The Chinese Cultural Revolution
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# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCUSSION</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. THE COURSE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. MAJOR EFFECTS ON THE SYSTEM AND THE SOCIETY</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Consequences for the Leadership</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Damage to the Party Structure</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Military Involvement</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Costs to the Economy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Foreign Policy</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. General Effects on Society</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE OUTLOOK</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSIONS

A. The political crisis in China continues. No end is in sight. Among the several possible outcomes, no one is distinctly more likely than others. But whatever its ultimate resolution, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has already done immense damage to the top leadership and the party, has profoundly altered the internal power structure, has greatly unsettled all levels of Chinese society, has unleashed new forces of instability, and has contributed to China's growing isolation in the world.

B. We have no evidence that the Cultural Revolution has yet had any significant effects on the military capabilities of the PLA or on China's advanced weapons programs. But the PLA is assuming more and more noncombat tasks and if this trend long continues it would almost certainly affect its combat capabilities.

C. Instability and confusion are likely to persist so long as Mao retains sufficient power and vigor to push his designs for remoulding the party and combating real and imagined threats to his doctrines and policies. Mao could misjudge his power position and go too far. He is now heavily dependent on the military for support; too vigorous efforts to bridle the armed forces could produce a coup against Mao or even fragmentation of the country and civil war. But these are extreme cases and we think it more likely that a basic tendency toward preservation of national unity will persist, despite the divisive impact of the Cultural Revolution.

D. Looking beyond Mao, the Cultural Revolution has made it more likely that the succession will be a disorderly and contentious struggle. The military may play a decisive role, but Lin Piao would not necessarily be their candidate. A collective including Chou
En-lai, some of the military leaders, and even some of the now disgraced party figures, might emerge. In any event we believe that many of Mao's dogmas and practices are likely to be set aside. This might be a gradual process, though it could come more rapidly if unresolved internal and external problems have been aggravated during the last months or years of Mao's rule.

E. The political crisis has already focused the leadership's energies and attention on internal affairs and has at least temporarily damaged Chinese prestige abroad. Within this context, however, China has maintained a relatively active foreign policy, though it has become more rigid in international Communist affairs. For the most part Peking has maintained policy positions which were well established before the Cultural Revolution began. As long as the Maoists retain control, Peking is unlikely to make any important changes in the general line of its foreign policy. At any rate, in the short term, an unremitting hostility to the US and the USSR is likely to remain the predominant feature of Chinese foreign policy. It is possible, however, that over the longer term, internal changes in the direction of moderation, if they do occur, will create more favorable conditions for reappraising foreign policy and perhaps for introducing elements of greater moderation.
DISCUSSION

1. Only two years ago, the fortunes of Communist China seemed to be rising. Internally, the economy was recovering from the disasters of the Great Leap Forward and the split with the USSR. Chinese scientists had already exploded their first atomic device. Even the problem of succession to the aging Mao seemed to be safely resolved in favor of Liu Shao-chi and a unified collective leadership. Externally, China was making progress in its dispute with the USSR: Khrushchev, the arch-enemy, had fallen in disgrace; several Asian Communist Parties adhered to China's bloc and there was support and sympathy from a wide variety of other Communists in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. In Vietnam, the success of the Viet Cong promised early vindication of Mao's line on armed liberation. Trends in Djakarta also held out the prospect of a Communist success that would outflank all of Southeast Asia.

2. Now the outlook for China has been drastically altered. Its leadership is in a sorry condition. The Chief of State and the General Secretary of the party are in disgrace, accused of treachery. Old revolutionary war heroes are discredited. Promising situations abroad have turned sour and foreign friends have been alienated. China is nearly isolated. For a few weeks early in 1967 there were serious and widespread disorders. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has plunged China into the greatest political crisis in the regime's 17-year history.

1. THE COURSE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

3. In retrospect, it seems likely that tensions have been building up in the political leadership during the years after the collapse of the Great Leap Forward and the humiliating retreat from that policy. A degree of stability and order was achieved, but at the cost of abandoning many of Mao's programs. During this period Mao was remarkably withdrawn, though the various political and ideological campaigns came and went. It may be that Mao's political powers were partially circumscribed and his initiatives blunted. It is likely, as the posters have claimed, that some of his lieutenants did not consult him regularly and thus took some decisions out of his hands. This probably led Mao to seek means to reassert his authority and doctrines over the country.

