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CHAIR: Ladies and gentlemen, it's always a pleasure to introduce a visitor as part of the Hoover Institution program in the Stanford Faculty Club. It shows that despite what you may have read in the newspapers, we are part of Stanford University. We just have a superior system of governance, scholars, and etcetera. Not everybody can be as lucky as the Hoover Institution.

Enough of that. Dick Burrows will probably tell me tomorrow morning I've already said much too much about it. He serves as my lawyer.

It's a particular pleasure tonight to introduce an old friend. And this is not a political remark when I make this. This is just a factual remark. And that was we were both supporters of the late Robert A. Taft, although we both admit that Dwight D. Eisenhower was a darn good President. I want you to know that I was a supporter of Robert A. Taft before I was a citizen. That's sort of like a Mexican wetback, except I was a Canadian wetback. And I had a wife who was a citizen and who swore to support me. And she's been doing a good job of it.

Oh, yes, she did. I don't want to get into that tonight, because we have with us tonight a man of many, many talents. He's a lawyer. That's really only coincidental. There's a rumor he's made a lot of money. Practically anybody but me can do that. But much more important, he's a scholar with a string of honorary degrees. He's a successful politician. He's a distinguished public servant. And what is particularly important, he's a modern-day Sherlock Holmes.

Bill Casey served with great distinction in World War

II. Of course, he served under a person who had worked for a person who was a graduate of Stanford University, who founded the Hoover Institution. I'm referring to the late William J. Donovan. I want you to know, Bill, that I'm almost as good a scholar as you are. I believe Bill Donovan was the Assistant Attorney General for Anti-Trust in the Hoover administration, if I'm not incorrect.

But I'm told that in World War II, and most of this is still somewhat -- probably somewhat secret, there is some question as to whether Bill Casey or General George Patton won the war.

Bill, behind the scenes -- Marty Anderson should be here tonight, because he's my source of all the Casey stories. Except the only one I remember was, when you were a captain, Bill, and you had that Ivy League major and you were in the bar at night and he ordered you to get him a chair and you told him to get his own goddamn chair. Off-duty, you see. But he served with great distinction in the Office of Strategic Services. Pardon me.

Since then, my gosh, there's a whole litany of the number of books you've written, Bill, including books on legal and financial subjects. He's even written a history of the American revolution. And I'm sure, since I was born and raised in Canada, that your history of the American revolution would be somewhat different than my history of the American revolution. But it shows what good friends you have.

Bill has served as Chairman of the SEC. He's been Under-secretary of State for Economic Affairs. He's been president and chairman of the Export-Import Bank and rendered particular service in 1980 -- and once again this is not political -- he rendered particular service in 1980 by managing the successful primary and election campaigns of a fellow by the name of Ronald Reagan, an honorary fellow of the Hoover Institution. We try to keep it all in the family, Bill.

But at the present time, as I'm sure you all know, he's Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. And I can say from a certain amount of inside information, although I sometimes have the feeling that Bill is so smart and so cagey that even though I'm chairman of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, we only get the good news. There must be some -- you can't possibly be as good as the impression I have of you, Bill.

What was that, Harry?

Well, Rita said no speeches from me tonight. I gives me great pleasure to call on the Director of Central Intelligence, William J. Casey.

[Applause.]

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE: Glen, I don't know whether I should take the time to fully straighten the record. I think I should first make it clear that I've taken a vow of political chastity, so that I stay out of political matters. I'm glad to be here in the presence of my overseers. Glen Campbell and Paul Seabury oversee my performance, and they're very diligent and assiduous and constructive in that process. And straightening out the record, I think I should say, Glen, that we're probably not as good as I tell you we are, as I brag in the reports.

I really don't want to make a speech to this knowledgeable and distinguished and scholarly audience. I feel that we have two scholarly organizations in the American intelligence community in the Hoover Institute and Stanford University. And I'd rather kind of dialogue and respond to your questions and expressions of interest. But maybe I should set the stage for that by giving you rather a quick overview of things that concern us in the American intelligence community.

