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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 328 25 September 1950

SUBJECT: Communist Party Intelligence Activities

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1. Introduction.

The Communist Party, if it is to be effective as a political and revolutionary organization, must have quantities of factual information in order to: (a) make a reasoned estimate of its own capabilities in relation to the more or less hostile environment in which it operates, and of the resources of the organized forces which oppose it; (b) devise a practical plan of action in the light of external conditions and of internal capabilities; and (c) dispose its forces in the most economical way for carrying out the plan, adjusting its tactics to changing conditions.

The Party must know what areas are most immediately important upon which to work; what possibilities are open there; what political, economic, and other circumstances will have a bearing on the success of its plans; what obstacles in the form of individuals, groups, or governmental agencies it will encounter; what the strength and weaknesses of the opposition are; what support it can expect to raise from among the neutral masses; and what issues may be exploited most profitably.

2. General Organizational and Operational Principles.

General organizational and operational principles followed by the Party in the procurement of intelligence include the following:

a. A clandestine intelligence procurement program is not undertaken without justification. The need for secret information must be great to justify the risk involved to Party personnel and prestige.

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b. Organized Party intelligence networks are set up separate from the political mechanism for reasons of security. There may be some individual contact with the lower ranks of the political apparatus, but it is kept to a minimum, and direction passes down the chain of the network itself from a functionary in the top level of the Party. Personal contact within the net, such as between the net and other Party organizations, is kept to a minimum. Personnel involved in intelligence procurement stop their overt Party activities and in some cases may withdraw their Party membership altogether.

c. Communications and meetings are carefully screened by strict security measures and by the use of cut-outs (intermediaries), letter-drops (selected locations for passing information), and couriers.

d. The first instrument of procurement is the Communist who has penetrated a hostile organization or who works in an organization selected as an espionage target. There may be some systematic "planting" of informants, but the basis of Party organization lends itself quite naturally to the simple recruitment of informants who are already "on the inside." The penetration agent is also a more efficient instrument for the procurement of intelligence than the outside informant, who must depend on personal observation.

3. Overt Intelligence.

To agitate with profit, and to conduct its political maneuvers with skill, the Party requires volumes of precise information.

Many of the Party's information requirements can be met by the exploitation of overt sources. The Party machine, including its auxiliaries,

fronts, and circles of sympathizers, is an information system and at the same time an action organization. From the individual member of a factory cell--who reports to his cell secretary on conditions of work in his factory, on the political inclinations of his fellow workers, and on their grievances, needs, and attitude towards the leaders of their unions--to the Central Committee member who sits in the national parliament and who reports to the Political Bureau on matters of high governmental plans and activities, the Party apparatus is one of individual reporters.

Much information is passed along the channels of the political apparatus in the form of periodic statistical, organizational, and personnel reports made by the secretaries of committees on the various territorial levels. Such periodic and routine reports, funnelled into the Organization Department or Cadre (personnel) Department of the Central Committee, provide much of the basic information requirement. They may be supplemented by special studies and surveys on particular problems of economics, social conditions, or politics.

Some Parties have set up special research or economics departments to direct information collecting efforts on the overt side, to make analyses, and to process reports for the benefit of the policy-making elements of the Party.

The network of Party newspapers, reporters, and correspondents constitutes an invaluable information service. Communist reporters and correspondents, like those of any political affiliation, normally have ready

access to repositories of data. They know where to go for information, and they usually have at least some "inside sources" which may be tapped for some of the information the Party must have.

4. Covert Intelligence

Covert intelligence includes such information as: intimate data on hostile personalities; "inside" details on the plans and capabilities of hostile political parties; information on the plans and activities of the police, security services, armed forces, and the internal administration of government offices as well as data on industrial capacities and developments and on technical progress.

It is often difficult to distinguish between the numerous Party operations directed at the collection of overt data and the Party's clandestine procurement program. The two activities overlap, and individuals are often found to be engaged in both. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the Party sometimes organizes special secret intelligence operations and nets for the procurement of necessary information which it cannot obtain openly.

