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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable David Packard
Chairman, NSSM-3 Steering Group

SUBJECT : Report of the Foreign Political
and Military Reactions Study
Group: General Purpose Forces

1. On behalf of the Foreign Political and Military Reactions Study Group, I forward the general purpose forces phase of its work for NSSM-3.

2. Because the report necessarily is concerned with the analysis of first-order political and military effects, the particular combinations and levels of Soviet forces described are at best illustrative. As the report points out (page 6):

"...Although the body of intelligence analysis underlying the Soviet force packages is extensive, a cautionary note is required. The quantification of force levels and system capabilities may create an impression of precise information, especially about future forces and systems, which would be quite unjustifiable in the light of the extent of our information."

3. Additional copies of the report are available if you require them.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2005

[Redacted Signature]

BRUCE C. CLARKE, Jr.
Chairman
Foreign Political and Military
Reactions Study Group

Attachment: a/s

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INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 3

Study Group Report

FOREIGN POLITICAL AND MILITARY REACTIONS
TO US STRATEGIES AND FORCES
(GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES)

CSD Roy No. 6

TS-199009B
June 1969

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WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
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DECLASSIFICATION

Foreign Political and Military Reactions
to US Strategies and Forces
(NSSM-3: General Purpose Forces)

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June 1969

Foreign Political and Military Reactions
to US Strategies and Forces
(NSSM-3: General Purpose Forces)

Introduction

This paper provides an assessment of possible political and general purpose force responses of selected major foreign nations to specified alternative US courses of action. It focuses on the Soviet Union, Communist China, and our major allies in Europe and Asia.

Parts I and II present brief discussions of Soviet general purpose force objectives and possible levels of Soviet forces in the 1970s in order to provide some perspective of the likely Soviet responses to alternative US strategies. Part III discusses the probable impact of US general purpose force strategies on the Soviet Union, Communist China, and other major nations of the world.

This paper does not discuss the relationship between Soviet strategic forces and Soviet general purpose forces, nor does it consider the impact of US strategic forces on Soviet general purpose forces. These topics will be treated at a latter stage in the NSSM-3 study.

In estimating foreign political and military reactions to the various US military strategies

Note: This report was prepared under the chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency with representation from the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the National Security Council Staff.

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under consideration, we proceed from certain general views, which it would be well to state at the outset.

With respect to the Soviet Union and Communist China, it is probable that neither seeks territorial aggrandizement by military aggression.* Instead they would prefer to exploit the fears, uncertainties, and weaknesses which would be created by a change in the global or local military balance, in order to extend and consolidate their political influence over their neighbors.

The USSR has used force mainly to improve its prewar position against an anticipated German attack and to preserve its postwar hegemony in the Eastern European buffer region. Communist China has acted--in Korea and India--with military force in areas adjacent to its borders. Although the variations between them are considerable, both the USSR and China see military power first as a means of defending the homeland (including, in the Soviet case, the buffer region of Eastern Europe) and, beyond this, as a means of bringing about political changes favorable to them in other countries. Thus we think it misleading to consider that either has a compulsive urge to invade its non-Communist neighbors, that only a high level of countervailing military power deters them from this course, or that the diminution of this opposing power would "tempt" them into aggression.

There are important exceptions to this generalization. To the Chinese, Taiwan and the offshore islands are regarded as domestic territory and would almost certainly be taken by force if no military risk were involved. And North Vietnam and North Korea clearly will use all feasible means to pursue

* *The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that Communist China has, in recent history, twice sought territorial aggrandizement by direct military aggression, e.g., Tibet and India. If either the USSR or Communist China considers the risks to be minimal, they may do so again.*

the unification of their countries by force; in North Vietnam's case, it is clearly ready to employ force in Laos.

Even if all this is true, however, many Europeans and Asians do not accept these propositions. They fear that, if the military balance tilts in the Communist favor, they will be subject not only to increased political-military pressure, but to outright invasion. Thus, the overall strength and precise disposition of US forces needed to assure our allies may be quite different from that which we would judge necessary to prevent open aggression. Many of our allies are highly sensitive in their desire to have US forces on the ground to contribute to conventional defense and, particularly in Europe, to provide a link, credible to all, to the US strategic deterrent.*

Finally, we would emphasize the second aspect of the Communist view of military power mentioned earlier--as an instrument of political pressure. If we think that the USSR would not invade, deliberately and without provocation, a militarily weakened West Germany, for example, we also believe that it would work vigorously to disorganize the politics of West Germany, and that military power and the implied threat of its use would be an important tool in that effort. A Chinese invasion of Thailand is very unlikely, but Chinese efforts to promote Thai insurgency and to remind the local combatants of China's own great military strength are quite likely. In some instances, the Communist states might seek to bring the local Communist party

* In this latter connection, the Department of State representative notes that our European allies have indicated increasing concern over the relative improvement of Soviet strategic capabilities vis-a-vis those of the US. As the Europeans have seen improvements in Soviet strategic capabilities, they have become increasingly sensitive, e.g., in preliminary strategic arms limitation talks, to implications which reductions in US general purpose forces in Europe may have for the interrelations between these forces and US strategic offensive forces in deterring the Soviet Union.

to power; in others, to maneuver into office leaders responsive to their wishes, e.g., in Laos and Cambodia.