There's a lot to worry about, as you all know. The growing magnitude and precision and accuracy of the Soviet missile arsenal kind of targeted at the United States and Western Europe and East Asia. And more than the arsenal is the continuing and kind of dazzling array of new weapon systems, their increasing precision and effectiveness, their cruise missiles, new missile carrying submarines, new missile carrying planes. And perhaps of greatest concern of all is the large commitment that the Soviets have made for some years now, and continue to make, in developing missile defense, deploying radars that could be the basis of a nationwide missile defense and testing interceptors, very powerful and effective interceptors. And if they should decide to break the ABM treaty and go in for a nationwide missile defense, they have sort of a four or five year headstart, because we've neglected that phase of our security for almost twenty years now. Oh, I'm sorry, almost ten years, since the ABM treaty in '72. And that could tip the strategic balance very seriously.

In addition, there's the enormous array of conventional forces that the Warsaw Pact has put together, outnumbering the NATO forces markedly in planes, tanks, guns, and deploying them in an increasingly forward and aggressive manner, backed up by long-range missiles targeted at European capitals.

But I think that that threat, the threat of these terribly menacing and disastrous weapons, is maybe secondary to the threat which I call creeping imperialism.

In 1961, Khrushchev said that the ultimate triumph of communism will come not through a nuclear war, which could destroy the world, not through conventional war, which could soon escalate into nuclear war, but through national wars of liberation. And we've seen since that time -- we've seen them establish a very formidable base in Cuba. We've seen them, in Vietnam, establish a position on the southern flank of China. We've seen them establish a position in the Horn of Africa, in Ethiopia or in South Yemen, dominating the waterway between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. And we've seen them establish a position threatening the mineral resources in southern Africa on which the advanced economies depend. And we've seen them establish a position on our doorstep in the Caribbean and Central America. And we've seen them develop a technique of warfare by proxy which threatens to extend these positions in a variety of directions.

On top of that, the current prime concern is that of international terrorism, and terrorism has become a weapons system employed notably by radical Arab states, but, to some extent, by East European bloc and Soviet proxies, allies, which can be used to intimidate and coerce weak governments in their foreign policies. We've seen that happen, and we know that the American installations, ambassadors, representatives abroad, and perhaps targets here, are a major objective of this kind of thing. And there is close to a hundred major terrorist organizations. There are better than 70-odd terrorist training camps, mostly in radical Arab states and behind the Iron Curtain, Cuba, South Yemen, Libya. So that's a new threat that really threatens to obliterate the distinction between peace and war, because this kind of thing can be projected very quietly, and it becomes very difficult to understand and recognize where it comes from, and certainly very difficult to warn against, because it's done very quietly with very few people.

And then there's a whole range of other threats: nuclear proliferation, active measures, regressive propaganda campaigns that have been very effective in confusing the Western alliance, dividing it and creating frictions between the United States and her allies and natural friends.

And finally, I think the thing that is a quiet and not widely recognized threat is the Soviet capability in science and technology. The intelligence community makes a biennial assessment of how the Soviets have been doing in science and technology, and particularly those technologies that are convertible into political capability and can be a source of strategic surprise. And we find every time we do it that though we still have a considerable lead, they draw abreast or even move ahead in a few additional technologies. And they have a great -- they've developed a great capacity for acquiring Western technology and

kind of short-cutting the painful development, research and development, and the creation of weapons capabilities which we have to go through. And we have found situations where they develop countermeasures for our weapons before we get them developed and deployed. And they're that good in being able to move around the world and acquire technological information out of our open societies. And this is kind of a permanent handicap under which we labor, and we have to do the best we can, and we are occasionally successful in aborting and impairing their ability to acquire our technology.

