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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

3 October 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS : Organizing the
Commitment of the Front's Second Echelon to Battle

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons, the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson outlining the activities and contributions of a front commander, his key staff officers, and his air army and tank army commanders when the front's second-echelon tank army is committed to battle to develop an offensive operation across the northern area of West Germany.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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DATE OF
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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 26a : Organizing the Commitment of the
Front's Second Echelon to Battle

SOURCE Documentary
Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students acting as front commanders, front chiefs of intelligence, operations, and radioelectronic warfare, and front air army and tank army commanders, in the various assessments, calculations, and decisions to be made when the second-echelon tank army is committed to battle in an offensive operation across the North German plain. The main points covered are the enemy assessment, principal targets for nuclear and conventional air, missile, and artillery destruction, the balance of forces in terms of key force components (missiles, divisions, and major weapons), time and distance factors for movement, and proposals for the use of airpower. The inclusion of radioelectronic warfare measures in this particular lesson underscores the prominence given to these activities in Soviet military thinking.

End of Summary

Comment:

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this lesson probably equate as follows:

Brown -- West Germany
Blue -- Great Britain
Lilac -- Belgium

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LESSON No. 26a

I. Lesson subject: Organizing the commitment of the front's second echelon to battle.

II. Estimated time for conducting the lesson.

Lesson No. 26a	Time (hours)		
	Classroom Study	Individual Study	Total
	4	4	8

III. Training objectives of the lesson:

-- to train students to deeply and fully estimate the situation when committing the front's second echelon to battle and to derive the correct conclusions from it;

-- to teach students to make a well-founded decision and to organize the commitment to battle of a tank army -- the front's second echelon;

-- to teach students the concise formulation of a decision and a short exposition of it;

-- to train students to assign (refine) tasks for the troops.

IV. Method of conducting the lesson -- a group exercise on maps with elements of a command-staff exercise.

V. Methodological recommendations on the preparation of students for the lessons /sic/.

When preparing the lessons, its /sic/ salient feature should be taken into consideration.

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The lesson is to be conducted by the departments of operational art, rocket troops and artillery, engineer troops, and rear services.

At the start of the students' individual preparation for the lesson, the directors of the training groups are to conduct general and individual briefings. In the process they are to recommend the following materials for study:

- Front Offensive Operations.^{*} Textbook.
- Engineer Support of the Operation. Textbook.
- Rocket Troops and Artillery in the Offensive and Defensive Operation. Textbook.
- the map assignment for the initial situation at 1930 hours 12 September.

After studying the recommended training materials, students must study the assignment, estimate the situation, refine the front commander's decision, plot it on a map and, in the role of commander of the 10th Tank Army, make a decision on the advance and deployment of the army and, in the process, outline the formation of the army on a map during its advance to the line of commitment to battle.

VI. Procedure for conducting lesson 26a

- I. Estimate of the situation -- 90 minutes
 - a) Assessment of the enemy -- 20 minutes

Students in the role of chief of intelligence are to report on the following main topics:

- changes in the disposition and status of the ground and air grouping of the enemy for the past 24 hours on the axis of the front's main thrust;

* Comment: May refer to the document disseminated as
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- capabilities of the enemy to deliver nuclear strikes;
- targets for delivery of a strike by the front's nuclear means;
- strong and weak aspects in the make-up and situation of enemy groupings and the possible nature of actions on 13 September.

Report of the chief of intelligence based on the situation at 1930 hours 12 September.

In the past 24 hours, as a result of rapid offensive actions of combat-effective groupings of the front's troops and delivery of follow-up grouped nuclear strikes, the operational situation of the enemy troops has sharply deteriorated. Attack groupings of the Brown 1st, 4th and 6th army corps, Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, and Blue 1st Army Corps have been routed and have sustained losses of up to 70 percent. The advancing reserves of the Brown 5th Army Corps and 24th Infantry Division, and Lilac 5th Motorized Infantry Division, located at a distance of up to 70 kilometers from the front line, have been stopped by nuclear strikes and have sustained losses of up to approximately 50 to 60 percent; they are conducting measures to restore combat effectiveness, as is the 5th Motorized Infantry Division, which is 25 kilometers from the front line. Two to four hours are required for /their/ advance to the front line and deployment. The 2nd Pershing Missile Wing has sustained losses of up to 80 percent, its 2nd Squadron has been destroyed, and remnants of the 4th Squadron (up to four launchers) are assumed to be deployed west of KHENGLO /THENGLO (Netherlands)/.

The situation of remaining squadrons and their condition have to be updated; in addition, two Honest John battalions have been noted in positions north of OLDENBURG and northeast of MINDEN, respectively, and the 24th Lance Missile Regiment is assumed to be in positions in the ALSFELD area.

Combat-effective units and subunits -- the 11th Motorized Infantry Division and 3rd Tank Division of the Brown 1st Army Corps and the Lilac 1st Motorized Infantry Division -- are conducting delaying actions directly in the zone of the forthcoming commitment of the 10th Tank Army. Defeated remnants -- the Brown 1st Motorized Infantry Division and the 24th Infantry Division which is approaching from the depth -- are in the second echelon.

In the 7th Army zone, the Brown 14th Motorized Infantry Division and Lilac 5th Motorized Infantry Division are the most combat-effective.

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In the 9th Army zone, defeated units -- the Lilac 2nd Army Corps -- are pulling out.

The most combat-effective of the enemy's divisions, on its left flank, are the Brown 25th Infantry Division and the Blue 2nd Armored Division, and they are delivering a counterthrust.

Based on losses, the enemy grouping can have: 20 to 22 operational-tactical missile launchers, 18 to 20 tactical missile launchers, up to 70 atomic artillery pieces, up to 1,500 tanks, up to 800 guns and mortars, and up to 500 antitank guided missile /launchers/.

The enemy air grouping also has sustained extensive losses, but still numbers up to 450 to 500 combat aircraft and of those, up to 100 to 120 are delivery aircraft.

