


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[redacted]
Manipulating the Media

Iraq since August 2002 has increased its exploitation of the international media, allowing camera crews access to sites, to showcase the alleged legitimacy of facilities and to refute US and UK claims of WMD links. Journalists discovered no BW activity during recent tours of the following sites:

- German and Arab journalists, in July and August 2002, respectively, toured the Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Vaccine plant, a former high-containment BW agent production facility

[redacted]
Iraqis claimed the facility was in disrepair.

- UK journalists on 24 September toured the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, named in unclassified UN documents as the storage location of BW stocks and genetic engineering efforts, but the journalists found no evidence of BW activity.

- International journalists on 20 August toured the Taii food distribution warehouse.

- German journalists in July 2002 toured Fallujah III (also known as Habbaniyah I), the location of a castor oil plant assessed as possibly involved in ricin toxin production

[redacted]
There is little chance journalists will witness or detect BW activity on Baghdad-orchestrated tours because access is controlled, facilities have been sanitized, prohibited materials have been concealed, the facilities are dual-use, or the journalists lack the training or capability to detect prohibited WMD activity.

Employing Plausible Deniability of Dual-Use Facilities

It appears that much of Iraq's BW activity occurs in dual-use facilities, enabling Baghdad to maintain facilities and personnel skills, embed BW activity within civilian activity, and provide facilities for off-hours or breakout BW activity. Development and production of vaccines, biopesticides, and some pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs share many technologies and equipment with development of BW agents

- Pathogens are commonly isolated for medical research and for determining appropriate medical treatment; however, the strain of *Clostridium perfringens* that Iraq claimed it produced for its BW program was isolated at the al-Rashid Hospital,

- The Dawrah FMD Vaccine plant, initially established for vaccine production by the French company Rhone Merieux, produced botulinum toxin and possibly anthrax spores prior to the Gulf

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~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

Lessons Learned From Iraq's Past Efforts To Mask Its BW Program (U)

Many overarching lessons have been learned regarding Iraq's denial and deception (D&D) efforts

[redacted]

[redacted] employed these measures to the maximum extent possible to protect its BW program.

[redacted]

Baghdad's basic tenet of refusal to admit to any proscribed activity until cornered, elements of several ministries supported the deception campaign. Media elements of the Ministry of Information helped

[redacted]

[redacted] Iraq established elusive mobile BW facilities [redacted]

Iraq's Cover Stories
Iraq employed elaborate cover stories for BW facilities, equipment, and materials to conceal and provide plausible denial of ongoing offensive BW activity.

[redacted]

This assessment was prepared by the DCI Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to [redacted]

[redacted]

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Lessons Learned From Iraq's Past Efforts To Mask Its BW Program (U)

Key Findings (U)

Since the Gulf war, Iraq has taken extensive steps to protect its offensive biological warfare (BW) program. [redacted]

[redacted]

- Establishing cover stories for BW facilities and activities.
- Manipulating the international media to aid in denying allegations Iraq is conducting BW work.
- Embedding elements of the program in dual-use facilities [redacted]
- Employing plausible deniability of dual-use facilities.
- Constructing redundant, survivable mobile BW facilities.

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

Mobilizing BW Capabilities

In all probability the mobile BW agent R&D, production and filling capabilities that Iraq has established,

will provide redundancy and survivability because of the inherent difficulty in locating and tracking mobile platforms, as evidenced by the fruitless "Scud hunts" of the Gulf war:


- Iraq decided in mid-1996 to establish mobile laboratories for BW agent research in order to evade UNSCOM inspections, according to [redacted] an Iraqi defector associated with the Iraqi National Congress.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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
21 November 2002

Lessons Learned From Iraq's Past Efforts To Mask Its BW Program (U)

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