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
Rwanda: Fallout From Rebel Invasion 

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Uganda-Rwanda: Museveni's Role in the Rebel Invasion 


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
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Rwanda: Fallout From Rebel Invasion

Rwandan President Habyarimana faces continuing challenges from the low-level ethnic insurgency, regional pressure over refugees, and sharp divisions among his Hutu supporters over political reform initiatives. Habyarimana has responded to the crisis by successfully soliciting international economic and military support against the mostly Tutsi rebels and stepping up political reform plans to include a constitutional referendum on a multiparty system next June. While Habyarimana probably hoped reform initiatives would preempt rebel demands and retain the backing of Western patrons such as France and Belgium, they are instead eroding his domestic support, especially in the military, while guerrilla attacks by rebel forces continue. A regional repatriation scheme for the Tutsi refugees probably cannot be achieved without political negotiations with the rebel forces, which could further jeopardize Habyarimana's position vis-a-vis the Hutu majority already alarmed by the prospect that political reform will allow Tutsis to gain political and economic power.

Lingering Conflict . . .


Soon after the invasion into northern Rwanda in October, rebel forces declared themselves the military wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a banned dissident group particularly active among Tutsi refugees in Uganda. Early successes by the rebel forces, including fighting in the capital, were reversed by the Rwandan Army with the help of Belgian, French, Egyptian, and South African military support. Hampered by logistic constraints and the loss of key commanders—the initial commander, Major General Fred Rwigyema was killed along with others early in the campaign—new rebel leadership adopted guerrilla



President Juvenal Habyarimana

Habyarimana, 53, staged a bloodless coup in 1973 in response to widespread government corruption and rising ethnic tensions. His regime has been marked by racial tolerance and, until recently, fiscal responsibility. The President's longstanding grassroots popularity among the rural majority has declined with the deteriorating economy

Jeune Afrique




He has inched toward political and economic reform in recent years by carefully building support and marginalizing his opponents. However, the President sets broad policy goals and relies on others to implement them; subordinates who disagree with him sometimes obstruct his plans. Hutu hardliners, emboldened by the Tutsi-led invasion, will almost certainly act to limit further liberalization.

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tactics with the goal of wearing down the nearly 9,000-member Army and forcing the government into negotiations. []

[] major rebel positions in the northeastern Mutara region were retaken by Rwandan forces in late October, but ambushes of Army troops and raids against economic and military targets by small groups of rebels have denied Habyarimana a decisive victory. A cease-fire has not yet been established and joint Rwanda-Uganda border patrols—which have improved in cooperation and scope despite tensions between Kigali and Kampala—have been hampered by logistic constraints, a naturally porous border, and local populations sympathetic to the refugee cause. []

[] sympathetic elements in Tanzania also may be providing logistic support to rebel forces. []

... Deepens Domestic Discontent

The rebel conflict has worsened Rwanda's economic situation and complicated Kigali's implementation of a World Bank/IMF structural adjustment program agreed to in Washington the day the rebels invaded. Vital imports, particularly foodstuffs, fuel, and fertilizers that reach landlocked Rwanda through Uganda and Tanzania have been disrupted by the fighting. Despite the resulting shortages and price increases, Habyarimana accelerated the reform timetable by announcing a currency devaluation. Although probably intended to bolster external support by demonstrating regime commitment to reform, the move aggravated the rise in import prices and, together with curfews and travel restrictions brought on by the insurgency, is adding to popular discontent. A prolonged conflict may spell disaster for an economy already suffering from depressed prices for its main export, coffee, and poor harvests caused by drought and lack of fertilizers. Tourism, a major source of hard currency, also has declined because the country's two parks are in the contested areas. In addition, the growing budget deficit because of military spending threatens to eat up emergency reserves and jeopardize the release of World Bank/IMF funds unless it can be made up with bilateral donations. []

Rwandan Patriotic Front at a Glance

Membership. *The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) apparently consists of disparate elements united only in their opposition to the Habyarimana regime and their intention to seize power and repatriate Rwandan Tutsi refugees from neighboring states. Membership is largely Tutsi, but several disaffected members of Rwanda's Hutu majority have allied themselves with the RPF, often for reasons of personal ambition or revenge.* []

