



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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
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
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
*Wednesday*  
*15 October 1980*





Contents

-



Special Analysis

Iraq-Iran: *Capabilities for Continuing the War* . . . . . 2





SPECIAL ANALYSIS

IRAQ-IRAN: Capabilities for Continuing the War

[REDACTED]

*Each side in the war apparently intends to outlast the other on the ground militarily while inflicting maximum economic damage through airstrikes. Iraq has the advantage of large stockpiles, a relatively well-functioning logistic system, and more reliable foreign sources of supply. Iran can try to conserve its supplies, hoping a defensive strategy will make the price of continuing too costly for Iraq. Operations of both can continue at present levels at least through the end of this month and probably longer.* [REDACTED]

Baghdad's ground forces have sufficient materiel to sustain the current level of combat for several weeks without a major resupply from abroad. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Southern Iran and Khuzestan are readily accessible to Iraqi reinforcement and resupply, while the mountains to the north and east hinder similar Iranian efforts. Should casualties become heavy, Iraq could draw on a manpower pool of 250,000 reservists and paramilitary forces. [REDACTED]

Iraq's military petroleum supplies probably are sufficient for several months of combat. [REDACTED]

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Iraqi aircraft losses have been low. Baghdad has stated that as of 4 October, 50 aircraft had been lost, an attrition rate allowing operations at current levels for several months. [redacted]

Shortages of spare parts, however, may limit operations for Iraq's more sophisticated MIG-23 and SU-20/22 fighter-bombers within several weeks. Iraq handles most of its aircraft maintenance, but engines and airframes are usually overhauled in the USSR, and this support probably will not be available. [redacted]

#### Iran's Capabilities

Iran's ability to sustain its forces depends largely on the intensity of the war. By relying on urban warfare to tie down Iraqi forces, Iran can stretch out its spare parts and fuel, make maximum use of its outnumbered and outgunned frontline units, and drag out the war at present levels of combat, possibly for months. Iraq's cautious strategy has given Iran time to transport supplies and reinforcements to the front. [redacted]

Most Iranian elements fighting in the cities are infantry units requiring only small arms and ammunition. Each of the four main cities in Khuzestan has major arms depots with large ammunition stocks. [redacted]

[redacted] The mobilization of new Iranian units probably would not affect the war for at least several months. [redacted]

[redacted] By using aircraft sparingly, Iran probably can continue to attack such high-visibility targets as refineries, power plants, and depots for an extended period. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Iran has lost between 70 and 100 aircraft of all types since the start of the war. Iran began the war with approximately 180 operational fighter aircraft and with perhaps as many as 150 additional, flyable fighters. Maintenance problems and a shortage of spare parts are forcing cannibalization. The closing of the Abadan refinery, the only facility producing jet fuel at the beginning of the conflict, may have forced Iran to begin refining jet fuel at one of its other refineries. If all of Iran's refining capacity were destroyed, it would be forced to rely on the estimated 30-day supply it had on hand at the beginning of the war. [redacted]

Resupply from Abroad

Soviet refusal to send major shipments through the Strait of Hormuz to Iraq should not constrain Iraqi operations for several weeks, if the level of fighting does not increase. Iraq has an airlift capability, access to the Jordanian port of Al Aqaba and possibly to Saudi and Kuwaiti ports, and land routes through Turkey to Europe. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] From 1977 through 1979, Soviet military deliveries averaged over \$900 million annually. Shipments this year prior to the war were running at about half that. [redacted]


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