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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

2 OCT
1963

MEMORANDUM FOR SPECIAL GROUP (CI) ASSISTANTS

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Surveys

1. Transmitted herewith at Mr. McGons's request are Sections 57 of the National Intelligence Surveys for Columbia, Iran, Peru, and Venezuela for your information and retention. Sometime during 1964 Sections 57 on Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Ecuador, Jordan, Thailand, and South Vietnam will be sent to you when they are completed and published. Ultimately, you will receive Sections 57 for all countries within the purview of the Special Group (CI).

2. These documents are being transmitted solely for your information and use. They are not being disseminated for consideration by the Special Group (CI).

3. It should be noted that these documents are supplementary to the material included in the Internal Security Assessments for Africa, the Near East, and South Asia which were produced this year.

(Signed)

[Redacted Signature]

[Redacted Title]
Special Group Officer

Attachments: As stated above

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NND 011188
Box 295
DOC: #351
Page 1 of 38

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

VENEZUELA

SECTION 57


SUBVERSION

This revision of Section 57 is issued under the NIS maintenance program. It supersedes the original Section 57, dated July 1949, copies of which should be destroyed.

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NND 011188
Box 295
DOC: #351
Page 2 of 38





WARNING

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TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SECTION 57

	<i>Page</i>
A. General	57 - 1
B. Communist activities	57 - 6
1. Venezuelan Communist Party	57 - 6
a. Organization	57 - 7
b. Leadership	57 - 9
c. Membership	57 - 10
d. Finances	57 - 11
e. Propaganda facilities	57 - 12
f. Paramilitary activities	57 - 13
g. Objectives and tactics	57 - 14
h. International contacts	57 - 16
2. Principal target groups	57 - 17
a. Political parties	57 - 17
b. Youth and students	57 - 20
c. Educators and intellectuals	57 - 21
d. Labor	57 - 21
e. Rural leagues	57 - 22
f. Civic improvement committees	57 - 23
3. Principal front groups	57 - 23
a. Venezuelan Committee for Peace and Democracy	57 - 23
b. Women's Movement	57 - 24
c. National Union of Women	57 - 24
d. Society of Friends of China	57 - 24
e. Venezuelan Association of Democratic Lawyers	57 - 24
f. Foreign Communist front groups	57 - 25
g. Youth and student front groups	57 - 25
h. Labor front groups	57 - 26
C. Non-Communist subversion	57 - 26
1. Role of the armed forces in subversion	57 - 27
2. Civilian subversive activities	57 - 28
3. Clandestine organizations	57 - 29
4. Foreign non-Communist subversive activities	57 - 31
D. Comment on principal sources	57 - 33

LIST OF FIGURES

			<i>Page</i>
Fig. 57-1	Chart	Organization, Communist Party	57 - 8
Fig. 57-2	Table	Electoral strength, Communist Party	57 - 18
Fig. 57-3	Map	Distribution, electoral vote, Communist Party	57 - 19

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NND 011188
Box 295
DOC: #351
Page 4 of 38

57. Subversion

The user can supplement the information in this Section by referring to Section 50, Introduction, for an overall view of the history, problems, and distinctive political characteristics of the country. The strength and effectiveness of forces for the suppression of subversion are discussed in Sections 56, Intelligence and Security, and 54, Public Order and Safety. The position and strength of a legal Communist Party in the national political scene are discussed in Section 53, Political Dynamics.

A. General

For more than a century Venezuela was ruled by a small elite of landholders and merchants who controlled the production and marketing of the few exports that provided the basis for a limited money economy. The transfer of political power from one faction to another within the ruling elite was usually accomplished by subversion and violence in which the armed forces participated on both sides. In the past quarter-century, however, the traditional pattern has been profoundly modified, although subversion remains an integral part of the political process. The exploitation of Venezuela's enormous petroleum resources has permitted a rapid commercial and industrial expansion accompanied by significant changes in the social structure. While overall population has doubled since the mid-1930's, the population in a few of the major cities has increased even more rapidly. Caracas, for example, has quadrupled in size during this period. A new middle class—owners and managers of the new enterprises—has emerged to demand and receive a voice in the conduct of the nation's affairs. This group has provided some of the outspoken champions of political reform. The urban and industrial labor force, including many people attracted from rural areas to the cities and oilfields in anticipation of a better way of life, has become increasingly vocal in its demand for fulfillment of its aspirations.

In response to these socio-economic changes two powerful and conflicting groups have come to the fore in the political sphere. These are the armed forces, which have demonstrated their willingness to seize and exercise political power in their own interest, and the mass-based, reformist political parties seeking to establish representative government with many of the trappings of a welfare state. Both groups have resorted to subversion to attain political power. The armed forces moved into the political vacuum created by the death of the dictator Juan Vicente Gómez in 1935, and have remained the decisive political force in Venezuela until recently. Military leaders, actively

supported by propertied elements, have ruled Venezuela for 19 of the more than 24 years since Gómez' death, and have shared control with civilians in coalition governments for an additional 3½ years during this period. None of the military regimes succeeded in building a political organization with mass support, however. Civilian-led political parties, independent of the government, came into legal existence for the first time in Venezuelan history in 1941 and immediately began to compete for leadership of the new urban middle and working classes. By 1946 the present leading political parties of Venezuela—Democratic Action (*Acción Democrática*—AD), Social Christian Party (*Partido Social Cristiano*—COPEI), Republican Democratic Union (*Unión Republicana Democrática*—URD), and the Venezuelan Communist Party (*Partido Comunista de Venezuela*—PCV)—had been formed and legalized. (For a complete discussion of the origin and history of these parties, see this Chapter, SECTION 53, under Political Parties.) By the end of 1948, following nearly 2½ years of AD-army rule and 10 months of constitutional government under an AD administration, these parties were sufficiently well-established to survive a decade of military dictatorship. They, in fact, collaborated in the underground movement which contributed to the overthrow of the administration of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez in January 1958. The four parties cooperated closely with the military-civilian forces in the Government Junta which ruled Venezuela from January 1958 until February 1959. Under the democratic regime headed by President Rómulo Betancourt of the AD, elected in December 1958 and inaugurated on February 13, 1959, a coalition of three of the parties has been maintained, but the PCV has been excluded from participation in the coalition government, and military hegemony in Venezuelan politics has been practically eliminated.

In Venezuela there is no recognized political organization actively opposed to the basic changes occurring in the social order. Practically all sectors of society have come to accept the socio-economic changes that have taken place in the past

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NND 011188

Box 295

PAGE 57-1

DOC: #351

Page 5 of 38

generation, and the great majority of the population endorses the broad social reform programs espoused by the four leading parties. In this situation opposition to change has tended to focus on specific policies and details of implementation rather than on the basic program of the government.

There are, nevertheless, highly vocal conservative elements at many levels in Venezuela with serious reservations about the amount of reform necessary or desirable, about the manner in which such reforms are to be carried out, and about the advisability of permitting the AD to direct the course of Venezuelan affairs. Probably the most reluctant to accept further social change and most opposed to the rising political power of the urban middle and lower classes are the military and civilian leaders known as *Andinos* (so-called because many of them are natives of the western Andean states that have dominated Venezuelan politics for the past 60 years). Unorganized and numerically small however, the *Andinos* per se were maneuvered out of power in the events following the overthrow of the Pérez Jiménez regime. A most active conspiratorial irritant on the political scene since that time has been the so-called *Pérez-jimenistas*, who include not only followers of Pérez Jiménez but also other reactionary conspirators. They have represented only a narrow cross-section of Venezuelan society, but have attempted by propaganda and a sporadic campaign of terrorism to undermine public confidence in the succeeding regimes. However, because of their small numbers and poor organization, and because of public antipathy toward Pérez Jiménez or other potential authoritarian leaders, they have failed to attract significant support. Both the *Andinos* and *Pérez-jimenistas* have denounced the AD program as being communistic and have appealed to the armed forces to seize power. Elements of both groups appear to be included in the membership of a subversive Civic-Military Institutional Committee (*Comité Institucionalista Cívico-Militar—CICM*).

Potentially more dangerous as a force for subversion are the important urban banking, commercial, and industrial elements and rural landholders who dominate the principal economic associations of the country. These groups usually prefer an apolitical role while seeking to influence official economic policies through their professional associations. They are not opposed to social change per se, and appear to regard democratic government as more desirable than an authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, they rate the economic order above social progress and have on occasion endorsed subversion to oust administrations that threatened their economic position. In the post-1958 situation, however, a majority among these

elements has given tacit support to the administration while exerting a moderating influence on its financial policies.

To date, the most serious potential threat of subversion in Venezuela is posed by the armed forces. The military establishment continues to be a power factor in the country and under a number of circumstances would attempt to resume political control. In the current period of rapid social change, the armed forces have come to regard themselves, and to be widely regarded in conservative circles, as the custodians and protectors of traditional Venezuelan values and institutions. Should these values and institutions, or their own professional interests and prerogatives, appear to be seriously jeopardized, a quick move to restore authoritarian rule might be attempted. In the event of collapse of the inter-party accord that has prevailed among non-Communist leftists since the fall of the Pérez Jiménez regime, some leaders of the armed forces would be sorely tempted to seize power despite civilian opposition. The pressure for military intervention in the political process would be greatly increased by a clear indication of approval by the usually apolitical civilian economic associations. Genuine concern over the threat of Communism is shared by the leaders of the armed forces, although some of them do not appear to make a distinction between Communism per se and leftist reformism.

At the same time, there are many important factors that tend to discourage military subversion in Venezuela. Since 1935 the armed forces have been increasingly professionalized, and a number of outspoken military leaders publicly at least have sought to impress upon their subordinates the need for an apolitical officer corps. Of more immediate significance is the fact that since the fall of Pérez Jiménez the armed forces have not been united in opposition to the regime and are not prepared for coordinated action against it on short notice. The failure of incipient coups in July and September 1958 demonstrated clearly at that time that the four services—army, navy, air force, and national guard—were not equally convinced of the desirability of political intervention, a state of affairs that also currently prevails. Furthermore, these incidents also served to reveal the strength of civilian opposition to the armed forces and the ability of the political parties to shut down the economy and marshal large numbers of businessmen, professional men, students, and workers to resist a coup d'état. It was made abundantly clear to the leaders of the armed forces that a military seizure of power would be accompanied by a great deal of bloodshed and probably a protracted civil resistance. The promptness with which the government has moved to "exile" the leaders of

the abortive coups also served to discourage subversive plotting in the armed forces. Nevertheless, plotting continues within the armed forces, and one direction it appears to be taking is toward the establishment of a civilian movement to create popular demand for military intervention. Current moves by the administration to secure the allegiance of the military also serve to reduce the threat of subversion by the armed forces.