Political Agenda. *The RPF has accused the Habyarimana regime of economic mismanagement, political persecution, and ethnic discrimination. Its political program includes calls for abolition of ethnic segregation, free and fair elections, a strict code of ethics for elected officials, repatriation and resettlement of Rwandan refugees, restructuring of the Army with RPF rebels as the nucleus, a nonaligned foreign policy, and implementation of policies to boost private investment and improve provision of basic social services.* []

Support. *The mainly ethnic-based RPF does not have much popular support in Rwanda, where Tutsis are only about 15 percent of the population. Although Hutus are divided over support for Habyarimana, they have little interest in aligning with the Tutsis, whose rule they overthrew shortly after independence from Belgium in 1962.* []

[] the RPF invasion also has sparked a power struggle in Rwanda. Habyarimana is precariously positioned between Tutsi exiles attempting to use the RPF insurgency and propaganda to their advantage in the political reform process and a Hutu power base factionalized by hardline anti-Tutsi elements and individual aspirations for control.

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Alexis Kanyarengwe: RPF Chairman

[redacted] Col. Alexis Kanyarengwe, an ethnic Hutu, has temporarily allied with the Tutsi-based RPF [redacted]
[redacted] formerly the second most powerful official in Habyarimana's government, Kanyarengwe had a power base independent of the President. Despite his anti-Tutsi reputation, Kanyarengwe was selected as deputy chairman by the RPF leaders to project a multiethnic image and in an attempt to mobilize his previous Hutu constituency. He was elected chairman following the death of the former RPF leader. [redacted]

Kanyarengwe, 52, graduated from Kigali Officers School along with Habyarimana in 1961. One of the military officers who helped propel Habyarimana to power in 1973, Kanyarengwe was rewarded with the Interior portfolio. [redacted]
[redacted] He was implicated [redacted] in a plot to overthrow Habyarimana in 1980. Kanyarengwe escaped to Tanzania, where he remained in political exile until the invasion in October. [redacted]

Habyarimana's recently announced reform program is almost certainly a bid to undermine RPF accusations of tyranny and corruption in his regime, and preempt the group's bid for a political role. Additionally, his insistence that the crisis is a result of external aggression primarily from Uganda keeps potential rivals, particularly those in the military, focused on national security rather than on coup plotting. Probably to deflect charges that it is a wholly Tutsi organization and to pressure Habyarimana into recognizing the RPF as a legitimate opposition group, the RPF has appointed Col. Alex Kanyerengwe, an exiled Hutu and former Internal Affairs Minister under Habyarimana, to replace Rwigyema as the group's chairman. [redacted]

The insurgent challenge has drastically speeded up the political reform process, including a new constitution and multiparty elections in 1991, which was initiated by Habyarimana prior to the invasion to complement and broaden support for his controversial economic liberalization plans. Western patrons have praised the reform effort and have boosted economic assistance.

The Rwandan public, however, has greeted the reforms—particularly new identity cards that omit tribal affiliation—with concern. Many Hutus fear that the omission will undermine their system of "equilibre"—the preferential allocation to the historically disadvantaged Hutu majority of government-controlled perquisites such as civil service positions. Hutus fear that a strictly merit system will favor Tutsis, who historically have had greater access to education, particularly if exiles return in large numbers. [redacted]
[redacted] Hutu elites in the north, Habyarimana's principle area of support, also are worried that an influx of Tutsi refugees will set back Hutu gains since independence. Dissatisfaction has been particularly prevalent in the military. [redacted]

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Maj. Paul KAGAME: RPF Military Commander

Ethnic Tutsi Paul Kagame's scholarly and reticent manner belies his role as the key operational commander of the RPF guerrilla force. [redacted]

Kagame has effectively adopted small-scale hit-and-run tactics in an attempt to destabilize the Hutu-dominated Rwanda regime and gain political concessions for his minority group. [redacted]

[redacted] *Kagame is ardently committed to improving Tutsi rights* [redacted]

Kagame was born in 1957. He earned a B.A. from Kampala College in 1978. Like many other unemployed refugees, he joined Museveni's guerrilla force in the early 1980s [redacted]

[redacted] *He abandoned military training at Ft. Leavenworth in early October 1990 to assume command of the Rwandan rebel forces when the former leader was slain.* [redacted]

Refugee Problem Remains . . .

