in many forms, subversion, insurrection, the implied threat of military force, the spectre of approaching nuclear weapons capabilities—all these are used simultaneously and in varying proportions as deemed appropriate. Propaganda is an instrument particularly congenial to the evangelistic nature of Chinese communism, and it is suitable to a nation whose material power is limited. The Chinese use it with great skill. As one example, their ability to turn out a spectacular reception for visiting dignitaries, including masses of apparently enthusiastic people lining the streets, has had a marked effect on even so sophisticated a guest as Pakistan's Ayub Khan. Every Chinese who travels outside the country, from the urbane and subtle Chou En-lai to the lowliest acrobat, is an active agent of Peiping's propaganda.

15. In the employment of its various means of advancing its foreign policy, Peiping is generally flexible, practical, and opportunistic. Although the influence of the socio-economic theories of communism may occasionally lead the Chinese Communists to misread a particular situation, they do not let these theories seriously inhibit their choice of means for implementing their policies. Guided by the Communist operational code that the end justifies the means, they readily employ tactics which violate particular Communist theories, as in their implicit promotion of racial prejudice against the whites—even Communist Russians.

16. By pursuing its foreign policy persistently and energetically, Communist China has had much more impact on the world than its military and economic power would seem to justify. Both Washington and Moscow are focusing much of their attention on their various problems with Peiping. This results less from the potency of Chinese policy than from the peculiar vulnerability of the

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international order in present circumstances. The rapid dissolution of colonial empires in Africa and Asia has left a political vacuum, marked by uncertain and shifting national alignments and chronic instability. The new nations with their weak, inexperienced governments are highly vulnerable to Peiping's line. With large expectations and small capabilities, their people are frustrated by the *status quo* and naturally inclined to blame their woes on such external factors as colonialist exploitation and racial domination. It is not too hard to sell them radical "solutions" to their problems. And not least important is that in a war-rearing world, troublemakers who want to upset the existing order can get by with a great deal, not because of their wisdom or strength, but because of the reluctance of others to take up the challenge.

II. POLICY TOWARD THE CAPITALIST WORLD

17. Ideological and nationalistic compulsions converge to make the US Communist China's primary enemy. According to Communist doctrine, the US, as the leading "capitalist imperialist" power, is the devil which must be destroyed to demonstrate the correctness of Communist doctrine and to clear the way for Communist progress. From the point of view of Chinese nationalism, the US is the power which frustrates completion of the unification of China and blocks Chinese ambitions in Southeast Asia. The US presence in the Western Pacific appears to the Chinese Communists as the major military threat to their security. If China is to dominate the Far East, it must reduce and eventually eliminate US strength in the area.

18. Communist China's immediate security interests and the short reach of its military power lead Peiping to concentrate its main foreign policy efforts on changing the balance of forces in the Far East. It works unremittingly to stir up anti-American feeling among other Far Eastern peoples and to undermine US alliances and military base agreements. It expects in time to force the US to abandon Taiwan. At the moment, however, Peiping's policies are undergoing their most violent and dangerous test in Vietnam.

19. In other parts of the world, the Chinese Communists are using whatever means they can to weaken the US. Their aim is to foster and support anti-imperialist revolution where practicable, as a means of scattering and draining US strength and establishing the US in the eyes of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans as the white imperialist oppressor.

20. The rest of the so-called capitalist world is seen by Peiping as an intermediate zone comprised of countries which, while capitalist themselves, are also victims of US exploitation. Among these nations, Peiping tries simultaneously to build up China's position as a recognized power and to weaken the US position of leadership. Peiping has been quick to exploit and to encourage French actions disruptive of Western unity. The Chinese have played upon Western European interest in trade opportunities by sending wide-ranging purchasing missions which have aroused expectations far in excess of China's

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actual ability to buy. Competition for this new market leads Western and Japanese industrialists to pressure their governments for improved relations with Peiping.

