



## National Intelligence Council Memorandum

### Rwanda and Burundi: Societies in Crisis

**Key Points** After the slaughter of an estimated 200,000 Rwandans, the tempo of ethnic bloodletting is slowing. Nonetheless, the massacres—of an even greater magnitude than the killings in Burundi last year—are creating an enormous and longlasting humanitarian crisis. In both countries, extremists with access to military power are using ethnic fears to derail democratic elections and power-sharing negotiations. Continued unrest has taken a heavy toll on moderates in both ethnic communities.

In Rwanda, the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) controls about half the country; it is contesting the capital and moving toward success. Should the rebels triumph, they will probably be able to co-opt other groups into an RPF-controlled regime. The only other way to end the bloodshed might be a Cyprus-type partition, entailing enormous population movements given the intermingling of majority Hutus and minority Tutsis.

The disorder in one country feeds unrest in the other. Moreover, financing from the large Rwandan and to a lesser extent Burundian exile communities keeps revanchist movements going.

We expect the number of Rwandans who have fled or have been displaced within the country to grow into the millions. Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi fear that the refugee influx will bring violence and that the human waves will include military forces.

At the same time, aid donors are fatigued. Given their limited mandate, UN peacekeepers in Rwanda could not slow the bloodbath, and ethnic unrest has swept away whatever gains were achieved by the large flows of economic aid to both countries.

---

*This memorandum was prepared by the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. It is based on discussions among intelligence community analysts at a teleconference held on 10 May 1994. It was coordinated with representatives of CIA, DIA, State/INR, NSA, and Army.*

APPROVED FOR RELEASE **NIC 00270/94**  
DATE: JAN 2006 13 May 1994

(b) (3)

~~SECRET~~

## Rwanda and Burundi: Societies in Crisis

*Never before in its 131-year history has the International Committee of the Red Cross seen at first hand such unmitigated hatred leading to the extermination of a significant part of the civilian population.*

*ICRC Aide-Memoire to Governments on the Rwanda Crisis, 29 April 1994*

In both Rwanda and Burundi, the traditional enmity between the Hutus, who comprise 80-90 percent of the populations, and the Tutsis, who comprise the minority, will continue to fuel ethnic conflict—derailing efforts toward peaceful power sharing. Although the tempo of ethnic bloodletting in Rwanda is slowing, the massacres are creating an enormous and longlasting humanitarian crisis. [REDACTED]

***Brutal slaughter of hundreds of thousands causes even more Rwandans to flee their homes***

Following the death of the Rwandan and Burundian presidents in a plane crash on 6 April, hardline Rwandan Hutus, using their control of the army, unleashed massacres of Tutsis and moderate Hutus to scuttle the Arusha Accord that was to have given Tutsis greater political power. Aid agencies fear that more than 200,000 Rwandans—mainly Tutsis and Hutu moderates—have died and more than 300,000 from both groups have fled the country. At least 500,000 have been displaced within Rwanda, a number that could rise as high as 3 million.<sup>1</sup> [REDACTED]

***Burundi could follow Rwanda's bloody lead***

The death of the Burundian president has not sparked significant unrest, but renewed violence could erupt in Burundi at any time. Democratic presidential elections in June 1993—in which Melchior Ndadaye became the country's first Hutu president—have been followed by three attempted coups by the Tutsi-controlled military and the murder of Ndadaye and other leaders. The coup attempt last October set off ethnic bloodletting that killed as many as 50,000 and drove another 600,000 or so Burundians into neighboring countries. Recent developments—including the latest failed coup, disarmament of Hutu militias and civilians, and a Tutsi-inspired constitutional

<sup>1</sup> Out of the 8.4 million population of Rwanda, about 1.3 million, or 15 percent, are estimated to be Tutsi. The International Committee of the Red Cross says between 100,000 and 500,000 people have been killed. Several international humanitarian agencies have characterized the situation in Rwanda as genocide, considering that between 8 percent to a possible 40 percent of the Tutsi population may have been slaughtered. Burundi's population is 6.1 million, with Tutsis comprising over 15 percent, or some 900,000 people. (U)

challenge to President Ntibantunganya's legitimacy—have added to tensions. [REDACTED]

### Rwanda and Burundi to 1993

Unlike most African states, Rwanda and Burundi were not artificial creations of colonial rule; their existence as political entities goes back several centuries. Between the 15th and 17th centuries, Tutsi herders moved into the area from Ethiopia and established dominance over Hutu farmers. Hutus traditionally were the social inferiors of the Tutsi nobility, who exchanged cattle for personal services. Both groups share social structures and the related Kirundi and Kinyarwanda languages. (U)

