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SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SNIE 10-5-54

SOVIET BLOC REACTION TO CERTAIN US
COURSES OF ACTION TO RESTRICT BLOC
REPRESENTATION IN THE US

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 29 June 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Director of Intelligence, AEC, and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: SEP 2006

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2-7-01

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July 14, 1954

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S/S-R advised that we did not believe it necessary to prepare a summary memorandum on the attached Estimate (SNIE 10-5-54) inasmuch as The Secretary and/or Under Secretary would be briefed in connection with NSC consideration of the subject. S/S-R agreed and will not send this Estimate "forward" except as part of documentation being prepared for the NSC briefing.

M. Spong

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SOVIET BLOC REACTION TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION TO RESTRICT BLOC REPRESENTATION IN THE US

THE PROBLEM

To estimate: (a) the likelihood of Soviet Bloc retaliation in response to US restrictions (as assumed below) on Soviet Bloc collection of unclassified materials of strategic intelligence value by Soviet Bloc representatives in the United States; (b) the probable character of such retaliatory measures; and (c) the effect of such retaliation on the US foreign intelligence effort.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. The US imposes restrictions on Soviet Bloc representatives in the US designed to prevent them from acquiring "publicly available unclassified strategic intelligence materials," such as aerial maps, aerial photographs and mosaics, topographical maps, geodetic maps, city plans, publications on government or government-sponsored technical research projects, which normally may be obtained openly in the US by purchase or request. These restrictions would not apply to newspapers, periodicals, books, technical journals, general purpose maps, and other published materials normally available commercially.

2. These restrictions would be of the same general character as those presently imposed by the Soviet Government and would include, but would not necessarily be limited to, the following:

a. Notification of Soviet Bloc diplomatic, official, and other personnel, including Soviet Bloc representatives in international organizations and quasi-official agencies, that they were prohibited from acquiring by any means, including photographing or sketching, information

concerning military objects, institutions, technology and armaments, seaports, large hydroelectric installations, railroad junctions, tunnels, and bridges, industrial establishments, scientific research institutions, laboratories, electric power stations, radio, telephone and telegraph stations, and all unclassified materials of the kind listed above, paragraph 1.

b. Notification of all Soviet Bloc missions in the US that these missions and any offices thereof must be plainly marked to indicate their official status.

c. Official advice to Soviet Bloc missions that any of their representatives who failed to reveal their affiliations in correspondence with US citizens or institutions will henceforth be considered to have violated the accepted norms of diplomatic conduct.

d. Application to Soviet Bloc representatives of travel restrictions that are strictly reciprocal with those applied to US representatives in the USSR or the Soviet Satellites.

e. Activation of an education and guidance program to insure refusals by institutions engaged in manufacturing or re-

search for the military agencies and the Atomic Energy Commission as well as by private US distributors and salespeople to supply unclassified materials of the kind listed above, paragraph 1, to Soviet Bloc representatives.

f. Activation of a program for prevention of publication of scientific, technical, industrial, and economic information

prejudicial to the defense interests of the US, and for control of export of the unclassified materials of the kind listed above, paragraph 1, to Soviet Bloc governments.

g. Notification of Soviet Bloc missions that all of their representatives must apply at a central government office for unclassified government documents.

THE ESTIMATE

PROBABLE SOVIET BLOC REACTION TO THE ASSUMED RESTRICTIONS

3. Soviet leaders would probably conclude that the assumed US restrictions would not be effective in reducing the collection of unclassified material of priority interest, although they would make the effort more difficult and costly. Soviet leaders would probably calculate initially and may eventually determine that these restrictions could be largely circumvented by the use of local Communists and sympathizers, agents, third parties, third countries, and the domestic and international mails. Thus the Soviet reaction would probably be based only in small part on the calculated and actual effect of the assumed US restrictions on its intelligence activities in the US.