Venezuela's strategic location in the Caribbean and its importance as one of the leading oil-producing nations of the world have made it of considerable interest to foreign powers. In the years following World War II foreign subversive activity inside Venezuela was promoted by the U.S.S.R. through the Soviet Embassy in Caracas and the Venezuelan-Soviet Cultural Institute. The Embassy sought to obtain vital information regarding the petroleum and other industries and lent aid and comfort to the PCV. These channels for subversive activity were closed in June 1952, when the irritation of the Venezuelan Government reached the point where it broke diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and banned the Venezuelan-Soviet Cultural Institute. In the same month Venezuela also severed diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia, the only other Soviet bloc country represented in Caracas. Since 1952 Venezuela has not maintained diplomatic relations with any member of the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has continued to have close contacts with the PCV, through which it has sought to promote in Venezuela a climate of hostility toward the United States.

The social, economic, and political transformation that has been taking place in the past generation has been propitious for the development of Communism in Venezuela. The PCV, which presently has legal status, ranks among the largest Communist parties in the Western Hemisphere and may well be one of the strongest in terms of its participation in the political life of the country. PCV members and persons sympathetic toward Communist doctrines are found primarily in the Caracas area, Maracaibo, and the oilfields, where the Party has competed effectively with non-Communist leftist parties in exploiting the demands and aspirations of the working class. The Party also draws support from other sectors—particularly among students, educators, and intellectuals—and maintains that its following represents a broad cross-section of Venezuelan society. As an agency of international Communism, the PCV is subservient to the policy requirements of the Soviet Union and has faithfully adjusted its program and tactics to reflect broad shifts in Soviet strategy. Nevertheless, the Party has found it advantageous to minimize its relationship with the U.S.S.R. and

necessary to adapt its program to the specific needs of the Venezuelan situation.

The most immediate and pressing objectives of the PCV are to preserve its freedom of action and to prepare a firm base from which to exert influence on the administration. Over a period of time it seeks to swing Venezuela into the neutralist camp in the "cold war" and, ultimately, to gain political control of the country. Both short- and long-term objectives include exacerbation of Venezuelan-U.S. relations and the establishment of closer ties between Venezuela and the Sino-Soviet bloc. Some Communist foreign policy goals (e.g., neutralism) coincide with those entertained in many non-Communist sectors, due partly to deeply ingrained anti-U.S. sentiment and partly to what is believed to be national self-interest. The Communist desire for political control, however, is opposed by the larger parties. The PCV hard core is composed of dedicated, well-disciplined Communists, but the bulk of the membership, acquired since January 1958, lacks thorough indoctrination and training in Party tactics. PCV leaders recognize that the Party, by itself, now has neither the capability to seize and hold political power by force nor the electoral following to take over the government by constitutional means. The PCV cooperated closely and effectively with the AD, the COPEI, and the URD in the clandestine *Junta Patriótica* (Patriotic Junta), which contributed to the overthrow of the Pérez Jiménez regime. Communists were excluded from key positions in the provisional government established in January 1958, and none of the non-Communist parties was willing to collaborate with the PCV in an electoral coalition or subversive operation. The much-vaunted 1958 "political unity" of the four leading parties has been effective only in countering the common danger of a military coup. Under these circumstances, Communist tactics have centered largely on a three-pronged propaganda campaign. To preserve "political unity" and thereby forestall open and bitter competition with the other parties, the Communists have mounted a sustained campaign of rumors of an impending military coup d'état. At the same time they have outstripped the other parties in attacking the United States, attributing to "U.S. imperialism" and "exploitation by U.S. monopolies" responsibility for most of the social and economic grievances of the lower and middle classes. By aggravating and exploiting these grievances and intensifying anti-U.S. feeling among the middle class and labor—both urban and rural—the Communists are seeking to build the popular following that would permit them to attain power at the head of a worker-peasant alliance. If these tactics should prove insufficient the PCV is also preparing a paramilitary organization designed in part to foment

political unrest through a campaign of sabotage and terrorism.

In their propaganda campaign the Communists seek to call upon the resources of front groups, organized and led by PCV members or sympathizers, and on professional associations and youth, student, and labor groups penetrated but not necessarily dominated by Party agents. While the establishment of Communist front groups in Venezuela has not developed to the point reached in some other Latin American republics, and a number are currently primarily paper organizations, some existing fronts are highly effective in extending PCV influence to those social elements that are active proponents of change. The front groups fall roughly into two categories: special-interest groups appealing to a limited audience, such as those of women or those made up of members of a particular profession; and general-purpose fronts, which direct their appeal to all classes and sectors of society. The Venezuelan Committee for Peace and Democracy (*Comité Venezolana por la Paz y Democracia*) is the principal example of the latter type. Extensive Communist penetration of the press in the Caracas area and strong influence in the Venezuelan Journalists' Association (*Asociación Venezolana de Periodistas*) has assured wide and uninterrupted dissemination of PCV propaganda, particularly that directed against the United States, in most of the major newspapers of the country. The Communists have failed to gain control of the leading labor organizations, which are dominated by the non-Communist leftist parties. The same is true, nominally at least, of the leading student organizations. Nevertheless, PCV members occupy strategic positions in most of the youth and worker organizations. In marked contrast with their past history of labor strikes and violence, both the Communist and non-Communist labor groups since January 1958 have avoided large-scale strikes, seeking to achieve their objectives by political means. Because the views of the non-Communist leftists on many exploitable issues coincide closely with many of the PCV propaganda objectives, these elements frequently lend themselves to Communist-inspired campaigns, thus reinforcing front activities in Venezuela and abroad. Some of the Communist fronts and Communist-infiltrated organizations are affiliated or have established liaison with international Communist front organizations. The travel of Venezuelan delegations to meetings of international Communist fronts abroad provides an important means of contact and communication between the PCV and the international Communist movement. As part of the campaign for closer relations between Venezuela and Communist China, Communists and fellow travelers on February 19, 1960 organized the Society of Friends of China

(*Sociedad de Amigos de China*) as a propaganda outlet. Previously, binational centers had not served an important function in the Venezuelan Communist propaganda apparatus.

The PCV is at once aided and hindered by the fact that the immediate objectives expressed in its program and its appeal to the nationalistic sentiment of the Venezuelan people are almost indistinguishable from those of the three leading non-Communist parties. These parties and the PCV appear to agree on the basic nature of Venezuelan problems and on their solutions, which include effective democratic government with full civil rights, more equal participation for all in the national wealth, and an expansion of existing state capitalism. In the Venezuelan context these proposals are revolutionary, but are now accepted by a substantial majority of the population as necessary and desirable. In these circumstances the Communists are permitted full freedom to expound their views, but their appeal is considerably dulled by the fact that they cannot effectively present themselves as the only revolutionary party concerned for the welfare of the mass of the people. In fact, the PCV has on occasion been accused of lacking revolutionary zeal, as when it supported the moderate, Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal, for the presidency against Rómulo Betancourt, whose reputation as a revolutionary was beyond question. The Communists obviously felt that Larrazábal would be more receptive than Betancourt to PCV influence. Nevertheless, the Communists maintain that the PCV is the "vanguard of democracy" in Venezuela and deserves the major share of the credit for the overthrow of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship. In their attacks on the United States, which they invariably link closely with the Pérez Jiménez regime, and in their demands for the eventual nationalization of natural resources, principally petroleum (which is exploited mainly by U.S. concerns), the Communists have been somewhat more vehement than the other parties. However, in their support for the "Buy Venezuelan" campaign, the major efforts to promote Venezuelan industry and reduce reliance on foreign, chiefly U.S. imports, the Communists have not distinguished themselves as more nationalistic than members of the other parties.

The widespread belief that the "political unity" of all civilian forces, including the PCV, is essential to prevent the restoration of a regime dominated by the armed forces has resulted in a high degree of toleration for the Venezuelan Communists. This tolerance also reflects popular recognition of the important role played by the PCV in the overthrow of the Pérez Jiménez regime. Under such circumstances the Communists have met with considerable success, particularly in labor, press, and

student circles, in presenting the PCV as a respectable, national party which differs only in degree from the parties of the non-Communist left. The Communists have also benefited directly from the conviction shared by the non-Communist leftists, and stoutly defended by the leaders of the major parties, that in an open political system all parties have an inherent right to express their views openly and to seek political office by constitutional means. Moreover, all of the parties currently predominant on the Venezuelan scene have had to operate clandestinely in the past. Their leaders are aware that a well-organized party can survive long periods of illegality. Besides, many of them are convinced that a legal Communist party is easier to keep under surveillance and is far less troublesome than a clandestine one. In addition, they are frankly concerned that any anti-Communist measures adopted by the present government might be turned against them by a future administration. The fact that some of the top PCV command are from wealthy Venezuelan families and have close social connections with prominent non-Communists undoubtedly contributes to the favorable atmosphere which the Communists enjoy. Furthermore, a certain amount of comradeship was built up between non-Communists and Communists who were jointly persecuted or jailed together by the dictatorship.

The leaders of the three major parties are aware of the international and subversive character of the Communist movement in Venezuela. Although they have cooperated closely with the PCV to oppose the threat of a coup from the right, they have consistently rejected the demands of the PCV for participation in the government and in interparty agreements. However, some elements in the non-Communist left—notably the AD youth organization and part of the URD—are not firmly convinced of the Communist danger and counsel cooperation or alliances with the PCV for partisan ends. In an effort to counter this tendency, AD and COPEI leaders have publicly described the Venezuelan Communists as members of an international movement and proponents of a philosophy inconsistent with the democratic and traditional goals of Venezuela. Moreover, on various occasions President Betancourt has warned the public, and particularly the labor force, against Communist machinations and the danger of becoming pawns in the international political strategy of a foreign power.

Serious concern over the danger posed by Communism in Venezuela has been expressed by the Catholic Church, the armed forces, and those propertied elements who stand to lose the most from a growth of Communist strength or influence. The COPEI also assumed an increasingly outspoken

anti-Communist position after mid-1959. The only consistent anti-Communist media of importance are the Catholic press, chiefly the Caracas daily *La Religión*, which points up the atheistic and subversive character of Communism and the nonsectarian humor magazine *Martin Garabato*, which seeks to undermine the Communist appeal by ridicule. Both publications stress the Communist threat to traditional Venezuelan values and institutions. The Catholic Church is actively engaged in a "social action" program in an effort to meet changing social conditions and satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the lower classes within the framework of Christian doctrine. In this situation it endorses most aspects of the social reform programs of the non-Communist parties while vehemently opposing the implications of the PCV program.

Foreign Communists are active among Spanish, Portuguese, Dominican, and Nicaraguan exile groups in Venezuela. The Communist-penetrated exile organizations engage in plotting against their home governments and occasionally lend themselves to PCV-sponsored propaganda campaigns in support of international Communist objectives. However, they do not appear to maintain regular and close connections with PCV and as of now do not pose a subversive threat against the Government of Venezuela.

The Venezuelan Government has the authority under existing legislation to cope with subversive movements of any nature. Judicial action in this respect may be based upon Articles 33 and 34 of the 1953 constitution, which define the duties of Venezuelan citizens and resident aliens, and the 1926 penal code, which defines conspiracy and subversion as crimes and prescribes the penalties for such crimes. Article 33 of the 1953 constitution stipulates that Venezuelan citizens shall defend their country in time of war, render military service, and obey the constitution and the laws and regulations enacted by the government. Article 34 states that aliens are to contribute to the national defense, respect the laws on the same terms as citizens, and refrain from political activities other than the exercise of suffrage when they are entitled to that right. Citizens who fail in their duties may be tried under a large body of laws governing civil and military offenses. Aliens who fail in their duties may be detained, confined, or expelled from the country. In the penal code definitions of criminal acts of a conspiratorial or subversive nature range from clandestine entry into restricted areas, for which the guilty may be jailed for 30 days, to conniving with foreign nations or external enemies against the territorial integrity or republican institutions of the nation, for which the penalty is 20 years confinement.

