SURVIVAL POTENTIAL OF RESIDUAL NON-COMMUNIST REGIMES IN CHINA

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SECRET
SURVIVAL POTENTIAL OF RESIDUAL NON-COMMUNIST
REGIMES IN CHINA

SUMMARY

NOTE: For the purpose of this study, "residual non-Communist regimes" refers to the organized military and political groups presently in existence and nominally a part of the Chinese National Government. A subsequent study, ORE 72-49, "Vulnerabilities of a Communist China," will deal with the prospect of other non-Communist resistance groups which may develop either on the mainland or on Taiwan.

1. In non-Communist China, the process of fragmentation has advanced so far that only a semblance of unity now exists among the remaining resistance centers. The Nationalist military forces are characterized by low morale, poor leadership, and loss of the will to fight, in contrast to the Chinese Communist forces, which enjoy high morale, good leadership and a decisive numerical superiority in the order of three to one.

2. The remaining non-Communist military forces in China are located in four geographically semi-independent areas—the south, the southwest, the northwest, and the island of Taiwan (including adjacent southeast coastal areas). The Communist forces currently are capable of launching simultaneous operations against these widely dispersed non-Communist forces on the mainland and of eliminating all effective military resistance by the end of 1950. The innumerable problems arising from too rapid military expansion may, however, induce the Communists to continue their present methodical area-by-area program of acquisition for an additional year or two. Under prevailing conditions, no combinations of resistance groups can prevent this eventual Communist victory. Even on Taiwan, the life expectancy of the Nationalist regime, under present conditions, appears at best to be three years.

3. The granting of extensive US political, economic, and logistic support as well as supervision of any or all these non-Communist military resistance groups would not materially alter their present hopeless situation. Not only would the actual delivery of US aid be extremely difficult, but in view of the present preponderant strength of the CCF and because of the time required for procurement, shipping, and distribution of any US aid to anti-Communist combat troops, the Communist forces either can reduce prospective recipients before US assistance is received or so time their operations as to capture the bulk of materiel that might be delivered. US aid to Taiwan, potentially a stronger resistance area than any part of the mainland, might serve only to accelerate and intensify Communist action against that island. It is estimated that no amount of US aid short of military occupation and control could ensure Taiwan's indefinite survival as a non-Communist area.

4. It is concluded, therefore, that even with extensive US support (short of major armed intervention involving the use of US combat forces), none of the non-Communist regimes in China can survive beyond 1950 except on Communist sufferance. Taiwan is the only non-Communist area of China where limited US military action in support of other measures might be effective in preventing Communist control. At the same time, such US action with respect to Taiwan could serve other important US security interests. Without US military occupation and control, however, Taiwan, like the rest of China, probably will be under Chinese Communist control by the end of 1950.

Note: The Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report. It is based on information available to CIA as of 27 September 1949.
SURVIVAL POTENTIAL OF RESIDUAL NON-COMMUNIST
REGIMES IN CHINA

1. Comparison of Nationalist and Communist Armed Forces.

The process of fragmentation is so far advanced in Nationalist China that only a semblance of unity remains. Rather than one unified National Government, there are several resistance centers, each of which is increasingly taking on the appearance of a separate politico-military regime. These centers are located in the south, the southwest, the northwest, and on the island of Taiwan, including adjacent southeast coastal areas. The ability of these non-Communist centers to continue organized resistance depends on the survival potential of their armed forces, which in turn depends to a certain extent on their geographical location. Analysis of this survival potential requires a review of the present strengths of the remaining non-Communist components—army, navy, and air force—in relation to the present strength of all Communist armed forces.

a. Nationalist.

The Nationalist armed forces now consist primarily of widely scattered, weak and uncoordinated groups. The cause for the weakness of Nationalist forces has been the loss of the all-important “will to fight.” The basic reasons for this loss are: (1) army politics, which keep incompetent officers in positions of high command; (2) general professional incompetence in the armed forces; (3) the personal interference of Chiang Kai-shek in tactical operations; (4) Chiang’s refusal to supply money and materiel to commanders on the mainland; (5) inadequate pay, food, clothing, and equipment for the troops; and (6) chronic graft and corruption practiced by senior officers at the expense of their men. Since these basic ills probably will not be cured, there appears little likelihood, within the foreseeable future, that efficient non-Communist military forces will be rallied and re-formed in China.

