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I understand that the United States government does not believe Russia has been completely accurate in the data it has given us regarding its chemical and biological weapons stockpile. How accurate is the data Russia has given us about its chemical and biological stockpile? Can you describe some of the major inaccuracies in the data Russia has given us?

Chemical Weapons:

We suspect that Moscow has significantly understated the size of its chemical agent stockpile and that the Russians have been burning, burying or dumping their older agent stocks to get down to the 40,000 metric tons declared. Russian scientists involved in the CW program have stated in press reports their belief that the stockpile is about 60,000-70,000 metric tons. One of them, Vladimir Ulev, has alleged that stocks were being destroyed at the Shikhany chemical weapons test facility-- Russia's primary open air CW test site. [redacted]

The Intelligence Community's latest estimate of stockpile size is 50,000-70,000 metric tons. [redacted]

[redacted] We have low-to-moderate confidence in this estimate. Statements by authoritative Russian spokesmen during US-Russian bilateral negotiations in the Spring of 1993 indicate that we were correct in distrusting the stockpile data provided by the Soviets in 1989--data which remained essentially unchanged in their 1994 declaration. During the 1993 bilateral talks, the Russians indicated to the US delegation that multi-ton quantities of CW-related chemicals stemming from a recent development program were stored outside of Phase I declared storage sites. Furthermore, they indicated these chemicals were not under Ministry of Defense control. [redacted]


[redacted]

Also missing from the exchanged data is information on new binary chemical agents which the Soviets and, more recently, the Russians have developed. A small stockpile of binary agents was said to exist and was stored at a site in Bryansk Oblast, according to Ulev. [redacted]

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
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Biological Weapons:

Concerning data about biological weapons stockpiles, the Russians have repeatedly asserted that they have never had a stockpile of such agents.



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Regarding Russia's inaccurate data concerning its chemical and biological stockpile, does the intelligence community believe that President Yel'tsin is part of this misinformation campaign? Who does the intelligence community believe is responsible for this false data?

We have no conclusive evidence to indicate that Boris Yel'tsin is part of a deliberate misinformation campaign. He may be unable or unwilling to ensure that subordinates are carrying out his orders to terminate the offensive CW and BW programs. Because of his precarious political position and the panoply of problems facing him, he may be unwilling to risk a confrontation with military supporters of these programs. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Russians claim that the MOD's 15th Directorate--once charged with day-to-day management of the military's offensive BW program--was abolished in 1992. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Since the firing of retired Lt. General Anatoliy Kuntsevich last April, the President's Committee on Chemical and Biological Weapons Treaty-related Issues has been largely relegated to the role of managing the recent US inspections of five selected Russian R&D, production and storage sites. [REDACTED]

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Q.4. Admiral Studeman, what is the assessment of the Intelligence Community regarding the inspection and monitoring provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention? Will ratification and implementation of the CWC significantly improve the monitoring of chemical weapons proliferation? Are non-signatories, including Iraq and North Korea, likely to sign the Conventions, and if not, will CWC sanctions be fully enforced by all signatories to the Convention?

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Of the countries that have not signed the CWC, Egypt, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Serbia, and Syria are assessed as having active CW programs. There has been little indication that any of these countries are likely to sign the Convention in the near future. [REDACTED]

Under the provisions of the CWC, sanctions, or prohibitions, on the transfer of chemicals are applied in varying degrees according to the Schedule of chemicals. The transfer of Schedule 1 chemicals is prohibited immediately upon entry-into-force (EIF). Schedule 2 chemicals may be exported to non-States Party up to three years after EIF, with end-use certificates, but is prohibited thereafter. There is no ban on the transfer of Schedule 3 chemicals to non-States Party, although end-use certificates are required. It is premature to predict which countries will not fully enforce these restrictions since many are still developing export control procedures. However, since the effectiveness of export controls will vary by country, it is plausible that some of the prohibitions will be circumvented. [REDACTED]

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Q.1. Russia is required to submit information on its chemical weapons stockpile and its chemical weapons facilities under the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding. Its latest data declarations submitted to the United States contained a number of discrepancies regarding its chemical weapons production facilities and stockpile. Russia has also blocked some inspections. Basically, Russia is not in compliance with these two agreements. Provide a detailed description of these discrepancies and a current assessment of issues that have been resolved and those that remain outstanding. Also, to the extent possible, provide an assessment of why Russia has provided false data.