III. POLICY TOWARD THE COMMUNIST WORLD

21. In recent years, the Soviet Union has come increasingly to rival the US as a dominant problem in Chinese foreign policy. In this case, too, nationalistic and ideological factors join to create strong enmity. Peiping now sees Moscow as a rival for leadership of the world Communist movement, as a dangerously degenerate force which threatens to lead the movement into a revisionist, neo-bourgeois dead-end, and as an unfaithful ally who refuses to lend proper support to legitimate Chinese objectives. The Chinese leaders are also well imbued with traditional anti-Russian feeling; they are acutely conscious of Tsarist territorial grabs, resentful of numerous indignities perpetrated by the Communist Russians, nervously aware of their long common boundary, and on guard against Russian subversion of China's border tribes. The bitter rivalry with the USSR sometimes diverts Chinese energies from their focus on the US, but often the same course of action can serve both anti-US and anti-Soviet ends, as it does in Vietnam. We believe that, unless a major international war breaks out, Peiping will continue its attacks on Soviet leadership beyond the period of this estimate.

22. Nonetheless, Peiping's attitude toward the Soviet Union is somewhat ambivalent. The USSR is recognized as the pioneer Communist nation and the most powerful member of the Communist camp. The Chinese regret that it is being led astray by revisionists and still hope that some day it will be run by men who will use Soviet power to support the Chinese line on world Communist policy. They also cherish the great strength inherent in an undivided world Communist movement. Yet the tactics they employ to undermine the present Soviet leadership tend to split and weaken the movement. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the nationalistic aspects of China's anti-Soviet feeling are directed at the Soviet state and people, not just the leaders.

23. The Chinese attack on Soviet leadership is conducted throughout the world and at all levels. Since at least 1960, the Chinese have striven with their limited assets to promote the overthrow of the Soviet leadership. They probably believe that they played a large part in the downfall of Khrushchev, and they probably do not expect Brezhnev and Kosygin to last long. It is unlikely, however, that they expect soon to see the USSR taken over by Soviet leaders who would follow the Peiping line. Within the Bloc, they encourage independence like that of Rumania and, where possible, defection to the Chinese side, as by Albania. In some non-Communist countries, e.g., Japan and New Zealand, they have captured the local Communist party; in others they are promoting party splits.

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24. In Communist front movements, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, they try to capture the leadership and swing the organization behind China's militant policies. They have had considerable success in limiting or barring Soviet participation in various Afro-Asian organizations and conferences. For the foreseeable future they are likely to continue their campaign to replace Soviet leadership in leftist movements throughout the world.

IV. POLICY TOWARD THE THIRD WORLD

25. "Asia, Africa, and Latin America" is a phrase which occurs with monotonous frequency, not only in Peiping's propaganda, but in its theoretical journals and domestic indoctrination programs. The Chinese leaders claim that the underdeveloped nations on these three continents represent three-fifths of the world and they reason that by getting most of these nations to follow the Chinese line Peiping can assure the eventual achievement of its goals. In this Third World, the Chinese not only aim to erode US strength, but to displace Soviet leadership of leftist movements; they also take up popular causes in the area and try to establish themselves as the champions and mentors of the underdeveloped nations. Seeking the broadest common denominator, Peiping avoids emphasis on formal communism and instead stresses anti-imperialism, national liberation, and less openly, anti-white feeling.

26. The greatest impact of Peiping's policy, as might be expected, is felt in nearby parts of Asia, and the theater of primary interest at present is Vietnam. Although Peiping is undoubtedly very much interested in adding South Vietnam to the Asian Communist bloc, it is probably even more concerned about how developments in Vietnam affect Peiping's struggles against Washington and Moscow. Indeed, many North Vietnamese leaders almost certainly have doubts that Peiping's policies are consistently in Hanoi's best interest.

27. Peiping sees the Vietnam struggle as an opportunity to demonstrate to all doubters the correctness of its line that the US is a "paper tiger," and that a properly conducted "war of liberation" can be brought to a successful conclusion, in spite of US opposition, without bringing on a major international war. Peiping now appears to be seeking a decisive and humiliating defeat of the US. If a Communist victory could be brought off in South Vietnam in the face of US military power, Peiping would have made a major advance in world affairs. The Chinese line in the Communist dispute would be vindicated, Soviet pretensions to leadership of the world movement would be discredited, US capability to counter local guerrilla insurrections would be placed in doubt throughout the world, and US prestige seriously damaged. Peiping's arrogance and aggressiveness would increase, while its efforts to take over leadership in the Communist movement and in the Third World would be greatly advanced. Communist failure to achieve their objectives in South Vietnam, on the other hand, would tend to discredit the Chinese before other Communists and in the Third World and to check their momentum in world affairs. Thus, to the Chinese leaders the present struggle involves vastly greater stakes than the control of South Vietnam.