4. The Soviet Bloc reaction would depend in far greater measure upon the Kremlin's calculation of the propaganda and political consequences of such action as it might take. Whatever course of action the Kremlin adopted with respect to retaliation, Soviet Bloc propaganda would almost certainly portray the US action as deliberately and unreasonably provocative and discriminatory against the Soviet Bloc. (This would be possible, since the assumed restrictions are selective and aimed at the Soviet Bloc only, differing in this respect from the Soviet restrictions, which at least in form apply to representatives of all states with diplomatic missions in Moscow, although in practice the restrictions are not as strictly applied to the Soviet Satellites as

they are to representatives of Western nations.) The Soviet leaders might believe that a refusal of the Soviet Bloc to be provoked into retaliation could be represented as a demonstration of Soviet self-confidence and maturity that could be contrasted in propaganda with a caricature of the US violating accepted norms of diplomatic conduct as a result of unreasonable fears and uncertainty. On the other hand, Soviet leaders might calculate that a Soviet Bloc retaliation to the US action could be presented as a justifiable reaction to US discrimination, and that failure to retaliate might be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

5. The Soviet Bloc reaction would probably also depend upon the manner in which the assumed restrictions are applied. A blanket application of all the restrictions, with attendant official notice and publicity, would probably cause the Kremlin to take countermeasures. On the other hand, if restrictions were applied progressively, appeared to be directed equally and reciprocally to all diplomatic missions, and attended by carefully controlled releases of information, the Kremlin might not apply retaliatory countermeasures. Moreover, in some cases, such as travel, restrictions could be implemented by a refusal to grant privileges to Soviet Bloc representatives that are not accorded to our representatives, rather than by the application of formal published directives. A progressive application of restrictions would also permit an appraisal of Soviet reactions as the restrictions are applied.

6. On balance, we believe Soviet leaders would conclude that:

a. US curtailment of the present privileges of Soviet Bloc representatives, without Soviet retaliation, would result in some practical inconvenience to the Soviet Bloc and the danger of some loss of political prestige.

b. Successive curtailments of privileges on both sides would at every step be more disadvantageous to the US intelligence collection effort than to the Soviet Bloc effort, since the US is much more dependent upon the retention of the present level of privileges for intelligence collection than is the Soviet Bloc.

c. It would be generally to the advantage of the Soviet Bloc, therefore, to retaliate by increasing the restrictions on US representatives in the Soviet Bloc.

We therefore believe that, if all the restrictions mentioned in the assumptions were applied *en bloc*, the Soviet Bloc would respond by retaliatory countermeasures. However, if the restrictions were applied carefully and progressively, such action might minimize the Soviet retaliatory countermeasures.

PROBABLE SOVIET BLOC REACTION TO LESS COMPREHENSIVE US RESTRICTIVE MEASURES

7. Some of the assumed US restrictions would be more objectionable to the Soviet Bloc than others. Measures such as those assumed in 2a., 2d., and 2g., which directly restrict the freedom of Soviet Bloc representatives would be the most objectionable in Soviet eyes and the most likely to provoke retaliatory action.

8. On the other hand, measures of an administrative or procedural nature, defining conduct compatible with the status of official foreign representatives, such as those assumed in 2b. and 2c., or measures designed to restrict information at its source, such as those assumed in 2e. and 2f., would probably not be considered objectionable by the Soviet Bloc. Such measures if applied singly, or apart from the assumed program as a whole, would probably not provoke Soviet retaliation.

RETALIATORY MEASURES THE SOVIET BLOC MIGHT ADOPT

9. Since the assumed US restrictions would not, in the main, exceed those currently imposed by the Bloc, Soviet Bloc retaliation could not be strictly reciprocal. Retaliatory measures would probably be adopted on the basis of the additional difficulties they would cause the US. If any retaliatory measures were adopted they would probably include intensified surveillance and increased harassment of US personnel rather than restrictions exactly comparable to those imposed by the US.

10. Specific retaliatory measures most likely to be adopted include the following:

a. Further limitation of the movements of US representatives either by direct travel restrictions or by the imposition of greater administrative hindrances to travel.

b. Increasingly strict enforcement of the existing regulations governing the conduct of diplomatic personnel in the Soviet Bloc, including more stringent enforcement of restrictions on photography.

c. Increased restrictions on the purchasing activities of US representatives in Moscow, and restrictions on US efforts to obtain publications.

d. Increased harassment of diplomatic personnel designed to hamper their activities, possibly including provocation intended to establish grounds for expulsion.



