(1) Army.

The 681,000 Nationalist “combat” forces listed in the accompanying table (p. 9) includes poorly trained and ill-equipped provincial levies. In addition to these forces, there are known to be some 500,000 Nationalist miscellaneous and service troops as well as approximately 300,000 to 350,000 local (Peace Preservation Corps) troops.

(2) Navy.

The Nationalist Navy has about 30,000 men and approximately 150 ships ranging from small river patrol craft to ex-Japanese destroyers, the most effective being ex-US Destroyer-Escorts. Morale in the navy is low despite a definite improvement in the last few months due to successful blockade and patrolling missions carried out in conjunction with the air force. Communist infiltration continues, and it is possible that many units might defect should the Communist Navy appear in reasonable force.

(3) Air Force.

It is estimated that from 85,000 to 100,000 personnel, including approximately 1,300 pilots, are in the Chinese Nationalist Air Force (CNAF).

Of approximately 1,000 aircraft in the CNAF at present, approximately 500 are operational. These are principally World War II USAF aircraft (light bombers, fighters, reconnaissance, twin-engine transport and training types) but include a number of Canadian Mosquito aircraft in the light-bomber category. Except for one light bomber squadron and two fighter squadrons the entire CNAF is located on Taiwan. Since the fall of Nanking and Shanghai, there has been a definite improvement in CNAF operations, both over land and in connection with the blockade.

b. Communist.

Communist regular forces, composed of the field forces and Military District troops, now
total approximately 2,017,000 (see Table, p. 10), giving the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) a decisive numerical superiority over the Nationalists in combat strength. These regular forces particularly the field troops, possess good leadership, good equipment, high morale and discipline as well as excellence in the use of intelligence and propaganda. In addition to the regulars, there are irregular forces known as the People's Militia, generally local in character and function, totalling perhaps 2,000,000. There are however, reports indicating that these forces having outlived their usefulness, may be in the process of dissolution in secure areas north of the Yangtze River. Such forces on occasion in the past, have supplemented the regulars during a campaign. A potential third source of manpower comes from Nationalist troops who have fallen into Communist hands. Of these, approximately 90,000 have been integrated into the CCF already. Communist regulars also will be greatly assisted in their drives south, southeast, and southwest by dissidents, bandits, and irregular Communist bands, already in control of wide rural areas in these sections.

In addition to their army the Chinese Communists now possess a small air force. In consequence of capture or defection, the CCF have obtained some 40 operational aircraft, including bombers, fighters, transports, and trainers (the majority believed located in Manchuria). Communist claims of defected Nationalist Air Force personnel bring their total strength to approximately 4500. This number may be exaggerated, but in any case, lack of aviation fuel, and of proper maintenance facilities and spare parts will limit the Communists' future capability for air operations.

Communist naval capabilities remain strictly limited. According to latest estimates, the Communists have acquired by defection or capture at least 63 vessels, (including 3 destroyer escorts), most of which are not operational. For the most part, crews of these craft and of those which have been disabled or destroyed are available to the Communists. The Communist capability for launching an amphibious attack depends on: (1) distance of objective (nearby objectives might be reached by small junks under cover of darkness); (2) rehabilitation of larger naval vessels already in Communist hands; (3) elimination of Nationalist Navy by destruction, capture, or defection; and (4) acquisition of merchant shipping for use as armed transports (important only in the case of Taiwan).

2. Survival Potential of Non-Communist Regimes.

At present the remaining non-Communist regimes in China are generally located in: (1) the southern provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi and adjacent areas of Hunan, Kiangsi, and Kwelchow—approximate troop strength 260,000; (2) the southwest, South Shensi, Szechwan, and Yunnan—approximate strength 200,000; (3) the northwest, Ningsia, Kansu, and Tsinghai—approximate troop strength 90,000; and (4) Taiwan and adjacent areas of the southeast coast—approximate troop strength 131,000. The armed forces within these areas, however, are not necessarily unified and their commanders are divided in loyalties. Only Taiwan has a limited potential for survival except on Communist sufferance.

a. Separate Areas of Resistance.

(1) South China.