Rwanda's Tutsi monarchy traditionally was more centralized and authoritarian than in Burundi, where the king's power rested on a shifting set of factional alliances. Rwanda also was marked by sharper social distinctions between Tutsis and Hutus. German and Belgian rule in the 20th century highlighted ethnic differences in both countries, as colonial authorities gave Tutsis disproportionate access to education and government jobs. (U)

Even before Rwanda gained independence in 1962, the Hutus had gained political power in civil strife marked by widespread ethnic violence and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis into exile. Two presidents—the southerner Grégoire Kayibanda (1962-1973) and the northerner Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994)—ruled over single-party regimes. The country enjoyed relative stability and ethnic peace until Tutsi exiles of the Rwandan Patriotic Front invaded from Uganda in 1990. The Rwandan peace pact in August 1993 (Arusha Accord) that ended the civil war between the Hutu-led government and the mainly Tutsi rebels was derailed by Hutu extremists. [REDACTED]

In Burundi, Tutsis remained in control until last year. The contrast between Hutu rule in Rwanda and the group's oppression in Burundi led to Hutu uprisings—in 1965, 1969, 1972, and 1988—that resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths. Each Hutu attack fueled Tutsi fears of extermination, and each bloody repression reinforced the Hutus' desire for revenge. Periodic ethnic unrest resulted in three successful *coups d'état* and many failed attempts. The last Tutsi president, Pierre Buyoya, judged the situation was untenable and orchestrated last year's election and transfer of power to a Hutu successor. [REDACTED]

### Forces For Instability

The traditional enmity between Tutsis and Hutus continues to drive events in Rwanda and Burundi. Since independence, hardliners—from both groups and in both countries—have led coups and fueled massacres to block political and military power sharing and quash their ethnic rivals.

*Too many obstacles to reconciliation*

In both countries, political and social institutions are too poorly developed and too tied to ethnic power bases to allow a peaceful transition to multi-ethnic power sharing. The forces for instability have repeatedly overwhelmed efforts at democratic elections, power-sharing accords, and ethnic reconciliation:

- ***Ethnic Intermingling.*** Hutus and Tutsis live interspersed across the two countries. This intensifies episodes of tribal violence, because ethnically motivated killers manipulated by political elites frequently know victims and can incite their kinsmen to participate. Moreover, this demographic pattern makes it difficult to impose peace by separating the warring groups.
- ***Spillover Effects.*** Disorder in one country feeds unrest in the other. The most concrete effect is the inter-flow of refugees, who strain the countries' limited resources and spread ethnic horror stories among their kinsmen. The cycle of violence strengthens the perception of duplicity on both sides and convinces each side that it cannot risk sharing power with the other.
- ***Exile Resources.*** Many Rwandan Tutsi exiles work as professionals and businessmen in neighboring states, as well as in Europe and North America. Contributions from this community have been an important resource for the RPF and are likely to continue to be available to support armed Tutsi movements in Rwanda and perhaps in Burundi.
- ***Poverty.*** With annual per capita GNP of less than \$300, Rwanda and Burundi are among the world's poorest countries; they are also the two most densely populated countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1990, moreover, Rwanda's economy has shrunk by more than 10 percent and Burundi's by about 5 percent, while their populations have grown about 10 percent. Recent violence has kept farmers from tending the coffee crop—the main export of both countries—further battering rural incomes. In Rwanda, the RPF's demand for land for returning Tutsi exiles has been a

*Financing the Tutsi minority*

sticking point. A lasting solution in Burundi would have to include a role in the economy for Tutsi soldiers and civil servants replaced by Hutus.

**Forces Inhibiting Reconciliation**

The recent violence has strengthened those elements in the social and political structure of Rwanda—and to a lesser extent in Burundi—that tend to block peaceful resolution of ethnic conflict:

*Few moderates left on either side*

- **Middle Ground Eroded.** Much of the recent violence has targeted leaders seeking a common ground between Hutus and Tutsis. In Rwanda, most moderate Hutu leaders appear to have been murdered or to have fled, leaving the interim government under the control of hardliners. The RPF's public statements indicate the group views all surviving government leaders as complicit in the slaughter. Until the violence ends, Rwandan moderates will be unwilling to come forward. In Burundi, the coup attempts and efforts to disarm civilians appear to be polarizing the political leadership of both ethnic groups.

*Splits within each group also growing*

- **Factionalism.** Continued unrest is increasing the number of factional fault lines in both countries and is undermining the ability of local leaders to convince their followers to adhere to a settlement. In Rwanda, government forces are divided between northern and southern elements. The rebels seem more unified, but divisions may develop between the Tutsi military leadership and Hutus serving as political window dressing or between Tutsis seeking revenge for the massacre of their kinsmen and others more disposed to reconciliation with the Hutu majority.

Similar factionalism is rife in Burundi. Tutsi soldiers' political loyalties and support for coup attempts derive from their membership in rival clans. The Hutu community is split between PALIPEHUTU—which says only a violent uprising can earn Hutus equality with Tutsis—and the ruling FRODEBU party, which in turn is split between moderates and radicals.