4. Mao has an almost mystical faith in what mobilized and indoctrinated masses can accomplish. This lay behind such movements as the Leap Forward and the Socialist Education campaign, a precursor of the Cultural Revolution. His approach stresses ideological indoctrination and the inevitability of struggle in political development. Indeed, his preoccupation with "contradictions" may have led him to exaggerate the dangers of capitalistic and bourgeois remnants in China. Thus, he has insisted on "uninterrupted revolution" as the means to combat what he sees as a persistent threat from the right. Others among
the leadership apparently believed that these matters could and should be submerged in the interest of getting on with the business of constructing a modern China.

5. In any case, Mao's dissatisfaction with the political situation must have been growing. We know from his conversations with foreign visitors that he was brooding over China's future. He indicated his concern over how little time might be left for him to complete his revolution. He expressed particular concern over the outlook of the younger generation, untried in revolution. And he was more and more obsessed that Soviet-style revisionism might infect China, especially after his death. Many of the themes which became prominent in the Cultural Revolution were strikingly expressed in the polemics with the USSR, especially in mid-1964.

6. It was in this state of latent tensions that new policy issues must have aggravated differences within the top command in Peking. The Vietnam war in particular and the threat of a war with the US were such issues. Related to them was the question of joint action in Vietnam with the USSR. Then, there was the practical question of a third Five-Year Plan. Perhaps the debacle in Indonesia added to the strains. Mao's suspiciousness may have led him to interpret policy disagreement as disloyalty. But in any event, by September-November 1965, Mao had apparently decided to make a move against his opponents. Whether these policy differences were the reason or merely the opportunity to open the attack is unclear. Mao may have decided sometime earlier, in the aftermath of the Great Leap, that his opposition in the party had to be removed if his general line were to be implemented.

7. An underlying issue must have been the question of Mao's successor. For years it had been widely known that Mao had designated Liu Shao-chi. But as his distrust of the party apparatus grew, he began to build up the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a model of orthodoxy and to enhance the prestige of its leader, Marshal Lin Piao. This situation added to the contention and struggle and became particularly acute after the Central Committee plenum last August, which confirmed Liu as the heir apparent. Those who had staked their careers on Liu were struggling to survive his decline and downfall, and those around Lin were probably trying to capitalize on his new prominence. As a consequence, political maneuverings have been tense and convoluted. Not only were leaders acting to protect their own careers, but we assume that, wherever possible, they took the opportunity to embarrass or eliminate rivals. The curious charges against implausible culprits suggests that many attacks were designed to settle old scores. We cannot completely discount repeated references to an attempted "coup" in February 1966. At that time Mao may have detected moves that he interpreted as attempts to usurp his power. Or, more likely, those leaders who saw themselves threatened by the campaign launched in the fall of 1965 may have taken defensive measures to counter Mao.

8. The Cultural Revolution has passed through various phases. When it first became public in the spring of 1966, it appeared limited to bringing down the
intellectuals and the party propaganda and cultural apparatus. By June, it had claimed the powerful Peng Chen and his Peking Party apparatus as major victims. In August, the Mao/Lin Piao forces won a showdown in the Central Committee. Despite the resulting demotion of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, party opposition appeared to be widespread in the provinces. The Red Guards were then unleashed for a frontal assault on the party apparatus. The immediate results were inconclusive and in October and November the extremes of the Red Guard movement were moderated. A new escalation followed in December when the revolutionary organizations were turned loose on the hitherto exempt factories and countryside, although the impact on the latter was somewhat less. By January the revolution was at its high tide, and party leaders were being deposed on a large scale, possibly with some PLA assistance. Disorder, confusion, and resistance were growing space.

9. A major retreat then occurred as the PLA was brought in to restore order. In the process some Red Guard and "revolutionary" organizations were suppressed in the interests of stability. In the ensuing countercurrent, even Madame Mao criticized the "anarchy" of the young revolutionaries. The party cadres were granted a temporary reprieve from attacks and some were installed in positions of authority. But for many, the respite did not last. In March, some Red Guard units that had been criticized in February resumed limited and more controlled action, and senior governmental officials were again brought under heavy attack.

10. The situation remains highly fluid. The top leadership has not been stabilized; the purge has yet to run its course and may be intensified even within the PLA; struggles over the pace and direction of the revolution continue. The shape of the governing and control institutions and their political composition is still being worked out. Mao's revolutionary followers appear to be locked in intramural struggles for position and confusion continues. The restoration of regime authority throughout China remains a serious problem for the Maoists. Above all, the mental attitudes and physical health of Mao are uncertain.