In this area the troops of PAI Chung-hsi, HSUEH Yueh, and YU Han-mou are not capable of effective continued resistance against the coming Communist drive into Kwangtung. Unless PAI can arrange a deal with the Communists, he probably will withdraw further west into Kwangsi where he may be joined by groups of Kwangtung remnants. If PAI withdraws into Kwangsi, he probably will defend this position so long as his money and arms hold out. When PAI becomes virtually isolated, militarily cut off from the east China coast and Szechwan, he probably will flee or seek the best possible deal with the Communists while he still has the bargaining point of about 175,000 armed-troops—PAI's chances for independent survival as an effective anti-Communist force for more than a few months beyond the fall of Kwangtung and Szechwan are very poor.
(2) Southwest China.

The principal southwestern provinces of Szechwan and Yunnan are under the titular command of CHIANG Kai-shek's appointee, CHANG Chun. CHANG, a staunch supporter of the Generalissimo, theoretically controls some 200,000 inferior troops. Their morale is low, pay is inadequate, and present military stocks insufficient for a determined stand. The Nationalists' command in this area is far from unified or absolute. Approximately 150,000 of the 200,000 troops in the area are under the direct command of HU Tsung-nan, currently located in south Shensi, while some 15,000 of the remainder are under the direct command of LU Han in Yunnan where pro-Communist bandit groups are very active.

The loyalty of the troops within Yunnan, moreover, is questionable. LU Han, the present governor, was appointed by CHIANG Kai-shek in 1945 to replace LUNG Yun, whom CHIANG removed by force. Although still nominally loyal to CHIANG, LU has recently utilized a bloodless "revolt" to demonstrate the relative independence of Yunnan from the Generalissimo. Furthermore, LU is a relative and still close associate of LUNG Yun, and is apparently not unaware of the latter's recent negotiations with the Chinese Communists in Hong Kong.

The Nationalists, therefore, have only 35,000 Szechwanese troops for the defense of that province. Fragmentation and disunity of the province's defensive potential are furthered by prevailing friction between the minor Szechwanese war-lords and CHANG Chun.

Although the rough terrain of Szechwan and Yunnan may slow their advance Communist forces, aided in their conquest by the extensive pro-Communist bandit groups already active throughout much of this area, will very probably overrun these provinces with ease. Szechwan, which contains the only remaining Nationalist arsenals of importance in mainland China and is a food surplus area, makes an enticing prize which the Communists probably will not long forego.

(3) Northwest China.

Prior to the latest Communist offensive, the provinces of Ningsia, Kansu and Tsinghai were under the effective control and comparatively good leadership of MA Pu-fang and MA Hung-kwai and were considered to be one of the strongest non-Communist areas of resistance. The Province of Sinkiang was also included in the Northwest command and was nominally under the leadership of MA Pu-fang. The present Communist offensive, however, has driven deep into the MA's position and has already resulted in the take-over of Lanchow, capital of Kansu and key city of the Northwest; Sinling, capital of Tsinghai; Ningsia, capital of Ningsia Province; as well as the defection of the Nationalist garrison at Hami in Sinkiang. The MA's apparently were unable to obtain assistance from CHIANG Kai-shek or any other residual non-Communist regime and have now abandoned their forces (approximately 90,000) and left the Northwest. Moreover, the Nationalist Provincial authorities in Sinkiang recently severed connections with the Canton Government and accepted the authority of the Communist regime in Peking. The Northwest, therefore, has now been reduced to a relatively insignificant position as a non-Communist resistance area in mainland China.

(4) Taiwan and Southeast China.

Taiwan, and some parts of the Chushan Archipelago and coastal areas of southern Fukien, and northern Kwangtung are under the personal control of CHIANG Kai-shek and his most trusted generals. CHIANG's forces are incapable of defending the southeast mainland against the superior Communist armies now entering the area. Rather than risk annihilation or defection of his remaining military strength, CHIANG has been withdrawing his best remaining forces to Taiwan, apparently writing off mainland China by relinquishing his holdings there to the Communists. CHIANG can be expected to continue his efforts to strengthen his island bastion. He probably will resume his role as Chief of State and attempt thereby to capitalize on the international recognition of his regime. Taiwan is already burdened by Nationalist ineffi-
ciency, and by the presence of approximately 250,000 disgruntled and Communist-infiltrated army, navy and air force personnel.

