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REMARKS OF WILLIAM J. CASEY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

before

VETERANS OF OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (VSS)

St. Francis Hotel
San Francisco, California
Saturday, 22 May 1982

APPROVED FOR RELEASE □ DATE:
03-Dec-2008

It is a real privilege for me to join you tonight in honoring John McCone. I plan to say a little about General Donovan and more about John McCone than he would want me to say, but I don't think more than you should hear on this occasion.

John McCone is a particularly fitting recipient of an award created to recognize and foster the kind of continuing dedication and contribution in both private and official capacities to country and the cause of freedom which characterized Donovan's career. It was created to recognize the citizen statesman and the citizen soldier. Bill Donovan demonstrated those qualities beginning with World War I, moving in and out of a law office to serve as soldier, as intelligence officer, as statesman, and as private citizen acting on his own and always on call when our national interests were at risk.

When World War II loomed on the horizon, Donovan was among the first to see it. As a private citizen, he left his law office time after time to watch military exercises in Germany and to visit battle fronts in Spain, Libya and Ethiopia. It's hard for us to realize today that there was a time when William J. Donovan was a one-man CIA for President Roosevelt. Donovan was sent to England to make an assessment as to whether England could survive and what it would take. He came back with the conviction that Britain had the will to survive no matter how overwhelming the odds. He persuaded Franklin Roosevelt to provide destroyers to keep the Atlantic sea lanes open and to lend-lease planes, tanks and guns to replace those which Britain had lost on the Continent and in the great air battle raging over the British Isles.

At about the same time, John McCone focused his great managerial and engineering skills on providing major support to the war effort. He built Liberty ships, that ungainly bulwark of the Allied supply lines, at a pace unprecedented in the shipbuilding industry. He directed the final modifications of B-24 and B-29 bombers before they went into combat. He was instrumental in the establishment and maintenance of a tanker fleet to fuel the US Navy in the Pacific Ocean. McCone did all this with a verve and a distinctive quality which set him apart.

When it became clear that the United States would have to fight a war, Roosevelt charged Donovan to create the first American central intelligence service, known as OSS. What was the OSS! Today, OSS stands for Old Soldiers Society. In 1941, Bill Donovan assembled what had to be the most diverse aggregation ever assembled of scholars and scientists, bankers and foreign correspondents, tycoons, psychologists and football stars, circus managers and circus freaks, safe-crackers, lock-pickers and pickpockets. Some of them are in this room tonight. After World War II, Donovan, based on the model he had established in OSS and papers he had submitted to President Roosevelt, fought to establish the present CIA.

After World War II, John McCone served as Under Secretary of the Air Force when this service first emerged as a separate branch of the armed forces. He ensured a correct understanding of the role of the US Air Force in an era where the potential for the uses of air power were subject to wild surmises. When the conflict in Korea began, John McCone applied his managerial talents to the production of fighter aircraft, and his efforts produced the required flow of these weapons to the Allied forces. John McCone also served as Deputy Secretary of Defense when the Department of Defense was a new and untested outfit. He prepared and presented the first ever Department of Defense budget.

As Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, McCone played a key role in assuring an adequate arsenal of weapons to deter Soviet aggression and also in developing International Atomic Energy agreements to introduce some sanity and reason into the handling of nuclear materials. His was the strongest voice in persuading the Soviet Union to sign and, thus, make international inspection of nuclear facilities a reality.

During the closing days of World War II, Donovan saw clearly that Soviet behavior in Poland, Romania, and Hungary constituted a threat to European and American security. When this materialized in the cold war, he preached that the way to avoid a hot war was to win the cold war. In his work for the Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission, John treated directly with top Soviet officials, and he measured them carefully. He found them to be dedicated to the single goal of world domination and willing to use any and all means to achieve their aims. John McCone concluded that the United States and its allies had to be prepared to take extraordinary measures to combat the extension of Soviet power and Communist principles and practices into the free world. He recognized that a clear understanding of Soviet capabilities and intentions was essential and that because the Soviet Union was a closed society, the responsibility for obtaining this essential knowledge would fall heavily on the US intelligence community.

When President Kennedy summoned John McCone to return to public service in 1961 as the Director of Central Intelligence, McCone made it clear to the President that he viewed the Soviet Union as a dangerous and devious adversary. He noted that this view was not shared by all the President's colleagues and insisted on direct access to the President as the only means of ensuring that the objective judgments of the nation's intelligence professionals received an unbiased hearing.

Both Donovan and McCone were innovators with the force and courage to fight for their ideas. When Donovan recognized that the great American melting pot could produce courageous young Italian Americans, Greek Americans, Slavic Americans, Norwegian Americans, and Oriental Americans to fight behind enemy lines with resistance forces in Italy and France, Burma and China, Norway, Greece and Yugoslavia, the Pentagon fiercely opposed what they disparagingly called Donovan's "private army." Donovan prevailed and operational groups and Jedburgh of the OSS greatly strengthened and focused resistance forces to save much time, blood and treasure in liberating Europe and the Asiatic mainland.

When McCone became DCI he quickly recognized that the time had come to bring American intelligence into the space age. He had to overcome heavy opposition in the Pentagon to establish the battery of satellites which today count and measure, locate and warn against the missiles and other weapons which the Soviets keep most secret but, as we saw in the SALT debate, the American public know and discuss in great detail.

The most surprising and significant quality that these two remarkable men share in common is that, though primarily perceived as doers and men of action, Donovan was and McCone is a true scholar. Their most critical and lasting contribution was to establish scholarship as the highest virtue, the heart and core, the quality which most distinguishes the American intelligence system.

