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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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
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SOVIET EXPECTATIONS  
FOR VISIT TO BRITAIN

During their visit to Britain, starting on 18 April, Khrushchev and Bulganin will probably want to hold conversations on trade and disarmament and will perhaps propose a friendship treaty with Britain, as well as restate the Soviet desire to take part in a conference on the Middle East. A Pravda statement of 9 April expressing the disappointment of the Soviet leaders that the British were limiting their

opportunities for contacts with British people suggests that a major goal of the trip is to make a favorable impression on the population as Malenkov did during his recent trip.

Soviet resentment over the British arrangements, which will keep to a minimum the number of cities and institutions the Soviet leaders will visit, had led Bulganin to suggest on 3 April that the trip

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be postponed. The next day, however, he agreed to Prime Minister Eden's request that he come as scheduled.

Topics for Discussion

The British have scheduled much of Bulganin's and Khrushchev's time for substantive discussions. Moscow, while expressing a desire for such talks, has given few clues as to the subjects it favors for discussion.

Disarmament will probably be the major topic stressed by the Soviet leaders. They will presumably seek to prove that the USSR's position has been brought close to the British stand, emphasizing particularly the similarity of the Soviet plan for a zone in central Europe subject to armaments limitation and inspection and the Eden plan presented at the summit conference. The Soviet plan assumes the continued division of Germany, and has been rejected by Britain as well as the United States on this ground. The Soviet leaders may use the occasion to make some additions to the 27 March Soviet disarmament proposal.

Bulganin and Khrushchev are likely to take a cautious attitude toward most of the issues that come up, being careful not to antagonize the British on such matters as colonialism and probably not making obvious efforts to weaken the Great Britain-United States alliance. Their interest in discussing various issues may be limited because of a belief that such divisive tactics would not be particularly profitable at this time.

With respect to the Middle East, one of the subjects the

British particularly want to discuss, the Soviet leaders will probably do little more than reaffirm their eagerness to take part in a conference on the area and their belief that the Baghdad pact is the real cause of tension there.

Possibly in preparation for discussions of the problem of Vietnam elections, a meeting was scheduled on 11 April between A. A. Gromyko and Lord Reading, representing the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference. The USSR has reportedly agreed to postpone the July 1956 date for all-Vietnam elections while pushing for a new Geneva conference on Indochina.

Bilateral Issues

There are few outstanding bilateral issues between Britain and the USSR. Premier Bulganin, in an interview on 11 April, said that the USSR was interested in expanding trade with Britain considerably, and in particular stressed the advantages that would result if Britain was willing to abandon strategic trade controls. Bulganin is likely to propose a friendship treaty such as that which he suggested to President Eisenhower. His second letter to the President on 1 February stated that the USSR was willing to conclude similar treaties with Britain and France.

The two sides should have no trouble in agreeing to increased cultural exchanges, although the USSR will probably resist, as it did at Geneva, any agreement to remove obstacles to the free flow of information such as the jamming of broadcasts. (Also see PART III, p.1)

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