The total Nationalist strength on Taiwan in the near future may number: ground troops 200,000, air force 85-100,000, and navy 30,000. An efficient force of this size could defend the island for a considerable length of time. However, the basic reasons for the defeat of the Nationalist forces will still exist. Thus, even though CHIANG, in an effort to bolster morale, releases some of the gold reserves on the island and raises the pay of the troops, it is extremely doubtful that these actions will have any lasting effect. These troops, poorly indoctrinated in the Nationalist cause, incompetently led, and exploited by their officers, have seen a successful Communist military advance from the Sungari River in Manchuria south nearly to Canton and west to Sining. They will be unlikely to regard Taiwan as the last remnant of a free China and a base from which the long march back to power could be launched. Many of these troops, pressed into the Nationalist Army against their will, probably will desire to return to their mainland homes. Leaving aside the native Taiwanese hatred of the present Chinese administration, played on and exploited by Communist propaganda and infiltration, the factor of morale, alone, can result in widespread troop defections, or at least weaken any determination to fight. That the Communists plan the "liberation" of Taiwan is evidenced by CCP propaganda and promises over the past nine months. There is, in short, little chance for the survival of a Chinese Nationalist regime on Taiwan beyond 1950 except on Communist sufferance. Despite their limited amphibious capabilities, the Communists may well forego an extended softening-up period and attempt an early seizure of Taiwan in order to eliminate CHIANG’s regime and to forestall an ultimate possibility of direct US intervention in Taiwan. They may on the other hand, for military and administrative reasons, postpone the "liberation" until 1951 or 1952: "In any event, the life expectancy of a Nationalist Taiwan appears at best to be two or three years.

Although there are Taiwanese aspirations for independence, there is little prospect of a native non-Communist regime succeeding to power in Taiwan without external aid.

b. Concerted Action against the Communists.

All four non-Communist resistance areas in mainland China are vulnerable. When CHIANG’s southeastern forces have been moved to Taiwan, this area of resistance as well as that in the remote northwest will have been separated by great distances from any non-Communist forces remaining on the mainland; thus the prospect for action in concert will have been greatly reduced.

The south under PAI Chung-hsi, HSUEH Yuen, and YU Han-mou, and the southwest nominally under CHANG Chun, while geographically contiguous, probably will not cooperate militarily, politically, or economically. PAI Chung-hsi is loyal to LI Tsung-jen and diametrically opposed to the Generalissimo and his policies; HSUEH is a "lone tiger," while CHANG Chun is a staunch supporter of CHIANG Kai-shek and takes orders only from him. Moreover, PAI and CHANG have drifted into a semi "warlord" status and probably will consider only themselves. Consequently, it is probable that either one will be most hesitant to leave the safety of his retreat to go to the aid of the other—particularly in view of the known numerical and professional superiority of the CCF.

Under present conditions, the widely dispersed Nationalist or non-Communist forces, totalling approximately 681,000 combat troops, cannot successfully oppose the 2,017,000 regular Communist forces. The CCF could launch simultaneous operations in the south, southeast, southwest, and northwest and eliminate all organized and effective military resistance by the end of 1950. They might, however, for various reasons, continue their methodical area-by-area conquest, the final liquidation of remaining non-Communist armed groups in China not being accomplished until 1951 or 1952. Under prevailing conditions, no combination or combinations of non-Communist resistance groups can successfully alter this capability.
   
   a. Material.

   (1) In South and Southwest China.

   Extension of large-scale US military and economic aid (short of US armed intervention) to PAI Chung-hsi and CHANG Chun would not alter the present hopeless military situation for long. PAI and CHANG, even if united and possessed of extensive US logistic support, would be unable to develop adequate resistance to oppose the available Communist regular forces. Furthermore, the actual delivery of US materiel would be extremely difficult. The Communist forces now occupy all ports north of and including Foochow and at present are driving south toward Amoy and Swatow. Estimates based on the current rate of their coastal advance indicate that Communist occupation of these ports will probably become a fact within a few weeks. National Government offices, moreover, are presently evacuating Canton in anticipation of that city's early capture. When Canton falls, all mainland ports north of Hong Kong available to receive US military supplies will be under Communist control. South of Hong Kong there will remain only the secondary mainland ports of Fort Bayard and Pakhoi, which possess no rail connections and are linked with the interior by a single, inadequate fair-weather road. The areas adjacent to these ports are infested with Communist guerrillas, and lines of communication to the interior are extremely vulnerable. Airlift operations, the only practical means of supplying anti-Communist forces in the interior, would depend on retention of the ports in non-Communist hands. In all probability, however, the Communist forces will not stop at Canton but in the very near future will deny the US the use of the two harbors by overrunning all of Kwangtung as well as the remainder of Communist-infested Hainan Island with its secondary port facilities.