We are not so confident of these propositions that we would trust them to deter all Communist aggression in a world in which the US had disengaged from all its present commitments. And we recognize that, in various circumstances, political conflicts may become so acute and intentions so unclear that at some point military attack might commend itself to the Communist power involved. Our intention is merely to stress that, in most cases, a major function of US military strength has been to stabilize the international alignment of pro-Western and even neutral governments on the periphery of the Communist world.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) believe that the foregoing discussion gives insufficient weight to the contribution of countervailing military power as a deterrent to Communist aggression. They believe that the Communist states have greater motives--the pursuit of national interests, the commitment to support allies, and the desire to encourage wars of national liberation--to use military force beyond their borders than is here suggested, and that opposing US and allied forces play a greater role in deterring them from this course of action than indicated above.

The Department of State representative is in general agreement with the view that it would be misleading to base US policy on the assumption that either the USSR or China has a compulsive urge to invade its non-Communist neighbors. However, the Department feels that it would be imprudent to assume that the removal of countervailing force would not increase their incentive to pursue basic foreign policy objectives by military means. The present concern in Peking and Moscow over a possible major

confrontation with the US certainly inhibits the use of overt force. If the US presence were removed, the inhibition would probably decline. At the same time, the removal of the US presence would make the use by the Communist powers of political pressures, backed by the threat of military force, a far more effective implement, and to that extent reduce the necessity of actually having to apply overt force.

I. Soviet Policy Objectives for General Purpose Forces

The objectives of Soviet general purpose forces are, first, to defend the territory of the USSR from attack and, second, to support its political objectives abroad. The demands placed upon the general purpose forces may be considered in terms of three fairly distinct areas of concern for the USSR.

(1) On their western borders, the Soviets desire a military capability to defeat NATO forces and to occupy Western Europe in the event of general war with the West, however the war might start. They want to preserve political and military hegemony within the Warsaw Pact in order to retain the East European buffer zone.

(2) In the east, the Soviets are increasingly concerned to protect their border against any territorial encroachments and to be prepared for any contingency arising from internal instability in China.

(3) The Soviets want to support the attainment of political objectives by maintaining a visible and impressive presence for possible military use at the southern border and beyond the peripheries of the Soviet bloc. To this end they maintain a naval combat force in the Mediterranean and land forces along the borders of Turkey and Iran. They want to expand their maritime activity and make it possible for various naval units to show the flag regularly in selective parts of the world. Their

recent activity in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf are examples of this.

Because of the complexity of these requirements Soviet long-run planning in the field of general purpose forces is less likely to be directly influenced by corresponding US planning than is the case in the field of strategic forces.

The major objective of Chinese Communist general purpose forces is defense of the homeland. Forward deployments along the southern frontier serve as forceful reminders of Chinese interests in these areas, but Peking has not given high priority to equipment programs that would improve China's ability to project its power over long distances beyond its borders. In general, apart from extreme US policy changes which radically altered the military situation near its borders, we expect Chinese planning for general purpose forces will be relatively insensitive to alternative US force structures.

II. Representative Soviet General Purpose Forces

Three illustrative general purpose force packages designed to approximate reasonable Soviet reactions to the several US alternative strategies and force structures proposed for NSSM-3 are shown in the Appendix. Although the body of intelligence analysis underlying these force packages is extensive, a cautionary note is required. The quantification of force levels may create an impression of precise information, especially about future forces and systems, which would be quite unjustifiable in the light of the extent of information.

The major differences in the three projected force packages are qualitative, not quantitative, especially in regard to ground and tactical air forces. The total number of army divisions does not vary greatly between them, but there are substantial differences in manning and equipment levels. These differences are noted in the footnotes to the tables in the Appendix. Similarly, the major differences in the tactical air forces are in the rates at which new aircraft are introduced.

III. Reactions to US Strategies and Forces

- A. US Strategy 0 - Withdraw to Western Hemisphere; maintain capability for major Western Hemisphere contingency only.

If the US adopted this strategy, the world would be thrown into an uproar. A simultaneous reaffirmation and extension of US nuclear commitments could mitigate the feelings of defenselessness, but not very much. European and Asian allies and neutrals would be pulled in two directions: toward regional security arrangements with their non-Communist neighbors; and toward accommodation with their Communist neighbors.*

The Communist powers would probably be slow to respond, partly out of disbelief. They would first want to assess their new political opportunities flowing from the demoralization of the non-Communist states. The USSR would increase its pressures on West Berlin as part of its campaign for a general European settlement on Soviet terms. China would give more serious attention to the preparations for an invasion of Taiwan while seeking politically to undermine the Nationalist government. For North Korea, one of the cardinal inhibitions on invasion of South Korea would be removed.

* *The representatives of the Department of State, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) believe that this paragraph does not fully convey the magnitude of negative European reactions to this strategy. The reaction of our European allies to a US withdrawal to the Western Hemisphere would be general consternation. Some countries might explore the possibility of a unified European defense system, but any such initiative would likely founder under present or realistically foreseeable circumstances. Although the Europeans together have the economic means to provide defense against the USSR, they lack unity and a credible independent nuclear deterrent. Revived historical jealousies among the states of Western Europe would probably also contribute to the demise of any initiative toward collective defense without US participation. Sooner or later the West European countries would probably seek accommodation with the USSR on Soviet terms, to the detriment of US interests.*

The Soviets' military response to US Strategy 0 would probably be to structure their general purpose forces at a level approximating the NIPP-Lo projection but with additional strategic airlift/sealift and surface naval forces. Under this strategy, the Soviets could afford to reduce their forces in Eastern Europe. The need to sustain their position in Eastern Europe and the desire to maintain a threat against Western European countries would, however, prevent a reduction to a level lower than NIPP-Lo. The decrease in general purpose forces in Europe would be partially offset by increases in the Far East forces.