The invasion has heightened tension over the longstanding Tutsi refugee issue, a key irritant in Rwanda's relations with its neighbors and a security and economic concern for the region. Some 500,000 mostly Tutsi refugees in the region compete with host country citizens for scarce resources and are often a channel for unrest across borders. The invasion halted implementation by the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) of a resettlement plan in Uganda that included registration of refugees for either repatriation to Rwanda or absorption into Uganda. Moreover, the conflict has added to refugee populations in the region, prompting neighboring heads of state to threaten expulsion to pressure Habyarimana to negotiate. For example, Uganda said in October that it can no longer act as a "refugee prison" and that Rwanda has ignored the problem of exiled Rwandans wanting to return home for 30 years. Some 10,000 new refugees

have entered Uganda as a result of the conflict. Kenyan President Moi spoke out against illegal aliens as a threat to Kenyan security and relations with neighboring countries and threatened to expel them all. Burundi, already host to some 250,000 Rwandans, is struggling to cope with an influx of new refugees that, while numbering only slightly over 1,000 so far, is more than its limited facilities and supplies can handle. [redacted]

. . . And Regional Summitry Bogged Down

Regional and international efforts to resolve the refugee question have gained impetus as a result of the fighting. Belgium—and later France—spearheaded initial attempts to arrange and monitor a cease-fire, mediate talks between Kigali and the RPF, and organize a regional conference on refugees. [redacted]

[redacted] France offered to fund a cease-fire

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monitoring force and to pay for the resettlement of Rwandan refugees if agreed to by a regional conference. The UNHCR also has said that under current circumstances only a regional agreement will provide a durable solution and provide the UNHCR with a mandate for action. [redacted]

Zaire, interested in promoting itself as the regional power, has offered to mediate among the region's heads of state. President Mobutu sent a special envoy to meet with the RPF and arrange its participation in talks. A summit was held on 20 November in Goma, Zaire; Kenya and Tanzania were absent but the RPF attended. Regional leaders failed, however, to reach agreement on a peace plan calling for a cease-fire and creation of an observation force, political dialogue between the Rwandan Government and the RPF, and a regional refugee conference. Rwanda argues that it cannot support a wholesale repatriation of refugees and that, while it is willing to work out a regional solution, it does not accept the RPF as spokesman for the refugee population. Nonetheless, Zaire has called for a meeting of the regional foreign ministers on 22 December in Gbadolite, to be followed by a summit of heads of state on 29 December in Arusha, Tanzania, to resolve the refugee issue. [redacted]

Outlook

Rwandan forces will most likely retain the upper hand in the conflict, but sporadic skirmishes will remain a source of regional tension and a potential threat to Habyarimana's position. It will be difficult for the region's heads of state to overcome their deep mutual distrust to achieve successful cooperation on refugee issues. Any solution of the refugee issue will almost certainly require large amounts of international aid, both for resettlement of Tutsi refugees and economic assistance for Rwanda's reform efforts. Moreover, domestic constraints mean that Habyarimana, who wants to appear responsive to his neighbors' and Western concerns without appearing to be giving in to Tutsi demands, has limited maneuvering room. He is likely to resist negotiating with the RPF, hoping instead that military containment of the rebel threat will weaken RPF bargaining power and shore up his political support. [redacted]

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Uganda-Rwanda: Museveni's Role in the Rebel Invasion

The invasion of Rwanda in early October by Ugandan-based Tutsi exiles has generated allegations in the region and the international community that Ugandan President Museveni actively supported the rebels.

Although Museveni has repeatedly denied foreknowledge of the invasion or subsequent resupply of the rebel forces, Kigali has ridiculed his claims of innocence.

We believe Museveni has been torn between his personal and ideological sympathy for the Tutsi cause and his fear that official support for the exiles would jeopardize his long struggle to gain regional and international legitimacy. To repair his damaged credibility, Museveni has ordered Ugandan troops to seal the border with Rwanda and has supported various cease-fire proposals. In our judgment, however, he has

The Tutsis Invade Rwanda

About 2,000 Rwandan exiles from Uganda invaded northeastern Rwanda on 1 October, threatening President Habyarimana's regime and raising the specter of renewed ethnic violence in the region. Initial successes by the exile force prompted Belgium and France to send troops to protect their nationals and

secure the airport. Zaire, which has a mutual defense agreement with Rwanda, also provided some 1,200 troops to aid Rwandan forces.