11. To the degree that the Cultural Revolution represents a last effort by Mao and his supporters to determine the future of China, then they have scored a Pyrrhic victory at best. Mao has succeeded in tearing apart the bureaucratic apparatus. It is questionable, however, whether he can find experienced or talented people who are also loyal Maoists to reinvigorate the old party machine, to replace it, or to build a parallel power structure. The young activists have been treated to a taste of revolution, but thus far they have not inherited real power. Indeed, the more traditional forces, the PLA as well as what remains of the bureaucracy, seems to have proved indispensable. Without them China might have degenerated into chaos. Thus, after more than 18 months of revolutionary turmoil, Mao is still a long way from achieving his ultimate objectives.
II. MAJOR EFFECTS ON THE SYSTEM AND THE SOCIETY

A. Consequences for the Leadership

12. The party purge has virtually demolished the top leadership. Within the Central Committee, no more than one-third of the members are apparently in good standing. Of the 25 members installed in the politburo in August 1968, only 7 are still clearly in good standing; 6 appear to have been purged, and the remainder have come under varying degrees of attack. There seems to be no clear pattern in these actions. Hard line leftists and presumably loyal Maoists have fallen; while some leaders who were thought to be more moderate have survived. The beneficiaries of one round of the purge have turned out to be the next victims. In some cases, leaders who were purged many years ago have been reinstated and assumed important posts.

13. In any event, Mao has stripped away much of the experienced command that has run China for the past decade or more. He is now relying on a small, incongruous group headed by Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, and including Mao's wife, his ghost writer and ideologue Chen Po-ta, and Kang Sheng, a party secretary with long associations with the secret police. Beyond this hard core, there has been no stable group that can be identified, and there are probably divisions and rivalry within the hard core.

14. Mao has not only demonstrated his ability to bring down prestigious leaders but also his willingness to do it regardless of their position or previous association with him. In these circumstances no one, including Chou En-lai and Lin Piao, can be sure of the future. There must be a great reluctance at all levels to assume responsibility or to take initiatives. The surviving leadership probably works in an atmosphere of deep mutual suspicion with personal survival an ever present concern. This situation must be having highly adverse effects on the decision-making process at the national level. Not only are many of the most experienced officials now in disgrace, but those remaining must find it difficult to carry on objective discussions on key economic, military, and foreign policy issues in the midst of the strain and suspicion induced by the Cultural Revolution.

B. Damage to the Party Structure

15. Mao probably launched his attack on the party not only to reduce its role, at least temporarily, but also to reconstitute its leadership. The extent and the tenacity of the opposition, however, may have forced Mao to widen his campaign beyond what he originally intended and to resort to mass action against the party by extra-party instruments. Even party officials spared in the purge have been humiliated by criticism and self-criticism. The result has been confusion in the party's chain of command, depressed morale, and a general erosion of authority throughout the apparatus.

16. It is possible that Mao intends to restore the party apparatus to its former place of authority. This could be a long and difficult process, particularly if the
central authority should itself lack strength and unity. At present the party apparatus is discredited and must contend with an atmosphere conditioned by Mao's own attacks on the principle of unquestioned obedience to party authority. By undermining one of the main props of his power, and gaining the enmity of party leaders, Mao has made himself more dependent on the military.

C. Military Involvement

17. The PLA now occupies an important, perhaps decisive role in Peking and throughout China. On the political front it has assumed a leading position in the provisional administrative organs now being set up. Moreover, it has been assigned administrative and control functions in economic and public security activities throughout the country. Thus far the PLA's primary action has been to restore order and maintain stability. But in assuming much of the party's function as an organ of control, the PLA has greatly enhanced its already powerful position.

18. The chaos of recent months, however, has also raised doubts about the cohesion of the PLA's top leadership. Factionalism has already appeared at this level and there have been purges of important military figures. Although the numbers do not compare to the losses in the party, the total may be large. Some military leaders may have been implicated because of close personal ties with disgraced party figures, others may have opposed the Cultural Revolution within the army, and still others may have been reluctant to see the PLA used in the political struggle. Thus far, the PLA has generally responded to Peking directives and authority.