5. Communist Intelligence for USSR.

In addition to its occasional direct intelligence effort, the Communist Party can generally be relied upon to assist Soviet intelligence agencies operating abroad. Such assistance is usually in the form of personnel and facilities. The Party provides the Soviet representatives with members and sympathizers who are willing and able to serve as agents, couriers,

cut-outs, and technicians for particular Soviet-directed intelligence operations. Party seamen and other waterfront elements are particularly suited for clandestine communication services.

In an emergency, the Party may furnish money, technical equipment, and communications facilities. Refuge, escape facilities and safe-conduct, safe meeting places, and false documents may also be provided for members of a Soviet network in case of necessity.

The product of direct Party intelligence operations in matters of especial interest to the USSR is also passed on to Soviet intelligence. Special operations may be taken up by the Party's intelligence system at the request of the Soviet intelligence representatives. At times, information procured by the Party is used to verify the accuracy of that obtained by Soviet intelligence operations.

General security considerations, however, dictate that intelligence groups organized and controlled directly by the Party should be carefully insulated from the activities of the Soviet intelligence systems. Thus, the exposure of one of them will not endanger the operations of the other. The diplomatic risk in the exposure of Soviet intelligence activities is obvious, and it will usually enforce a studiously secure separation from compromising personal or organizational connections with any branch of activity of the local Communist Party.

Many factors bear upon the extent, the methods, and procedure that direct Party intelligence efforts will follow. The current political line,

organizational and operating tactics and plans, the attitude taken toward the Party by the government and by other groups, the effectiveness of civil security controls, the availability of capable personnel, and many other internal and external circumstances all influence the way in which the Party will organize, plan, and direct its own intelligence operations, if it undertakes them at all. Such complex influences make it most difficult to anticipate, at any one time, how and where the Party may be expected to engage in intelligence operations.

At times, assistance to Soviet intelligence needs and operations takes precedence over those of the Party. This is particularly true when the USSR believes its security imperiled. The findings of the Royal Commission in Canada, based on the testimony of Igor Gusenko and other investigations, demonstrate that at least a large part of the Party's intelligence activity consists of gathering technical and industrial information.

6. The Communist Party Intelligence Apparatus.

It is difficult to detect Party intelligence nets at work because of the thorough security, both organizational and operational, which is put upon them.

Control.

Two types of basic organized cover are available for the exercise of control: (1) the net may be planned and directed secretly by the ordinary departments and offices of the political apparatus along with all the other, overt, activities, which they support; (2) a net may be set up

and operated independently of the overt political apparatus, with contact and control carefully maintained only at top levels. Generally, the personnel in this second type of organization have no ostensible connection with the Party. They are drawn from among the ranks of those who have no record with the police, or from among sympathizers who are not known, as such, outside the organization. Occasionally, a Party member who has formally, and with some publicity, severed his Party allegiance, will show up as a member of a Party intelligence net. Obviously, such persons are particularly useful against hostile political groups, which may accept them into their own ranks, because of their alleged defection from the Communist cause.

Control of Party intelligence activities is usually to be found centered in some office at the headquarters level of the Party. Security there is usually strong, the handful of leading Party functionaries having been tested over long years and their loyalty having been strengthened by a lifetime of indoctrination and by their personal stake in the future of the Party. The Secretary General, as well as the responsible heads of the Organization or Cadre Departments, are believed to be frequently concerned with the organization and control of Party intelligence operations. With their card files, indexes, wide contacts, and comprehensive knowledge of the personnel, deployment, and organization of the Party, the Organization and Cadre Department heads are in a good position to plan operations, to

select suitable recruits, and to give detailed operational directions. They have also had a long conspiratorial experience; many of them have been trained in the USSR, and they have acquired considerable organizing skill.

When these functionaries are too busy with other matters or are too exposed to police surveillance, the job of directing intelligence work may be entrusted to other personnel. Such Communists specialize in clandestine work. They have had special training in it or have a natural aptitude for it. In some Parties, such a peculiarly talented person has been charged with the control of all clandestine work, which includes items other than intelligence.

b. Targets.

The coercive instruments of the state (armed forces, police, security services), the state administrative apparatus, and hostile political groups are the chief intelligence targets of the Party. These are the organized powers that will prevent or hinder a Communist revolution, and they must be smashed or made useless if the Party is ever to succeed.