Domestic conspiracy and subversion with intent to depose national, state, or municipal governments or to destroy republican institutions at these levels may draw penalties of from three to five years confinement in political jail. Unlimited abuse and slander of public officials, a favorite conspiratorial device to create a climate of instability, invite penalties ranging from 1 to 30 months incarceration. In some instances the penal code also imposes fines. Aliens tried and found guilty of conspiracy or subversion may be deported, but the penal code makes no provision for the exile of Venezuelan citizens. In practice, however, the Venezuelan Government has had frequent recourse to measures of exception (*alta policia*), whereby civilian conspirators have been exiled without judicial trial. Military conspirators are more commonly assigned abroad for an indefinite period. Long-established custom condones both practices.

B. Communist activities

1. Venezuelan Communist Party

The Communist Party of Venezuela (*Partido Comunista de Venezuela*—PCV) was founded clandestinely in 1931 during the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez. It was outlawed in 1936 by General Eleazar López Contreras. Although still officially proscribed, the Party was allowed to engage in front activities during the early 1940's by López' successor, General Isaias Medina, in return for Communist support of various social and economic reforms sponsored by the administration. The Communist front groups eventually merged into the Venezuelan Popular Union (*Unión Popular Venezolana*—UPV), which was legalized in the Federal District on May 17, 1944. The UPV subsequently declined in importance and for all practical purposes ceased to exist. The PCV itself was legalized in the Federal District the following year. During the period 1941–45 the PCV largely followed the international Communist wartime policy of collaboration with existing regimes in Latin America. Under the leadership of Juan Bautista Fuenmayor, Eduardo and Gustavo Machado, Luis Miquelena, and Rodolfo Quintero, the PCV concentrated much of its attention upon the labor movement, becoming the dominant element in the trade unions. The Communist Party was particularly strong among the petroleum workers, who composed the largest single organized group in labor. By 1945 it was estimated that the Party had 18,000 members.

A longstanding feud over tactics and doctrine precipitated an open split in the ranks of the PCV in June 1945, when a dissident group was expelled for unwillingness to accept the PCV policy of collaboration with the Medina regime. After an un-

successful unity congress, dissidents in 1947 formed what eventually was called the Revolutionary Party of the Communist Proletariat (*Partido Revolucionario del Proletariat* [*comunista*]—PRPc). Its members were later commonly referred to as the "Black Communists," as opposed to the "Red Communists" of the PCV. During the latter part of the period October 1945–November 1948 when the non-Communist leftist Democratic Action party (*Acción Democrática*—AD) was in power, the "Red Communists" under Gustavo Machado and Juan Bautista Fuenmayor pursued a policy of alignment with the governing party. In contrast, the "Black Communists," whose principal spokesmen were Luis Miquelena and Rodolfo Quintero, generally followed a course of nonalignment. Blessed with the tacit endorsement of the international Communist movement, the "Red Communists" remained the stronger of the two factions by a large margin. In the congressional elections of 1947 the "Red Communists" registered 43,190 votes, or approximately 3.6% of the total votes cast; the "Black Communists" received 7,068 votes, or approximately 0.6% of the total vote. There is reason to believe that during the early years of the 1948–58 dictatorship the PRPc cooperated more closely with the government than did the PCV, and in return was given considerable freedom of action. For example, the PRPc was allowed to maintain control of the influential Federation of Workers of the Federal District and the State of Miranda. Efforts to restore unity to the Venezuelan Communist movement were not wholly successful until 1952, when a group of PRPc leaders rejoined the PCV, and the PRPc for all practical purposes ceased to exist.

During the 1945–48 period of *Acción Democrática* government, the Communists were notably unsuccessful in their efforts to expand their infiltration of the labor movement, the educational system, youth groups, and women's organizations. This failure was largely due to competitive activities by the AD; the PCV–PRPc split also contributed to the Communists' difficulties. However, the military coup d'état of November 24, 1948 and the subsequent banning of the AD in December 1948 temporarily offered the Communists opportunity for renewed activity.

In May 1950, however, the PCV was outlawed by the military junta, and its petroleum federation and affiliates were dissolved; these measures, coupled with some police harassment and the arrest of some PCV leaders, the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia in June 1952, and action taken by the Venezuelan Government against the then existing Venezuelan-Soviet Cultural Institute and its members contributed to the checking of overt Communist activities in

Venezuela in the early 1950's. Between 1953 and 1957 PCV membership and overt activities decreased steadily, as those PCV leaders who had not been imprisoned either went underground or into exile abroad. However, the PCV was not persecuted as ruthlessly as other parties during the dictatorship, and the Party later emerged with its structure largely intact.

The Communists participated directly in the *Junta Patriótica*, the clandestine movement organized in August 1957 which was instrumental in the ouster of the Pérez Jiménez regime in January 1958. With the fall of Pérez Jiménez the PCV gained *de facto* legal status and resumed overt political activity under the leadership of Jesús Faría, Gustavo Machado, and Pompeyo Márquez Millán. Operating in a free political system the Party has succeeded in pushing its membership well above the 1945 level, although it remains numerically weak in comparison with the three major parties—AD, URD, and COPEI. *De jure* legal status was achieved with the promulgation on May 23, 1958 of an electoral law which enabled Communists to run for public office. In addition to the considerable influence through its infiltration of key positions in organized labor, communications media, the teaching profession and student organizations, the PCV is believed to have also achieved some success in its efforts to infiltrate the government and major leftist parties.

a. ORGANIZATION — The organization of the PCV is comparable to that of other Communist parties throughout Latin America. It is organized in the 20 states, in the federal territories of Delta Amacuro and Amazonas, and in the Federal District. Because of its present legal status, the PCV is able to operate openly and has assumed many of the aspects of a normal political party from an organizational standpoint. Several reports have indicated that a clandestine Party apparatus exists parallel to the overt PCV structure. Little is known at present about the structure and composition of the clandestine organization. It has been reported that crypto-Communists are active in labor union work, and presumably PCV members are operating secretly in other areas as well. In early 1959 the Party began organizing a small clandestine guerrilla force. (For a description of this organization, see below, under Paramilitary Activities.)

In the ascending order of the hierarchy, elements of the formal Party structure are cells (area and enterprise); ward or local committees; regional committees; the Central Committee (including the Political Bureau [Politburo] and the National Secretariat); and (theoretically) the National Con-

gress (for a chart of Party structure, see FIGURE 57-1).

(1) *Party cells* — The basic units of the PCV are Party cells established in factories, cities and towns, and rural districts. Cells made up of industrial or commercial workers in a given company are called enterprise cells (*células de empresa*). Cells in residential areas are called neighborhood, street, or apartment building cells (*células de barrio, de calle, o de bloque*). According to one PCV writer, enterprise cells are favored because they are composed of factory workers—the bulwark of the Party. Theoretically, no cell can have less than 3 or more than 10 members; however, membership of more than 20 has been reported in some cells. An average of 10% of the cell members are women; the PCV goal is 40% female membership. Each cell is under the leadership of a political secretary; the officers of second and third highest rank are the secretaries of propaganda and finance, respectively. These officials are elected by the full cell membership at a cell conference or cell general assembly, which is, in theory, the supreme authority of the cell. Cell meetings are held weekly at a regular site, which may be a member's home or a ward committee headquarters in the case of residential cells, or at the place of employment in the case of enterprise cells. According to a PCV publication, the order of business at a cell meeting should be as follows: 1) a review of the state of fulfillment of the tasks assigned at the previous meeting; 2) a review of finances and of the status of dues payments; 3) political discussion; report of the political secretary; assignment of new tasks based on the needs ascertained during the political discussion; and 4) an educational session consisting of such things as a lecture, comments on a reading assignment, and course work. According to the same source, the role of the cell is to 1) participate in the formation of Party policy through the study and discussion of the materials prepared by the Party leadership; 2) spread the Party line through the distribution of propaganda, the sale of the Party newspaper *Tribuna Popular*, and the organization of public assemblies and conferences; 3) recruit new members; 4) educate members and explain to them the Party ideology; 5) keep Party ties with the masses and assist them in the defense of their rights; and 6) organize its members in collective projects, with each member having specific tasks and responsibilities "in the political battles and efforts of the worker and popular masses to regain what is rightfully theirs."

(2) *Ward and local committees* — Cells are grouped together into wards (*zonas or radios*) in the Federal District and in some other cities, and into local areas (*locales*), less populous munici-




FIGURE 57-1. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA, 1959


palties and villages in the provinces. A ward or local area generally may contain up to 20 cells, and a few in Caracas have more. Each ward or local area is under the control of a committee (*comité de radio* or *comité local*). The committee members are elected at a ward or local conference attended by delegates from the member cells.

(3) *Regional committees* — Each state as well as the Federal District comprises a region. Each region is under the jurisdiction of a regional committee (*comité regional*), which is elected by a regional conference composed of delegates chosen at ward and local conferences. In theory, the regional conference is the supreme authority in a region; in practice it merely ratifies decisions of the regional committee.

The largest and most influential regional committee is that of the Federal District. According to a bulletin distributed by the Regional Committee to its ward committees, as of August 1959 the Federal District Regional Committee controlled 20 ward committees with a total of 267 cells. Of

the 20 ward committees in the Federal District, 1 is composed only of transportation workers' cells, another of press, radio, and television workers, and 3 are composed entirely of enterprise cells. The remaining known ward committees represent the Caracas districts of Altigracia, Sucre, San Juan, Santa Rosalía, La Pastora, El Valle, San Agustín, El Recreo, La Vega, Antímamo, and San José, and the coastal Vargas department, including the city of La Guaira.

(4) *Central Committee* — Supreme authority over the PCV at the national level nominally is vested in the National Congress, composed of delegates designated by the regional conferences, which theoretically meets every two years. The National Congress in turn designates the members of the Central Committee, which acts as the supreme directive body between sessions of the congress. In fact, however, no full-scale congress has been held since the Second National Congress, August 20-25, 1948, which elected or confirmed the bulk of the present PCV leadership. A Third



National Congress is scheduled tentatively for the latter half of 1960. In reality, maximum authority at all times is vested in the Central Committee, which is composed of from 30 to 35 members and an equal number of alternates. Within this organization key power rests with a Political Bureau (Politburo) consisting of 12 Central Committee members, which in turn is subject to the authority of a five-member National Secretariat composed of Politburo members. Unlike some other Communist parties in Latin America, the PCV does not make extensive use of a national conference as a substitute for a full national congress. Instead, it uses mainly plenums of the Central Committee as its medium for countrywide discussion and ratification of policy.