A.1. Wyoming MOU Phase II provisions mandated a two-part declaration of the entire former Soviet/Russian chemical weapons program, including development, production and storage facilities as well as size and composition of their CW stockpile. The Russians delivered both parts of their declarations after the prescribed MOU deadlines in April and May. Overall, the Russian data are incomplete, inconsistent with the Soviet Phase I declaration as well as several Russian officials' statements, and inaccurate,

Specifically:

- The Russians declared a CW stockpile of 39,927 metric tonnes (MT), which is significantly smaller than the IC estimate of 50,000 and 70,000 MT, and understated their production capacity.
- The Russians acknowledged some previously undeclared munitions and provided information on declared storage facilities that is generally consistent with U.S. holdings. However, they did not provide a full declaration of CW munitions and agents assessed to be in their stockpile, including some traditional munitions and agent-fills as well as possibly novel agents and binary systems.
- The Russians did not declare many of their known CW development, production and storage facilities, including some of which the former Soviet Union declared under Phase I and the U.S. subsequently visited.
- On those production facilities declared, the Russians failed to provide complete diagrams, equipment lists, descriptive narratives, and conversion and destruction plans.
- The Russians did not declare most of their development facilities, including those associated with their new agents and binary weapons program.

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- [redacted]
- Some aspects of the Russian declarations contradict previous statements made by Soviet and Russian officials. For example, during a February 1993 visit to the Volgograd Khimprom Production Facility, a Russian official stated that the U.S. would be able to inspect building 428 (long suspected of being involved in research and development) under Phase II inspection provisions. However, that building was not declared under Phase II and was, therefore, off-limits to U.S. inspectors during Phase II inspections. [redacted]

In responding to U.S. concerns about the Russian declaration, Moscow has maintained that its declarations are consistent with its understanding of MOU requirements. However, the Russians' reinterpretation of the definition of a "chemical weapons production facility"--to include only those facilities housing production and/or filling equipment at the time of declaration--is inconsistent with the long-standing multinational and U.S. interpretation. As defined in the CWC and the Wyoming MOU, a chemical weapons production facility means any equipment, as well as any building housing such equipment, that was designed, constructed or used at any time since 1 January 1946. Their narrow interpretation of the requirements to declare CW development facilities, although legally defensible, contrasts greatly with a much broader U.S. interpretation. In addition, the current Russian position represents a major shift from the approach, which was similar to Washington's, used by the former Soviet Union during the negotiation of the MOU and through the implementation of Phase I. [redacted]

The U.S. continues to pursue resolution of these concerns through the MOU's provisions for submitting questions on each side's declarations and for conducting consultations. Russian responses to U.S. questions, while clarifying some minor issues, have not resolved key U.S. concerns and raised a few new ones. The U.S. and Russia have since August 1994 conducted four rounds of consultations in Moscow on MOU implementation issues. During the first round of talks, the Russians indicated that their past research and development efforts on CW had not led to the construction of new binary production facilities or to stockpiling of binary weapons. This statement, however, did not preclude the use of existing CW production facilities, nor the production and stockpiling of binary components. [redacted]

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In early February 1995, ACDA Director John Holum and a small delegation met with Russian officials in Moscow to "brainstorm" on means for resolving outstanding concerns about MOU implementation. Although the Russian officials were not in a position to commit to specific proposals, they did agree in principle to provide a supplemental declaration of CW production facilities declared by the Soviets in 1989 under Phase I, but omitted by the Russians in their Phase II declaration. However, the supplemental declaration would not include all production facilities currently assessed by the IC to have been involved in the Russian offensive program. The declaration would also be made in such a way as not to prejudice either side's interpretation of the provisions. The Russian officials were reluctant to adopt a broader interpretation of the declaration requirement for CW development facilities, but did agree to consider a U.S. proposal to draft language on a common understanding of the requirement. They were also unwilling to consider a U.S. proposal to resolve concerns about binary CW weapons through a mutual exchange of information on each side's program. The U.S. has proposed further discussions in Washington with Russian officials at the end of February.

Regarding inspections, the U.S. ability to conduct meaningful inspections in Russia was hampered, in part, by the incomplete nature of the Russian data. Since inspections were restricted to declared facilities, the Russians effectively limited potential inspection sites by excluding from their declaration some facilities of highest concern to the U.S. In addition, the lack of detailed and complete site and process flow diagrams, equipment lists, and descriptive narratives hampered the inspectors' ability to effectively use their inspection time. The Russians did allow the U.S. to conduct its five designated inspections. However, as with their data declaration, Moscow took a more restrictive approach to inspections, which in some cases was inconsistent with MOU provisions, than did the U.S.

The implementing documents to the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) have not been finalized, and hence, the Agreement has not yet entered into force. In early 1993, the U.S. and Russia agreed to what the U.S. believed to be the final draft of the implementing documents. However, Moscow indicated shortly thereafter that several changes needed to be made. During the late 1994 consultations, Moscow stated that it is unwilling to discuss BDA concerns at this time and that it is considering whether CWC provisions would be more advantageous to them than the BDA. Should the BDA enter into force, Russia's Phase II declaration would serve as the basis for U.S. monitoring and inspection of Russian destruction activity.