- **Obstacles to Outside Help.** In both countries, manipulation by contending factions of outside mediators and peacekeepers has made it much harder for disinterested parties—such as the UN, OAU, and Western powers—to help find or implement peaceful solutions. Rwandan government forces, after attacking UN

peacekeeping troops in early April and accusing the Belgian contingent of complicity in President Habyarimana's death, now say they want an expanded multilateral military presence, probably to block new RPF gains. The RPF has hedged statements that it would welcome a multilateral force to protect aid deliveries, probably because the rebels believe they will win in the weeks needed to deploy such a force. In Burundi, opposition by the Army's Tutsi hierarchy has sharply restricted the mission and size—from 200 to 31—of an OAU military observer force that is intended to build confidence between the regime and the troops.

[redacted]

***Neighboring states promoting their own interests***

- ***Meddling Neighbors.*** Uganda and Zaire will continue to support their allies in Rwanda and Burundi. Uganda is likely to keep giving the RPF weaponry, logistical support, and sanctuary, and could provide some troop support. For Ugandan President Museveni, this aid repays his debt to the Rwandan rebels' military cadre, who were his comrades-in-arms during his fight for power. Museveni probably also judges that only an RPF victory would induce the estimated 200,000 Tutsi exiles in Uganda—where they have drawn native Ugandans' resentment—to return to Rwanda. If asked, Museveni might also aid any Burundian Tutsi group that allied with the RPF. [redacted]

Zaire's President Mobutu views the crises in Rwanda and Burundi as a chance to remind Western donors that his regime cannot be ignored and to burnish his regional and international image by mediating among the rival factions. At the same time, Mobutu probably will provide limited support to Rwandan and Burundian Hutus. The Zairian military intervened against the RPF in 1990 and sent Rwandan government forces some weapons last month. Kinshasa has not meddled as much in Burundi, but we believe that Mobutu would seriously consider a request by either an embattled Hutu government or radical Hutu militias for military help. [redacted]

**Prospects and Implications for the United States**

***Rwandan peace accords not salvageable***

***Conflict Resolution Mechanisms Disintegrating.*** The onset of civil war and massive ethnic slaughter in Rwanda last month sounded the death knell for the Arusha accords of August 1993 that promised power sharing, transition to electoral democracy, and military demobilization. Renewed fighting and widespread butchery have

dissipated the limited trust developed between the government and RPF during a year of negotiations. [REDACTED]

*What if the rebels win...*

The RPF controls about half the country, can isolate the capital at will, and is moving toward defeating government forces. Should the rebels triumph, they will try to co-opt other groups into an RPF-controlled regime. The rebels have already spoken of a "national conference" as a forum for establishing the legitimacy of a new government. [REDACTED]

#### Could the RPF Govern?

We believe the RPF, based on its negotiating history, realizes that a minority Tutsi government would not be viable. Should the rebels defeat the interim government, their ability to establish political control over Rwanda will depend on their ability to co-opt the surviving moderate Hutu leaders. The RPF's record suggests it probably would be able to do so if it wins quickly. The group has installed Hutus in visible political positions—such as RPF Chairman Kanyarengwe—and worked well with moderate Hutu representatives during the peace negotiations last year. Another factor in the RPF's favor is that rebel troops have refrained from retaliating on a massive scale for anti-Tutsi atrocities; their strong discipline leads us to judge that RPF troops will continue doing so. [REDACTED]

The ability of the rebels to establish a functioning government would decline, however, if the war dragged on. Hutus amenable to cooperation with the RPF would be hunted down by the interim government's security forces and hardline militias, and continued massacres of Tutsis could reduce the RPF's willingness to cooperate across ethnic lines. [REDACTED]

*...or could a stalemate result in a Cyprus-like partition?*

On the other hand, if a military stalemate develops, continued fighting probably will deepen mistrust even further and preclude a negotiated political settlement for some time. In this case, a more radical solution—for example, a *de facto*, Cyprus-like partition between a mainly Tutsi, RPF-held sector and a mainly Hutu, government-controlled zone—may be the only way to end the bloodletting. Partition would require massive shifts of population and would impose enormous humanitarian and financial costs. The final extent of the massacres probably would determine whether the RPF would even consider this option. Such a step would have significant long-term risks. [REDACTED]

In Burundi, the process that led to last year's democratic election and the transfer of political power to the Hutu majority is under extreme pressure. We believe the most immediate challenge is that of ensuring the physical security of each ethnic group. The deaths of two Hutu presidents within six months highlight the vulnerability of Burundi's politicians, and extremists could try to massacre moderate leaders in a power grab. On the other hand, Tutsis suspect that efforts to protect the political leadership, such as the creation of a separate Presidential Guard, are steps designed to impose Hutu military dominance over the minority group and could leave them defenseless against Hutu mobs and militias.