19. A factor which continues to be divisive in the military leadership is the old issue of whether to stress political indoctrination at the expense of professional training. It also seems likely that a broader range of issues was in dispute; for example, the introduction of large-scale US forces in the Vietnam war probably provoked debate over the likelihood of war with the US and the proper Chinese response. In this context, the advisability of "joint action" with the USSR was almost certainly debated, both within the PLA and the top political leadership. Whatever the issues, the PLA has demonstrated that it is not immune to the policy differences that are troubling the regime. While this is not entirely a function of the Cultural Revolution, the confusion of the campaign brought latent problems to the surface and accentuated the policy disputes.

20. We have no evidence that the Cultural Revolution has yet had any significant effects on the military capabilities of the PLA or on China's advanced weapons programs. But the PLA is assuming more and more noncombat tasks and if this trend long continues it would almost certainly affect its combat capabilities.

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1 These organs are the "three-way alliances" which are made up of military personnel, representatives of the revolutionary masses, and party and governmental cadre who are considered revolutionary.
D. Costs to the Economy

21. Despite the radical tone of the Cultural Revolution, the regime's economic policies have continued generally moderate. This probably reflects, in part at least, a realistic appreciation of the dangers to the country that would result from serious disruptions in agriculture and industrial production. Therefore, the Cultural Revolution was not directed into the farms and factories until the end of 1966. Confusion was immediate and affected many areas. Workers left their jobs; rail transport was interrupted; peasants demanded more grain; and production was disrupted as workers demanded more benefits. These were partly spontaneous reactions. But, in addition, many local party authorities, fearing for their own positions, connived to encourage the workers and peasants in their demands, hoping to spread confusion and thereby force Peking to pull back.

22. For a time, Peking attempted to maintain both production and a high level of revolutionary activity. By late January, however, the serious disruptions brought a moderating response from Peking. As has come to be expected, Chou En-lai served as the voice of moderation, taking a stand that inevitably had the effect of pointing up the hazards of radical actions not only in the economy but elsewhere as well. Although this point of view has since lost ground to a resurgence of the radicals, the economy is still being protected from extreme policy shifts.

23. The army was brought in to restore order and to transmit economic directives, particularly in those areas where the party has lost control. The test of this expedient is yet to come. While the army has the power generally to maintain order and enforce rulings from above, it would be surprising if the PLA suddenly displayed talents for managing the increasingly diversified economy. Nevertheless, there appears little alternative to the PLA replacing civilian authority wherever the latter is ineffective in managing production. Based on the reports received to date, the army has more often been involved in a propaganda role. Where it has been involved in coordinating or supervisory work, the military has created frictions because of its lack of flexibility and experience.

24. We cannot quantify the costs of the relatively limited disruptions which occurred last winter or the continuing deleterious effects of uncertain or inexpert management and administration of the economy, but they surely have been significant. Transport and communications, food distribution, and foreign trade have all been adversely affected for short periods. Industry and agriculture may have been more seriously affected: industry probably showed little or no increase during the last quarter of 1966 and the first quarter of 1967, and in agriculture the disruptions during winter and early spring may have affected planning and preparations for spring farm work.

25. While the regime is now exercising prudence with respect to the economy, it is also condemning Liu Shao-chi for allegedly following the same course in

We cannot be sure, therefore, that the restraints now in force on economic policy are secure against further, and more serious, attacks from Mao. Chou has shown remarkable finesse, presumably with Mao's approval, in thus far blunting any radicalization of economic policy. But as long as Mao lives, such a possibility will remain a significant threat. If Mao should decide on a production upsurge in the manner of the Leap Forward, we would expect a prompt deterioration in the economy.

E. Foreign Policy

26. It is likely that foreign policy issues played a role in dividing the leadership. It is obviously absurd to credit Liu Shao-chi and his followers with all the pro-Soviet, procapitalist, and capitulationist type policies contained in current charges. Even so, it is probable that there were high-level critics of Mao's basic line, which resulted in the loss of Soviet military, technical, and economic assistance. By early 1966, China's attempt to take a leading role in the world revolutionary movement was failing, with consequent losses to Chinese prestige, particularly in the case of the Indonesian fiasco. But most critical, the Maoist line had left China with few friends or allies at the very moment when the dangers to China, because of the increased US involvement in Vietnam, were becoming the most acute since 1950.

27. The political crisis has focused the leadership's energies and attentions on internal affairs. Within this context, China has maintained a relatively active foreign policy, though it has become more rigid in international Communist affairs. In general, its actions have tended to consist of positions and policies well established before the Cultural Revolution began. The more rigid policy toward the Communist world has permitted the USSR to score heavily in the world Communist movement at China's expense. Even among Asian Communists, China has lost friends. In the rest of the world, the excesses of the Red Guards severely damaged China's image and added to its already declining prestige.