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28. Peiping also is almost certainly anxious to avoid escalation of the Vietnamese struggle into a major Sino-US war, which might destroy China's painfully acquired industrial and advanced weapons facilities and prove the Chinese line on world Communist policy to have been dangerously wrong. While the Chinese may be quite confident that a wider war can be avoided, they have been making preparations for the possibility of at least a limited engagement growing out of US attacks against North Vietnam. To date, they have not made risky countermoves to the limited US air strikes in central North Vietnam. Nevertheless, we believe that the Chinese leaders would be prepared to risk a major military conflict with the US should they feel their vital security interests threatened by US actions. The Communists almost certainly feel that the tide is running strongly in their favor in South Vietnam. They therefore are almost certainly giving the Viet Cong and North Vietnam every encouragement to hold on in the face of US bombings and to sustain or step up their pressures in the South. In the meantime, they will continue to do what they can to maximize international and US domestic pressures for cessation of US bombings and for US withdrawal from Vietnam.

29. In the rest of Southeast Asia, unless the situation alters sharply, Peiping is likely to continue its current policies. It will continue to support Indonesia's aggressive, anti-Western policies while seeking to control the costs and risks to Communist China. It will also support the growth in power of the Peiping-oriented Indonesian Communist Party. In the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation, Peiping sees the prospect of a conflict which could further undermine the US-UK position in the area at little or no cost to China. The Chinese will continue trying to pressure Thailand; they will encourage increased dissident activity and from time to time issue threats and warnings. They also will probably continue their guarded tolerance of Ne Win's regime in Burma. Peiping will encourage Prince Sihanouk's anti-US activities but probably will stop short of any firm commitments which might involve it too deeply. In the Philippines, Peiping will continue its efforts to promote leftward trends and anti-Americanism, but probably without notable success.

30. In northeast Asia, the important target is prosperous, capitalist Japan. Peiping takes a long view and is prepared to go a step at a time toward the distant goal of a Communist Japan. During the next few months, the stress will be on disrupting Japan's relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan by such tactics as insisting on Japanese Government guarantees on loans for major Communist Chinese purchases. Peiping will support and sharpen nationalist and leftist demands for termination of the US-Japan defense treaty and removal of US military bases from Japan and Okinawa, but with little prospect of success during the period of this estimate. Peiping will continue to be the dominant influence on the Japanese Communist Party and will keep striving to increase its influence in the Socialist Party and other leftist groups and to sow dissension within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

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31. In South Asia, China will continue to woo Pakistan and to play upon Pakistan's fear of India and the effects of US military aid to India. It will carry on its feud with India but probably will not initiate hostilities. It may encourage the leftwing Communists in India to increase their anti-government activity, and, perhaps, turn to violence. Against the small Himalayan states, which form an outer zone for India, it will continue its steady pressures in order to draw them under increasing Communist influence. Peiping, which had considerable influence in the Bandaranaike government in Ceylon, will probably promote strikes and other forms of resistance to the new government of Dudley Senanayake.

32. In Peiping's view, Africa is the second great area of opportunity. Considering that Peiping's serious bid for significant influence there is only two or three years old, its impact has been remarkable. This is in large part a function of the great vulnerability of the area; nonetheless, Peiping's flexibility in exploiting widely varied opportunities is noteworthy. In some countries, such as Congo (Brazzaville) and, until recently, Burundi, it used bribery to great advantage. In others, it has used economic aid, managing to get considerable political mileage out of its offers. China has made these offers on a no-strings basis, some in the form of grants but most in the form of credits on comparatively generous terms. Although Peiping's military aid is largely clandestine, it is known to be supplying arms to active or potential revolutionaries in several African nations, including the Congo (Leopoldville) and Mozambique.