Targets for delivery of nuclear strikes by the front's means of nuclear attack are: remnants of three Pershing missile squadrons with eight to ten launchers, delivery aircraft on airfields and three strips of highway, four air defense and tactical aviation control and guidance posts, up to 20 Hawk and Nike Hercules batteries; reconstituted control posts of the Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and five army corps; remnants of two Lance missile battalions and two Lance missile regiments, combat-effective units of eight divisions which have been brought up to 50-percent strength -- 14th Motorized Infantry Division of the Brown 4th Army Corps, 24th Infantry Division of the Brown 1st Army Corps, 17th, 19th, and 20th motorized infantry divisions of the Brown 5th Army Corps, 5th Motorized Infantry Division of the Lilac 1st Army Corps, Brown 25th Infantry Division, 2nd Armored Division of the Blue 1st Army Corps and individual combat-effective units and subunits of nine divisions of the Brown 1st and 4th army corps, Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, Blue 1st Army Corps, and four large pumping stations. There are a total of up to 180 targets of the type: Pershing detachment, Lance, Hawk, and Nike Hercules battery, airfield, command post, control and warning post and control and warning center, tank and infantry battalion.

A strong aspect of the enemy is (in spite of extensive losses) his capability to still deliver massed and grouped nuclear strikes and ability to deliver a counterthrust with forces of up to five divisions. A weak aspect is the enemy's loss of initiative on the flanks, the rout of his attack groupings, extensive troop losses in the Brown 1st, 4th and 6th army corps, Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, and Blue 1st Army Corps, and as a result of this, large gaps will have formed in the combat disposition of

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his troops.

The probable nature of enemy actions on 13 September can be made up of attempts to have the combat-effective units and large units of the first echelon and the approaching reserves go over to the defense and hold the BREMEN, DIEPHOLZ, OSNABRUCK, BIELEFELD line which has been prepared and covered using nuclear land mines.

Simultaneously, with nuclear strikes against combat-effective groupings of the front's troops, destruction is to be inflicted on them and their further advance prohibited.

Nor has the possibility that the enemy will deliver (following a nuclear attack) a counterthrust with forces of the Brown 5th Army Corps from the OSNABRUCK, BIELEFELD or DEMFERDE /sic -- ?LEMFORDE/, MINDEN line and the Brown 24th Infantry Division and the Lilac 5th Motorized Infantry Division from the BREMEN, DIEPHOLZ line been excluded.

b) Assessment of our forces -- 50 minutes.

Students in the role of chief of the operations directorate are to report the following main topics:

-- assessment of the condition and operational situation of the troops on the axis of the main thrust of the front, and the condition and situation of troops of the 10th Tank Army.

-- calculations of the balance of forces on the axis of the main thrust and in the zone for commitment of the 10th Tank Army to battle;

-- calculations on the advance and deployment of the 10th Tank Army from a departure area to possible lines of commitment to battle;

-- assessment of the terrain and the precise definition of the line and time of commitment of the 10th Tank Army to battle.

Report of the chief of the operations directorate

Troops of the Coastal Front, in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet and the 3rd Army of the Western Front, exploiting the results of the initial massed strike of the front and follow-up nuclear strikes, have inflicted destruction on troops of the Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps, Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, and Blue 1st Army Corps, and over five days of the

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offensive have advanced to a depth of 140 to 150 kilometers.

Troops of the 7th and 9th armies have encircled and are destroying the remnants of the 16th Tank Division and two brigades of the 15th Motorized Infantry Division of the Brown 4th Army Corps, and the 1st and 4th armored divisions of the Blue 1st Army Corps.

The front's troops are assuming the following operational posture:

-- The 4th Army, while pursuing units of the Brown 6th Army Corps, has advanced over a 24 hour period up to 40 kilometers and is successfully developing the offensive.

The operational disposition is in one echelon. The army is capable of developing the offensive and fulfilling the task within the time period prescribed for it. It is necessary for the army to be reinforced with one division to restore the second echelon and to conduct the next army operation.

-- The 2nd Army Corps is engaged in heavy fighting for HAMBURG; its task for 13 to 14 September is to complete the rout of the opposing grouping and seize the important HAMBURG industrial area.

-- The 7th Army (1st, 4th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 28th motorized rifle divisions) with its previous means of reinforcement has all divisions in the first echelon. The most combat-effective divisions are the 4th, 12th and 13th motorized rifle divisions. The remaining divisions have actually lost combat effectiveness, and of those only individual combat-effective subunits are active.

The army, with its main forces, has deployed to the north.

The 12th Motorized Rifle Division, which has advanced to a depth of up to 60 kilometers, is having the most success.

The 1st and 13th motorized rifle divisions are destroying encircled units of the Brown 16th Tank Division and 15th Motorized Infantry Division. The 28th Motorized Rifle Division was subjected to a nuclear strike and lost its control.

In the army's zone the enemy, through the delivery of individual and grouped nuclear strikes and an offensive by the 14th Motorized Infantry Division, is striving to destroy the 12th Motorized Rifle Division and

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also, exploiting gaps in the battle formations of the 13th Motorized Rifle Division, combat-effective units of the 16th Tank Division and 15th Motorized Infantry Division /are striving/ to break out of the encirclement.

A weakness in the operational situation of the army is the absence of forces and means to develop the offensive in a westerly direction (southwest of BREMEN).

To develop the offensive in a westerly direction, it is necessary to reinforce the army with no less than two to three divisions. For this purpose it is advisable to resubordinate the 17th Motorized Rifle Division of the 6th Army to the army, and also to commit to battle the 28th Motorized Rifle Division, which is located at a distance of up to 80 kilometers from the line of contact with the enemy; up to five hours are needed for its advance and commitment to battle, and taking into account the necessity of restoring control in the division this time period increases to as much as 12 hours. The division can be committed to battle at 1000 hours 13 September. Following the elimination of the encircled grouping on the axis of the main thrust, the 13th Motorized Rifle Division can also be used.