So I think that's kind of a broad review of the kind of threats that we try to watch. I think that I can report that the intelligence community is, I think, functioning quite well. I think it's recovered its spirit and its effectiveness from the kind of decline that it suffered during the '70s. During that period of time, it lost 50% of its personnel, 40% of its funding. However, it snapped back as soon as it was clear that the present set of policy-makers value and need and use the assessments and the intelligence and the production of the intelligence community. And at the same time, on a bipartisan basis, the Congress has been generous in providing resources to rebuild, to rebuild the capabilities that have been allowed to decline in the previous period and to utilize emerging technologies to enormously expand the capability to get information on a technical basis -- the photography, the signals intelligence, the telemetry, the acoustics, and the other technical marvels that are employed to reach out and gather facts from around the world. And the net of all this is we project that over the next three or four years, we'll be, you know, collecting four times as many photos, signals, reports as we are today, because these new capabilities are that prolific, and we'll be able to function in bad weather and around the clock, and that sort of thing.

Well, of course, all that expansion of the amount of data that comes in places great burdens of processing, sorting out, selecting, and finally analyzing and deriving a meaning out of the expanded flow of information that is going to be coming in. And that is the kind of scholarly work that's carried on here on this campus and this institution and academia around the country. And there's a great need to acquire good talent and develop good talent. And in that we've had a pretty good recruiting session, they tell me, out here at Stanford a couple of weeks ago; I think probably the most successful one that we've had in a long time. And that followed on the heels of a good session at M.I.T. So we're rather encouraged by the ability to appear on a campus and get talented people interested in coming down and taking on a challenging and honorable career in intelligence work. And of course we look for support in encouraging promising people to consider that as a career.

You know, the intelligence community takes something of a beating in the press any time its activity can be sensationalized. That seems to happen because it's good copy. And that's not good for the morale and spirit. But we're not very fragile people, and they survive it very well. But they kind of feel that the leadership ought to go out and defend them, and we're doing that to an increasing degree. And at the same time, they recognize that they have a special responsibility, that their successes are going to go unheralded, their failures are going to be trumpeted to the rooftops. But still, they're anxious to have us recognize that they have a commitment to the security of this nation, its prosperity. The work they do is critical to our national policy of pursuing, developing coherent and meaningful, effective policies. And I think those in this room recognize that. But I think we have a task of speaking back to the media and getting that understood more broadly. And I think some of us are going to go around and do more talking on that score.

I think that's about all I would like to say by way of introductory comments and would be glad to elaborate on anything that interests you, answer any questions and pursue any kind of a dialogue.

Yes?

Q: Bill, given the resolve of the Soviet Union that you so lucidly described, including surrogates that they've got going around the world, do you see some light at the end of tunnel for us? And if so, how do we get there?

DIRECTOR CASEY: The situation is, by no means, all black. They have their problems too. And I think although they have made a lot of progress in establishing positions around the world during the whole decade of the '70s, and maybe the early part of the '80s, they have severe economic problems. They have severe demographic problems. They have severe health and social problems. Mortality is off, way down. Alcoholism and all kinds of health problems. And when you look around the world, they have established -- by this process of creeping imperialism, they have established dominant positions in Central America, on the Horn of Africa, in southern Africa, in Southeast Asia. At the same time, in the last couple of years, you see them meeting increasing resistance. The Afghan mujaheddin, the rebels, free-dome fighters there, are really giving them a terrible time. They're in a hornets' nest. They know it, and they don't know quite how to get out. I don't think they want to get out. But they really can't subordinate that resistance without putting in about four times as many men as they have, going from, we estimate, a hundred thousand to four hundred thousand. And that would amount to about 30% of the Soviet land forces.

You look at Southeast Asia, and they've got a resistance there of 50,000 people in Kampuchea, and they're able to move all around that country. Southern Africa: the resistance forces there are sixty to seventy-five thousand. Nicaragua, you've got fifteen to eighteen thousand. And they're running into resistance. They're terrified of the expansion of kind of Shia fundamentalism from Iran and Iraq and Afghanistan, up into the Soviet Asian republics. I think that's a major reason they're doing what they're doing in Afghanistan.