The initial invasion force of deserters from the Ugandan Army was joined by other Tutsis and disaffected Hutus, bringing the exiles' strength to some 4,000. The rebel forces soon declared themselves the military wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a banned dissident group particularly active among Tutsi refugees in Uganda. Following early combat successes, the RPF guerrilla force was hampered by logistic constraints and the death of its commander, Fred Rwigyema, and other leaders. Meanwhile, the Rwandan Army, benefiting from military resupply by France, Belgium, Egypt, and South Africa, contained the rebels primarily to the northeastern Mutara region. There the rebels are continuing guerrilla operations in an effort to disrupt Rwandan trade routes, wear down the Army, and pressure Kigali into negotiations.

Museveni's Sympathy for the Tutsi Cause

Ideological and ethnic issues factor heavily in Museveni's sympathy for the RPF. Even before the October invasion, Museveni, whose own tribal group is distantly related to the Tutsis, publicly advocated the right of Tutsi exiles to return home, share power, and be integrated into the Rwandan military. Long a supporter of liberation movements, Museveni has supported armed struggle as a last resort to redress legitimate grievances of ethnic groups. He has publicly stated that Rwanda's decades-long refusal to repatriate the Tutsis sparked the invasion by the frustrated and dispossessed exiles.

Museveni is close to senior RPF leaders—he enjoyed a long friendship with RPF leader Rwigyema—and is

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The Tutsi Legacy in Uganda

Rwandans, locally referred to as Banyarwanda, are the largest refugee group in Uganda. Most of the 225,000 Rwandan refugees are ethnic Tutsis who fled following the 1959 Hutu revolution that toppled the Tutsi monarchy and subsequent ethnic violence associated with Rwanda's independence in 1962. In the face of Kigali's refusal to repatriate them, the majority of Rwandan refugees became well established in Uganda and many have achieved a degree of economic success. Rwandan exiles played a key role in the insurgency that brought Museveni to power in 1986 and have constituted as much as 15 percent of the Ugandan Army. Tutsi rebel leader Rwigyema, who fought alongside Museveni in various conflicts since 1976, rose to become the Ugandan Army's Deputy Commander and Uganda's Deputy Minister of Defense. [redacted]

Many Ugandans, however, chafe over the longstanding Rwandan refugee presence in their country. Resenting that "foreigners" became so influential in the Ugandan Army, Museveni's critics have faulted him for catering to Tutsi interests. Ugandans in the border region also resent exiles as competitors for limited jobs and increasingly scarce arable land. For example, clashes between Ugandan peasants and Rwandan squatters have dramatically increased over the last year. [redacted]

indebted to Rwigyema and other Tutsi exiles for their many years of service in the Ugandan military. Museveni and Rwigyema went through guerrilla training in Mozambique together in the late 1970s and fought side-by-side in Uganda for nearly a decade against the Amin and Obote regimes. [redacted]

[redacted] Rwigyema was a member of the President's inner circle [redacted]

Ugandan public opinion also favored the invasion for a variety of reasons. Many Ugandans, for example, reportedly favor any development likely to rid their country permanently of the many Rwandan refugees who they believe take jobs, education, and land away from native Ugandans. Support for the invasion has also come from Ugandan border residents with ethnic ties to Rwanda and Burundi. Moreover, sympathy for the Tutsi exiles and their "just" cause against Kigali reportedly runs deep in the Ugandan Army. [redacted]

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Rwanda: Arguing for Ugandan Culpability

Rwandan diplomatic statements and public pronouncements charging Ugandan complicity in the Tutsi rebel invasion reflect Kigali's fear that rebel attacks will become a continuing threat unless international pressure forces Uganda to seal its side of the border. Despite assurances from Museveni, Kigali believes rebels still use Uganda as a safehaven and supply source. A senior Rwandan defense official recently complained that the majority of rebel fighters are now based in Uganda and that joint border surveillance teams have been ineffective because of Ugandan interference. Moreover, the charges of Ugandan complicity allow Habyarimana to avoid being seen as the stumblingblock to regional peace and may lessen pressure from his Western patrons—especially France and Belgium—for unilateral concessions [redacted]