Providing the encircled enemy grouping has been eliminated by the morning of 13 September, the 13th Motorized Rifle Division can be committed to battle no earlier than 14 September. It is also necessary to take measures to repel the further advance of the 14th Motorized Infantry Division at the junction of the 11th and 12th motorized rifle divisions and to prevent combat-effective enemy units from breaking out of the encirclement.

The army has 19 operational-tactical and tactical missiles and 18 nuclear warheads and, providing the above measures are implemented, will be capable of fulfilling the follow-up task of the army by the close of 15 September.

The 6th Army (17th Motorized Rifle Division and 5th Tank Division) with its previous means of reinforcement, has been weakened by nuclear strikes; and its 5th and 19th tank divisions, advancing on the axis of the main thrust, have lost combat effectiveness.

Only the 17th Motorized Rifle Division, which has made an assault crossing of the WESER River and advanced to a depth of up to 40 kilometers, has maintained combat effectiveness. The 5th Tank Division is conducting

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an offensive using only individual combat-effective subunits and is fulfilling minor tactical tasks.

The army has eight operational-tactical and tactical launchers and seven nuclear warheads.

Overall (as a result of total extensive losses and limited control capabilities) the army is not capable of performing operational tasks and is in need of restoring combat effectiveness.

-- The 9th Army (6th, 18th, 21st, 23rd motorized rifle divisions, 10th, 20th, 26th tank divisions) with its previous means of reinforcement, has maintained combat effectiveness. The 6th Motorized Rifle Division and 10th Tank Division are having the most success. The 6th Motorized Rifle Division has advanced to a depth of up to 80 kilometers and made an assault crossing of the WESER River. The 20th Tank Division is being committed to battle on this axis, which allows the army to develop a successful offensive on the axis of its main thrust. The greatest pressure is on the left flank of the army, where the 26th Tank Division is engaged in heavy fighting on a front up to 45 kilometers wide with units of the Blue 2nd Armored Division and Brown 25th Infantry Division, which are attempting to break out of their encirclement, and /with/ combat-effective units of the 1st and 4th armored divisions; and also in the zone of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division, where the enemy, by exploiting gaps between the 18th and 31st /21st/ motorized rifle divisions, is attempting to break through in a westerly direction.

The antitank reserves of the 9th Army and 18th Motorized Rifle Division and a sortie by the 9th Separate Helicopter Regiment can be used to destroy tanks which have broken through.

The 21st and 23rd motorized rifle divisions have lost combat effectiveness and are conducting battle jointly with the 18th Motorized Rifle Division with only individual combat-effective subunits; following the elimination of the encircled grouping they should be put in the front reserve.

The army has 18 operational-tactical and tactical missile launchers and 21 nuclear-armed missiles.

Overall, the army is capable of developing the offensive and by the close of 14 September will fulfill its follow-up task.

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The 10th Tank Army, with three divisions (15th and 22nd tank divisions, 29th Motorized Rifle Division) has concentrated in a departure area for commitment to battle 100 to 180 kilometers from the line of troop contact, where it was subjected to an enemy nuclear strike. As a result of the attack, the 29th Motorized Rifle Division and up to two battalions in leading regiments of the division have lost control. Six to seven hours are required to restore control and eliminate the aftereffects /of the nuclear strike/.

The most combat-effective divisions are the 15th and 22nd tank divisions. The 15th Motorized Rifle Division requires six to seven hours for advance and commitment to battle and the 22nd Tank Division requires 10 to 12 hours, since a refueling of its equipment is required.

The army has 19 /missile/ launchers and 28 nuclear warheads. Overall, the army is combat-effective and ready for commitment to battle.

-- the front rocket troops have 117 /missile/ launchers (60 for operational-tactical missiles and 57 for tactical missiles). Of these, 72 launchers (49 for operational-tactical missiles and 33 for tactical missiles) and 65 nuclear warheads are on the axis of the main thrust.

Today, up to the close of the day, 46 nuclear warheads (25 for operational-tactical missiles and 21 for tactical missiles) can be employed;

-- the 1st Air Army continues to restore the combat effectiveness of its units and is rebasing to new airfields.

The army has 736 aircraft and 160 combat helicopters in its complement.

The flight resource on 13 September is two army sorties; and the army, beginning the morning of 13 September, can employ 48 nuclear bombs.

This allows a massed nuclear strike employing up to 113 nuclear munitions to be delivered jointly with the rocket troops.

On 12 September, the remainder of the flight resources /consists of/ two regimental sorties of a fighter-bomber division in readiness status No. 1 and No. 2 with three nuclear bombs and one sortie of the 9th Separate Helicopter Regiment.

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-- Air defense troops -- the 13th Surface-to-Air Missile /SAM/ Brigade has completed deployment in the 10th Tank Army zone, which will provide cover for troops of the 10th Tank Army during their advance to the line of commitment.

With the commitment of the 10th Tank Army to battle on the axis of the main thrust and taking losses into account, the balance of forces can be summed up as follows:

a) Overall balance of forces

Forces and means	Our troops: 6th, 7th, 9th armies, 10th Tank Army with means of reinforcement, 2nd, 3rd front missile brigades, 4th, 5th antitank artillery brigades, 1st Air Army	Enemy: Brown 1st, 5th army corps, Lilac 5th Motorized Infantry Division, 2nd Army Corps, Brown 24th, 25th infantry divisions, Blue 2nd Armored Division	Ratio
1	2	3	4
Operational-tactical missile launchers	49	20-22	2.2-2.5 : 1
Tactical missile launchers	36	18-20	1.9-2 : 1
Atomic artillery pieces	--	45	--
Divisions:	15	14	1 : 1
Consisting of:			
-- Tank divisions	8	3	2.6 : 1
-- Motorized rifle divisions, motorized infantry divisions	7	11	1 : 1.5