So that I think that we're in much better position than we were a few years ago. They thought they had it going their way militarily, because we were not countering them or offering them any resistance. We were kind of permitting them to build up and hand them the margin of superiority. I think they've recognized that that has come to an end. They lost in their effort to block the deployment of intermediate range missiles in Europe. I think they're probably going to go back and make a lot of fuss and try to show the American public that the foreign policy isn't working and it's dangerous. I think we may see that during the election period. But I think the fundamentals are in a much more satisfactory shape than they were a couple of years ago.

Yes?

Q: They practice disinformation against us on a large scale. Could we not retaliate by telling them what they secretly believe? "You are penetrated by spies and traitors," and give them opportunities to look for those spies and traitors....

DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, I don't want to talk in any great detail about that. [Laughter.] I will say that -- I will admit that I think they're better at that than we are. They've been doing it longer. And we do have some impediments. We don't get -- we don't get their press to play our propaganda line as they sometimes succeed in doing. Their disinformation falls on fertile ground. Any disinformation we were able to project might play around the world to some slight degree. But it doesn't fall on particularly fertile ground, and it certainly doesn't readily reach into the Soviet population.

So we have some -- the asymmetry between the kind of societies that we have, the kind of information, the kind of press, media we have, puts us at a considerable disadvantage. I'll leave it that way.

Yes?

Q: The last time we heard from the head of the CIA, we were told, and it was difficult for us to believe our ears, that the CIA was a greater danger to the freedom of the American

people than the Soviet Union. This was said to us by Admiral Jay [sic] Turner....

Now....

DIRECTOR CASEY: Jay Turner? You mean Stan Turner.

Q: Stan Turner. We wondered, did he believe that? Were there any consequences in the institution he headed of a belief of that sort? Did he do any harm that couldn't have been rectified? And some of us, I think, would confirm my statement.

DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, I've heard Admiral Turner make a lot of damn fool statements, but I never heard one as foolish as that.

[Laughter.]

That's manifest nonsense, because, you know, I think this is -- I kind of mentioned this in my opening remarks that it is a little hard to take the propensity in the media and in some small elements of the American public to kind of treat the CIA as an evil force, and the reality is that these are very dedicated people committed to a career in support of the national interest and national security. They only do what they're authorized to do. They strictly adhere to the law and ethical standards in the conduct of their mission. They carry on special activities only when the President directs them to, and, by law, they brief and keep the oversight committees of the Congress aware of these activities. And, you know, it's kind of the spy story stuff, James Bond. It's a good way to sell papers to put the CIA in headlines. I just think we have to talk back and explain what we do, insofar as we can, within the limits of security.

As to the damage that's derived from that kind of attitude, I have to say that I think there was a loss of spirit and prestige of the intelligence community during the mid '70s. It turned out that, with few exceptions, all the charges and allegations turned out to be false, and responsible members of Congress made that clear and established this oversight process.

But there was a political kind of aftermath in that I think the Carter administration, generally, and Admiral Turner towed the line there, that intelligence was something that might harm you politically because the public had an unfavorable perception of it. And therefore, you kind of distanced yourself. And it was that distancing that I think damaged the morale and the spirit of the organization more than anything else, more than the criticism and all the bad press. And as soon as it became clear the new administration really believed in it, supported it and wanted to rebuild it, why, the attitudes and the morale

changed almost overnight.

So I'd say it didn't do any -- it was sort of a period of trauma, but it didn't do any permanent damage.

That's a long-winded answer.

Paul?

Q: Bill, you talk now very optimistically....

MAN: Paul, don't violate the security....

[Laughter.]

DIRECTOR CASEY: There's our overseer there.

Q: I guard my words.