The Soviets could be expected to increase their strategic airlift/sealift and surface naval forces at a rate greater than NIPP-Lo in order to take advantage of the removal of the US presence from many parts of the world. The Soviets would test the new power relationship, probing for such political gains as the traffic might bear. They would be concerned not to do this so fast as to make it likely that the US would reverse its policies. The Soviets have not always shown great political sophistication in these matters, however, and they could move more rapidly than would be prudent. In any event, if the Soviets found their actions did not cause a reversal of the US strategy, then a further buildup of Soviet naval and airlift/sealift intervention could be expected.

Both the Soviet Union and Communist China would intensify their efforts to extend their influence in the world by all feasible means, including security arrangements and military and economic aid programs.

- B. US Strategy 1 - Maintain worldwide capability to aid allies except against direct Chinese or Russian invasions; sharply reduced US force for NATO, rely on nuclear weapons; do not meet conventional Chinese invasion in Asia.

We assume that, in adopting this strategy, the US would publicly replace the strategy of flexible response with some form of early nuclear response as its doctrine for deterrence.

We also assume that the US, in its announcement of this policy and the way in which it subsequently conducted its affairs, would reaffirm existing commitments and try to make clear and credible its continued interest in and involvement with Europe and Asia. This is a crucial assumption, for the considerable pullback of forces from abroad would otherwise produce foreign political reactions approaching those described under US Strategy 0.

1. USSR

The Soviet Union would react with puzzlement and caution. It would want to gauge the firmness and extent of US commitments which, though publicly reaffirmed, had been so altered in form as to raise new doubts. The Soviets would also want time in which to assess the reactions of US allies, hoping that disarray among these countries would provide them with opportunities for political gains. Their initial military response would be to structure their general purpose forces in the same manner as under US Strategy 0.

Once the assumptions noted above became clear, we think it highly unlikely that the USSR would conclude that surprise attack in Europe had become an attractive or feasible course of action. This view rests on the continuation of the US nuclear deterrent as well as the considerations discussed in the Introduction.* In the special case of West Berlin, the USSR, urged on by East Germany, would probably feel encouraged at some point to renew its pressures. The Soviets would expect in these circumstances considerable progress toward their version of a European settlement, including formal acknowledgement of the division of Germany. Pressures on Berlin would be aimed at promoting this outcome.

* *In the view of the representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Staff, more important (since the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee would be severely undermined) is that no such crude Soviet move would be necessary to extend political influence over the several states of Western Europe. Political pressures backed by overwhelming military superiority would be sufficient.*

The Soviets would probably also come to believe that they could safely increase their military involvement in non-NATO areas where US defense commitments were not formal and clear-cut. In the Middle East, however, their conclusions would depend heavily on what sort of naval presence the US retained in the Mediterranean. If the US totally withdrew from this area, the Soviets would judge that increased involvement carried little additional risk; withdrawal of, say, half the present level of US strength would probably not greatly affect, in and of itself, the Soviet calculation of risks. The actual outcome would be influenced by the Soviet judgment of US attitudes, i.e., whether Moscow concluded that these withdrawals signified a strong tendency to neo-isolationism which lowered the likelihood that the US would use the Sixth Fleet in various contingencies.

We doubt that the USSR would make any early moves to reduce its own forces in Europe. It would not want to encourage in Eastern Europe the thought that it was prepared to loosen its grip. And the Soviets would feel a greater concern, particularly at first, about the role of West Germany in Central Europe in the absence of large US forces there. They would nevertheless perceive an improvement in their security. The US reductions might lead them to conclude that they could stretch out re-equipment programs for their general purpose forces. They would probably also feel freer to respond to any requirements they saw for transferring units to the Chinese border areas. After a time, and assuming that the European members of NATO did not make up for the US withdrawals, Moscow would probably reduce its forces in Eastern Europe, pulling, say, one quarter or more of its 20 divisions out of East Germany.*

* *The representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Staff believe that prudence on their part might cause the Soviets to maintain their present level of military forces in Central and Eastern Europe to pursue political objectives there--and quite possibly more long-range goals than they can now imagine as feasible.*

The Soviets would be of two minds about the Asian aspects of this strategy. They would see US withdrawal as an opportunity to extend their own influence, but they would also fear, particularly with respect to Southeast Asia, that this withdrawal would work more to Chinese advantage than to their own. In addition, they would be concerned that, to the extent that the Sino-American confrontation wound down, the groundwork was being laid for Sino-American collusion against the USSR.

In these circumstances, the USSR would probably step up its cultivation of state-to-state relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. Insofar as it could do so without compromising this aim, it would give greater support to Communist movements in the region. In Northeast Asia, Moscow probably would not look with favor upon a resumption of the Korean war, which would give a push to Japanese rearmament and risk provoking a reversal of the new US policy, while bringing no direct advantage to the USSR. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the Soviets would curtail their military assistance to and political support of North Korea.

2. Europe

There would be much consternation when the US broached this strategy in NATO. Doubts about the US nuclear commitment would initially rise to a high level. The Europeans would anticipate the unpleasant prospect of renewed pressures to increase their own conventional forces. Many Germans would fear that the US move would expose them dangerously to Soviet pressures and perhaps even represented a tacit sellout of their interests. Even though Europeans entertain no great hopes of a negotiated mutual reduction of forces on the continent they would be dismayed that unilateral US action had foreclosed this possibility.

Longer-run reactions would depend to a great extent upon subsequent Soviet and American behavior. If the USSR adopted a policy of menace and threat, and the US political response seemed less than adequate, the initial fears about the value of the US nuclear guarantee would not only persist but grow. The more likely case, however,

is that the USSR would concentrate upon political pressures in pursuing its demands for acceptance of the European status quo. We also assume that the US would conduct itself in a manner which minimized erosion of the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. In these circumstances much of the early consternation in Western Europe would subside in time.