Donovan's talent and interest in intelligence came out of his experience as the outstanding investigative lawyer of his time. In the Madison Oil case, in the Appalachian coal case, in nationwide investigations of bankruptcy

practices and public utility regulation, in Senate hearings on the munition makers, he had learned how to gather a huge array of facts, sift and analyze them, assess their meaning, arrive at a conclusion and present it vividly. He persuaded President Roosevelt that it would be critical in fighting a war and preserving the peace to develop and apply this ability on a worldwide scale. For the OSS, Donovan scoured our campuses and gathered hundreds of the finest scholars in America to process geographic, scientific, political and military information and analyze every military, political, economic and technological aspect of the war and the preparations for peace.

Kenneth Strong, General Eisenhower's G-2 in the European war, rated McCone at the top of the world's intelligence chiefs in his book, Intelligence at the Top. Of McCone, he wrote: "It was widely assumed that in view of his previous experience he would concentrate on management. In actual fact he became particularly distinguished among his professional intelligence associates for his work in substantive intelligence...." John McCone saw the primary mission of CIA and the Intelligence Community to be the production of sound and relevant national intelligence estimates. These were to be based on the best analytical talent available and to be supported by the best collection systems which human ingenuity could devise.

McCone devoted as much personal attention to the writing of national intelligence estimates as any Director of Central Intelligence has ever done. He took full advantage of his direct access to the President and his senior national security advisers to ensure that these estimates were given full consideration in US policy decisions.

McCone gave CIA analysts a sense of purpose and accomplishment in knowing that their judgments were heard. He set the national intelligence estimate firmly in its rightful place as a means of providing advice directly to senior policymakers.

McCone quickly established a reputation for resisting the conventional wisdom and for having the personal courage to make his convictions known. Soon after becoming DCI, he worried about the size of Soviet military aid to Cuba and ordered increased intelligence coverage. This soon disclosed that surface-to-air missiles were being deployed to the island. What are they there to protect, he wondered, not sugar plantations or rum mills. There are no targets there now, he concluded, so they must intend to bring something there. Perhaps they are being deployed to prevent our U-2s from detecting something yet to come or to defend something to be brought in which we would have to attack. Thus, he was many months ahead of anyone in Washington in predicting that Moscow might base offensive missiles in Cuba. When Cuban refugees brought reports that large missiles were being landed and installed in Cuba, everyone else in Washington dismissed them. To a man, the experts said they could not be offensive weapons. The Soviets would never do anything so foolish. McCone's break with the conventional wisdom was vindicated when a U-2 airplane returned with pictures of Soviet missiles in Cuba which could not be denied.

John McCone looked at the situation as Khrushchev might view it. The Soviet leaders were well aware of the US edge in ICBMs; the Soviets had a large number of medium and intermediate range missiles which could not reach the United States. If these missiles were deployed to Cuba and made operationally ready with nuclear warheads, then the strategic advantage would shift in favor of the Soviet Union.

The strength and clarity of the McCone approach to intelligence was again illustrated by his role in Vietnam. The Intelligence Community's estimates on Communist reactions to US courses of action in Vietnam were accurate. It is a great credit to their integrity that they stand today, inadvertently disclosed, as a testament to the ability of the intelligence professionals to foresee an unfavorable outcome long before our senior policymakers did.

McCone was disturbed by the tendency of the senior officials to discount distasteful intelligence findings, and he made a point of urging his own views and the judgments of the Intelligence Community on the top leaders. McCone's view of the Communist actions in Vietnam was clear and steady, and he displayed the courage of his convictions. His final act as Director of Central Intelligence was to hand the President personally -- minutes before the new Director of Central Intelligence was sworn in -- his unequivocal views on the Vietnam issue. He warned that the decision to put US forces into a direct combat role would involve the United States in a land war in Asia, a situation against which our most respected military authorities had also repeatedly warned. Such a conflict would be unwinnable, and it would become increasingly difficult to extricate ourselves. If infantry operations were to be confined to South Vietnam, then the scale of air warfare against North Vietnam should be intensified. If the conflict became prolonged, world opinion, including the American public, would turn against the US role in Vietnam, and we would be under relentless pressure to settle on terms not of our own making. On this prophetic note, John McCone retired from active government service.

I cite these highlights not as a summary of McCone's accomplishments as the Director of Central Intelligence (this would require volumes), but to

underline his evaluation of intelligence to its highest role, a major contributor to policy consideration. When national intelligence is objective-- and honest in recognizing gaps in our knowledge and differences of opinions-- and when it is relevant to the issues facing our nation's leaders, then it is doing what its founder, William J. Donovan, intended that it should do. When there is a sense of national urgency and need, then the Intelligence Community needs to work together in a way which overrides bureaucratic parochialism and jockeying for position.

When John McCone returned to private life in 1965, he left a legacy of accomplishments worthy of emulation by all future Directors of Central Intelligence. Whatever changes have been brought about by the passage of time, by managerial restructuring, and by the forays of self-serving investigative bodies and individuals, the need for a strong intelligence organization persists, and the need to identify and understand the major threats to our security has increased.

When John McCone left the government, his direct involvement may have diminished somewhat, but his concern for our national security and his dedication to preserving and strengthening our intelligence functions have not waned. He has continued to act as a sage counsel to the leaders of our nation and, in particular, to his successor Directors of Central Intelligence. I have sought his advice; I have tried to model myself as DCI on DCI John McCone; I shall continue to call on him for counsel.

Bill Donovan would have been extraordinarily proud of the way John McCone put substance into the concept of an American national intelligence service.