Except when such concerns become of strategic importance to a Party engaged in direct military effort, the industrial or technical espionage it undertakes seems to be primarily for the benefit of Soviet intelligence agencies rather than for its own use.

Clandestine and controlled penetration of the target organization is the basic plan of Party intelligence operations. It is effected by

individuals or groups who are secret members of the Party or of one of its auxiliaries. They are supported, guided, and controlled by special personnel. Penetration follows the line of least resistance. Wherever an opportunity is presented it is likely to be taken. Advantage is taken of personal friendships, and professional and social contacts. Secret Party members join hostile organizations; they are elected, appointed, or find employment by themselves in governmental institutions. Defectible elements inside the target organization are subverted (bribed, coerced, or converted).

It is even simpler to penetrate the armed forces. Secret members are drafted or they enlist. In addition, the Party generally organizes youth organizations and youth fronts to attract and subvert young persons who are liable to military duty. In the 1930's special attention was paid to relief organizations and to youth labor organizations, such as the CCC in the United States. Party interest in the maritime industry is partially accounted for by the fact that the merchant marine is drawn upon heavily by the navy during an emergency. From among such elements potential recruits for Party intelligence work can be scrutinized, screened, and picked.

Direction and control of penetration of the armed forces rests with a secret organ set up at the national level, often called the "Military Committee" or "Anti-Military Committee," with a network of directing functionaries at lower Party echelons. The functionaries may control the system of cells that has been built up in the Army directly (but through secure cut-outs) or indirectly, through the local Party political organiza-

tions closest to the military unit involved.

Intelligence procurement, however, is only one of several purposes behind the Party's military work. The central directing organ, such as the "Military Committee," also administers the ordinary political and agitation-propaganda activities of Communist members of the military. It is at least of equal importance that as many members as possible get some training in the use of arms and in infantry tactics, that the morale and efficiency of the army be reduced as far as possible, and that the Party extend its political influence by organizing cells of newly recruited members.

Direct penetration operations into the armed services is supplemented, as it is in the case of hostile political groups, by subverting ordinarily loyal elements. It is a common practice to employ young women members of Party youth organizations to act as "bait". They frequent public places around a military or naval installation, picking up service men as the opportunity arises, and attempt to interest them in Communist ideas.

Government agencies concerned in one way or another with the administration of the armed services are also profitable targets for penetration, more usually with the intent of getting control of the military from within than of procuring intelligence. Penetration at this high level, of course, is particularly feasible when the Party has become a major political force, provided it is not otherwise hampered in its political activities. It can use members who have been elected to public office, or its patronage, or other political influence to secure the appointment of secret members and

sympathizers to key positions. The postwar history of several European countries has shown that a numerically large or strategically important Communist vote will be seized upon to put Party members into cabinet or other positions. Then more and more Communists will be given jobs in which intelligence and subversive activities can be practiced on a large scale in relative safety.

During periods of "revolutionary calm," when the Party is on the defensive, or when it is concerned mainly with extending its political and organizational influence, its "military work" is likely to be aimed chiefly at organizational and agitation-propaganda activities. The intelligence function is usually relegated to a secondary position at such times.

On the other hand, when the Party arrives at the conclusion that it is about to enter upon a period of revolutionary possibilities, or when it is actually engaged in revolution, civil war, or military resistance, then it can be expected to put much of its effort into collecting military intelligence. It will, in such a "revolutionary situation," systematize its penetration and organize a special military intelligence service.

The use of a special clandestine Party auxiliary directed towards the penetration of the enemy armed services for intelligence and subversive purposes during a Communist revolution is illustrated by the activities of a Party in Southeastern Europe:

(1) When the Party emerged from resistance activities following the war, large numbers of its experienced guerrilla fighters were drafted into the armed services, police, and security services of the state.

(2) In order to ensure their continued allegiance and the organizational control which the Party had over them, and to draw as many new men into its machine as possible, the Party set up a special auxiliary organization, consisting entirely of Communists in the services, plus a directing skeletion of functionaries drawn from the political apparatus.