33. Peiping has succeeded in winning recognition from many of the new African nations and will continue its efforts to win over others. Substantial African support exists for a UN seat for Communist China. Where Peiping has embassies, it uses overt diplomacy with some success. Exchange visits of national leaders have proved effective. Premier Chou En-lai has visited Africa twice in the past year, and a number of African leaders have been flattered with spectacular receptions in Peiping. Communist China subsidizes several African journals and floods the continent with Chinese propaganda literature. Africans are brought to China for training in subversion and guerrilla warfare. A few others are subsidized for study at Chinese universities. The student program has had spotty success, with many of the African students returning disillusioned and anti-Chinese. During the next few years, Peiping is likely to increase its efforts in Africa substantially.

34. In Latin America, Peiping will also seek to cause trouble for the US. It will probably also seek to improve relations with some existing Latin American governments, particularly if this involves a worsening of relations between them and the US. In general, however, Peiping faces a more stable social order in Latin America than in Africa, and there will be fewer openings to exploit. In further contrast, most Latin American countries already have long-established Communist parties with ties to Moscow; the focus of Peiping's effort among

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these parties will probably be to gain footholds, to try to subvert them from Moscow where possible, and to foster splinter parties where it cannot—as it has already done in Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil. Peiping will also continue present efforts to increase its influence in Argentina's Peronista movement. Sino-Cuban relations appear to have deteriorated sharply in the last few months. If this trend continues, Peiping's Latin American program may be impeded by Castroite opposition.

V. POLICY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

35. The UN at once attracts and repels the Chinese Communists. They feel a mission to occupy China's seat as one of the big five in the UN. They will continue to seek international support for their membership, partly as a matter of prestige, and partly to create problems for the US. However, they still bitterly resent the UN effort against them in Korea and are stung by the annual humiliation of being rejected for membership. They particularly object to the UN's peacekeeping activities, which they consider are performed at the behest of the US and which are aimed at damping down the very kind of disorders the Chinese wish to promote.

36. Peiping sees its fundamental interest not in being a part of an increasingly effective UN, which has no part in the Chinese Communist long-range world view, but in using the UN in the short run and eventually destroying it. It is clearly not prepared to pay a price for admission. On the contrary, it asks a price—the expulsion of Nationalist China—for joining. The Chinese Communist leaders feel that, although they can continue to get along outside the UN, the UN will be hard pressed to function as a world organization while a nuclear power controlling nearly one-quarter of the world's population remains outside. The recent addition of Indonesia's 105 million people to China's group of outsiders—a move Peiping applauded—doubtless strengthens this confidence.

37. The Chinese Communist leaders view international conferences on nuclear disarmament with similar cynicism. While they appreciate that total nuclear disarmament would greatly reduce the gap between Chinese and US military potential, they also realize that such disarmament is highly unlikely in the next few years (they would almost certainly refuse to accept meaningful inspection of their own facilities). Thus their propaganda support of complete nuclear disarmament is no more than a means of winning credit with the neutralists and have-nots who want to see US and Soviet stockpiles destroyed.

38. A significant, longer term gambit which the Chinese may be undertaking is a sort of extortion aimed at ending US protection of Taiwan. They have hinted that they may refuse to enter any agreement for the renunciation of nuclear weapons while the US stands between them and the "recovery" of the island. They hope thus to marshal increasing pressure against the US position and to weaken Taiwan's defense.

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VI. LONG-RANGE PROSPECTS

39. As long as the present group of hard-line, Long-March veterans remains in control of Communist China, which is likely to be well beyond the period of this estimate, Peiping's dynamic, aggressive policies will be continued, possibly even accelerated. How the succeeding generation of leaders will act is uncertain, as we know little about them. Their lack of experience in the outside world, however, and their many years of one-sided indoctrination do not give much promise of a favorable change. Furthermore, there are no short-range solutions for China's food and population problems, and such psychological factors as the arrogance arising from the Chinese sense of superiority as a people and as the guardians of "true" communism will inhibit the development of a spirit of cooperation and compromise for a long time to come.

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
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