In the field of strategic doctrine a lowering of the nuclear threshold would probably cause much turmoil. Most of NATO's European members still retain considerable concern, however, over flexible response because they fear that it weakens the deterrent to conventional and limited nuclear war in Europe.* This concern appears to be growing as appreciation of the consequences of limited nuclear war becomes more widespread. The shift in posture by the US would be large and abrupt enough, however, to cause its allies first to examine security alternatives. European nuclear deterrents would attract new attention, and voices on the German right would be heard to question West Germany's policy of nuclear self-denial. Efforts to unite around a European nuclear force would still face great difficulties, however. We doubt that, in the end, the NATO allies would decide to increase their own contribution of conventional forces very much, or that problems of strategic doctrine would be grave enough to destroy the alliance.

The chief problem would be Germany. The Germans would, of all the allies, feel the most military insecurity. We do not think, however, that Bonn would decide to accept the isolation and universal enmity which would be the consequence of a national nuclear weapons program. Nor would the

* At the same time we note that the NATO governments officially support the flexible response concept in supporting the current NATO strategy. The key elements of NATO strategy are (a) direct defense, (b) controlled escalation, and (c) general nuclear response. NATO strategy conforms to ministerial guidance furnished to the NATO Military Committee.

Germans want to provoke the alarm of their allies and the USSR by increasing their conventional forces; indeed, a cut which would reduce the disparity between German and non-German forces in the alliance is more likely, unless Soviet conduct seemed to present a clear and present danger.

The Germans would also feel a weakening of their political position. This could cause them to feel that they had to go further along the line of extending recognition to East Germany in hopes of promoting detente in Central Europe. At the same time, they would seek to move closer to France. The recognition that West Germany's ultimate security guarantee still rested with the US, however, would limit these trends.

Even with a continued US nuclear commitment, a reduction in forces in Europe on the scale considered in this strategy would, in the long run, diminish US influence in the alliance. This trend would make it harder to get the Europeans to accept various US proposals and to maintain an anti-Soviet front over a wide range of issues. But it might also help to facilitate the development within NATO of a European grouping intended to develop a common view and to pursue common projects. The opposite reaction--a disintegration of NATO and a series of unilateral national movements toward Soviet positions--is possible but less likely.


The representatives of the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), and the Department of State believe that this section underrates NATO reactions to this strategy. Our European allies might conclude that the removal of these forces is a precursor to total disengagement from the continent. They would tend to doubt that the remaining "trip wire" forces would provide the essential link between NATO forces in Europe and the US strategic deterrent.

As under Strategy 0, our European allies would be increasingly inclined toward accommodation with the USSR. There is a possibility that the Europeans would attempt to

organize a unified conventional defense capability, while depending for the short term upon the US nuclear guarantee. However, they would realize that in the longer term European countries alone or in concert would have to acquire a credible nuclear deterrent against the USSR. Otherwise, there would be little point in making the increased conventional effort. Without centralized political institutions, European efforts toward a unified defense would probably fail.

3. Asia

The Chinese probably would feel encouraged to increase their political and military support to "people's wars" in Southeast Asia. They would also judge that their own security was improved and would expect their influence in Asia to grow. The likelihood of large-scale Chinese invasion would not be significantly altered, but probing actions against the offshore islands would be likely. Taiwan would not feel a direct impairment of its security, presuming the retention of all or a large part of the Seventh Fleet, but it would be concerned over the possibility of a more complete US withdrawal from Asia, and a concomitant rise in Communist China's stature, in the longer term.



Both Koreas would judge that the withdrawal of all American combat troops from South Korea, whatever the US said, greatly diminished its commitment to the defense of that country. This would, in our view, increase the chances of a North Korean attack. South Korea, anticipating

this, would press the US very hard for additional military aid and for a new treaty commitment. If, on the other hand, the US left some part of its present forces [redacted] in South Korea the chances of war probably would not change very much, although South Korea would vociferously assert the opposite.

In the above cases, the reactions of all concerned would be affected by the extent to which they believed that the US had won or lost the war in South Vietnam. We consider in this respect two illustrative outcomes. In the first, the US withdraws from South Vietnam, leaving in Saigon a weak neutral government or worse ("unfavorable outcome"); in the second, it has achieved a settlement which preserves a stable pro-Western government in Saigon with control of the countryside and leaves at least some US advisers in the country ("favorable outcome").

China and North Korea on the one hand, and Taiwan and South Korea on the other, would be encouraged or discouraged in obvious ways by these variants. We think that these alternative outcomes in Vietnam would not radically alter reaction in these countries to the US option, but the "unfavorable outcome" in Vietnam would probably encourage China to increase further its support for "people's wars" in Southeast Asia. Hanoi, on the other hand, will be far more sensitive to the course of US policy in South Vietnam than it will to the US regional or global posture. Nevertheless, there would be some effect from the adoption of this strategy. In the "favorable outcome," Hanoi would probably conclude that US Strategy 1 rendered unlikely the resumption of US bombing and ruled out a US invasion, and that it could calculate its strategy in the South and in Laos and Cambodia accordingly. In the "unfavorable outcome," the North Vietnamese would interpret US Strategy 1 as giving it great freedom of maneuver and timing as it mixed political and military tactics in completing the takeover of the South.

Thailand regards externally supported insurgency as the most serious threat to its security, although the Thai do not discount completely the possibility of a large-scale invasion from China or North Vietnam. While the Thai expect the US to reduce its combat forces substantially after the fighting ends in Vietnam, they would be shocked if all US combat units were withdrawn from the mainland of Southeast Asia following a Vietnamese settlement. In the worst case, complete withdrawal of US forces from the mainland following an unfavorable settlement in Vietnam, the Thai would probably begin by seeking a more definite US commitment in the form of a mutual defense agreement. If these efforts failed and the Thai became convinced that the US had abandoned its SEATO commitments, they would probably gradually abandon their Western-oriented foreign policy and seek a more neutral position and an eventual accommodation with Peking.