(3) In effect, the military organization was a separate Communist organization, with an "interlocking directorate" with the Party proper. It had its own Central Committee, consisting of a few responsible functionaries of the Party's Central Committee, plus a responsible functionary for each of the several regions into which the Party divided the country for its own administrative and organizational convenience. The regional heads of the auxiliary were each responsible for the direction and control of members of the auxiliary whose military, police, or other units were stationed in the region.

(4) Within the Army, the members of the auxiliary were organized into three-man cells. The leader of each cell in a command (i.e., platoon or company) was responsible to another functionary who directed two or more additional cell leaders. For security reasons, these cell leaders were the only persons under his control with whom he had any contact. The same

principles of control and limited contact were repeated up the chain of the military command to the brigade level, at which point the responsible leader of the Communist auxiliary was responsible to the regional Party functionary, who was ordinarily not a member of the Army, but a functionary of the regional committee of the political apparatus of the Party. His contact with the leader of the brigade auxiliary was carefully screened by the use of one or more cut-outs.

(5) A Party member who was about to be called into service reported that fact to the leader of his cell in the political apparatus. Notice was then passed up the channels of the Party proper to the regional organization in the area in which the prospective recruit was to serve. Here, it was passed by the regional head of the auxiliary to the appropriate brigade head, who, in turn, passed it down through the channels of the auxiliary. Finally, the new recruit was met at his station, and drawn into one of the cells of the auxiliary.

(6) Members of the auxiliary were engaged in acts of sabotage, agitation and propaganda, drawing in sympathizers where practical to do so, and undermining the morale of the other troops. When the Party began its revolution, they attempted to subvert their fellow soldiers, and organized several mutinies and mass desertions.

(7) By reporting from personal observation and by stealing documents, members of the auxiliary kept the Party informed on personalities,

strength, disposition, morale, and equipment of the troops; armaments and installations; technical and mechanized equipment; supply; plans and operations of units; and on security regulations.

An example of a military intelligence organization under Party control, created under conditions of resistance warfare, is furnished by another Communist Party in the Balkans during World War II:

(1) The Party organized, controlled, and directed a resistance army that fought the German occupation. It had to set up an organization for the procurement of military intelligence.

(2) Since the Party was illegal and had to operate underground except in areas which it controlled by its own arms, it had to make some provision for counter-intelligence against the police and security agencies of the occupying power. It also had to provide for other clandestine services behind the enemy lines: a secret communications system, an escape and safe-house system, preparation of false documents, and a program of sabotage. All of these clandestine activities, in addition to the strategic and tactical intelligence functions, the Party put under the control of a special organization of Information Centers.

(3) The Central Information Center, set up directly under the Central Committee of the Party, was the organizing and controlling center for Information Centers set up in each of the regions of the country. The regional Centers directed district Centers, each of which, in its turn, had several city or village Information Centers under its direction.

Three-man intelligence groups at the base of the net carried out actual operations.

(4) At each level of organization, the head of the Information Center was also a member (usually the Political or Organization Secretary) of the local Committee of the (underground) Party's political apparatus. For the functioning of the Centers, however, direction was taken, not from the political committee, but from the next higher Information Center.

(5) As the strength of the Party's army grew and it took over increasingly wider territories, the duties of the Information Centers likewise expanded. Each center was then divided into four sections, one for each of these functions: (a) military espionage and control of the political security of the resistance army; (b) espionage directed against the Gestapo and against the intelligence and security services of the puppet government; (c) sabotage, preparation of false documents, and intelligence missions into enemy-held territory; (d) clandestine communications: a courier system.

(6) Each major command of the resistance army had its own tactical military intelligence organization. These operated largely in the actual combat zone, but they also sent missions into enemy areas on occasion. The network of the Party Information Centers also operated in all three zones, and in the zone of combat it paralleled the intelligence organization of the resistance army. In higher commands, the unit intelligence officer was also the responsible functionary of the corresponding Information Center.

(7) With the beginning of mopping-up operations after the Party's victory, each Information Center was assigned a special guerrilla unit, made up of hand-picked Communists. These units protected the personnel and the installations of the Information Centers and carried out whatever liquidation or other strong-arm missions were thought necessary by the Information Centers, which by now had begun to concentrate on civil security duties, but which could not yet afford to compromise their security by overt coercive activities.

