


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~~NOFORN NOCONTRACT~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505



19 July 1990

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(b) (3)

MEMORANDUM TO: The Honorable Richard Haass  
Special Assistant to the President for  
Near East and South Asian Affairs

FROM: Special Assistant to the DDI for Nuclear Proliferation

SUBJECT: Analysis on Iraqi Attempt to Procure Furnaces ~~(S-NF)~~

1. This memorandum is in response to a request from Under Secretary of Commerce, Dennis Klosky, prompted by a US company's desire to export dual-use furnaces to Iraq. We believe there is substantial risk that the requested furnaces could be intended for use in nuclear weapons-related activities. Our belief is based on the manner in which the furnaces are being procured, previous Iraqi procurement behavior, and questions about the credibility of Iraq's claimed prospective end-use for the furnaces. ~~(S-NF)~~

2. Based on their specifications, we believe the furnaces could be used to process uranium or plutonium compounds into forms suitable for nuclear weapons, but we have no indication Iraq currently has sufficient material available. Although other non-nuclear end-uses are possible, we doubt the furnace will be used, as claimed, for manufacturing prosthetics from titanium. Moreover, cheaper materials are more available for developing prosthetics than rare and costly titanium. ~~(S-NF)~~

3. We believe Iraq gives high priority to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability to counter perceived military threats from Iran and Israel, and Baghdad's other purchasing activities--especially through worldwide covert channels--strongly suggest that a weapons program exists. These procurement efforts are essential to Iraq's ability to produce a nuclear weapon. ~~(S-NF)~~

4. President Saddam Husayn's close confidant, Husayn Kamil al-Majid--who is a driving force in Baghdad's long-range missile, chemical, and biological weapons programs--appears to be in charge of the nuclear procurement effort. The nuclear network--part of a larger military procurement effort controlled by Majid's Ministry of Industry and

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Military Industrialization (MIMI) and his Special Security organization-  
-uses Iraqi public sector enterprises, international front companies,  
foreign agents, and probably even the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.  
The Iraqis currently are focussing on procurement of enrichment and  
reprocessing technology and material, and diagnostic equipment.

5. The entity seeking to procure the furnaces, the Ministry of  
Industry and Minerals, is probably the same as MIMI. In 1988, Iraqi  
industrial ministries were reorganized and Husayn Kamil al-Majid was  
named head of the newly-formed Ministry of Industry and Minerals. Since  
then, however, this ministry has been subsumed into MIMI and probably no  
longer exists. Iraq may be using the Ministry's old name--which does  
not highlight its military role--in an effort to avoid raising suspicion  
about the end-use of the requested equipment. ~~(S-NF)~~

cc: Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
International Security Affairs  
Principal Acting Secretary of State for  
Politco-Military Affairs  
Under Secretary for Export Administration  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
International Security Affairs  
Chief, Export Control Branch