   The granting of material support to these regimes does not ensure its effective utilization in maintaining them against the present preponderant strength of the Communist forces. Such aid has proven ineffective in the past and the Communist forces have been the ultimate recipients of large quantities of US materiel. Because of their present preponderant strength and because of the time required for procurement, shipping, and distribution of any US aid to anti-Communist combat troops, the Communist forces either can reduce prospective recipients before US assistance is received or so time their operations as to capture the bulk of materiel that might be delivered. Covert aid to these regimes would necessarily be in such small quantities as to be militarily ineffective. These considerations inter alia would tend to offset the advantage to be derived from any improvement in morale which would result from the granting of US assistance.

   (2) In the Northwest.

   The northwest under the MAs has always functioned as an independent region. Although the area is economically self-supporting and self-sufficient in food, the Moslem troops there do not have sufficient arms and ammunition to repulse a major Communist assault, and they have recently suffered a series of reverses at the hands of the Communists. The only feasible means of supplying these troops with requisite materiel would be by airlift. This method would be very costly and would necessitate the establishment, maintenance, and protection of an intermediate air base, presumably somewhere in southwestern China. Such a base obviously would be a major Communist objective and could not be held against a determined Communist assault. Even should it be possible to supply the troops in the northwest by direct airlift, their manpower is limited, and these remaining widely scattered and demoralized forces could not hold out for long against the available Communist military power. Moreover, any US airlift operation would be propaganda by the Chinese Communists as an act of war. In the last analysis the recent Communist advances in this area have precluded the possibility of granting effective aid.

   (3) On Taiwan.

   Taiwan is potentially the strongest non-Communist area of China. The island's garrison contains not only army forces but also
will contain in the near future all remnants of the Nationalist Navy and Air Force. Further, Taiwan's separation from the mainland renders it less susceptible to military assault. Substantial funds and military stores are on hand, and the island is relatively accessible to possible outside assistance. These factors of apparent advantage, however, are estimated to be insufficient to overcome the basic Nationalist weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Not only do the armed forces suffer from inept leadership, but all the worst aspects of the Nationalist Government are apparent in its maladministration of the island. These factors invite and facilitate Communist infiltration and subversion, which are already in progress. The way is being paved for a Communist military occupation which will not necessarily be preceded by a military assault.

Experience has shown that US political, economic, and logistic aid on a variety of scales had had little salutary effect on the basic Nationalist weaknesses. Moreover, there is nothing in the record of the Nationalists to indicate their willingness or ability to overcome their weaknesses by establishing an effective government and military establishment in Taiwan. As in the case of non-Communist areas of the mainland, the mere granting of US logistic support to Taiwan, with its attendant political implications, might serve only to accelerate Communist action against the island. In this situation, no amount of US aid, short of armed intervention and control of Taiwan, can ensure its indefinite survival as a non-Communist area.

Finally, even assuming the survival of Taiwan as a non-Communist area of China, its geographical position (the factor which contributes most to its military security) would render less effective its employment as a nucleus of an anti-Communist resistance movement on the mainland. This is not to say, however, that Taiwan is otherwise insignificant to US security. Actually its strategic significance is great but not primarily as a base for supporting organized opposition to Communism in China.

b. US Supervision of Nationalist Armed Forces.

Past experience of the Joint US Military Advisory Group in China, as well as the US Army's World War II experience in China, has proved that US operational advice, to be accepted and acted upon, must be backed by command authority and receive US supervision and implementation at least down to and including division level. Without requisite US command authority in the top echelon, advice to tactical commanders generally produces little or no result. Moreover, an agreement giving a US officer or officers command authority over Nationalist forces would in effect be US armed intervention in China and certainly would be so propagated by the CCP and the USSR, to the possible detriment of the US.

Even if the US were willing to assume the responsibility and risks involved in this form of "armed intervention," it is highly doubtful that US command and direction of Nationalist forces could at this late date overcome the Communist preponderance of military power. There is not sufficient time left for the many arduous months required to recruit, reorganize, re-equip, resupply, retrain and revitalize remaining anti-Communist forces in order to cope with the present three to one disparity between Nationalist and Communist-trained manpower. Only major US armed intervention, involving the tactical employment of large numbers of US combat troops, could appreciably alter the current situation.