The PCV has a youth auxiliary called the Venezuelan Communist Youth (*Juventud Comunista de Venezuela—JCV*). It is a nationwide organization which is generally considered an integral part of the PCV structure, since JCV members participate in most phases of Party activity. JCV members range in age from about 14 to 30. No breakdown has been obtainable, however, on the distribution of JCV members by age groups. Minimum age for PCV membership is 18, hence JCV members may transfer into the Party proper at any time between their 18th and their 31st birthdays. The actual time when such a transition occurs, however, varies according to the status of the individual, e.g., usefulness of the individual to the Party, whether he is a student or has become gainfully employed in the labor force, and whether he is deemed ready for full Party membership. JCV President Héctor Rodríguez Bauza is a member of the PCV Politburo and was elected to Congress as a deputy in the December 1958 elections. The organization of the JCV in many ways parallels that of the PCV, the main exception being the unique structure at the Central University. At the bottom of the nonuniversity hierarchy are cells which are under the jurisdiction of ward or town committees; these in turn are under state regional committees. At the head of the JCV organization is the National Executive Committee (*Comisión Ejecutiva Nacional*) composed of approximately 11 officers and 7 auxiliary secretaries. It is believed that the National Executive Committee is directly responsible to the PCV Central Committee, and is also controlled and elected by the resolutions of periodic JCV national conventions, the last of which was held in May 1959 with the attendance of approximately 300 delegates from all over Venezuela. At the Central University, which is one of the main centers of JCV activity, is a regional committee controlled by a University Bureau (*Buró Universitario*). Under the bureau are executive committees, one for each university school or faculty, and

under these committees are base committees equivalent to cells in the nonuniversity structure. The JCV university organization is frequently referred to as the University Communist Youth (*Juventud Comunista Universitaria—JCU*). The University Bureau controls the Propaganda Secretariat, which distributes Communist literature, supervises sales of the PCV party organ, *Tribuna Popular*, and publishes a newspaper, *Universidad Nueva*. An educational and indoctrination program inaugurated by the bureau in early 1959 provided for the establishment of study circles, weekly courses in politics and organization, seminars to be given by Communist professors, and directed reading.

b. LEADERSHIP — It is believed that the majority of the PCV Politburo and Central Committee officials remained in exile during the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship. Others, including PCV Secretary General Jesús Faría, were imprisoned by Pérez Jiménez. A clandestine Central Committee was maintained in Venezuela during the dictatorship under the leadership of Pompeyo Márquez Millán. Márquez and other clandestine leaders, including Guillermo García Ponce, Eloy Torres, Eleazar Díaz Rangel, and Douglas Bravo, cooperated with the *Junta Patriótica* during the latter months of the dictatorship and worked with non-Communist parties in the planning and execution of the general strike of January 1958 which precipitated the fall of Pérez Jiménez. This close liaison between the PCV and leaders of other parties during the revolution was largely responsible for the favorable political climate in which the Communists were able to operate after Pérez' exile. After the Government Junta under Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal assumed control of the government on January 23, 1958, virtually all the members of the Central Committee came out of hiding, were released from prison, or returned to Venezuela from exile abroad. The Politburo emerged and assumed active direction of the PCV. Its composition has remained constant, although two regular members of the Politburo reportedly were added to the National Secretariat in July 1959. The National Secretariat is now believed to consist of Jesús Faría, secretary general; Gustavo Machado Morales; Pompeyo Márquez Millán; Alonso Ojeda Olaechea, agrarian secretary; and Luis Emiro Arrieta, organization secretary. Other members of the Politburo are Guillermo García Ponce, propaganda secretary; Pedro Ortega Díaz, secretary general of the Federal District Regional Committee; Martín José Ramírez Castro, finance secretary; Eloy Torres, labor secretary; Eduardo Machado Morales, press secretary; Ernesto Silva Tellería; Héctor Rodríguez Bauza, president of the *Juventud Comunista de Venezuela*; and Eduardo Gallegos Mancera, member of the Municipal Council of the Federal District.

Since the mid-1940's the PCV's most prominent leader and principal spokesman has been Gustavo Machado Morales, an able and persuasive Marxist of great personal magnetism. His long and almost legendary career, marked by paramilitary revolutionary activities, imprisonment, frequent exile, and peregrinations throughout Venezuela, the Caribbean area and the Soviet Union, in some ways parallels that of Brazilian Communist leader Luiz Carlos Prestes (see NIS 94, CHAPTER V, SECTION 59, Biographies of Key Personalities). Machado, who is a member of a wealthy and prominent Caracas family and a Paris University law graduate, joined the Communist movement in 1925 after a period of intensive indoctrination in Communist dogma in the Soviet Union. In 1929 he staged an unsuccessful insurrection against the government of Venezuela and President Juan Vicente Gómez. He then went into hiding, not to reappear until after the death of Gómez in 1935. Imprisoned briefly and later exiled, Machado did not appear again in Venezuela until 1941. In that year he demonstrated his willingness to adhere strictly to the international Communist line by switching abruptly from denunciation of President Medina and the latter's pro-Allied policies to support of both shortly after the Russo-German pact collapsed with Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union.

Although Machado remains the PCV's chief spokesman today, he has been criticized recently by other Party members for his failure to develop a more dynamic Party policy. Secretary General Jesús Faría likewise has been criticized for lack of dynamism attributable to his current poor health. In July 1959 the National Secretariat of the Politburo reportedly was expanded from three to five members. The new members added were Luis Emiro Arrieta and Alonso Ojeda Olachea. It was rumored at the time of the change that the purpose of the expansion might have been to facilitate the eventual removal of Machado and Faría from the National Secretariat.

It has also been reported that Pompeyo Márquez has emerged as the top PCV leader and theoretician. Márquez headed the Venezuelan delegation to the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow during January-February 1959, and spent four months visiting the U.S.S.R. and Communist China. Shortly after his return to Venezuela the Central Committee held its 20th Plenum, June 26-29, 1959, which served as an occasion for dissemination by Márquez of the latest Kremlin line. The PCV leadership appears to be relatively flexible at the higher levels, and follows the collective leadership doctrine dictated by Khrushchev at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 to a greater extent than do most other Communist parties of Latin America.

Faría, Machado, Márquez, and to a somewhat lesser extent, Ojeda and Arrieta, have all been active in Party affairs during the past two years and, with the exception of Machado, have made numerous trips to and from the Sino-Soviet bloc. None appears to have a purely figurehead status. It has been reported that Machado, because of his public relations value, may retain his prominent position in the Party hierarchy as long as the PCV's present policy of unity with the non-Communist leftist parties prevails, but that Márquez or another leader may assume overall direction of Party operations in the event the Communists assume a more radical course or are forced to go underground.

c. MEMBERSHIP—The PCV made striking gains in membership during the year following the ouster of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship in January 1958. It is estimated that in late 1957 the Party was composed of a skeleton cadre of about 9,000 PCV and JCV militants; by October 1958 the enrolled membership had risen to approximately 40,000 (including JCV members) according to PCV middle-level leaders. Enrollment appears to have leveled off since late 1958, as Venezuelan press accounts reported that PCV membership remained around the 40,000 level as of July 1959. This figure compares with a previous high of 20,000 in 1947, according to figures released by the British Empire Communist Conference in March of that year. Judging by the percentage of the PCV vote attributable to the Federal District and the state of Miranda in the December 1958 elections, it is probable that at least 16,000 PCV members (including JCV members) out of the estimated total of 40,000 are from the metropolitan Caracas area. Evidence exists that during 1959 the PCV concentrated on organization and on the consolidation of its 1958 membership gains.

Most Communists come from labor and youth (primarily student) groups and, to a lesser extent numerically, from the teaching profession, and from the ranks of journalists and intellectuals. Because of the integral relationship between the PCV and the JCV, the Communists generally group members of both organizations together in their estimates of PCV strength. Although the exact percentage of JCV members among the estimated 40,000 Communists in Venezuela today is not known, it is probable that from 40% to 55% of the Communists—16,000 to 22,000—are members of the youth organization.

PCV members are most heavily concentrated in 1) the Federal District area (including the state of Miranda); 2) the state of Zulia in the west; and 3) the state of Anzoátegui in the east. All three areas contain relatively large numbers of industrial workers—Zulia and Anzoátegui by virtue of

being Venezuela's most important oil producing states. The party's rapid increase in strength during the postrevolutionary period is largely attributable to 1) the favorable political environment in which the PCV was able to operate after January 23, 1958; 2) generally favorable treatment from the Venezuelan press and other communications media; and 3) a skillfully-organized mass recruitment campaign inaugurated on June 1, 1958 and carried on until November of the same year—a few weeks before the December presidential and congressional elections. The fact that Caracas' population had doubled over the past 10 years gave the Communists an unusually good target in that they were able to reach with a minimum of effort a heavy concentration of poor and politically naive inhabitants.

The June 1958 recruitment drive constituted an effort to make the PCV a Party with a mass base capable of producing a significant impact in the congressional and presidential elections which were held on December 7, 1958. During the drive a minimum of prerequisites were required of prospective Party members. Almost anyone could join, and recommendations from PCV members were not required. Mass meetings were organized to stimulate recruitment, and national, regional, and local leaders were sent around the country to promote the campaign. Party units were encouraged to compete with one another in recruitment contests. Meetings were even held among remote Indian tribes in the interior, notably in the Amazonas Territory, and interpreters were employed to translate speeches into local dialects. Party leaders recognized the problems created by the assimilation of such a great number of new members and scheduled a series of activities to encourage and sustain the interest of the recruits and to teach them Communist theory and tactics. Much of the training took place in the Caracas area, where it was reported that 6 schools staffed by a total of 18 instructors were established in August 1958. Classes at these schools consisted of weekly 3½-hour indoctrination sessions. In October 1959 a Marxist school, the *Instituto Ezequiel Zamora*, was opened in Caracas. Staffed by prominent Communist leaders and intellectuals, including Gustavo and Eduardo Machado, Pompeyo Márquez, Guillermo García Ponce and Fernando Key Sánchez, the institute is open to all, regardless of academic background.

d. FINANCES — The PCV relies mainly on membership dues and fundraising drives to cover its operating expenses, as it has few members or supporters who are able to make substantial donations to the Party. Membership dues generally are paid monthly and levies are based on ability to pay. The method of assessment is usually left to the in-

dividual cell, but quotas normally are fixed for each cell by its parent ward or local committee. In many cells each member is required to contribute 1% of his monthly salary to the Party if he earns up to 1,000 bolívares (US\$300) per month; if he earns more than this amount he is obliged to contribute from 2%–4% of his monthly pay. Party members who are unemployed are required to make token payments ranging from 7 to 60 cents (U.S.) per month. Fundraising drives take several forms, including sales of membership cards—often at about US\$15 each—subscription drives featuring the sale of nonredeemable “bonds,” sales of revenue stamps for Party membership cards, and periodic national financial campaigns during which Party cells are called upon to fulfill specific quotas by such means as extra assessments, raffles, dances, dinners, and “salary days.” At the latter each member is expected to donate the equivalent of one day's salary to the Party. Proceeds from the collection of dues are generally split between the cells, the ward or local committees, the regional committees, the Central Committee and Politburo. Often the larger portion of the proceeds is retained by the cells and ward or local committees to cover day-to-day administrative and program expenses. Money obtained from fundraising campaigns, on the other hand, is often divided so that the highest percentage of the proceeds goes to the top echelons of the PCV hierarchy. For example, it was reported that the proceeds of a revenue stamp sale for membership cards planned by a Caracas ward committee in June 1959 would possibly be divided as follows: 15% for the ward committee; 20% for the regional committee; 25% for the Central Committee; and 40% for the Politburo. The JCV participates in most Party fundraising activities and is assessed quotas just as are the PCV cells.