7. Industrial and Technological Intelligence.

The procurement of industrial and technological intelligence by a Communist Party is facilitated by the fact that the cells are concentrated in industrial establishments, technological research centers, and maritime centers. The cells are always useful for the spotting and recruiting of agents. Experience has shown, however, that this potentiality has been more often exploited by Soviet intelligence agencies directly than by the Communist Parties themselves. The interest of the Soviets in industrial and technological matters is obviously more immediate than that of the Party. Occasionally, however, the Party has engaged in such operations for the benefit of Soviet intelligence. A Central European Party did so in the early 1930's. The organization was set up, staffed, and controlled by the Party. The intelligence product was forwarded to representatives of the Soviet intelligence.

(a) The "Industrial Reporting" organization was established by the Party to procure industrial and technological intelligence and to keep the Party informed on labor-management relations for organizational and agitation use. It was responsible to the Central Committee of the Party, but was organized as a separate network independent of the political apparatus below the top level. The country was divided into several regions, and the Industrial Reporting chief for each of these had several subsidiary nets of agents.

(b) The agents of the Industrial Reporting organization recruited sympathizers and members of the Party and its auxiliary to steal plans, make photographs, write reports, and compile statistics on industrial and technological developments and processes at their places of work. Armament plants received special attention.

(c) The product of these informants was passed up the network through the regional chiefs to the national chief. At the national level the organization had facilities for collating and evaluating the information and for photographing documents. Much of the product was then turned over to Soviet intelligence representatives.

8. Training.

Party members received professional training for intelligence work before World War II in special Soviet schools. Intelligence agencies in

the USSR achieved thereby not only the expert training of key personnel slated to work for Soviet intelligence directly, but also a considerable degree of professionalism among the personnel assigned to work under the control of the various national Parties. Since there has been no evidence to show that the national Parties are presently operating their own intelligence schools, it is reasonable to conclude that such training is still being carried out within the USSR or, possibly, in satellite areas.

9. Communist Counter-Intelligence.

The Party must protect its cadres and organizations from the effects of penetration by agents and informants of the police and of hostile intelligence agencies. It must also preserve strict ideological and organizational discipline and operational security. This is of prime importance when the Party is illegal and is forced to operate underground. To cover these needs, the Party charges a particular office or organ with responsibility for defensive security. These must not be confused with the organs set up to handle the direct intelligence functions. Unquestionably, the experience that some Party members gain in the course of their work in one or another of the internal security organs may fit them for service in the direct intelligence organization when the latter is actually put into operation. Nevertheless, the existence of a security organization is not of itself proof that the Party is engaged in offensive intelligence activities.

The Party organs usually charged with the maintenance of internal security are the Cadre (personnel) Department and the Control Commission. The functions of the two overlap and vary from one Party to another. The Control Commission (or Security and Discipline Commission, as it is sometimes called) seems to be devoted chiefly to investigating the efficiency of other Party organizations and the efficiency and political reliability of Party functionaries. It may initiate an investigation as an outcome of a routine analysis of internal reports, or in response to allegations made by one member against another, or at the suggestion of the Cadre Department. The Control Commission is traditionally the "high court" of the Party, and it hears cases in which it may have had a hand in the preparation of charges. It passes sentence on offenders of Party discipline and security, including the sentence of expulsion.

The Cadre Department (or Commission) has broader functions. It collects and collates biographical information on all functionaries--data on their political, personal, economic, religious, educational, and occupational background--and it collects reports made by their superiors and other associates on the way in which they have handled their jobs. It selects, assigns, and deploys the militants as best to suit their talents and the interests of the Party. It may also be explicitly charged with the preservation of internal security. To this end, it keeps a close check on the accuracy and truth of the biographical data. It may also arrange for surveillance of members suspected of treasonable connections and take testimony of the suspect's associates.

Parties that have no Cadre Department either assign the personnel function to other appropriate organs (such as the Organization, Youth, Women's Labor Department), or center it within one of these, the Organization Department being the most likely spot. The investigative function in such a case is also given over to one of the other offices or to one of the Party's auxiliaries, the Youth organization being frequently assigned the task.

In some cases, special commissions may be appointed to investigate the security of individual Party members and entire Party organizations.