- C. US Strategy 2A - NATO oriented; provide for initial defense of NATO except against worst-case surprise attack following concealed mobilization; same as Strategy 1 in rest of the world.

In considering this and succeeding strategies, we assume that the US frames its pronouncements in a manner designed to maximize the deterrent value of its forces.

1. USSR

As concerns the European aspects of this strategy, the USSR would perceive no substantial change and therefore would not be prompted to reconsider its policies. With respect to non-NATO areas, it would probably conclude that the overall reduction of US general purpose forces provided it with some increased freedom to pursue its foreign political objectives. Soviet concerns about the implications of this US posture in Asia would be similar to those outlined under US Strategy 1.

The Soviets' military response to this US Strategy would be a continuation of their present

general purpose force structure trends. The threat to the Soviet Union--the US forces in Europe and the continental US forces available for use in Europe--remains at approximately the same level as in the existing US deployment. Soviet forces in Europe could be expected to remain at existing levels; the Soviet posture in the Far East would be determined largely independent of US actions; and the Soviets can be expected to continue their development of a maritime presence in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

2. Europe

NATO members would not be much concerned about a reduction of US forces and commitments in Asia. They would be anxious, however, for reassurance that this move did not presage a subsequent withdrawal from Europe.

3. Asia

Asian reactions would be similar to those outlined under US Strategy 1. This is true, to an important extent, for all the succeeding options as well, since in all these cases US deployment in Asia is almost the same. Neither Communist nor non-Communist governments are likely to react very strongly to the stated variations in forces available for Asia but deployed in the continental US. Apart from deployments in Asia, the important variables are the level of military assistance and the persuasiveness of declared US commitments, as well as the outcome in Vietnam.

With respect to US Strategy 2A, if the Vietnamese outcome were favorable, most Asian countries would judge that US commitments remained valid despite the NATO orientation of our strategy. If this orientation were combined with an unfavorable outcome in Vietnam, however, US credibility would be difficult to maintain. In this instance, pressures would mount for higher levels of military aid and increased assurances of support or, failing this, accommodation--e.g., Thailand.

- D. US Strategy 2B - Asia oriented; peacetime forces for sustained defense against Chinese invasion in Southeast Asia or Korea; same as in Strategy 1 for NATO.

1. USSR

In their thinking about Europe, the Soviets probably would be governed by reactions falling between those described for US Strategies 1 and 2A. They would perceive a large reduction of US forces in Europe, presumably accompanied by a declaratory policy lowering the nuclear threshold. At the same time, they would note a substantial airlift/sealift capability and would have to assume that forces in the continental US, although intended for Asia under this option, were available for commitment to Europe. Thus their calculations of the risks associated with forward moves would tend to fall between those described for US Strategies 1 and 2A. The Soviets' military reaction would be to structure their general purpose forces at about the same level as for US Strategy 1, but transfers of forces from Eastern Europe to the Far East would be less likely.

Soviet tactics toward Western Europe would be designed both to encourage any neutralism generated by the US moves and to guard against the possibility that, given a diminished US presence, West Germany would become a relatively more important and less constrained power.

2. Europe

NATO allies, perceiving the same changes as did the USSR, would react a little differently. They would, out of prudence, tend to discount US rapid deployment capabilities which the Soviets, out of prudence, would tend to credit. Their reactions would be similar to those outlined under US Strategy 1, with one important difference. Even if the US did not make explicit the Asian orientation of this option, this would emerge over time. When it did, Europeans would be thrown into political confusion. Having been assured of the priority which the present administration attaches to Europe,

NATO governments would in this case judge that the US policy reversal was so substantial as to call into question the nuclear deterrent.

3. Asia

To the extent that the Asian orientation of this strategy emerged, Communist China would judge that the threat to its security, and the possibility of Soviet-American collusion, had increased somewhat. With US regional deployments unchanged, however (and perhaps reduced in South Korea), this reaction probably would not be so strong as to lead to changes in Chinese behavior in supporting "people's wars."

In Vietnam, if a favorable outcome had been reached, a priority for Asian commitments might help somewhat to restrain Hanoi from an early resumption of heavy fighting. In the case of an unfavorable outcome, US Strategy 2B would have little effect in this regard.

Non-Communist governments would react along the lines discussed in US Strategy 1.

- E. US Strategy 2AB - Meet either Warsaw Pact or Chinese invasion as in Strategies 2A and 2B, but not both simultaneously.

This would be perceived abroad as a policy of adhering to existing commitments in all regions while reducing forces somewhat but maintaining present deployments in Europe. Reactions would be those described for Europe under US Strategy 2A and for Asia under 2B.

- F. US Strategy 2C - Approximates currently approved strategy; meet Warsaw Pact and Chinese invasion as in Strategies 2A and 2B simultaneously.

US Strategy 2D - Same as Strategy 2C, except meet Chinese in Korea and Southeast Asia simultaneously.

These two strategies would be seen abroad as essentially identical. Forces and deployments would be perceived as roughly similar to those which presently exist (except perhaps in Korea, for which see the discussion of Strategy 1). Reactions would therefore be minimal in both Communist and non-Communist governments, which would tend to conclude that US policy remained unchanged.