Cell members are constantly urged to push sales of the Party newspaper *Tribuna Popular*. Often they are asked to purchase two subscriptions of the newspaper themselves, one for their personal use and for transmittal to friends, and another for posting in public places.

Generally, the PCV's financial campaigns have been only moderately successful, and it is apparent that in the recent past the Party has been hard pressed to finance its program of propaganda and recruitment. Furthermore, PCV members are frequently in arrears in the payment of their dues, and income from *Tribuna Popular* has fallen below that hoped for by the Party leadership. Probably the Party's largest fundraising drive to date was the National Financial Campaign inaugurated in August 1958 for the purpose of backing PCV candidates in the December 1958 elections. At the end of the campaign Party leaders said publicly

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NND 011188

Box 295 PAGE 57-11

DOC: #351

Page 15 of 38

that the campaign had succeeded in providing the PCV with 1,000,000 bolivares (US\$300,000) or twice the original goal, but this claim is open to question. Interim results of the drive, published two weeks before its end, showed that subscriptions in the Federal District and the state of Zulia—the two areas of greatest PCV strength—were less than 50% of the assigned quotas for these regions. After the end of the drive, it was reported that Party leaders in the Federal District admitted to cell members that they were disappointed in the results of the campaign.

There is no evidence of significant direct financial support of PCV by the international Communist organization. However, the cost of the considerable amount of travel by PCV and JCV members to the Sino-Soviet bloc presumably is financed to a large extent by the U.S.S.R. and Communist China. In addition, much of the written propaganda distributed by the PCV is printed in the bloc, and the cost of shipping the material to Venezuela is borne for the most part by the U.S.S.R. (For the rumored possibility of Soviet financial assistance to *Tribuna Popular*, see below, under Propaganda Facilities.)

e. PROPAGANDA FACILITIES — The PCV has at its disposal extensive facilities for the dissemination of Party news and propaganda. These include the Communist press, consisting of a widely circulated weekly tabloid and a dozen periodicals, and the non-Communist leftist press, which employs many Communist writers and provides space for PCV propaganda. The PCV is not known to control any radio or television stations, but Communists play a predominant role in the Federal District radio and television workers' union. Sino-Soviet bloc literature is distributed freely throughout Venezuela, and movies from the Sino-Soviet bloc are shown from time to time.

The principal medium for PCV propaganda is the Party's weekly tabloid newspaper *Tribuna Popular*, which has a reported normal circulation of approximately 50,000. Its editor is Gustavo Machado Morales. The newspaper has offices at PCV headquarters in Caracas. Distribution is maintained throughout Venezuela, largely through the promotional efforts of the Party cell members. *Tribuna Popular* is used to disseminate Party news and directives and is required reading for all PCV members. After trying unsuccessfully for over a year to convert *Tribuna Popular* into a daily, the PCV Central Committee in July 1959 announced again that it planned to make *Tribuna Popular* a daily newspaper, and the Party at that time inaugurated a two-month campaign to raise funds for the paper. Politburo member Eduardo Machado traveled to Havana for the announced purpose of purchasing

printing equipment, spent only a few days there, and then flew to Mexico City, where he reportedly visited the Soviet Embassy. Subsequently plans were announced for the establishment of a new printing firm, *Editorial Cantaclaro*, and the purchase of presses from East Germany to publish a daily paper beginning in January 1960. Although the presses for *Editorial Cantaclaro* arrived in early 1960, such a step-up in publication has not as yet occurred. If *Tribuna Popular* actually appears on a daily basis in the near future, it would seem likely, judging from the failure of PCV newspaper fundraising drives in the past, that financial backing will have been provided by the U.S.S.R.

Communists also publish *Dominguito*, a humor magazine with claimed weekly circulation of 36,000, under the direction of Gabriel Bracho Montiel. Other leading PCV magazines are *Principios*, a monthly edited by National Secretariat member Pompeyo Márquez which concentrates on Communist ideology and is designed for the intellectual; *Cruz del Sur*, a cultural and intellectual magazine published monthly by the Cruz del Sur bookstore in Caracas; *Libertad*, a monthly; *Tiempos Nuevos*; and *Educador*, an irregularly published magazine started in mid-1959 with an initial printing of 2,000 copies. *Juventud Comunista de Venezuela* publishes *Joven Guardia*, a youth newspaper which appears intermittently; its circulation is reported to be approximately 20,000. The student body of Andrés Bello Lyceum (*Liceo Andrés Bello*) in Caracas publishes intermittently a pro-Communist newspaper, *Cuadros*. The Spanish Communist front organization *Libertad para España* publishes a monthly magazine which bears the group's name. Several Spanish-language magazines edited in Moscow are distributed freely in Venezuela, including *Unión Soviética* and other periodicals devoted to sports, agriculture, ballet and theater, metallurgy, and writing and music. A Caracas firm, *Distribuidora Magrija, C.A.*, imports Communist publications in small lots from many countries and distributes them in Venezuela. Several Caracas bookstores deal in Communist literature, including *Librería Cruz del Sur* and *Librería Ezequiel Zamora*, and the JCV outlet *Librería Poliedro*. The PCV owns two Caracas printing firms, *Editora e Impresora Venezolana* and *Impresos Miranda, C.A.*, and several PCV leaders own *Editorial Cantaclaro*, which they hope will eventually publish *Tribuna Popular* on a daily basis. Another Caracas publishing house, *Editora Grafos*, is owned by a member of the Communist Party of Spain and reportedly publishes Spanish Communist propaganda. *Informativa Venezolana*, press clipping service, is run by PCV newspaperman Servando García Ponce. Two Communist-controlled outlets, *Club de Discos Cruz del Sur* and *Discos Supraphon*,

distribute Soviet bloc phonograph records and music.

Communist propagandists have been greatly aided by the policies and attitudes of most of the publications which comprise the non-Communist press; many of these publications employ or accept contributions from Communists and pro-Communists. Most of the major Caracas dailies are to some extent critical of U.S. foreign policy and anti-"imperialist" and make no consistent effort to counterbalance the propaganda which appears in the Communist press or which is contributed by Communists to the non-Communist press. Some Communists and persons sympathetic toward Communism are employed on the editorial staffs of most of the Caracas dailies, and these papers occasionally give editorial space to PCV and pro-Communist contributors from the outside. For example, *El Universal* (circulation 45,000), probably the most conservative of the major Caracas newspapers, during 1958 published articles by Pompeyo Márquez of the PCV National Secretariat. Márquez now writes sporadically for *El Nacional* (circulation 90,000), while Jesús Faría and Guillermo García Ponce frequently have written articles for *La Esfera* (circulation 50,000). Communists Servando García Ponce and Manuel Trujillo write daily columns for *Ultimas Noticias* (circulation 90,000). At least 15 Communist or pro-Communist writers are used by the two largest dailies of Caracas, *El Nacional* and *Ultimas Noticias*.

The Venezuelan Journalists' Association (*Asociación Venezolana de Periodistas—AVP*) is the only group of journalists which exerts an effective degree of influence on the national scene. It is highly sensitive to any foreign criticism of post-revolutionary Venezuela, but is unhesitating in pointing out the faults of other countries, with the apparent exception to date of the Soviet bloc countries. Although a majority of the membership is affiliated with the AD, PCV members are a strong minority and many of them enjoy prestige and importance in their own right as political, cultural, and journalistic figures. Communists hold positions of control on the AVP national board and the Federal District branch, which represents about 50% of AVP membership, and are influential in the Zulia section. This has enabled Communist journalists to limit unfavorable publicity against their Party and to keep many anti-Communists from gaining positions in the higher echelons of the association. At the AVP national convention in October 1959, Communists won the chairmanships of five of eight working committees and the vice-chairmanships of two others. Ana Luisa Llovera, an avowed member of AD who has a record of Communist-front group activities, was elected president of AVP, and PCV member Servando

García Ponce became executive secretary general. Subsequently, in November, PCV member Eleazar Díaz Rangel was reelected as secretary general of the Federal District branch of AVP, and Communists now hold three of seven positions on the executive board of this branch organization. A PCV-URD-Independent slate defeated an AD-COPEI slate 102 votes to 90.

Communists and persons sympathetic toward Communism among the nonprofessional personnel of Caracas newspapers reportedly have on some occasions been able to prevent the publishing of anti-Communist material. Many of these individuals are members of National Press Workers' Union (*Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Prensa—SNTP*), which is headed by a Communist secretary general. An example of apparent Communist interference of this sort was the almost complete suppression in Caracas newspapers of a United Press International news story concerning a feud between Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro and the Cuban Communists in late May 1959. Subsequent investigation indicated the possibility that the story had been removed surreptitiously from newspaper wireless files.

Anti-Communism has a weak but growing voice in the Venezuelan press. The Catholic press consistently has been the Communists' strongest critic. In addition, several minor dailies and a Caracas weekly humor magazine, *Martín Garabato*, are outspokenly anti-Communist. Because of limited circulation the anti-Communist press is not generally effective in counterbalancing pro-Communist propaganda in the Venezuelan press as a whole. A Catholic-oriented anti-Communist newspapermen's organization formed in July 1959, the National Organization of Democratic Newspapermen (*Organización Nacional de Periodistas Democráticos—ONPD* or ONAPED), wields little real power in comparison to the AVP. Beginning in mid-1959 articles critical of the Communists became increasingly apparent in some of the leading Caracas dailies, including the Capriles papers (*Ultimas Noticias*, *La Esfera*, and *El Mundo*) and *El Universal*.

f. PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES—Sporadic and generally *ad hoc* preparations for armed guerrilla action were made by the PCV during 1958 when the *Junta de Gobierno* was ruling Venezuela. These plans, which were never put into effect, were aimed mainly at protecting the provisional government against rightist attempts to seize power and at providing a base for clandestine PCV activity in the event of a successful rightist coup. During the several crises which threatened the provisional government during 1958, it was revealed that the

~~SECRET~~

NND 011188

Box 295

PAGE 57-13

DOC: #351

Page 17 of 38

PCV had hidden caches of arms, including pistols, rifles, and "Molotov cocktails," destined for use against counterrevolutionaries in case nonmilitary defenses failed. The Party instructed key members how to patrol streets at such times.

