

21783

~~SECRET~~

43

*file*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 325

13 September 1950

SUBJECT: Current Reassessment of the Tito-Soviet Break

Despite occasional speculation and rumors of dubious origin regarding a possible rapprochement between Moscow and Belgrade, all available evidence indicates that the cleavage between the USSR and the Tito Government has appreciably widened since the original break on 28 June 1948. Moreover, it is estimated that the extent of the cleavage as well as over-riding reasons of self-interest and prestige in the case of both Tito and the Kremlin renders such a rapprochement improbable.

The ideological-political conflict between the Kremlin and the Tito Government has sharpened during the past year and remains the prime deterrent to a Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. The Titoist alternative to Kremlin-dominated Communism constitutes a dangerous ideological threat to the Soviet monolithic structure; any concession to the Yugoslav thesis of equality between national Communist parties or states would undermine the whole edifice of Soviet power. The ruthless eradication of local nationalism is an integral part of the Kremlin's efforts to impose the dogma of Moscow's unquestioned primacy and infallibility on its orbit. A reversal of this policy towards an unrepentant Tito would, therefore, not only create ideological havoc in world Communism but would have dangerous political implications for future relations between the USSR and its Satellites. Although the Kremlin has undoubtedly not abandoned its hope of recapturing Yugoslavia as part of the Soviet orbit, it will exert every effort to see that this occurs on its own terms and under Cominform leadership.

For their part, the Yugoslav leaders appear increasingly convinced that the present Soviet leadership is irrevocably committed to a policy of militant imperialism. During the past year, Yugoslav anti-Stalinist doctrine has steadily crystallized, and concrete efforts are being made to spread the Yugoslav concept of "national" Communism with some degree of success. Yugoslav criticism of the Kremlin's "aggressive and hegemonistic" aims has become more outspoken. The Communist leaders of Yugoslavia probably realize that any acceptance of a "working arrangement" with the present Soviet regime would be at best a fragile opportunistic expedient, entailing ultimate submission to Moscow and their personal liquidation. On the other hand, by pursuing its

Note: This memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force.

Document No.

NO CHANGE in Class.

DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

Date: *5/1/78* By:

BT

~~SECRET~~

present course, the Yugoslav Government probably is confident that the Western Powers will support Yugoslavia in its ideological struggle with Moscow.

The Kremlin, in dealing with Yugoslav defection, has been careful to avoid a debate on the ideological merits of the Yugoslav position as well as any emphasis of the Tito heresy as an aspect of the Communist movement. The Kremlin has gradually broken the political, economic, and military ties which formerly bound Yugoslavia to the Soviet orbit. Through its Cominform front, it has waged unremitting political warfare against the Tito Government with the avowed purpose of destroying the "Fascist Yugoslav clique." Voluminous and unprecedented appeals have been broadcast from Moscow and its Satellites to the Yugoslav people to overthrow their government. Ominous military pressures have been exerted on the Yugoslav periphery, while Yugoslav diplomatic missions within the orbit have been subjected to even more repressive measures than have those of the Western Powers.

Since mid-1949 the economic break between the Soviet orbit and Yugoslavia has been virtually complete, necessitating a shift of the Yugoslav economy toward the West with the attendant transitional difficulties. There is at present no evidence of direct economic transactions between the orbit and Yugoslavia, even though they might be of mutual benefit. Some minor commercial exchanges may have occurred through Swiss or Austrian intermediaries. Meanwhile, the over-commitment of Yugoslav resources for vital Western imports largely precludes the resumption of trade with the orbit. Having been forced at great cost to readjust its entire economy as a result of the Soviet blockade, the Tito Government is not likely at this point to sacrifice Western trade and support in exchange for a renewal of Soviet exploitation. As a result of the current drought-induced crop failure, the Yugoslav economy apparently faces a critical setback, which the Kremlin will seek to exploit by all available means. If the crop failure proves as serious as is now indicated, the Yugoslav Government will be forced to turn increasingly to the West for emergency economic aid.

The Korean aggression has apparently caused the Tito Government to revise its previous estimate that the USSR would not seek its elimination through overt military action. In view of the Soviet build-up of the Satellite armies and the accumulation of military supplies in the Balkan area over recent months, the Yugoslav Government, though apparently not regarding an attack as imminent, probably views with growing concern the threat of Soviet/Satellite aggression. The Belgrade Government, therefore, is proceeding with several long-range precautionary measures designed to maintain the combat-readiness of its forces.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

It is reportedly attempting to reduce its dependence on current stocks of obsolescent military equipment (largely supplied by the USSR at the end of the war) by costly purchases of modern materiel from "neutral" sources and by expanding its own munitions industry. Moreover, the strong Yugoslav UN delegation has apparently been instructed to emphasize whenever possible the dangers to world peace resulting from any Soviet-inspired aggression.

The Tito Government is apparently convinced that it should, for ideological and political reasons, limit itself to denouncing all aggression, but otherwise adhere to an independent position between the "East-West power blocs." Although the Tito Government has avoided openly identifying itself with the West, it appears hopeful that within the UN framework the US will support Yugoslavia's independence. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia's attitude toward the US and its relations with the non-Communist world have registered some improvement and this trend will probably continue as the question of Yugoslav survival becomes more critical and Western support becomes more tangible.

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~