28. For the North Vietnamese, the Cultural Revolution has introduced tension and doubts about China's reliability. Moreover, the vehemence of Peking's anti-Soviet line must emphasize to Hanoi its tenuous position on the end of a long supply line maintained by bitterly quarreling allies. We cannot be very certain of how the Cultural Revolution has affected China's position on Vietnam. They almost certainly will continue to support Hanoi and to urge a protracted war.

29. As long as the Maoists retain control, Peking is unlikely to make any important changes in the general line of its foreign policy, despite its growing isolation and lack of notable successes. In fact, the Cultural Revolution can be interpreted as an effort to provide the revolutionary successors and the internal orthodoxy which will insure the continuation of the foreign policy developed over the last seven or eight years. This policy involves unrelenting and
uncompromising struggle for preeminence within the international Communist camp and for leadership within the Afro-Asian world, hostility toward the US and the USSR, and selective peaceful coexistence with the rest of the world.

F. General Effects on Society

30. Even before the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese people were showing increasing disenchantment with the recurrent burdens of mass campaigns and incessant ideological exhortations. Now, the eulogies to Mao and his thought have become so extreme as to mock all belief and the use of terror against respected elders must have shocked and repelled much of the population. The intellectuals bore the initial brunt of the Red Guards, the government bureaucracy was drawn in later, and most of the urban populace has been touched in some way. Of the 600 million people who reside in rural China, relatively few felt the impact of the revolutionary activity, which was essentially an urban phenomenon. But few people in China could have escaped the message that Mao was having trouble with long trusted leaders; to some degree at least peasant faith in the wisdom and effectiveness of the leadership must have suffered.

31. The evidence of January indicates that once the workers and peasantry realized that they were being encouraged to attack the authorities, the campaign quickly degenerated into a loss of discipline and order. The swift spread of insecurity, confusion, and disrespect of authority must have jolted many in Peking, if not Mao and his most zealous supporters. At any rate, Peking promptly retreated and it was at this juncture that the FLA was called into the picture.

32. Another group that may pose a continuing problem is the students. While the excitement of "rebellion against authority" has probably distracted students temporarily, they will realize, if or when things quiet down, that they have been shunted aside and have lost educational and employment opportunities. This will add to the frustrations of this group.

Perhaps equally important, the long disruption in the schools is causing China to slip behind in its effort to overcome shortages in trained manpower. This could have serious longer range consequences for research and development in both the industrial and military sectors.

III. THE OUTLOOK

33. Internal Politics and Policies. The prospects are that, so long as his health permits him to exercise active leadership, Mao will maintain a continuing high level of tensions while some of those around him try to moderate the pace and mitigate the damage. Autocratic though he may be, Mao appears to retain enough political flexibility to respond to forces about him and to be influenced by those colleagues who have his ear. As the creator and prime mover of the Cultural Revolution, he must feel his campaign is far from finished. Thus, there will probably continue to be fluctuations between more radical initiatives and periods of consolidation or retreat. We cannot predict precise tactics or individual victims at the top. But we can be fairly confident that as long as
Mao is capable of political command, China's situation will probably be tense and inherently unstable.

34. Although the events of the past year and a half have resulted in a surprising degree of political instability in China, we do not believe such drastic developments as civil war or fragmentation along regional lines are likely. We do feel, however, that if Mao and his followers attempt to purge the military with the harshness they applied to the party, there is a good chance that they would face defiance and resistance. This might lead to regional alliances and loss of control at the center, or a military coup.

35. The present prospect of continuing instability under Mao would become even more certain should Mao's health decline and a long interregnum occur. It is difficult to estimate the prospects for Mao's health. Obviously, at 73, his health is subject to sudden deterioration. If he were to linger on, as Lenin did, then factionalism would almost certainly grow as each leader sought to secure his position through appropriate alliances. The possibility of a coup would exist and its realization might depend on whether Mao could be maneuvered out without a struggle. An extremely critical situation could develop if the leaders tried to set Mao aside during a period of poor health, and he revived enough to fight back. If such a period were prolonged, one consequence might be the decline of Peking's authority throughout China.