Late in 1958 PCV leaders discussed plans to organize a permanent secret guerrilla force whose primary mission allegedly would be to aid in the repelling of invasion and/or coup attempts, and whose secondary mission would be to stand in readiness to support the Party in its struggle for power. The organization of such a guerrilla force was begun on a small scale in the Caracas area in March 1959. A Revolutionary Guerrilla Committee (*Comité Revolucionario de Comandos*—CRC) was set up as a covert subcommittee of the PCV Central Committee. Although the CRC and its subsidiary groups have no overt connection with the Party, their membership is composed of persons selected from PCV cells, most of whom operate under pseudonyms in the clandestine organization. It is believed that overall control of the CRC rests with Eduardo Machado Morales, a member of the Politburo. The national commander is Douglas Bravo, who is also propaganda secretary of the Federal District Regional Committee.

Training exercises for guerrilla commanders include instruction in street fighting, sabotage, determination of strategic locations, weapons handling, principles of guerrilla warfare, and political theory. Small-scale field maneuvers have been conducted in the hills surrounding Caracas. The future commanders are expected to orient themselves geographically with the coastal mountains between Puerto Cabello and Higuerote, which traverse Caracas, and with the area around Cumaná. Guerrilla training activities so far have for the most part been limited to the Caracas area. Special short courses in guerrilla tactics were given to groups of Communist leaders from the interior of Venezuela in April 1959, and similar courses were planned for later the same year; it is indicated, therefore, that the Party hopes to develop at least a skeletal guerrilla organization in the outlying regions of Venezuela. According to Party leaders, the specific aims of the guerrilla organization are 1) to counterattack in the event of an amphibious invasion of Venezuela by followers of ex-dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez; 2) to counterattack in the event of an attempted coup by discontented rightist military elements; 3) on PCV orders, to attack as guerrillas in any part of the country; and 4) to conduct isolated hit-and-run attacks, particularly in city streets, against the police or against other armed organizations.

The Communist guerrilla organization cannot be considered a potent military force at the present time, since it is still in the formative stage and emphasis has been placed on the training of leaders rather than on the recruitment of large units of rank-and-file Communists. Present size of the force reportedly is slightly over 200 men. PCV leaders contend that the primary purpose of their paramilitary organization is to help defend the present democratically-elected government against possible coup or invasion attempts. Nevertheless, their efforts to form the framework of a guerrilla apparatus have been expanded at the same time that they themselves have taken an increasingly antigovernment attitude.

g. OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS — With respect to intermediate and long-range objectives, the Venezuelan Communists seek to impair relations between their country and the United States, to generate pressure on the government to adopt a neutralist policy in the "cold war," and to prepare the way for an eventual revolution by which they would come to power. Since January 1958 the immediate political consideration of the PCV has been to preserve its freedom of action and build a firm base from which to influence democratic administrations in Venezuela. In pursuit of this goal the Communists have emphasized the need for unity among the leading parties and have consistently attempted to portray the PCV as a respectable, national organization differing only in degree from the other major parties of the left.

The Communists have advocated coalition government and guaranteed minority representation in Congress. Other features of the PCV program—extensive social reform, expansion of educational facilities, reduction of living costs, and labor unity—have closely resembled comparable provisions in the programs of the non-Communist parties. A continuing public campaign has been waged by the Communists against Pérez Jiménez sympathizers, and the Party has promised to resist with force any coups attempted against the present government.

The unity theme has prevailed in spite of a growing anti-Communist attitude on the part of the government since Betancourt took office in February 1959. The policy of the Communists in the face of this growing hostility has been changing gradually from moderation to propaganda activity against the government, although it still professes support of constitutional government—despite the fact that PCV leaders reportedly are convinced that the present AD and COPEI leaders are probably their greatest longrun enemies, and represent the political groups with which the PCV would least care to align itself if it were not com-

pelled to do so by circumstances. PCV leaders apparently believe that the present AD policy of hostility toward the PCV is engineered by the "old guard right wing" of the AD, and feel that the younger "left wing" members of the AD are more receptive to their policies and overtures; they attempt to fortify the latter faction whenever possible and to take advantage of any rifts between the two groups. At the same time they attempt to strengthen leftist elements in the COPEI and the URD. The Communists' current outward policy remains one of avoiding extreme disruptive tactics and other actions which may bring on repressive measures from the administration, and of maintaining a façade of official PCV support for the government. While such a policy tends to protect the relatively favorable status which the PCV enjoys at the present time, it also causes the Party to forfeit a certain amount of potential mass appeal; because the PCV program ostensibly differs only slightly from those of the other major political groups, the Party is not a unique attraction for the poor and for other discontented elements of the population. The Party has engaged in a mass propaganda and recruitment campaign which produced dividends in the December 1958 presidential and congressional elections. The campaign has been particularly effective among students and educators, who comprise, along with labor, the principal target groups of the PCV. The propaganda assault has been aided by front organizations, the most prominent being the Venezuelan branch of the World Peace Council, which have been influential in promoting frequent overseas travel by Venezuelans to attend Sino-Soviet bloc front activities.

The PCV has developed several policies and propaganda themes which complement and are consistent with its doctrine of national unity. Many Venezuelans who have spoken out against Communist influence in government and politics have been labeled by the PCV as *Pérezjimenista* reactionaries bent on destroying political unity and undermining the Venezuelan revolution. This tactic serves the dual purpose of discrediting anti-Communism and demonstrating PCV patriotism and support of the revolution. The PCV has joined the other major parties in campaigning for aid for the underprivileged. It has supported literacy campaigns, slum clearance, and sanitation drives and has formed or joined campaigns to aid labor, small farmers, and Indians. It has participated in neighborhood improvement committees and has succeeded in gaining control of some of them. Agitation for a moratorium on outstanding debts and antispeculation legislation likewise have formed part of the Communist campaign in favor of the poorer classes.

The PCV remains strong in the labor movement, but deprived of the relatively favorable position it occupied during the Pérez Jiménez regime, has lost ground to AD and COPEI labor groups in some areas. In order to forestall the resurgence of a central labor organization oriented toward ORIT,* the PCV has accepted the non-Communist position that Venezuelan labor at the present time should avoid affiliation with either Western-oriented or international Communist labor organizations but maintain liaison with all of them.

In the economic sphere the PCV has followed a nationalist policy which has differed only slightly from those of the other major parties except on the subject of economic aid from the United States. PCV leaders reportedly have said that their Party will fight with all its resources any offers of increased U.S. aid. For the sake of political unity the PCV has not agitated for the immediate nationalization of the Venezuelan oil industry, but has called for revision of existing petroleum and iron ore agreements to provide Venezuela with a greater share of the profits, a state-owned National Petroleum Corporation to compete with the foreign oil companies, and a state monopoly for the internal handling and marketing of refined petroleum products. The PCV holds that no new petroleum or iron ore concession should be granted. It has propagandized only mildly in favor of increased trade between Venezuela and the Soviet bloc, mainly because the bloc is not in a position to absorb large quantities of petroleum—Venezuela's main export.

Beginning in mid-1959 the PCV has campaigned actively for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the U.S.S.R. and other Sino-Soviet bloc countries. (Relations between Venezuela and the U.S.S.R. were maintained from March 14, 1945 until June 13, 1952, when they were severed, and the Venezuelan-Soviet Cultural Institute was closed by the Pérez Jiménez government. Later in June 1952 relations with Czechoslovakia were also broken; since that time Venezuela has exchanged diplomatic missions with no bloc country.) However, according to Héctor Mújica, prominent Communist and director of the Central University School of Journalism, the question of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the Soviet bloc is not now a primary issue in the eyes of the PCV and will not be pressed by that Party. Apparently the Communists do not want

* *Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores* (Inter-American Regional Workers Organization), Latin American affiliate of the non-Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ICFTU.

NND 011188

Box 295

DOC: #351

Page 19 of 38

PAGE 57-15

~~SECRET~~

to create a controversy over the question at the present time.

One of the PCV's foremost objectives is the aggravation of relations between Venezuela and the United States. Its main tactics in this respect are the encouragement of nationalist sentiment among Venezuelans, use of the theme that the United States favors dictators in Latin America, and espousal of the theory that Latin America's ills are a result of American "imperialist" exploitation. A recent target of PCV attacks has been the United States Military Missions in Venezuela, which the Party seems intent upon driving out of the country. Frequent articles in *Tribuna Popular* demand the expulsion of the missions.

h. INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS — The PCV traditionally has been closely attuned to the policies and directives of the Soviet Government. Liaison between the Venezuelan Communists and leaders in the Soviet Union has been particularly close since late 1957, when Russian leaders reportedly expressed concern over the lack of coordination within the Communist movement in Latin America and determined to provide more immediate guidance to the movement. Guidance to PCV leaders and coordination have been effected for the most part by travel on an increasing scale of Venezuelan Communists to the U.S.S.R. and to other bloc countries, including Communist China. PCV leaders also have traveled to other Latin American countries, where they have consulted with Soviet diplomats and with other non-Venezuelan Communists. Similar international contacts have been undertaken by the Communists at the student level. Possible Soviet use of Latin American Communist exiles as couriers and as advisers to the PCV was revealed with the arrest of Guatemalan Communist José Manuel Fortuny in Rio de Janeiro in October 1958. After an extended stay in the Soviet Union and a tour through Brazil and Uruguay, Fortuny was arrested en route to Caracas, where reportedly he was to work with the PCV in the final phase of the electoral campaign.

At a meeting of Latin American delegates at the celebration in Moscow commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution in November 1957, provisions were apparently made for cooperation and coordination of effort between the Communist parties of Latin America and for more frequent travel of Party leaders to the U.S.S.R. The then-clandestine PCV was represented at the meeting by Oscar T. Merchant. Early in 1958, after the PCV had gained *de facto* legal status, the Party hastened to expand its international contacts. In March 1958 PCV leader Eduardo Machado went to Mexico for a secret meeting of Middle American Communist parties. In June 1958 PCV

Secretary General Jesús Faria and Eduardo Machado went to Mexico, where they consulted with Mexican Communist leaders and with officials of the Soviet Embassy. The two PCV leaders proceeded to Moscow where, among other things, they reportedly conferred with Soviet leaders on the possibility of the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations between Venezuela and the U.S.S.R.

Probably the most important consultations between PCV leaders and Soviet and other foreign Communist leaders since the beginning of the PCV's postrevolutionary expansion occurred during and after the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), held in Moscow January 27-February 5, 1959. The congress was attended by a top-level Venezuelan delegation headed by National Secretariat member Pompeyo Márquez. Also on the delegation were Alonso Ojeda Olaechea, at that time a member of the Politburo and now also reportedly a member of the National Secretariat; Pedro Ortega Díaz, a member of the Politburo; and Pedro Gutiérrez of the Central Committee. Directly following the congress a special meeting of Latin American delegates was held in Moscow, presided over by two officials of the CPSU. At the meeting the necessity for greater coordination among Latin American Communist parties and between these parties and the U.S.S.R. was reiterated by the Soviet officials. Other subjects stressed at the meeting were the need for Latin American Communists to adapt themselves to and identify with national movements reflecting the legitimate aspirations of the people of Latin America, and, as an extension of the unity principle, the policy of forging a common front with nationalist and anti-imperialist movements.