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1	2	3	4
Tanks	2,305	1,358	1.7 : 1
Guns and mortars	2,275	754	3 : 1
Antitank guided missiles, antitank artillery	760	520	1.5 : 1
Aircraft	736	450-500	1.5 : 1
Combat helicopters	130	50-60	2-2.6 : 1

b) Balance of forces in the 10th Tank Army zone

Forces and means	10th Tank Army, 17th Motorized Rifle Division with means of reinforcement, 2nd, 3rd front missile brigades, 4th, 5th antitank artillery brigades	Brown 1st Army Corps (1st, 11th motorized infantry divisions, 24th Infantry Division), 19th Motorized Infantry Division of Brown 5th Army Corps, Lilac 5th Motorized Infantry Division	Ratio
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1	2	3	4
Operational-tactical missile launchers	32	10	3.2:1
Tactical missile launchers	14	6	2:1
Atomic artillery pieces	--	18-20	absolute

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1	2	3	4
Divisions:	4	4	1 : 1
Consisting of:			
Tank divisions	2	--	absolute
Motorized rifle divisions, motorized infantry divisions	2	4	1 : 2
Tanks	726	395	1.8 : 1
Guns and mortars	1,126	235	4.8 : 1
Antitank guided missiles, antitank artillery	307	148	2 : 1
Combat helicopters	40	40-50	1 : 1

c) Balance of forces upon commitment of the 10th Tank Army

Forces and means	Our troops: 10 6A /sic -- presumably 10th Tank Army/ minus 29th Motorized Rifle Division; bomber aviation with means of reinforcement, 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade	Brown 1st Army Corps (11th Motorized Infantry Division, 3rd Tank Division), Lilac 5th Motorized Infantry Division	Ratio
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1	2	3	4
Operational-tactical missiles	10	2	5 : 1
Tactical missiles	13	2	6.5 : 1

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1	2	3	4
Atomic artillery pieces	--	12	absolute
Divisions	4	3	1.3 : 1
Tanks	771	301	2.5 : 1
Guns and mortars	849	150	5.6 : 1
Antitank artillery	306	167	1.8 : 1
Combat helicopters	70	30-40	2 : 1

The balance of forces on the axis of the main thrust has changed still more in favor of the front's troops.

The balance of forces, upon commitment of the 10th Tank Army to battle, is overwhelming and ensures success.

The balance of forces in the offensive zone of the 10th Tank Army (while the enemy is committing up to two divisions to battle) is declining. To achieve success, it is necessary to deliver a massed nuclear strike during this commitment to battle in order to destroy newly-detected missile/nuclear means and combat-effective groupings of enemy troops and by the same token alter the balance of forces sharply in favor of the 10th Tank Army.

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Calculation for the advance and deployment of troops of the 10th Tank Army

Formations, large units, units	Distance from line of contact with the enemy (kilometers)	Rate of advance (kilo- meters per hour)	Time for advance (hours)	Time for deployment (hours)	Total time for advance and commitment to battle (hours)
1	2	3	4	5	6
<u>10th Tank Army</u>					
15th Tank Division	100	20	5	1.5-2	6-7
29th Motorized Rifle Division	75	20	4	1.5-2	6
22nd Tank Division	170	25	7	1.5-2	9-10
10th Army Artillery Brigade	80	25	3	2	5
10th Army Rocket Launcher Artillery Regiment	80	25	3	1	4
10th SAM Brigade	150-170	25	7-8	1	8-9
15th SAM Brigade	120-150	25	6-7	1	7-8
8th Artillery Division units	50	25	2	2	4
11th Artillery Division units /including: /	60	25	3	2	5

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1	2	3	4	5	6
6th Howitzer Artillery Brigade	150	25	7	0.5	7.5
<u>7th Army</u>					
28th Motorized Rifle Division	60	20	3	1.5-2	5
13th Motorized Rifle Division	180	25	8	1.5-2	10
<u>9th Army</u>					
20th Tank Division	40	20	2	1.5-2	3.5-4
18th Motorized Rifle Division	160-180	25	7	1.5-2	9-10
4th Antitank Artillery Brigade	60	25	2.5-3	0.3	3-3.5
5th Antitank Artillery Brigade	75	25	3	0.3	3-3.5

The calculations show that the 10th Tank Army's advance and commitment to battle requires six to seven hours for the 15th Tank Division, nine to ten hours for the 22nd Tank Division, and three to four hours for the reinforcement artillery. In addition, two to two and one-half hours are needed by the 22nd Tank Division for refueling its equipment.

Assessment of terrain and time -- five minutes

The terrain to the north of the SREDNO-GERMANSKIY KANAL /MITTELLAND CANAL/ in the 10th Tank Army's zone of advance is somewhat rolling and swampy, especially in the area of SULINGEN, DITEKHOLETS /sic -- DIEPHOLZ/, RAHDEN, and is broken by a network of shallow rivers and drainage canals; hills in places offer a good view of the terrain. However, a dense network of motor roads allows mechanized transports to move in all directions.

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Swampy areas have to be negotiated in company and battalion columns. Five to six through routes can be prepared in the army's zone of advance. Based on an assessment of the situation of first-echelon troops and the terrain, the main line of commitment will be line No. 1; SYKE, UCHTE.

Time of commitment. It is now 1930 hours 12 September. Sunset was at 1900 hours, sunrise will be at 0600 hours. There is no daylight time for the preparation of 10th Tank Army troops. Final reconnaissance of targets and installations for delivery of a nuclear strike and pinpointing of tasks for division-regiment-battalion commanders on the terrain requires no less than 1.5 hours. Therefore, the time for the 10th Army's commitment to battle is advisably fixed at 0830 hours 13 September.

An assessment of the condition of the rocket troops and artillery and air defense troops, and proposals concerning their combat employment, and also the status of the engineer troops and engineer support, the status of the rear services, and a proposal on the decision regarding rear services support, will be carried out in the lessons on those respective departments.

c) Proposals of the commander of the 1st Air Army on supporting the commitment of the 10th Tank Army to battle -- ten minutes

Students in the role of commander of the 1st Air Army are to report the following topics:

-- strength of the air army, number of nuclear munitions, the flight resource;

-- proposals on air support to the 10th Tank Army during its commitment to battle.

