

B21

7289

~~SECRET~~

22 April 1949

47

WESTERN EUROPE



GERMANY

✓ Soviet Tactics Soviet tactics in Germany continue to suggest that although Soviet control of all Germany undoubtedly remains the maximum objective, the Kremlin has decided that a "neutral" Germany, prevented from making a

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

GERMANY

firm alignment with the West, is a more feasible goal for the immediate future. The Kremlin may reason that the traditional tendency of German commerce to look eastward for markets and raw materials will bring Germany under eventual Soviet domination.

Meanwhile, rumors have been active recently that the Soviet Union will soon lift the Berlin blockade. Although there has been little or no concrete evidence to support such rumors, it must seem self-evident to the Kremlin that if the USSR is to regain the initiative and if the Soviet campaign for "German unity" is to have any appreciable success among the German people, the Berlin blockade will have to be lifted. Any such Soviet offer, if made now, would certainly be part of an over-all "peace offer" and probably would be made in such a way as to camouflage the Soviet defeat on the blockade. The current Paris "peace congress" would seem to provide an ideal setting for such a Soviet offer, but there is no evidence that Soviet strategy has changed enough to permit an offer on Germany actually acceptable to the western powers.

- 4 -

~~SECRET~~

## SATELLITE COMMUNIST PURGES

✓

The recent purges of high-level Communist officials in Bulgaria indicate that Kremlin efforts to establish reliable Communist leadership in the Satellites are meeting with increasing difficulties. In attempting to eradicate Satellite "nationalism," the Kremlin is confronted with two almost equally unpleasant alternatives, neither of which can be wholly successful. If the USSR continues its liquidation of old-line Satellite Communists, the morale and cohesion of the local Communist parties, as well as their control over the Eastern European countries, may be jeopardized. If the Kremlin chooses the other alternative and relaxes its control over the Satellite governments and Party leaders, it runs the risk of further defections like Tito's. Neither course of action will make it any easier for Satellite Communists to perform the nearly impossible task of justifying Moscow's ruthless exploitation of Eastern European resources or increase Satellite dependability in the event of hostilities.

Since Tito's defection last summer, purges of high-level Communist personnel have occurred in Poland, Albania, guerrilla Greece, and, most recently, in Bulgaria. Meanwhile, recurring reports from practically all of the Satellites also indicate continued nationalist dissensions within the ranks of the various Communist parties. In many instances, reports regarding as yet unpurged nationalist leaders within the Satellite parties reveal that the existence of these schisms is common knowledge. The "deviationists" are usually officials connected with economic planning who can see most clearly the pattern of Moscow's ruthless exploitation of the Satellites. In the face of resurgent nationalism among the Satellites and increasing prosperity in Western Europe, the

~~SECRET~~

Kremlin cannot afford the risk of relaxing its grip over the Communist parties in Eastern Europe. Thus, the Kremlin will probably be forced to use even more brutal state-police methods in retaining and consolidating its control over the Satellites, even though such methods are not a basic cure for nationalist deviation.

- 19 -

~~SECRET~~