PCV policies since the 21st CPSU Congress have coincided with the broad principles laid down at the special meeting for Latin American Communists. In line with the call for increased cooperation between Communist parties in Latin America, Venezuelan leaders are reportedly among the chief coordinators of a vast plan of Communist action in Latin America. The PCV has participated in other cooperative efforts, including a conference of Latin American Communist leaders in Santiago, Chile which was designed to coincide with the August 1959 meeting there of American foreign ministers and with a leftist propaganda rally sponsored by the Chilean Popular Action Front (*Frente de Acción Popular*—FRAP) (see NIS 89, CHAPTER V, SECTION 55, under Domestic Policies). Unity of action with non-Communist parties—another tenet of the 21st CPSU Congress meetings—has, as previously discussed, long been espoused by PCV. (For a more extensive coverage of the PCV national

unity policy, see above, under Objectives and Tactics.) The PCV stands as a prominent example of the successful implementation of still another recommendation at the Moscow meetings—the identification of Latin American Communist parties with national movements. The PCV has been strikingly successful in depicting itself as a strictly Venezuelan product, free of obligations to foreign (i.e. Soviet) masters, which acts only in the interests of the Venezuelan people. In its propaganda the PCV repeatedly denies that it is a foreign-dominated party. Typical in this respect is the following excerpt from an indoctrination essay by Guillermo García Ponce:

It is infamy to say that the Communist Party is an organization at the service of a foreign power. The Communist Party is a national party, a Venezuelan party, a party of true patriots. Our policies and our program are decided by Venezuelan Communists in order to serve the interests of Venezuela. Those who say that our party is not a national party are those who lie in order to put themselves in the good graces of a foreign power: the United States. We Communists are not intimidated by the calumnies of the servants of American policy in our country. Bolivar was also accused of being a "foreign agent," and it was said that Francisco de Miranda was an "agent of England." We Communists do not deny that we are united with the working classes of all countries, and with all the communist parties of the world, by the bonds established by a common ideological fountain, by the science of Marxism and Leninism, and by the sacred principles of the international solidarity of the proletariat. But this does not conflict with our status as a national party, a Venezuelan party, a party which places the sacred welfare of our country above any other interest.

2. Principal target groups

a. POLITICAL PARTIES—In its dealings with other political parties the PCV has placed great emphasis on the national unity theme, which originated with the *Junta Patriótica*, the multi-party organization which directed clandestine operations against the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship during the months preceding Pérez' ouster. By calling for a spirit of cooperation between Communists and the major political parties and by emphasizing its avowed role as a legitimate Venezuelan party free from international encumbrances, the PCV has attempted to gain important positions in and out of government for its members and supporters, and to influence the policies of the non-Communist parties. Concomitantly, it has sought a large popular electoral vote in an effort to realize its aspiration of becoming a party with a base sufficiently large to qualify it as a major factor in Venezuelan politics. During 1958 when the Government Junta was in power, several Com-

munist and pro-Communists succeeded in gaining high positions in the government. The PCV failed, however, in its efforts to bring about a single unity candidate for president supported by itself and the three major non-Communist parties. President Betancourt subsequently refused to cooperate with the Communists or include them in his government, and the influence of the PCV in ruling circles declined markedly compared to what it had been under the Government Junta.

During the early postrevolutionary period the Communists were aided in their unity drive by the fact that many Venezuelans felt the country owed its liberty to interparty cooperation and feared that the resurgence of factionalism would compromise the revolution. Many influential non-Communists were willing to work with the PCV and belittled the Communist danger because they believed that most PCV members constituted a peculiar breed of "home-grown" Communists whose primary allegiance rested with Venezuela rather than with the Soviet Union. The fact that many of the top PCV command are from wealthy families and have social and blood ties with prominent non-Communists undoubtedly contributed to the complete freedom to proselyte and engage in propaganda which the Communists enjoyed during the period of the Government Junta.

Although no avowed PCV or known sympathizers were given cabinet posts during the period of the provisional government, several Communists and pro-Communists were appointed by the Junta to public offices at lower levels, especially to technical positions in the Ministry of Education and the autonomous government institutes, such as the National Agrarian Institute (*Instituto Nacional Agrario*), the Agriculture and Cattle Bank (*Banco Agrícola y Pecuario*), the National Institute of Sanitation Works (*Instituto Nacional de Obras Sanitarias*), the Venezuelan Social Security Institute (*Instituto Venezolano de Seguridad Social*), the Venezuelan Children's Council (*Consejo Venezolano del Niño*), and the Venezuelan Development Corporation (*Corporación Venezolana de Fomento*). Communists were also represented on the electoral law and agrarian reform law drafting committees and were appointed to the Supreme Electoral Council. While some of these Communists and pro-Communists still hold their jobs, they are slowly being weeded out by the Betancourt regime.

Unity in the strictly political sense between the PCV and the major non-Communist parties showed signs of wearing thin toward the end of 1958. In August Betancourt announced that the AD, the URD, and the COPEI had decided against a post-election popular front government with Communist participation, and in October the same three parties signed the "Punto Fijo" pact by which they agreed

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NND 011188

Box 295

PAGE 57-17

DOC: #351

Page 21 of 38

to run separate slates in the December elections and guaranteed a postelection coalition government which, by implication, would not include the PCV. (See this Chapter, SECTION 53, A. General, for details.)

The PCV showing in the December 1958 presidential election did not live up to Communist expectations. The URD candidate, Larrazábal, whom the Communists finally decided to back, lost the election to Betancourt by nearly 400,000 votes, and the PCV failed to increase its share of the total vote over what it had been in the last free presidential election in 1947. (See FIGURE 57-2, a table, showing PCV electoral strength in 1947 and 1958.) However, the Communists made a good show of strength in the December legislative elections. They received nearly twice as many congressional votes as presidential votes and made the second-best showing of any party in the Federal District, where they received more votes than the AD and were topped only by the URD. They received 2 seats in the Senate out of a total of 51, and 7 seats in the Chamber of Deputies out of a total of 133. The Senate seats were occupied by Jesús Faria and Pompeyo Márquez, PCV secretary general and national secretary, respectively. Elected to the lower chamber were Gustavo Machado Morales, Guil-

lermo García Ponce, Eloy Torres, Héctor Rodríguez Bauza, Joaquín Araujo Ortega, Eduardo Machado Morales, and Pedro Ortega Díaz. (For distributions of the Communist vote in the 1958 elections, see FIGURE 57-3, a map.)

Of particular significance in the PCV voting pattern in the 1958 elections were 1) the excess of the PCV's congressional votes over its presidential votes; and 2) its show of strength in the Federal District congressional election. Among the reasons for the comparatively small PCV vote for President were the intense campaign conducted by the Catholic Church against the PCV and Betancourt's wide popular appeal. Although the larger Communist congressional vote has not been fully explained, it is apparent that most of the excess votes came from the fringe of new and undisciplined voters from the lower classes, who, although not PCV members, were attracted by the individual appeal of many of the politically experienced PCV candidates and by the social welfare and neighborhood improvement activities of the Communists in slum areas. The latter factor was of particular importance in the Caracas area, which has a "new" population estimated at 60,000 adult persons, most of them penniless, who migrated to the capital after January 1958.

FIGURE 57-2. ELECTORAL STRENGTH OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA, 1947 AND 1958

AREA	TOTAL PCV VOTE			PCV PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VENEZUELAN VOTE, BY AREA			PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PARTY VOTE, BY AREA		
	Presidential election Dec. 7, 1958	National Congress elections Dec. 7, 1958	Presidential election Dec. 14, 1947	Presidential election Dec. 7, 1958	National Congress elections Dec. 7, 1958	Presidential election Dec. 14, 1947	Presidential election Dec. 7, 1958	National Congress elections Dec. 7, 1958	Presidential election Dec. 14, 1947
Distrito Federal.....	29,997	71,425	6,762	6.9	16.5	3.3	35.5	44.4	18.5
Anzoátegui.....	4,730	8,520	2,324	3.2	5.9	5.1	5.6	5.3	6.3
Apure.....	385	547	115	1.0	1.4	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.3
Aragua.....	4,616	8,002	960	4.1	7.3	2.1	5.5	5.0	2.6
Barinas.....	569	915	110	1.2	2.0	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.3
Bolívar.....	1,584	2,977	186	2.0	3.9	0.8	1.9	1.9	0.5
Carabobo.....	3,261	6,393	1,216	2.4	4.7	1.8	3.9	4.0	3.3
Cojedes.....	223	316	157	0.3	1.2	1.4	0.3	0.2	0.5
Falcón.....	3,400	5,123	1,613	2.6	4.0	3.5	4.0	3.2	4.5
Guárico.....	1,350	1,985	336	1.5	2.3	1.1	1.6	1.2	0.9
Lara.....	6,244	7,971	4,295	3.3	4.3	4.9	7.4	5.0	11.7
Mérida.....	525	739	327	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.9
Miranda.....	4,936	9,853	836	2.9	6.0	1.2	5.8	6.1	2.3
Monagas.....	2,248	3,138	494	2.5	3.5	1.2	2.7	2.0	1.3
Nueva Esparta.....	412	562	361	1.1	1.5	1.8	0.5	0.3	1.0
Portuguesa.....	2,077	2,503	1,549	2.9	3.5	5.9	2.5	1.5	4.2
Sucre.....	2,828	3,721	1,943	1.8	2.5	2.6	3.3	2.3	5.3
Táchira.....	665	903	391	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.6	1.0
Trujillo.....	1,214	1,743	1,072	0.9	1.4	1.7	1.4	1.1	2.9
Yaracuy.....	1,857	2,180	1,240	2.7	3.2	3.2	2.2	1.3	3.5
Zulia.....	11,102	20,961	10,147	3.3	6.3	8.4	13.1	13.0	27.7
Amazonas.....	55	94	143	1.6	2.8	2.8	0.1	0.1	0.5
Delta Amacuro.....	173	215	10	1.3	1.7	0.7	0.2	0.1	insig
Total.....	84,451	160,791	36,587	*3.1	*6.0	*3.1	100.0	100.0	100.0

* National average.

NND 011188

Box 295

DOC: #351

Page 22 of 38




FIGURE 57-3. DISTRIBUTION, BY STATE, OF THE ELECTORAL VOTE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA FOR THE NATIONAL CONGRESS, DECEMBER 1958

The situation of the Communists was sharply altered by the installation of the popularly-elected AD coalition government under Betancourt. In his inaugural address on February 13, 1959, Betancourt announced that although the civil liberties of the Communists would be respected by his administration, PCV members would be barred from positions in the government. The coalition cabinet appointed by Betancourt contained representatives from the AD, the URD, and the COPEI, and some independents, but no known Communists. During the early months of the Betancourt regime the Ministry of Interior engaged in mild harassment of the PCV, mainly by interfering with PCV rallies, and there was evidence of a general tighten-

ing of the government's policy toward Communists. In November 1959 the regime's position against Communist participation in the government was reiterated. Some PCV leaders and other political observers reportedly felt that Betancourt and his AD and COPEI supporters, by their anti-Communist statements and actions, were deliberately trying to provoke the PCV to such an extent that it would attack the administration publicly and thus shatter its unity facade. It was not believed, however, that Betancourt would go so far as to outlaw the PCV, since he had stated several times in the past that he supported the legitimate right of that party to operate in Venezuela as a legal organ and that the banning of Communist parties was



not an effective method of combatting Communism in Latin American countries.

b. YOUTH AND STUDENTS—Youth and student groups appear to be one of the targets of highest priority for the Communists in Venezuela. Under the seasoned leadership of "professional students" in their middle and late twenties, PCV's youth wing, *Juventud Comunista de Venezuela*, has become one of the most powerful and influential young Communist groups in the Western Hemisphere, in terms of both its size relative to that of its parent organization, and its impact on Venezuelan politics and government. Its influence was demonstrated vividly during the visit of U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon to Caracas in May 1958, when Communist student leaders formed the nuclei of several of the anti-Nixon demonstrations. The principal long-term Communist aims in the student field appear to be the preservation of respectability through cooperation of the JCV with the youth movements of the AD, the COPEI, and the URD; the formation and expansion of future PCV cadres through concentrated indoctrination in Marxist ideology; and the dissemination of concentrated anti-U.S. and pro-Soviet propaganda among student and other youth groups.