These strategies, and Strategies 2E, 3, and 4 as well, are based on the contingency that simultaneous major wars might occur with the Warsaw Pact in Europe and with China in Asia. One question is whether this contingency could over the next five or six years arise out of a coordinated full-scale Sino-Soviet attack on the US and its allies in both Europe and Asia. Given the state of relations between the USSR and Communist China, any such coordinated military thrust could come only after a fundamental redirection of relations between the two major Communist powers. Such a rapprochement would evolve slowly and almost certainly would be highly visible to the West.

Over the next several years, the more relevant concern probably should be whether, if the US were at war with one major Communist power, the other might attack, not as a result of prior coordination, but unilaterally. In considering such possibilities, we note that the contingency presumes that the US has gone onto a war footing in at least some respects. It also presumes that either nuclear weapons have been used or that the possibility of their use has risen.

The Study Group is divided as to the likelihood of an attack on our allies by either the USSR

or Communist China if the US were at war with the other. Some members of the Study Group believe that the increased risk of US retaliation with nuclear weapons would be recognized by the nation not at war and that it would, therefore, act with restraint. Other members of the Study Group are of the opinion that a major US involvement in one section of the world would be viewed by the USSR or China as an opportunity for profitable overt aggression in another area.

The members of the Study Group who believe that the Communist leaders would act with restraint think it highly unlikely that the Soviets would conclude that aggression in Europe carried less risk should the US become engaged in a major conventional war with China. On the contrary, they believe that the Soviets would almost certainly conclude that the nuclear threshold in Europe had dropped substantially and that, if the USSR attacked, any restraints on the US response arising from domestic opinion would be minimal. These members argue that the main concerns of the USSR, as illustrated by their reactions to Vietnam and the Middle East crisis, would probably be to avoid direct involvement and to position themselves to profit from the outcome of their rivals' struggle. These considerations would be even stronger if the war in Asia had become nuclear.

Similarly, in the view of these members, if a major war were in progress in Europe, the Chinese would probably judge that US propensity to meet aggression in Asia with nuclear weapons had greatly increased because a second aggression might confront the US with the choice of abandoning one theater or resorting to a nuclear response. They would almost certainly believe that the risks of the latter choice were too high and that China, as the much weaker nuclear power, would receive the nuclear blow. It is recognized, however, that the Chinese might see this contingency as an opportunity to increase their pressures, short of invasion, in Southeast Asia.

For these same reasons, the contingency of what might be called a triple-front war, involving the USSR in Europe and the Chinese in both Korea and Southeast Asia, is viewed as even more unlikely.

On the other hand, the members of the Study Group who are of the opinion that the Communist leaders would look upon US involvement in a major war as an opportunity to act elsewhere consider that, in the event of a US war with China, the Soviets might conclude that it would be advantageous to initiate military moves in Europe and in the Middle East. These members note that the commitment of a significant part of the US armed forces to a war in Asia would unquestionably weaken the US ability to respond to a crisis elsewhere and that the Soviets, therefore, could feel free to act in an aggressive manner.

Similarly, in the event of a war in Europe, these members of the Study Group believe that Communist China would not view the risk of US nuclear response as having risen significantly and consequently would become more aggressive in Asia. Alternatively, these members consider that the Chinese might recognize an increased risk of nuclear war, but be willing to accept increased risk in view of the improved opportunity for military success resulting from US involvement elsewhere.

The Study Group as a whole believes that the probable reaction of North Korea to US engagement elsewhere would be one of restraint. A major and prolonged US involvement in Vietnam has not led Pyongyang to conclude that the risks of attack upon South Korea are lower. But there is a chance that European war, if it were lengthy and indeterminate, might persuade the North Korean leadership, which is unusually bold and single-minded, that a propitious moment for invasion had arrived. On balance, we think this chance is small, so long as US combat forces [redacted] have not been totally withdrawn from South Korea.

- G. US Strategy 2E - Conduct either sustained defense of NATO and holding action in Asia (Korea and Southeast Asia) or initial defense of NATO and sustained defense in Asia.

Our NATO allies would react negatively to this strategy and to Strategies 3 and 4 because they

provide for a sustained conventional defense of Western Europe. The Europeans see such a sustained defense as a re-run of World Wars I and II and do not relish the prospect. US capabilities to fight a prolonged conventional war in Europe would undermine the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee, and European reactions would be even more negative if we pressured our allies to match our capabilities. Our NATO allies do not interpret the strategy of "flexible response" or of "direct defense" to include a sustained defense. In fact, they do not buy enough war material to enable them to fight beyond 30 to 45 days.*

The Soviets' reaction to this strategy probably would be a continuation of their present general purpose force structure trends. They may augment some forces slightly in response to the increase in US logistic stockpiles and tactical aircraft, but

* *The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that our NATO allies, in effect, support the sustained defense concept in supporting the current NATO strategy of direct defense. (a) Direct defense seeks to "defeat the aggression on the level at which the enemy chooses to fight." The ministerial guidance to the NATO Military Committee which led to the development of the concept of direct defense imposes no time limitation on planned duration of the direct defense phase. "Full options for direct defense exist when NATO can successfully counter any aggression, at whatever place, time, level, and duration it occurs." (b) The Joint Chiefs of Staff further consider that a strategy of sustained conventional defense of Western Europe would not evoke the kind of negative reaction as stated. The principal negative reaction would be based upon economic constraints, rather than the validity of the strategy. The growing concern of the NATO allies over the effects of a nuclear exchange, even at the tactical level, suggests that this strategy might become more acceptable over time. The alternative to the sustained defense concept represents a lowering of the nuclear threshold with the associated risk of high levels of collateral damage.*

overall they probably would view the threat to the Soviet Union as being approximately the same as in the existing US deployment.

H. US Strategy 3 - Meet enemy capabilities worldwide.

US Strategy 4 - Same as Strategy 3, but less capability assumed for allies.