36. If Mao dies in the near future we would still expect the succession to be disorderly and contentious. Lin Piao is the chosen heir, but he would face a severe test. We are not convinced that he has the political acumen or physical stamina to survive the tough infighting that is likely to follow Mao's death. His chances may depend to a great extent on whether he can command the political support of the PLA, particularly if at that time the party is still in a weakened state. Recent events, however, suggest that factionalism based on personal rivalries and policy conflicts have occurred in the army as they have elsewhere.

37. Also in the near term, Chou En-lai is a figure to be reckoned with. His staying power and abilities are well known. More than any other leader at present, Chou seems to have the versatility and skill to grasp the levers of power and steer the country toward more moderate policies. He too, however, would probably have to count on the PLA for political support. Indeed, it is possible that his survival thus far reflects a working arrangement between Chou and his government bureaucracy and some of the military leaders. Chou appears in good health despite his 62 years, but the past year has subjected him to long work days and incessant stress.

38. It is also possible that after a long period of domination by Mao, the political and military leaders would be inclined toward a greater measure of collective leadership. This tendency would probably be strengthened if Mao's excesses continue for some time. In any case, considerable political maneuvering is likely and almost certainly no single leader will assume the powers and wield the influence that Mao has had.
39. The composition of the post-Mao leadership will, of course, have a great bearing on the direction of Chinese policies. Once Mao leaves the scene, however, we believe many of the uniquely Maoist dogmas and practices are likely to expire with him, not only because they have been discredited in the Cultural Revolution but also because they are not relevant to the emerging realities of social and economic development. Indeed, the fact that the Cultural Revolution was necessary demonstrates that perpetuating Mao's revolution depends to a great extent on his person. Even if Lin Piao gains power, we would still expect a movement away from the extremes of Maoist internal policies. We cannot say how fast or how far this process would develop. In the near term, it might unfold gradually. If Mao stays on for some longer period, then the process might be much more rapid, particularly if unresolved internal and external problems have been aggravated during the last months or years of Mao.

40. If the party is still enfeebled at the time of change, the army would probably assume a stronger role in policymaking. In our view, there is probably a cautious group within the PLA who would be inclined to find common ground with moderate political leaders. We would not rule out that the net result of the succession struggle would be to create a military regime in China.

41. Economic constraints will impose limits on China's policies. Since the "Great Leap," Peking has used moderate policies to restore living standards and to organize its resources for renewed economic development. A continuation of these policies could probably secure modest economic growth. Most Chinese will judge any government on its ability to help them meet their basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter.

42. Radical policies which seek more ambitious economic goals could not be long maintained if, in the face of population pressures, they reduce or even interrupt the growth of production. Mao's "Leap Forward" approach, with its emphasis on political motivation at the expense of material incentives, has already been discredited. Many Chinese leaders probably feel that they have a better model in the more balanced approach of the 1950's or even in the Stalinist model in effect during the first Five-Year Plan in 1953-1957. The chances that Mao's successors will adopt revisionist economic policies may be affected by economic pressures forcing them toward a very hard line on austerity and discipline throughout Chinese society. We can be sure that any likely successor group will base its program on Marxism-Leninism, even if it is strongly influenced by military leaders. But actual programs will probably reflect increasingly the influence of Chinese culture and the Chinese environment. The resemblance to socialism as it has developed in the West will almost certainly diminish over time.

43. China's World Role. These various permutations in the resolution of China's political crisis cannot help but affect its world policy. But we cannot predict with any confidence how internal developments will bear on foreign
affairs. There is no precedent in Communist China for a succession struggle. Stalinist analogies are tempting but perhaps misleading. Much might depend on what transpires while Mao remains in control. Finally, the world scene changes and creates new situations and problems.

44. If a succession struggle is prolonged, this would probably concentrate attention on internal affairs even more than it has during the Cultural Revolution. Thus, for some time, China's unremitting hostility toward the US and USSR, accompanied by a more flexible policy toward the rest of the world, are likely to be the predominant trends.

45. Beyond this, the most we can estimate is that the forces of change inside the country could, but not necessarily would, have the same effect on international conduct; that is, a more moderate internal policy might be accompanied by some relaxation of external tensions and some move to reduce China's isolation. The last phase of Mao and the succession, however, will probably coincide with the growth of Chinese strategic capabilities, and we are highly uncertain how the Chinese leadership expects to exploit this situation. As of now we would estimate that the sum total of the various political, economic, military factors, as well as international developments will create pressures for adjusting Chinese ambitions and resources, as defined and expounded by Mao, to the realities of world politics.
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