Report of the commander of the 1st Air Army

The 1st Air Army has 736 aircraft, 340 of them delivery aircraft, 160 combat helicopters, and 48 nuclear bombs.

In support of the commitment of the 10th Tank Army, by agreement with the front chief of staff and the commander of rocket troops and artillery, it is advisable for group strikes of five air regiments of fighter-bomber aviation and bomber aviation (four fighter-bomber divisions, one bomber regiment) employing 38 nuclear bombs to destroy the following targets from 0815 hours to 0830 hours 13 September: headquarters of the 2nd Allied

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Tactical Air Force, combat-effective units of the Brown 5th Army Corps, 14th Motorized Rifle /sic/ Division, 24th and 25th infantry divisions, Lilac 5th Motorized Rifle /sic/ Division, aircraft of two airfields, and three Nike Hercules and Hawk batteries.

Four regimental sorties of the 10th Separate Helicopter Regiment, three regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation and four 20-kiloton nuclear bombs are to be allocated for air support of the 10th Tank Army on 13 September.

During the night from 12 to 13 September, one bomber regiment is to conduct a search and destroy mission for enemy missile/nuclear means, concentrating its main efforts on the destruction of launchers of the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing.

During 12 September, search and destruction of the enemy's nuclear means shall continue.

Cover for the 10th Tank Army during advance and commitment to battle is to be provided by forces of two fighter divisions (3rd and 5th fighter divisions).

Reconnaissance aviation prior to 2000 hours 12 September and from dawn 13 September is to conduct final reconnaissance of targets for the front's nuclear strike.

Six regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation, ten regimental sorties of army aviation and six nuclear /bombs/ are to be allocated for air support of the front's troops.

d) Proposals of the chief of radioelectronic warfare -- ten minutes.

Students in the role of chief of radioelectronic warfare are to report the following topics:

-- tasks of radioelectronic countermeasures units

-- time of deployment and their readiness to operate.

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Report of the chief of radioelectronic warfare

In the situation which has developed, I propose:

1. To concentrate the main effort of radioelectronic countermeasures units on disrupting radio control of troops of the Brown 1st and 5th army corps, first-echelon divisions and their units, Brown Tactical Air Command aviation, and control of units of missile/nuclear means.
2. In cooperation with engineer and chemical troops, to impede airborne radar reconnaissance and aimed strikes against troops of the 10th Tank Army on the routes of advance and line of commitment to battle, and on bridges and crossings over the WESER River.
3. To continue covering siting areas of front and army missile brigades and the command posts of the front and armies.
4. By 0200 hours 12 September, to deploy radioelectronic countermeasures units in siting areas in readiness to jam by 0500 hours 13 September.

Decision of the commander of the Coastal Front on the commitment of the second echelon --the 10th Tank Army -- to battle and development of the operation -- 45 minutes.

1. The opposing enemy grouping with its nuclear means has been routed by nuclear strikes in the zone of the front. The greatest losses, up to 70 percent, were sustained by large units of the Brown 1st and 4th army corps, Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, and the Blue 1st Army Corps.

Most combat-effective are the 14th and 15th infantry divisions of the Brown 4th Army Corps, 17th, 19th and 20th motorized infantry divisions of the Brown 5th Army Corps, and the Brown 24th Infantry Division, whose losses amount up to 50 percent. The enemy's missile/nuclear grouping has sustained heavy losses.

However, the enemy is still capable of delivering massed and grouped nuclear strikes, and also strikes using tactical and army aviation.

In the zone of the front up to 180 targets have been detected which are subject to destruction by nuclear weapons.

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The enemy's probable concept on 13 September may consist of an attempt to have combat-effective first-echelon units and large units go over to the defense, and to hold the prepared BREMEN, DIEPHOLZ, OSNABRUCK, BIELEFELD line while simultaneously using nuclear strikes against combat-effective groupings of the front's troops to inflict destruction and prevent their further advance.

Also, one cannot rule out the possibility that the enemy will deliver (following a nuclear strike) a counterthrust using combat-effective groupings of troops -- the Brown 5th Army Corps from the OSNABRUCK, BIELEFELD line or from the DEMFERDE /sic -- ?LEMFORDE/, MINDEN line and the Brown 24th Infantry Division and Lilac 5th Motorized Infantry Division from the BREMEN, DIEPHOLZ line.

I have decided to destroy the following detected missile/nuclear means before 2000 hours 12 September by delivering grouped and individual strikes employing 15 nuclear munitions (12 missiles and three nuclear bombs): the 4th Pershing Missile Squadron, three Honest John battalions, 24th Lance Missile Regiment, delivery aircraft at two airfields, command post of the Brown 1st Army Corps, and also the encircled enemy grouping.

Simultaneously, by 0600 hours 13 September, combat-effective troop groupings will be used to improve the operational situation of the troops and establish conditions for commitment to battle of the front's second echelon -- the 10th Tank Army -- to complete the rout of the encircled enemy groupings in the zones of the 7th and 9th armies, and to free forces to exploit success on the axis of the main thrust of the front.

2. On the morning of 13 September, forces of three armies -- the 7th and 9th armies, and 10th Tank Army -- are to continue to develop the offensive on the axis of the main thrust. Forces of the 4th Army and 2nd Army Corps are to be on the JUTLAND axis.

The second echelon of the front -- the 10th Tank Army -- will be committed to battle on the morning of 13 September in the zone of the 6th Army from the SYKE, UCHTE line following the massed strike by leapfrogging units of the 5th Tank Division and 17th Motorized Rifle Division of the 6th Army which have been weakened by enemy nuclear strikes; and while developing the offensive on the SULINGEN, ENSCHEDE axis, it will fulfill the immediate task of the front by the close of 14 September. Subsequently, while exploiting success on the KLEVE, EINDHOVEN, CHARLEROI /axis/, it is to make an assault crossing of the RHINE River from the march

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and achieve the objective of the operation in the time prescribed by General Headquarters.