1. USSR

The Soviets would perceive an increased threat to their position in Europe. They would respond with a buildup of their own general purpose forces to a level approximating the NIPP-Hi projection and with pressure on their East European allies to do likewise. If, under this option, three more US divisions were deployed to Europe, the Soviets' concern would be grave and their buildup rapid. Some general purpose forces intended for the Far East would be diverted to Europe.

The growth of Soviet airlift/sealift and surface naval forces might be temporarily delayed during the buildup of the forces opposite NATO. Over the long term, however, these forces can be expected to increase as currently projected.

2. Europe

A buildup on this scale would--as indicated above for Strategy 2E--outrun the security concerns of most NATO allies. It would arouse considerable opposition on the grounds that it revived the cold war and negated the chances of relaxing tensions. Germany would be the principal beneficiary of the increased US capabilities, but Bonn would not be willing to meet the increased offset requirements and needs for additional troop facilities arising from three additional US divisions in Europe. NATO members would be unwilling to make corresponding increases in their own forces.

3. Rest of World

These postures would increase substantially that body of world opinion which regards the US outlook as excessively military and fears that the US is arrogating to itself the role of "world policeman." Some Asian allies would value the increased military aid associated with US Strategy 3.

APPENDIX

Representative Soviet General Purpose
Forces Opposing Proposed US
Strategies and Forces

Because of uncertainties in both nonmilitary and military factors, we cannot define Soviet responses to US actions with precision. We can, however, describe the general levels of effort that the Soviets might devote to general purpose forces in the 1970s in relation to different US postures.

The three illustrative general purpose force packages shown in the following tables have been designed to approximate reasonable Soviet reactions to the several US alternative strategies and force structures proposed for NSSM-3. Although the body of intelligence analysis underlying these force packages is extensive, a cautionary note is required. The quantification of force levels may create an impression of precise information, especially about future forces and systems, which would be quite unjustifiable in the light of the extent of our information.

The representative force packages are consistent with the Soviet forces projected for the period 1969-1978 in the National Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP-69). The present trends in Soviet forces--re-equipping with modern arms, increased airlift/sealift capability, and development of the ability to maintain a more extensive naval presence--are expected to continue to some degree in each of the representative packages.

The components of the Soviet reaction forces have been costed in detail in National Intelligence Projections and Estimates. Average annual costs vary from a low of about \$27 billion a year implied by Soviet Force Package 1 to over \$32 billion a year for Force Package 3, in equivalent US cost terms. Both figures include only costs of equipping

and maintaining the specified forces under peacetime conditions with normal levels of operating reserves. The costs would be considerably higher if the Soviets were to begin preparations for fighting a sustained conventional war. Economic considerations as they affect Soviet decisions on conventional forces are discussed more fully in the section on interactions between strategic and general purpose force postures.

Soviet General Purpose Force Package 1 (see Table 1), structured as a likely Soviet response to US Strategies 0, 1, and 2B, generally corresponds to the low projection for Soviet ground and tactical air forces in existing national intelligence and to the high projection for airlift/sealift and surface naval forces. Force Package 2 (see Table 2), the likely level of response to US Strategies 2A, 2AB, 2C, 2D, and 2E, generally corresponds to the middle of the range of existing national intelligence. Force Package 3 (see Table 3), responding to US Strategies 3 and 4, generally corresponds to the high projection for ground and tactical air forces and to the low projection for airlift/sealift and surface naval forces.

The major differences in the three projected force packages in regard to ground and tactical air forces are qualitative, not quantitative. The total number of army divisions does not vary greatly between them, but there are substantial differences in manning and equipment levels. The qualitative aspects of the force packages are noted in the tables. Similarly, the major differences in the tactical air forces are in the rates at which new aircraft are introduced.

Table A-1
Force Package 1

Projected Soviet General Purpose Forces
Opposing US Strategies 0, 1, and 2B
(Continued)

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Submarines										
SSG and SSGN	61	61	59	57	55	53	51	49	49	49
SSN	18	22	28	34	40	46	52	58	64	70
SS	246	238	225	213	200	192	174	156	143	115
Helicopter carriers	2	2	2	3	3	4	4	4	4	4
Missile cruisers	12	15	17	21	23	25	27	31	31	31
Missile destroyers	34	38	42	47	52	56	60	64	68	70
Escorts	149	148	142	135	129	129	123	119	120	123
Amphibious ships	109	112	115	119	121	125	129	135	136	137
Naval aircraft										
Heavy reconnaissance	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	35	30
Medium bombers	500	480	460	440	420	400	380	360	330	300
Light bombers	40	30	20	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrol/ASW	75	100	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120
Maximum sealift capability										
Motorized rifle divisions	28	32	36	40	44	49	50	51	52	53
or										
Tank divisions	29	33	37	41	45	51	52	53	54	55

a. Category I indicates full-strength divisions. Category II indicates 50-percent strength in men and major items of equipment.

b. This force package projects increases and improvements in artillery, logistic support, and nuclear-capable rocket and missile launchers to be phased over a ten- to fifteen-year period instead of the projected five- to ten-year period estimated in NIPP-69.

