


9 Dec 1949  
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

PALESTINE

✓ Soviet Policy In openly supporting the internationalization of Jerusalem, the USSR has once again demonstrated its desire to gain a voice in Near Eastern affairs and to foster dissension and unrest in the area and has highlighted the deterioration of Soviet-Israeli relations. The USSR probably supports internationalization, not only for the opportunity it affords for a direct Soviet voice in the administration of Jerusalem but in the hope that the plan will prove unworkable and thus give rise to irridentist agitation and political instability. Although the USSR has abandoned its support for Israel on this issue, basic Soviet objectives remain unchanged: namely, to reduce Anglo-American influence, promote disunity in the Near East, and foster political and economic instability. Thus, in pursuance of these aims, the USSR at first supported Israel. With the gradual strengthening of US-Israeli ties, the USSR has reduced its support and is again laying emphasis on its basic anti-Zionist policy. Similarly, Soviet support for a separate Arab state in Palestine is designed primarily to weaken UK-supported Jordan and to increase fragmentation in the Arab world.



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30 Dec. 1949

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F A R E A S T

CHINA

✓ Sino-Soviet Friction    Resentment against Soviet encroachment and exploitation is apparently increasing in Communist China. Particularly strong in non-Communist circles, this anti-Soviet feeling is reportedly also spreading to members of the Chinese Communist Party. Principal reasons for growing friction between the USSR and the Chinese Communists include: rumors of large food shipments from China to the USSR; Soviet refusal to return machinery to Manchuria; Soviet oppression of the Manchurian people; Soviet profiteering in trade relations; the interference of Soviet advisers in China; and the inadequacy of Soviet technicians. Non-Party circles are beginning to blame the USSR not only for genuine Soviet malpractices but for certain deficiencies of the Chinese economy and mistakes of the Chinese Communists. Some circles of the Communist Party are reported to share in the anti-Soviet feeling, and the Party leadership may choose to change its tactics in presenting Sino-Soviet "friendship" to both the Party rank-and-file and the Chinese people generally. However, the Party leadership has probably not wavered in its determination to maintain close relations with the Soviet Union. The anticipated Sino-Soviet treaty is likely to extend and formalize the very Soviet privileges which have occasioned resentment. Although the Party leadership may regret certain aspects of Sino-Soviet relations, there is no evidence that the "alliance" is insecure.

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23 Dec. 1949

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F A R E A S T

CHINA

✓ Mao in Moscow One result of Mao Tse-Tung's visit to Moscow will probably be the conclusion of a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship between the USSR and the Chinese Communist Government. This treaty, augmenting the Sino-Soviet Pact of 1945 to which the Chinese Communists have already given their stamp of approval, will probably provide for: (1) economic and technical assistance by the USSR along lines already developing in China, as well as an expansion of cultural relations; and (2) secret military protocols providing for cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries and the joint use and development of Chinese military facilities, particularly air bases. The presence of outstanding Politburo members Molotov, Malenkov, and Bulganin at the meeting between Stalin and Mao suggests that other important matters were discussed. In all likelihood, both Stalin and Mao saw in this visit an opportunity to re-examine questions likely to become increasingly urgent in the near future, such as: (1) Western diplomatic recognition and trade; (2) the Japanese peace treaty; (3) further Communist penetration of Central and Southeast Asia; and (4) the extent of Soviet-Chinese cooperation in Manchuria, Sinkiang, and possibly China proper.

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