The 30th Airborne Division is to make an assault landing starting on the morning of 14 September.

On the morning of 13 September, 78 nuclear munitions are to be employed -- 40 by rocket troops and 38 by the 1st Air Army of the front -- in a massed nuclear strike to destroy remnants of the 1st and 3rd Pershing missile squadrons, delivery aircraft at four airfields, remnants of the 150th Lance Missile Battalion and 25th Lance Missile Regiment, four centers and posts of control and guidance for tactical aviation, restored command posts of the Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, Brown 5th Army Corps and combat-effective units of 13 divisions (Brown: 14th Motorized Infantry Division of the 4th Army Corps, 1st and 11th motorized infantry divisions of the 1st Army Corps, 17th, 19th, and 20th motorized infantry divisions of the 5th Army Corps, and 24th Infantry Division; Lilac: 1st and 5th motorized infantry divisions of the 1st Army Corps, 101st and 301st motorized infantry divisions of the 2nd Army Corps; Brown 25th Infantry Division, Blue 2nd Armored Division, and three Nike Hercules batteries.

The massed nuclear strike will begin: for rocket troops and artillery -- 0800 hours 13 September, for aviation -- 0815 hours /13 September/.

The duration of the fire strike -- 15 minutes.

Artillery of the 6th Army will be allocated for the artillery strike.

The operational disposition of the front is to be in two echelons -- in the first echelon: 4th, 7th, and 9th armies, 10th Tank Army; in the second echelon -- 6th Army. The combat effectiveness of large units is to be restored by front reserve divisions which have lost combat effectiveness.

Troop tasks:

-- 10th Tank Army (15th, 22nd tank divisions, 29th Motorized Rifle Division) with the 11th Artillery Division (minus the 15th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 12th Rocket Launcher Artillery Brigade), 14th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 11th Rocket Launcher Artillery Brigade of the 8th Artillery Division at 0830 hours 13 September following the massed nuclear strike will be committed to battle from the SYKE, UCHIE line, and with a thrust on

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the SULINGEN, ENSCHEDE, KLEVE axis is to complete the rout of units of the Brown 1st and 11th motorized infantry divisions, 24th Infantry Division of the 1st Army Corps, and 19th Motorized Infantry Division of the 5th Army Corps; and in cooperation with the 30th Airborne Division make an assault crossing of the RHINE River from the march; and by the close of 16 September arrive at to the ZWOLLE, ARNHEM, VEGHEL, HELMOND, (excluding) MEIJEL line. In the subsequent development of the offensive on the EINDHOVEN, CHARLEROI axis, by 19 to 20 September it is to seize the BRUSSELS, CHARLEROI, TIENEN area.

In the massed nuclear strike, 11 nuclear warheads (five operational-tactical missiles, six tactical missiles) are to be employed to destroy the 150th Lance Missile Battalion, command post of the Northern Army Group, command post of the 5th Army Corps, and combat-effective subunits of the 1st and 11th motorized rifle divisions on the line of commitment, as well as the 27th Airborne Brigade.

The army is to be allocated 26 nuclear warheads (including ten operational-tactical missiles and 16 tactical missiles) for the operation.

Upon commitment to battle the army is to be supported by three regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation with six nuclear bombs and four regimental sorties of the 10th Separate Helicopter Regiment.

Cover for the army during advance and commitment is to be handled by forces of the 3rd and 5th fighter divisions.

Line of demarcation, on the right -- WIETZENDORF, SYKE, (excluding) MOLLBERGEN, ZWOLLE, on the left -- GARDELEGEN, NEUSTADT, BORGHORST, WESEL, (excluding) HORST.

Routes of advance: No. 1 -- SULZE, VESTENPOLATS /sic -- ?WESTENHOLZ/, OTERSEN, VAHLZEN, BASSUM;

No. 2 -- WINSSEN, GILTEN, SHVERING /probably SCHWERINGEN/, AZANDORF /sic -- ASENDORF/;

No. 3 -- DIECKHORST, southern outskirts of CELLE, SCHWARMSTEDT, DRAKENBURG, ODENDORF;

No. 4 -- KALBE, BROME, GIFHORN, HANIGSEN, MELLENDORF, NIENBURG, SULINGEN;

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No. 5 -- GARDELEGEN, OEBISFELDE, LEHRTE, NEUSTADT, SHTRAERBERG
/probably STEYERBERG/;

No. 6 -- BRAUNSCHWEIG, southern outskirts of HANNOVER, HAGENBURG,
UCHTE.

The departure line WIETZENDORF, SEHNDE will be traversed at 0200 hours
13 September by the heads of the main forces columns.

The army forward control post on the line of commitment is to be in
the area of the hill /vysota/ with reference mark 57.

-- 7th Army (4th, 12th, 13th, 17th, 28th motorized rifle divisions)
with the 2nd Gun Artillery Brigade of the 8th Artillery Division of the
Reserve of the Supreme High Command is to destroy enemy subunits which have
broken out of the encirclement and complete the rout of encircled units of
the Brown 4th Army Corps. On the morning of 13 September the main forces
are to develop the offensive on the DELMENHORST, EMMEN, MEPPEL axis; and
part of the forces, in cooperation with the 2nd Army Corps, are to
complete the rout of the Brown 4th Army Corps and Lilac 1st Army Corps on
the ROTENBURG, BREMERHAVEN /axis/; and by the close of 16 to 17 September,
they are to come out at the seacoast throughout the zone and achieve the
objective of the operation.

Nine nuclear munitions are to be employed in the massed nuclear strike
to destroy the 1st Pershing Missile Squadron, command post of the Lilac 1st
Army Corps, combat-effective subunits of the Brown 15th Motorized Infantry
Division and 1st Motorized Infantry Division, and the Lilac 5th Motorized
Infantry Division.