You talk very optimistically about that there's a new period over which you are supervising. And I make this -- I pose this question to you as a kind of dean of a college that now has a lot of resources to recruit new students.

What thought have you given to the question -- and I'm not talking about technical collecting analysis, but in the question of the recruitment and training of people working in human intelligence, do you have any new thoughts about the kinds of people who ought to be attracted and how you would go about attracting people into this profession and the difficulties you're going to have?

DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, I'd like to make it very clear that I consider that the technical intelligence has produced all this great, increased flow of information. That was done really pursuant to decisions that were made in '78, '79. These things take almost a decade to put together and build, and they're coming off the line now. And there's going to be a great increase in the flow, as I think I said earlier, of technically derived, factual information.

Now, during that draw-down period in the '70s, the human intelligence capabilities, the collection, the people you have out around the world to help get information from people who want to help you, friendly sources, and so on, and the scholars, the analytical people -- we lost about a half of them during the late '70s. And we've been rebuilding.

There's a limitation to how fast you can bring these people on; a limitation [as to] the size of the training capability, and you can only bring so many on. We've been building

up steadily. We're certainly looking, and we're trying -- we're doing everything we can in every direction to encourage people to come into this kind of a career, both on the operational side, those that go out to collect the human intelligence from sources around the world, develop the sources, and those who analyze and try to make sense of the information that comes in.

We need all the help we can get in any direction there. It's rather encouraging that this last year we had 153,000 inquiries for employment, people who wanted to consider this as a career. They go through a very stiff selection and testing process. Of those 153,000, I guess we actually interviewed something like 20,000, about 8,000 who carried further with applications. When they went through the testing, it worked down to 4,000 who were eligible to come on board. And we wound up taking on about 1,800.

People in the intelligence community, and particularly the CIA, I think go through the most rigorous selection and testing process known to man. They take a very tough, the hardest intelligence test we can find, the toughest psychological test we can find. And those who go into operational work go through a psychiatric examination and process. They all go on the polygraph. And we find out whether they've been on drugs or whether they've been drinking, and whatnot. So by the time they go through, we're pretty sure they're smart, pretty sure they're clean, pretty sure they're healthy and pretty sure they can psychologically cope with the kind of things they've got to deal with out there.

But still, we need all the talent and all the ideas as to sources of talent we can get, and we're wide open to help and suggestions from any direction at all.

Emily?

Q: Yeah. Do you find in terms of your responsibilities as DCI that it's a problem, the fact that you're allowed to operate in foreign countries, but that the FBI has the responsibility for intelligence in the United States with respect to what Soviets and other enemies may be doing here? Do you find that a problem, and, if you had your druthers, would you take over the FBI functions in the domestic....?

DIRECTOR CASEY: No, I don't think so. I think it would be unacceptable, politically....

Q: Well, yeah....

DIRECTOR CASEY: So, therefore, I don't think about it. I don't think -- I think that -- you know, for a long time, there

was a fierce rivalry between the CIA and the FBI, and, you know, they didn't hardly talk to each other and there was a lot of vying for position. I think that's entirely disappeared. I think the cooperation is pretty effective. We do things jointly. The business of passing information that we get abroad that needs to be handled internally to the FBI I think is effectively done, and there's a carryover collaboration which is acceptable. So I think that it works pretty good. And I think there's a certain specialization that the FBI has capabilities in the United States that we couldn't duplicate. We know where they could duplicate and develop the capabilities that we've developed, CIA has developed abroad in the 35 years of its existence. I think it's a pretty -- and it's a system that is not -- many countries have the same thing. And I think that, you know, the KGB has both. In a lot of countries there is one agency that does both internal security and foreign intelligence. But my observation is that that tends to be -- the internal security tends to be the dominant force, and the foreign intelligence tends to be sort of a little appendage. And I think the idea of two separate organizations, each specializing in each function, makes for a stronger performance in each area.

Yes?