President Yel'tsin established the President's Committee on Convention-related Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons (PC) in early 1992 to handle the implementation aspects of various chemical and biological weapons agreements to which Russia is party. Although the role of this committee has

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broadened over time, it still has not demonstrated the clout or apparent authority to push forward a unified policy from the interagency quagmire. Moreover, recent information suggests that the degree to which the PC has influence over Moscow's decision-making process has declined significantly since early 1994 when Anatoliy Kuntsevich was removed as head of the PC. [REDACTED]

The content of Russia's data declaration likely was influenced by a number of organizations and issues. At least portions of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) appear to be exerting the most resistance on CW issues. Other ministries also are operating with a considerable amount of autonomy and are seeking to advance their own interests as they struggle over control of Russia's CW policy and the allocations and influence that flow from that policy. There are indications that several individuals within the MoD--particularly within the Chemical, Biological and Radiological Troops--and the State Committee for the Chemical and Petrochemical Industry (formerly part of the Ministry of Chemical Industry) oppose abandoning the Russian CW program. [REDACTED]


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Q.2. Russia appears to be maintaining an offensive biological weapons program despite the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1992 agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom to terminate such programs. On what evidence does the U.S. base its claims that Russia is continuing to develop offensive biological weapons? Provide a detailed assessment of the Russian BW program, including a description of all facilities and a listing of all agents currently being maintained or developed.



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Despite repeated assurances that Russia has been in full compliance with the BWC since March 1992, the U.S. Intelligence Community judges that some key offensive activities continue in Russia and that Yel'tsin has been unable or unwilling to terminate them. We are confident that support for maintaining a mobilization base for wartime production and the scaled-down efforts aimed at developing new agents resides in the highest echelons of the Ministry of Defense. The continuing refusal of that Ministry to be open about past BW offensive activities, whether in declarations to the UN or in trilateral and bilateral discussions, only reinforces our doubts about its intent to terminate all offensive BW activities. [redacted]

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Q.9. Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in January 1993, despite the fact that it is concealing chemical weapons. Do we know the size, nature and location of Iran's chemical program? What countries, if any, are aiding Iran with its development and production program? Does the U.S. expect Iran to ratify the CWC and declare, accurately or otherwise, its chemical stockpile and facilities?

A.9. Iran possesses a large offensive CW program that has grown dramatically since it began about 1983. Iran is seeking a larger, more advanced, and virtually self-sufficient program, which we believe will soon emerge as perhaps the largest in the Third World. [redacted]

Iran is now in the midst of an eight-year plan in which it is seeking a broad range of large-scale CW agent and precursor production facilities. It has continued to upgrade and expand its chemical weapons production infrastructure and chemical munitions arsenal, even after signing the CWC in January 1993.

- These facilities and existing CW agent plants will allow Iran to produce over 2,500 tons of agent per year--more than Iraq produced at the height of its CW program.
- Iran's development effort also includes facilities to produce virtually every precursor it needs, thus lowering the risk to Tehran of export controls and interdiction efforts.
- As part of this expansion, Iran is spending large sums of money on long-term capital improvements to its chemical warfare program, which suggests that Tehran intends to maintain a CW capability well into the foreseeable future.

[redacted]
Furthermore, Iran is leading a drive among lesser developed countries to link ratification of the CWC with elimination of Australia Group export controls, which are more comprehensive and stringent than CWC controls.

- If these efforts are successful, Iran would be able to acquire more easily the precursor chemicals and production equipment it needs for its CW program. [redacted]

We assess that Iran has produced as much as several thousand tons of CW agents, including blister, choking, and blood agents. It has been attempting to produce nerve agents since 1988, but we do not know if it has yet succeeded on a large scale.

- A CW agent production facility is located near Aliabad [redacted]

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Iran has a basic chemical munitions arsenal, which it most likely will continue to diversify and improve. The size of Iran's chemical weapons stockpile is difficult to assess, but it may be substantial.

- Iran's arsenal probably consists of standard long- and short-range chemical munitions, including aerial bombs, artillery shells and rockets, and mortar rounds.
- We believe that Iran is seeking a chemical warhead for its Scud missiles and may have received some assistance from North Korea in this field.

[REDACTED]

At the September 1994 Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) Plenary in The Hague, Iran stated that the PrepCom's lack of commitment to remove preexisting export controls is a major obstacle to its ratification of the CWC. This hard-line position may be primarily for negotiating purposes, however, and is likely to soften, as the number of ratifying countries approaches 65 and entry into force is close at hand. Tehran may then move forward on ratification in order to remain a player within the CWC arena, specifically as a member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Executive Council. Should Iran ratify the CWC, it is unlikely that, given its push to expand its existing CW program as well as its efforts within the PrepCom to restrict CWC provisions, Iran will fully disclose its CW program or fully adhere to the Convention. [REDACTED]

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