Artillery of the 17th Motorized Rifle Division, army artillery and the
2nd Gun Artillery Brigade of the 8th Artillery Division are to be brought
in for fire destruction during commitment of the 10th Tank Army to battle.
The line of demarcation, on the right --- is the previous /line/; on the
left -- (excluding) WIETZENDORF, (excluding) SYKE, MOLLBERGEN (northwest of
CLOPPENBURG), (excluding) ZWOLLE.

The 6th Army, with combat-effective units of the 5th Tank Division and
17th Motorized Rifle Division, by 0600 hours 13 September will seize the
SYKE, UCHTE line and support the 10th Tank Army's commitment to battle.
After this, it is to transfer the 17th Motorized Rifle Division to the 7th
Army and upon commitment of the 10th Tank Army to battle, the 6th Army,
made up of the 5th, 9th, 19th tank divisions and the 11th Motorized Rifle

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Division, will become the second echelon as of 1500 hours 13 September.

In the massed nuclear strike at 0800 hours 13 September, three nuclear munitions are to be used to destroy the control and warning center in the area of LINGEN and combat-effective subunits of the 11th Motorized Rifle Division and Brown 3rd Tank Division.

As of 2100 hours 12 September, routes No. 1, 2, 3 are to be released to the 10th Tank Army.

Artillery of the 5th Tank Division, 17th Motorized Rifle Division and army artillery are to be brought in for fire destruction during commitment to battle of the 10th Tank Army.

The 9th Army (6th, 18th motorized rifle divisions, 10th, 20th, 26th tank divisions) with the 15th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 12th Rocket Launcher Artillery Brigade of the 11th Artillery Division of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command, will destroy units which have broken out of the encirclement and complete the rout of encircled units of the Blue 1st Army Corps; on the morning of 13 September following the massed nuclear strike it will develop the offensive on the BIELEFELD, MUNSTER axis and, in cooperation with the 10th Tank Army and 3rd Army of the Western Front, complete the defeat of units of the Lilac 2nd Army Corps, Brown 5th Army Corps, and Blue 1st Army Corps; and by the close of 14 September it will fulfill the follow-up task of the army.

The northern sector of the RUHR area is to be seized by the close of 16 September while the offensive is developed on the MUNSTER, VENLO axis. Forces of no less than one division are to make an assault crossing of the RHINE River from the march south of WESEL and seize the area of VENLO.

Seven nuclear munitions are to be employed in a massed strike to destroy the 1st Pershing Missile Squadron, 50th Lance Missile Regiment, the airfield and control and warning center in the area of ENSCHEDE and the command post of the Lilac 2nd Army Corps.

Artillery of the 10th Tank Division of the 9th Army is to be brought in for fire destruction of the enemy during commitment of the 10th Tank Army to battle.

As of 2200 hours routes Nos. 4, 5, 6 are to be released to the 10th Tank Army.

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The line of demarcation, on the right: (excluding) GARDELEGEN, (excluding) NEUSTADT, (excluding) BORGHORST, (excluding) WESEL, HORST;

On the left, the line of demarcation is the previous /line/.

-- The 4th Army and 2nd Army Corps are to continue to fulfill tasks previously assigned to the front rocket troops.

Before 2000 hours 12 September, the following are to be destroyed: the 4th Pershing Missile Squadron, 24th Lance Missile Regiment, delivery aircraft at airfields at APPELDORN and REINE /or RHEINE/, 109th Honest John Battalion, Honest John batteries of the 3rd Tank Division and 14th Motorized Infantry Division, command post of the Brown 1st Army Corps and combat-effective subunits of the Brown 14th and 15th motorized infantry divisions.

The 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades are to employ seven nuclear missiles in a massed nuclear strike at 0800 hours 13 September to destroy: the 3rd Pershing Missile Squadron, delivery aircraft at airfields at LATEN /?LATHEN/, LINGEN, MUNSTER, and two batteries of the 24th Nike-Hercules Battalion.

Upon commitment of the 10th Tank Army to battle, /the 4th Army and 2nd Army Corps/ are to be in readiness to destroy newly-detected means of nuclear attack.

-- The 1st Air Army, before 2000 hours, is to deliver a strike employing two nuclear bombs and destroy the 4th Pershing Missile Squadron.

One regimental sortie of fighter-bombers employing one nuclear bomb is to deliver a strike against the Brown 14th Motorized Infantry Division in the area of ROTENBURG.

One regimental sortie of fighter-bombers is to support the 9th Army during destruction of enemy tanks advancing in the area of ROHRSHEIM.

On the morning of 13 September 38 nuclear munitions are to be used in a massed nuclear strike at 0815 hours 13 September to destroy combat-effective units of the Brown 14th Motorized Infantry Division, 24th and 25th infantry divisions, and 17th, 19th, 20th motorized infantry divisions, and the Lilac 5th Motorized Infantry Division of the 1st Army Corps.

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Three sorties of fighter-bomber aviation with six nuclear bombs and four regimental sorties of the 10th Separate Helicopter Regiment are to support the commitment to battle of the 10th Tank Army.

Search and destruction of the enemy's nuclear means is to be accomplished by the expenditure of two regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation and two regimental sorties of bomber aviation employing six nuclear bombs.

Forces of the 3rd and 5th fighter divisions are to cover the 10th Tank Army during advance and deployment.

-- Air defense troops. The main efforts of air defense troops are to be concentrated on covering the 10th Tank Army during advance and deployment on the line of commitment to battle, and for this the 15th Front SAM Brigade is to be brought in to prohibit delivery of a massed air strike by the enemy.

-- Antitank reserves of the front: 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade and Mobile Obstacle Detachment No. 1 -- are to be deployed to cover the advance and deployment of troops of the 10th Tank Army on the fire line northeast of SYKE; the 5th Antitank Artillery Brigade and Mobile Obstacle Detachment No. 2 are to be in readiness to repel a possible counterthrust by enemy tanks from the OSNABRUCK, SULINGEN axis.