Table A-1
Force Package 1

Projected Soviet General Purpose Forces
Opposing US Strategies 0, 1, and 2B

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Motorized rifle divisions										
Category I	30	30	31	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
Category II a/*	34	38	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39
Tank divisions										
Category I	28	28	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29
Category II a/	22	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Airborne divisions	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Total Category I and II b/ Manpower in Category I and II divisions (in thousands)	121	126	128	130	130	130	130	130	130	130
Navy infantry brigades	7	8	9	9	10	10	11	11	12	12
Old model fighters Fresco/Farmer	750	800	725	625	450	275	125	50	0	0
Current model fighters Fishbed/Fitter/Firebar	1,975	1,975	1,975	1,975	1,975	1,975	1,910	1,800	1,700	1,680
Future model fighters Foxbat/TF-71/TF-72	0	0	25	150	350	575	800	950	1,075	1,125
Light bombers Beagle/Brewer	600	600	575	475	375	250	150	50	25	0
Airlift Medium transports	900	925	925	925	925	925	925	900	900	900
Heavy transports	15	30	45	60	80	100	120	120	120	120

* Footnotes appear at the end of the table.

Continued

Table A-2
Force Package 2

Projected Soviet General Purpose Forces
Opposing US Strategies 2A, 2AB, 2C, 2D, and 2E
(Continued)

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Submarines										
SSG and SSGN	61	61	59	57	55	53	51	49	49	49
SSN	20	24	30	36	44	50	58	64	72	78
SS	247	240	227	216	203	196	178	160	148	120
Helicopter carriers	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3
Missile cruisers	11	14	16	18	20	21	22	24	24	24
Missile destroyers	34	38	42	47	51	54	58	62	65	66
Escorts	149	148	142	135	129	129	123	119	120	123
Amphibious ships	109	112	115	119	119	121	125	129	129	135
Naval aircraft										
Heavy reconnaissance	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	40	35
Medium bombers	540	535	525	510	490	470	450	425	400	370
Light bombers	50	40	30	20	10	0	0	0	0	0
Patrol/ASW	95	120	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140
Maximum sealift capability										
Motorized rifle divisions	28	30	32	34	36	40	42	44	46	49
or										
Tank divisions	29	31	33	35	37	42	44	46	48	51

a. Category I indicates full-strength divisions. Category II indicates 60-percent strength in men and major items of equipment.

b. This force package projects a 10- to 15-percent increase in tube artillery and logistic support by 1978 and a 10- to 15-percent increase in nuclear-capable rocket and missile launchers by 1974.

Table A-2
Force Package 2Projected Soviet General Purpose Forces
Opposing US Strategies 2A, 2AB, 2C, 2D, and 2E

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Motorized rifle divisions										
Category I	30	30	31	32	33	33	33	33	33	33
Category II a/*	34	38	39	39	40	40	40	40	40	40
Tank divisions										
Category I	28	28	29	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
Category II a/	22	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Airborne divisions	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Total Category I and II b/ Manpower in Category I and II divisions (in thousands)	121	126	129	131	133	133	133	133	133	133
Navy infantry brigades	6	7	8	8	9	9	9	9	9	9
Old model fighters Fresco/Farmer	725	710	640	525	375	200	75	25	0	0
Current model fighters Fishbed/Fitter/Firebar	2,090	2,125	2,125	2,125	2,125	2,125	2,050	1,940	1,840	1,790
Future model fighters Foxbat/TF-71/TF-72	0	25	60	225	425	675	900	1,050	1,175	1,225
Light bombers Beagle/Brewer	600	590	560	460	350	225	140	60	40	25
Airlift Medium transports	875	880	880	880	880	880	875	860	850	850
Heavy transports	10	20	30	45	60	75	90	95	100	100

* Footnotes appear at the end of the table.

Continued

Table A-3
Force Package 3

Projected Soviet General Purpose Forces
Opposing US Strategies 3 and 4
(Continued)

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Submarines										
SSG and SSGN	61	61	59	57	55	53	51	49	49	49
SSN	22	26	32	39	47	55	63	71	79	87
SS	248	241	229	218	206	199	182	165	153	125
Helicopter carriers	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Missile cruisers	10	12	14	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
Missile destroyers	34	38	42	47	50	53	56	59	62	63
Escorts	149	148	142	135	129	129	123	119	120	123
Amphibious ships	109	112	114	116	117	118	120	122	123	126
Naval Aircraft										
Heavy reconnaissance	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	45
Medium bombers	580	595	595	575	555	535	515	495	465	435
Light bombers	60	50	40	30	20	10	0	0	0	0
Patrol/ASW	115	140	160	160	160	160	160	160	160	160
Maximum sealift capability										
Motorized rifle divisions	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	37	39
or										
Tank divisions	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	38	40

a. Category I indicates full-strength divisions. Category II indicates 70-percent strength in men and major items of equipment.

b. This force package projects a 10- to 15-percent increase in tube artillery and logistics support by 1978 and a 10- to 15-percent increase in nuclear-capable rocket and missile launchers by 1974.

Table A-3
Force Package 3

Projected Soviet General Purpose Forces
Opposing US Strategies 3 and 4

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Motorized rifle divisions										
Category I	30	30	32	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Category II a/*	34	38	39	40	41	41	41	41	41	41
Tank divisions										
Category I	28	28	29	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
Category II a/	22	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Airborne divisions	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Total Category I and II b/ Manpower in Category I and II divisions (in thousands)	121	126	130	135	136	136	136	136	136	136
Navy infantry brigades	6	6	6	7	8	8	8	8	8	8
Old model fighters	700	625	550	425	300	125	25	0	0	0
Fresco										
Current model fighters	2,200	2,275	2,275	2,275	2,275	2,275	2,200	2,075	1,975	1,925
Fishbed/Fitter/Firebar										
Future model fighters	0	25	100	300	500	775	1,000	1,150	1,275	1,325
Foxbat/TF-71/TF-72										
Light bombers	600	575	550	450	325	200	125	75	50	25
Beagle/Brewer										
Airlift	850	850	850	850	850	850	825	825	800	800
Medium transports	5	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	80
Heavy transports										

* Footnotes appear at the end of the table.

Continued