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E A S T E R N E U R O P E

SOVIET UNION

✓ "Peace" Motif Soviet reaction to Secretary Acheson's recent public pronouncements on US-Soviet relations not only reflects a continuing lack of interest in negotiating a basic settlement with the West, but demonstrates the Kremlin's ability and intention to distort and exploit Western actions and propaganda in support of the Soviet "peace" campaign. The denunciations of Acheson's proposals for reducing international tension, although designed in part to counteract their world-wide impact, were not defensive in nature. On the contrary, they were a part of the continuing Kremlin offensive designed to raise doubt in the West concerning the sincerity of Western efforts toward peace and to intensify Soviet bloc hostility to and isolation from the "imperialists." Meanwhile, the Kremlin appears satisfied with the Partisans for Peace movement and will intensify its efforts to use the "peace front" technique. Eleven peace congresses are scheduled for 1950, attesting to Soviet success in maintaining at least a measure of non-Communist support and participation for this movement.



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F A R E A S T

CHINA

✓
Military Plans Despite repeated reports that the Chinese Communists are preparing for a large military campaign aimed at gaining control over all of Southeast Asia, it is unlikely that such a campaign will be launched in the near future. The primary objective of the Communists in China for 1950 continues to be the complete elimination of all Nationalist resistance and the extension of Communist control over all territories formerly held by the Nationalists. Present international Communist strategy, formulated and announced by the USSR and endorsed by the Chinese Communist Party, does not envisage the employment of the regular armed forces of a Communist nation for large-scale operations as a means of gaining control over non-Communist nations. Moreover, a military adventure by the Chinese Communists into Southeast Asia would contribute little to an early solution of the economic difficulties which derive at least in part from the Nationalist blockade and air attacks. Despite reported Communist dissension over such matters as the degree of subservience to the USSR, policy toward the West and methods to alleviate peasant unrest, there is no conclusive evidence of disagreement concerning the necessity for early occupation of Taiwan and Hainan and the elimination of the Nationalist Navy and Air Force.

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