Q: About ten years, Secretary of the Navy John Warner made a pact with Moscow to stop this chicken operation at sea, where Soviet ships and U. S. ships would pass dangerously close to each other. Now we have the case of the Soviet submarine hitting the U. S. carrier, and recently a Soviet carrier was shooting flares at a U. S. destroyer.

Do you think that this is a question of individual skippers getting out of hand, or is this a policy sent forth from Moscow?

DIRECTOR CASEY: I'm not sure. I think it's too early to tell.

I think this submarine popping up under the carrier was likely to be accidental. But I also think that we have indications, and I think it may well be, that the Soviets have decided that they're not going to get a helpful negotiation or resumption of discussions or dialogue with the United States and the best thing they can do is to kind of brandish the sword a little bit and make a lot of noise. It creates the impression around the world that the United States is unstable, untrustworthy and run by people who don't really want a peaceful relationship. And they've said as much. They said that if we deployed those missiles in Europe to offset the missiles that they had already deployed in Europe, that they would carry out analagous deployments to threaten us, and they've done by bringing long-range

missiles into East Germany, by sending more submarines off our coast with missiles. And I think we're likely to see a lot of that during the course of this year.

I don't think it will come to anything. But I think it will be done -- it's likely to be done for political effect. They make no bones of it. They'd rather not see the President reelected because they think he's a little tough on them.

Yes?

Q: Recently, I guess it was last fall, there were a number of Soviet ostensible diplomats sent home, not only by the United States, but France and other countries, for espionage, apparently blatant espionage activities, I guess industrial spying.

DIRECTOR CASEY: Yep.

Q: How good a handle do we have on their activities in this regard?

DIRECTOR CASEY: This has been the greater counter-espionage success we've ever had. In 1983, there were 117 Soviet spies kicked out or arrested or defecting, and some of the defectors gave us information that told us a lot about the network, the Soviet network worldwide. So I would say we have a better handle on that than we've ever had. And we've had a period of success which has been -- it's quite disruptive of the morale and effectiveness of the Soviet intelligence services. But, still, they've got a big organization, and when you throw 117 out, that's a lot. We probably lost four or five during that same period of time.

But when they throw 117 out, the scale on which they operate is such that there's still a lot left. So I don't think we have a satisfactory hold on it, but I think we're working on it with reasonable effectiveness.

Yeah?

Q: Yes, sir. I'm glad to hear that you're more optimistic than would have been case some years ago. But still two things bother me. And one is that you're talking about the Soviets having problems. But these are problems that they're having in their offensive operations. They're not being pushed back anywhere. They're not being threatened in Afghanistan or in the Horn of Africa or in Southeast Asia, or anywhere else. And as someone who has lived all his life in Europe, I would like to see some more than just falling back and saying, oh, well, they're not as powerful as they could be, because you can always

say that.

But still, I mean, I think the competence in the agency is much greater than it was.

One other thing is that in regard to a concrete case, the plot to kill the Pope, I think that you were quoted as saying about a year ago that there was little evidence of a Bulgarian connection in that case....

DIRECTOR CASEY: That was a false quotation.

Q: Thank you. I'm glad to hear that. I'm not asking your opinion, because that's the kind of thing that you're not sure of. But I think there's a question here of allies and friends around the world listening to what the U. S. says on this kind of an issue, and I think there's a question of what kind of an impression it'll give to friends and enemies when one takes a stand on these things. But if it was a false quotation, I'm really very glad to hear that.

DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, let me explain that a little bit.

We took the position consciously that it would be a bad thing for the CIA to be out trying to make the case that it was the Bulgarians and the KGB who tried to assassinate the Pope. At the very beginning, the Soviets, before anything happened, tried to make it a CIA plot, a CIA plot trying to put this on the Soviets. This is not new. In 19 -- whenever it was -- '48 when the Czechoslovakian leader, Mazarak, jumped out of the window, and I think the evidence indicated this was a Soviet assassination, they very quickly tried to put it on the Americans.