4. Conclusion.

None of the extant non-Communist regimes in mainland China, acting individually or in concert, even with extensive US political, economic, and logistic support, can survive beyond 1950 except on sufferance of the Communists. Also, granting of such aid probably would precipitate a Communist drive to wipe out the recipients long before the materiel could reach them. The only means by which the US can insure the indefinite survival of those groups as organized forces is through armed intervention. Such action, to be effective, would necessitate a major military ef-
fort involving extensive use of US combat troops. Moreover, the continued survival of non-Communist regimes would not, in itself, eliminate Communism from China. In fact, US military action in support of remnants of the discredited Nationalist regime could solidify popular Chinese support for the Communist Party, would subject the US to a degree of world condemnation, and might conceivably precipitate World War III.

Taiwan remains the one non-Communist area of China where positive US military action could be effective in preventing Chinese Communist control and thereby directly serve important US strategic interests. Without major armed intervention, US political, economic, and logistic support of the present Nationalist island regime cannot insure its indefinite survival as a non-Communist base. Communist capabilities are such that only extended US military occupation and control of Taiwan can prevent its eventual capture and subjugation by Chinese Communist forces. Failing US military occupation and control, a non-Communist regime on Taiwan probably will succumb to the Chinese Communists by the end of 1950.

ORGANIZATION OF CHINESE NATIONALIST ARMY, 27 SEPTEMBER 1949

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present Area</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Loyalty</th>
<th>Future (?)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>CH'EN Ch'eng</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>CHIANG Kai-shek</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pescadores</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pescadores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan, Kwangsi, Hupeh</td>
<td>PAI Chung-hsi</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>LI Tsung-jen</td>
<td>Szechwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Shensi</td>
<td>HU Tsung-nan</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>CHIANG Kai-shek</td>
<td>Szechwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>MA Pu-fang</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>self</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MA Hung-kwel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szechwan</td>
<td>CHANG Chun</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>CHIANG Kai-shek</td>
<td>Szechwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>LU Han</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
<td>HSUEH Yueh</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yu Han-mou</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukien</td>
<td>CH'EN Ch'eng</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>CHIANG Kai-shek</td>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chushan</td>
<td>CH'EN Ch'eng</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>CHIANG Kai-shek</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Combat Forces: 681,000

Service and Miscellaneous troops: 500,000*

REGULAR FORCES TOTAL: 1,181,000

IRREGULAR FORCES: Peace Preservation Corps (Local Troops) 300,000 – 350,000

* Approximately 200,000 of these troops are being used in combat. Lack of training and equipment, however, makes them ineffective as combat troops.
ORGANIZATION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES (ARMY) 27 SEPTEMBER 1949

REGULAR FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Unit Designation</th>
<th>Old Unit Designation</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Field Army</td>
<td>Northwest People's Liberation Army</td>
<td>P'ENG Teh-huai</td>
<td>158,000</td>
<td>Shensi-Shansi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Field Army</td>
<td>Central Plains People's Liberation Army</td>
<td>LIU P'o-ch'eng</td>
<td>321,000</td>
<td>Yangtze and South China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Field Army</td>
<td>East China People's Liberation Army</td>
<td>CH'EN Yi</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Yangtze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Field Army</td>
<td>Northeast People's Liberation Army</td>
<td>LIN Piao</td>
<td>720,000</td>
<td>Yangtze and North China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Field Army</td>
<td>North China People's Liberation Army</td>
<td>NIEH Jung-chen</td>
<td>383,000</td>
<td>North China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undesignated Regulars in South China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>South China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regular Forces Total: 2,017,000

IRREGULAR FORCES: The People's Militia: 2,000,000 (approximately)

CAPTURED NATIONALIST TROOPS: Only the approximately 90,000 troops in the units enumerated above have been included in CCF strength. The remainder are not yet believed to have been integrated into the CCF order of battle.

Note: The total regulars includes an estimated 638,000 Military District Troops and former Nationalist troops of the ex-Nationalist 38th, 59th, 60th, and 77th Armies, and 34th and 110th Divisions with an aggregate total of approximately 90,000 troops.