Rwandan officials may also be genuinely afraid of Ugandan regional aspirations. Some have charged that the invasion was motivated by Museveni's regional ambitions and not refugee problems. In their view, the invasion is an act of external aggression and not a civil war or the result of an internal dispute. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Turning a Blind Eye

Kampala has been willing to overlook small-scale Tutsi exile support for the rebels through Uganda, in our view.

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[Redacted]

In our view, Museveni also underestimated the backlash triggered by the rebel operation and has become worried that his and Uganda's interests may be at risk. Museveni is probably especially concerned that charges of his involvement in the Tutsi invasion could undermine his painstaking effort to build credibility as a responsible regional leader and as Chairman of the Organization of African Unity. Museveni's fears may be well founded. Western donors are voicing concern over Kampala's alleged complicity in the invasion, and are warning that future aid levels may hinge on further evidence of Uganda's true role in the conflict. [Redacted]

Museveni is also probably concerned about the deterioration in Kampala's relations with Zaire and Kenya—the latter is the economic lifeline of landlocked Uganda—in the wake of accusations of his complicity in the invasion. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Moreover, the invasion forced Rwanda to reroute commercial traffic from traditional Ugandan routes, a major source of revenue for Kampala, to alternative routes through Zaire and Tanzania. [Redacted]

Moving To Repair His Damaged Credibility

To protect his regional and international image, Museveni launched a diplomatic offensive to "set the record straight" and support regional mediation efforts. Immediately after the invasion began, senior Ugandan officials condemned it and disavowed prior knowledge of the move in a spate of press conferences and calls on Western diplomats. In addition, since early October Museveni has met [Redacted] with Habyarimana, and Uganda has participated in the numerous regional

meetings on the issue. Museveni has supported various calls for a cease-fire in Rwanda, an all-African peacekeeping force, and a regional summit on refugees sponsored by the United Nations. Moreover, [Redacted] Kampala provided communications and a meeting site for talks between the rebels and an envoy of mediator President Mobutu of Zaire. [Redacted]

Kampala's diplomatic blitz has been backed up with measures to curtail rebel activity.

• [Redacted] Museveni, while still in the United States in early October, declared that Tutsis who left the Ugandan Army were deserters and ordered the arrest of any returning rebels.

• [Redacted] the Army set up roadblocks to deter more Tutsi desertions and temporarily detained more than 700 refugees trying to join the rebels. [Redacted]

• [Redacted] Kampala invited a team of Rwandan officers to jointly monitor key checkpoints in Uganda and gave them free access to disprove Kigali's suspicions that rebels still operate from Ugandan territory.

• [Redacted]

Outlook: Museveni Still Likely To Play Both Sides

We believe that Museveni's future actions will be driven by his hope of finding a durable solution for the Tutsi exiles and his desire to revive his sagging regional and international image. Although Museveni probably would have preferred a lightning victory over Kigali by Tutsi invaders, we believe he has subsequently concluded that a negotiated settlement is the best option for him and the exiles. Indeed, Museveni probably reasons that negotiations are now the best way to reach his twin goals of resolving the longstanding Tutsi

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refugee issue and boosting his credibility. [redacted]
Despite concern about his image, we believe that Museveni's ideological sympathy for the Tutsis will prompt him to continue to sanction discreet private Tutsi exile, Libyan, and possibly low-level Ugandan support for the rebels. Museveni probably believes such a tactic will allow the RPF to keep pressure on Kigali to enter negotiations while permitting Kampala to claim deniability. Although Museveni mistrusts Libyan leader Qadhafi, he probably calculates that Kampala can manage Tripoli's involvement with the

RPF. We believe Kampala will probably permit limited Libyan support to the rebels unless Museveni perceives Qadhafi pursuing aims incompatible with Ugandan objectives, or Tripoli's meddling becomes public enough to make Kampala vulnerable to renewed international criticism. [redacted]

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