### Regional Refugee Situation

Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi fear that the influx of more than 300,000 Rwandan refugees will be economically costly, lead to violence, and that the human waves will include military forces:

- At least 250,000 Rwandans have crossed into remote western Tanzania and have been moved to an area some 18 kilometers from the border. International agencies are scrambling for funds, workers, and relief goods to avert a health catastrophe from cholera, measles, and other diseases.
- More than 50,000 Rwandan Tutsis have fled to Burundi, along with about 200,000 Burundian Hutu refugees who had fled last fall to escape violence and are now returning. The fragile ethnic balance in Burundi could easily be upset if local people believe the recent arrivals are monopolizing relief supplies. Some 60,000 Burundian Hutu refugees remain in Rwanda.
- Zaire claims it has received some 8,500 Rwandan refugees, and another 5,500 Rwandans are in Uganda. Some 22,000 Burundians have fled into Zaire from refugee camps in Rwanda. Although the numbers are relatively small, the remoteness of the border camps and poor transport systems are straining the relief effort.

***Massive humanitarian crisis will continue***

***Chronic Humanitarian Crisis.*** Continued political instability and ethnic violence will exact a heavy human price. We expect the number of Rwandans who have fled or have been displaced within the country—we estimate 800,000—to rise into the millions. Similarly, the 200,000 Burundians who recently returned from camps in Rwanda may remain displaced within Burundi. These population

displacements also have disrupted food production; Rwandan farmers probably have drastically reduced planting during the current long rainy season, and last year Burundi lost an estimated two-thirds of the food crops planted during the short rains. [redacted]

***Another blow to UN  
peacekeeping efforts...***

***Donor Fatigue.*** Rwanda and Burundi's cycle of violence has spun out of control despite considerable political and economic aid from the outside. Some donors are reassessing assistance to Africa, especially for peacekeeping operations. The limited mandate of the 2,500-man UN contingent in Rwanda prevented it from intervening to halt or slow the bloodbath:

- Belgium—which had 10 peacekeepers murdered—is reevaluating its participation in any future UN military operations.
- Because of their experiences in other operations, Nigeria and other African countries say they will participate in a proposed multilateral force to protect aid deliveries only if they have prior commitments of logistical and transport support from the United States and other Western powers. [redacted]

***...and to economic  
assistance to Africa***

The experience of Rwanda and Burundi may also cause donors to reconsider economic assistance. Donors disbursed \$1.3 billion to Rwanda and \$1.0 billion to Burundi—representing about 20 percent of their GDPs—between 1986 and 1990, when the World Bank said they were generally pursuing the right economic course. But since then, ethnic violence has swept away the gains achieved by these resource transfers. [redacted]

# Rwanda and Burundi: Societies in Crisis

## Annex: Military Forces in Rwanda and Burundi

### Rwanda

#### Rwandan Armed Forces (Government):

Combat Effective manpower nationwide: 10,000

Combat Effective manpower in Kigali: 2,500

#### Major weapons systems:

Armored cars:	62
Mortars (60 mm, 80 mm, 120 mm)	250
122 mm howitzers	6
Air defense machine guns	35
SA-7 air defense missiles	unk
75 mm recoilless rifles	50
Helicopters	6

#### Hutu Militias (Pro-Government):

Combat Effective manpower nationwide: well over 10,000

Weapons: AK-47 assault rifles, hand grenades

#### Rwandan Patriotic Army (Rebels):

Combat Effective manpower nationwide: 13,000

Combat Effective manpower in Kigali: 4,500


#### Major weapons systems (quantities unknown):

- 107 mm towed multiple rocket launchers
- 60 mm, 80 mm, 120 mm mortars
- Towed air defense guns
- SA-7 man-portable missiles

#### United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR):

50 military observers in Kigali; authorized strength of 270.





**Burundi**

**Burundian Armed Forces**

Estimated manpower nationwide: 13,500  
(includes Army, Gendarmerie, Security Service)

**Major weapons systems:**

Armored cars:	85
122-mm howitzers and rocket-launchers	22
3-inch, 82-mm, 120-mm mortars	109
75-mm recoilless rifles	13
40-mm antitank grenade launchers	69
Air defense artillery	188
Helicopters (operational)	10
C-47 Transport (operational)	2
Trainers (operational)	2
Light fixed-wing (operational)	2

**Hutu Party Militias**


Unknown number of militiamen armed with various light infantry weapons, possibly including rocket-propelled grenade launchers.

**OAU Inter-African Observer Mission in Burundi (MIOB)**

31 military observers; authorized strength of 47.



# Rwanda: Concentrations Of Displaced Persons And Refugees, 11 May 1994



Confidential

PREPARED 11 MAY 94