-- engineer troops are to support the commitment to battle of the 10th Tank Army and are to prepare no less than five routes in the zone of its advance.

The flanks of the 10th Tank Army are to be covered jointly by obstacles and by antitank reserves on the line of commitment.

Radioelectronic warfare tasks

-- The main efforts of radioelectronic warfare units are to be concentrated on disrupting radio control of troops of the Brown 1st and 5th army corps;

-- precision bombing by enemy aviation against troops of the 10th Tank Army during advance and deployment is to be prohibited;

-- siting areas of front and army brigades and the command posts of the front and armies will continue to be covered.

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Front staff

1. By 0700 hours 13 September, the enemy troop grouping and targets for a nuclear attack, especially in the zone of commitment of the 10th Tank Army, are to be more precisely defined.

2. A strict provost and traffic control service to ensure precise fulfillment of the schedule of advance for the 10th Tank Army as well as discipline and order on traffic routes is to be established.

3. The concealed advance of the 10th Tank Army and stability of control and communications are to be ensured.

Decision of the commander of the 10th Tank Army on advance and deployment of troops during commitment to battle -- 45 minutes.

Students in the role of commander of the 10th Tank Army are to report the decision on the following topics:

-- procedure for advancing the army's troops to the line of commitment to battle (march formation of the army);

-- procedure of deployment of army troops;

-- procedure for nuclear and fire destruction of the enemy during commitment to battle;

-- organization of control.

Report of the decision of the commander of the 10th Tank Army (variant) -- 45 minutes.

The advance of the army's troops to the line of commitment and the commitment to battle are to be accomplished in a two-echelon formation along five to six routes: two routes for each first-echelon division and one route for army units. (The disposition of troops during the advance is shown on the map of the decision.)

The following are to be in the first echelon:

-- 15th Tank Division with the 14th Heavy Howitzer Brigade; the 3rd, 4th, and 6th howitzer brigades of the 11th Artillery Division;

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-- 22nd Tank Division with the 8th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, 6th Howitzer Brigade (excluding the 3rd and 4th artillery divisions);

-- 10th Army Rocket Artillery Group, /consisting of/ the 10th Army Rocket Launcher Artillery Regiment, 11th Rocket Launcher Artillery Brigade;

-- 10th Army Artillery Group, /consisting of/ the 10th Army Artillery Brigade, 3rd Gun Artillery Brigade;

-- 10th Army Missile Brigade, 10th SAM Brigade, 15th SAM Brigade, 10th OSNAZ-S /Aircraft Radio Intercept/ Battalion, 10th OSNAZ-N /Ground Radio Intercept/ Battalion.

In the second echelon -- 29th Motorized Rifle Division and reserves of engineer and chemical troops.

Deployment procedure

Reconnaissance detachments from the 25th Infantry /sic/ Division and 29th Motorized Rifle Division, as of 1800 hours 12 September, have been deployed in the battle formations of the 17th Motorized Rifle Division and 5th Tank Division and are conducting reconnaissance, not crossing the line of contact with the enemy. A reconnaissance detachment from the 22nd Tank Division is to be sent out at 2000 hours.

OSNAZ radiotechnical units are to be deployed to operate by 2100 hours 12 September.

The advance of forward detachments and advance guards will begin, for the 15th Tank Division, at 2300 hours, for the 22nd Tank Division, at 2030 hours 12 September in readiness to cover the deployment of artillery, air defense troops and the main forces at the line of commitment by 0400 hours 13 September.

The selection, topographic tie-in, and preparation of siting areas for rocket troops, an observation post and fire position for artillery, the selection and preparation of a division command post and an army command post and forward command post are to be done in the period from 2200 hours 12 September to 0400 hours 13 September.

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The advance and deployment of rocket troops and artillery are to occur, for the 15th Tank Division, from 0100 hours to 0600 hours 13 September, and for the 22nd Tank Division, from 2100 hours 12 September to 0600 hours 13 September.

Advance and deployment of the main forces are to begin, for the 22nd Tank Division -- at 2200 hours 12 September, for the 15th Tank Division -- from 0200 hours 13 September to 0800 hours 13 September. The equipment of the 22nd Tank Division is to be refueled from 0200 hours to 0400 hours 12 September in the area northwest of HANNOVER.

Final reconnaissance of targets of destruction for rocket troops and artillery and the refinement of their tasks are to be done from 0600 hours to 0730 hours 13 September; a briefing and pinpointing of tasks on the terrain is to be held for commanders of regiments and battalions from 0600 hours to 0730 hours.

Procedure of nuclear fire destruction of the enemy

A massed strike by rocket troops and artillery and nuclear and fire destruction will occur from 0800 hours to 0827 hours.

A massed strike by aviation, from 0815 hours to 0830 hours.

Duration of the fire strike -- 15 minutes.

Start of fire strike -- 0810 hours.

End of fire concentration -- 0825 hours.

Capture of strongpoints on the enemy's forward edge by first-echelon troops -- 0830 hours 13 September.

Organization of control

The forward control post of the army and the command posts of the divisions are to advance behind the forward detachments and are to be deployed by 0300 hours 13 September.

The command post of the army is to advance over an army route and is to be deployed for operation in a new area by 0500 hours 13 September.

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Critique of the lesson -- five to ten minutes.

The subject of the lesson and the training objectives are to be announced, how they were attained is to be determined, and an assessment of the students' preparation for the lesson is to be given.

Attention is to be focused on the necessity of thoroughly preparing the front's commitment to battle and its all-round combat and materiel-technical support, especially with respect to the organization of reconnaissance, radioelectronic warfare, provost and traffic control service, engineer support, the organization of air defense, and the execution of nuclear and fire destruction of the enemy.

Further working out of matters of organizing the commitment of the 10th Tank Army to battle will be done in lessons associated with the departments of rocket troops and artillery, air defense, combat engineering, and rear services.



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