So for us to go around and try to make the case when the Italians are doing the investigation and handling all the information, we thought, and I still believe, would have played into the Soviets' hands from a propaganda standpoint. So we thought it one of, you know, keep hands off. This happened in Italy. The Italian authorities are investigating it. If we have any information, we'll be happy to give it to them. But we're not going to go out and go out in front and make the case. Some people thought we should and they said we were trying to maintain detente and open up. That was all false. That was just conjecture.

Yes?

Q: I wonder. You've commented a little bit on Soviet industrial espionage. I wonder if you would comment on Chinese industrial espionage in the United States.

DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, there're an awful lot of Chinese over here, an enormous number of students. And we suspect that a lot of them are engaged in intelligence gathering. And it's a very tough question how you weigh what they can acquire in terms of intelligence against the kind of political and maybe the diplomatic desirability of a constructive relationship on a diplomatic level. It's a close call. I think that a lot of Chinese, young Chinese students coming over here getting educated, seeing how our society works and going back to China is probably a constructive thing from our point of view. On the other hand, they may get some information. But then you weigh that against the fact that there's so damn much information available publicly any way in our open society, how important is the additional information they get?

And this is an argument that goes back and forth. The State Department wants to maintain the relationship and doesn't want to crack down on the Chinese, or the Soviets for that matter. The FBI is pressed to keep track of the espionage. They want to get rid of them and make their job easier. And it's just one of those things that gets booted about and talked about and never gets really fully resolved, because there're reasonable arguments both ways.

I think we have much more severe problems.

Q: One more question....

DIRECTOR CASEY: Yes.

Q: ...over here. I want to make certain you get your sleep, Bill, so I can sleep well.

[Laughter.]

DIRECTOR CASEY: I think I can see that I've said enough.

Q: Now, one more question.

DIRECTOR CASEY: All right.

Q: What seems to be the driving force between successive Soviet leaderships in wanting to expand forcibly in the world? I mean there isn't one Napoleon. There isn't one Alexander the Great. It's a successive thing. Is it fear of invasion again? What is it that makes the successive ones continue the same policy?

DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, that's a very penetrating question on which you probably get as many answers as you can

get to answer it.

I would speculate that there is a dynamic, that the military-industrial people have the clout in the Soviet Union today, and probably have had it for some time, and they have the normal propensity to build and become more powerful and more militarily powerful. And I think there is the ideology. They have been brought up to believe, and they've told themselves all these years, that it's just a matter of time before the capitalist system disappeared and it's their duty to help it. And I think that really, in my view, the driving imperative in the Soviet leadership is to maintain their perks and their status because the gap between the way they live and their status and the rest of the country is so great. And they feel that to maintain a visible threat out there, be prepared to deal with it, that if they stop doing that that they would jeopardize their control and their dominion and their status in the country because it's kind of structured that way. I think all those things play a role. And I think that the idea that it makes any difference who's the leader I just reject. I don't think that it makes much difference whether it's President Andropov or Chernenko. They're all the in the grip of a system.

I said at the Commonwealth Club down at the rally today, I said, you know, the only thing that makes much difference whether Chernenko lives one year, two years or five years, that the CIA had predicted Chinese Chairman Mao's death twenty times, and we'd gotten very careful about predicting when anybody's going to check out.

Well....

[Applause.]

CHAIR: Bill, I'm sure I speak for all of us here tonight. I want to thank you very much again. And I want to particularly address -- and I'm not trying to curry favor with you. I don't want your job for several more years. And furthermore, I wouldn't want half of Stanford University to fall down. But I do want to say, on the basis of my knowledge -- I'm sure Harry Rowan, who's been much, much closer to it for two years working in a very high position in the CIA. I think I can testify you're doing a wonderful job in terms of morale, improving the quality of the agency....

[End of Director Casey's address.]