In many instances the JCV tactic of cooperation with non-Communist student groups, particularly in the field of protest demonstrations, has been more successful than have PCV unity tactics at the Party level. The JCV, together with the youth organizations of the AD, the COPEI, the URD, and two minor political groups, Republican Integration (*Integración Republicana*—IR) and the Socialist Workers' Party (*Partido Socialista de Trabajadores*—PST), signed a unity pact in November 1958 pledging, among other things, the maintenance of a political truce and a ban on political factionalism. The participation of the Communists in the youth pact was altogether at variance with the policy followed by the AD, the URD, and the COPEI parent organizations of excluding the PCV from the unity pact signed earlier the same month.

Communist influence among students is greatest in Caracas, especially at Central University. Although the AD apparently has developed the strongest influence among the university's 12,000 students, the Communists are believed to have a student following nearly equal to that of the AD. Moreover, the Communist following is a better disciplined group. The Communists are active on the executive council of the Federation of University Centers (*Federación de Centros Universitarios*—FCU), the university's politically influential student organization, and were largely responsible for the FCU's decision in July 1958 to join the

Communist-run International Union of Students (IUS). A Communist, Germán Lairer, is vice president of FCU. With respect to the Federations of Student Centers at the other three national universities, the Communists appear to rate second in strength at the University of Zulia (in Maracaibo), but are weaker than the COPEI and the URD at the University of the Andes (in Mérida) and the University of Carabobo (in Valencia). At the elections held at the Central University in mid-1959 for student representatives to the student-faculty electoral body (*claustró*), which in turn elects the rector, the Communists won 33% of the popular vote; the AD received 34%, the COPEI 14%, the Independents 16%, and the URD 3%.

Communists and pro-Communists gained control of the arrangements committees of and the Venezuelan delegation to the FCU-sponsored Third Latin American Student Congress held in Caracas September 6-15, 1959, attended by representatives of 19 Latin American countries, Puerto Rico, the National Student Association of the United States, the international non-Communist student organization COSEC (Coordinating Secretariat for National Student Unions), the Catholic international student group, *Pax Romana*, and the Communist IUS. Although in itself the congress was not a Communist conclave, the Communists who dominated the Venezuelan organizers apparently honed to use it as a Communist propaganda forum. The credentials committee, organizing committee, and directive board of the congress all showed favoritism to foreign Communist delegations and attempted to ensure the recognition of pro-Communist factions of delegations which were split. Central University FCU President Héctor Pérez Marcano, leftist member of the AD youth organization who acted as president of the congress, supported the Communists at every opportunity and was instrumental in the theft of cables sent from Colombia to the anti-Communist Colombian delegation supporting its stand for recognition. Although a majority of the delegates to the congress probably were pro-Communist, the Venezuelan Communists were not wholly satisfied with the results of the gathering, since a minority of anti-Communist delegations succeeded in making themselves heard and disrupted many of the tactics of the organizers.

The influence of Communist thinking on the policies of the non-Communist youth groups is demonstrated in the public pronouncements of these organizations, which repeatedly duplicate PCV and JCV propaganda themes. For example, youth reports published by the AD and the URD in March 1959 repudiated a proposed visit of Puerto Rico Governor Luis Muñoz Marín to Venezuela, called for the formation of a front to struggle against

"colonialism" and "imperialism," mentioned the "dangers of turning over natural resources to imperialistic trusts," and supported the Communist-sponsored Seventh World Festival of Democratic Youth in Vienna. While the extreme positions taken by AD and URD youth groups are to some extent the result of Communist propaganda and infiltration, they also reflect a common attitude among young Latin American ultranationalistic intellectuals who mistrust and resent the predominant political and economic position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. The AD Youth Bureau itself has repeatedly denied that it is Communist-oriented. Whatever the derivations of the policies of AD and other non-Communist youth groups may be, it is apparent that many of the objectives of these organizations coincide with the goals of the PCV.

C. EDUCATORS AND INTELLECTUALS — Communist influence among student groups is complemented by strong PCV representation among educators and intellectuals. At the university faculty level Communist penetration is highest at the Central University, the most prominent Party member being Héctor Mújica, director of the school of journalism, and José Vicente Scorza, dean of the college of sciences. Other Communist professors include Federico Brito Figueroa, Luis Aníbal Gómez, Raúl Agudo Freitas, and Pedro Beroes of the journalism school; A. D. Boelli of the biology school; J. B. Sojo and Antonio Estévez of the music school; and Pedro Esteban Mejía Alarcón, J. M. Sánchez Mijares, Francisco Mieres, and Gladys Trujillo Moreno of the economics school; Federico Montenegro, J. R. Núñez Tenorio, Nicolás Curiel, and Pedro Duno of the college of humanities; Simón Muñoz Armas and Rafael Angel Barreto of the school of medicine, and Luis J. Mota Potentini of the school of dentistry. The rector of Central University, Francisco de Venanzi, was elected with AD and Communist student support. De Venanzi has tolerated and often encouraged the activities of politically volatile students and has been accused of being "soft" on Communism. Elsewhere, the teaching staffs of the University of the Andes in Mérida and, to a lesser extent, the University of Zulia in Maracaibo include a number of Communists.

At the secondary school level, Communists are active in the Venezuelan Teachers' Federation (*Federación Venezolana de Maestros—FVM*); there are 2 PCV members of the 17-man directorate of this organization, along with 9 members from the AD, 4 from the COPEI and 2 URD representatives. At the *Liceo Andrés Bello*, Caracas' largest lyceum, 12 of the 70 teachers are reported to be Communists or pro-Communists.

d. LABOR — Like youth and student elements, organized labor is reported to be one of the PCV's most important target groups. Operating from a position of strength in the immediate postrevolutionary labor scene, the Communists maintained their national policy of unity in their dealings with labor elements and thereby gained respectability. In spite of setbacks in some areas, the PCV has succeeded in holding control over large segments of Venezuelan labor. The Party's labor strength is far below that of the AD, but equals or surpasses that of the COPEI and the URD in many areas. The labor organizations of the AD, the COPEI, and the URD are growing, however, and the PCV is hard-pressed to prevent inroads by these groups.

At the time of the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez the Communist leaders appeared to be in a most favorable position to win control over Venezuelan labor. During the Pérez Jiménez regime severe repressive measures were taken against most AD and COPEI labor unions. In contrast, the government's attitude toward certain Communist unions was relatively lenient; these unions were even allowed to maintain open contact with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the Confederation of Latin American Workers (*Confederación de Trabajadores de la América Latina—CTAL*), Communist international labor organizations, throughout the period of the dictatorship. The Pérez Jiménez regime also employed "former" Communist leaders in the government-sponsored unions with which it sought to replace those which had been repressed. The explanation given was that these Communists were useful informants. It is also notable that the regime feared the AD more than it did Communism and was willing to use Communist hostility toward the AD for its own ends. Notwithstanding the strong position of the PCV in the labor field at the time of the January 1958 revolution, the return from exile of AD leaders who had improved their skills and reputations in a number of ORIT posts abroad and who had worked closely with their clandestine AD labor organizations in Venezuela soon led to the reestablishment of AD predominance in organized labor.

Of the estimated 2,000,000 Venezuelans in the labor force, slightly more than 1,000,000 are organized. Most of them now belong to unions and federations in the AD-dominated Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (*Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos—CTV*), which was reorganized and expanded at a trade union congress in November 1959. After the congress the CTV claimed a membership of 1,100,000, including 700,000 industrial and commercial workers, and 400,000 agricultural workers organized into 1,250 rural associations. Nine industrial federations and 22 regional federations comprise the CTV affiliates. Of the

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NND 011188

Box 295

PAGE 57-21

DOC: #351

Page 25 of 38

more than 900 delegates attending the November trade union congress, 20% were PCV members. This was greater than the number of delegates representing either the COPEI or the URD (13% each), but less than half the number of AD delegates, who comprised 54% of the total number of participants. However, the number of PCV delegates from the vital Federal District area equaled that of the AD. The PCV and the AD each claimed 75 delegates from the Federal District; the URD claimed 53 delegates and the COPEI 30. Of the top officers elected at the congress 10 are affiliated with the AD, 5 with the PCV, and 4 each with the COPEI, and the URD. Thus, the PCV emerged from the congress as a strong minority force capable of exerting considerable influence on Venezuelan labor, particularly in the event the two other minority parties should agree to cooperate with the Communists in order to challenge the AD leadership.

Although the Communists do not exert a preponderant influence on the CTV, they are powerful in several influential federations and in numerous union organizations through Venezuela. Their strongest position is in the Federation of Workers of the Federal District and the State of Miranda (*Federación de Trabajadores del Distrito Federal y Estado de Miranda*), with a claimed membership of 250,000, where they have 3 out of 12 positions on the executive committee, including that of secretary general, and 9 out of 35 on the central executive council. This organization was set up in 1959 and replaced the AD Trade Union Center of Workers of the Federal District and the State of Miranda (*Central Sindical de Trabajadores del Distrito Federal y Estado Miranda*), the COPEI Pro-Federation Committee of Organized Workers of Venezuela (*Comité Pro-Federación de Trabajadores Organizados de Venezuela—COFETROV*), and the "Black" Communist Federation of Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda (*Federación de Trabajadores del Distrito Federal y Estado Miranda*). The Communists are also active in the important Federation of Venezuelan Petroleum Workers (*Federación de Trabajadores Petroleros de Venezuela—FEDEPETROL*), but have lost strength there since the fall of the Pérez Jiménez regime. As of early 1960 Communists constituted the largest faction in 7 out of 42 member unions of FEDEPETROL, but in only 1 of these, the Union of Petroleum Workers and Employees of Maracaibo (*Sindicato de Empleados y Obreros Petroleros de Maracaibo—SEOP*), did they command an absolute majority of the membership.

The lessening of PCV strength in the petroleum industry since the revolution stems from the termination of the relatively favorable position enjoyed by the PCV in petroleum workers' unions under Pérez Jiménez and from the postrevolution-

ary resurgence of the AD and the COPEI, which have made inroads into areas where the Communists formerly were dominant. Significant AD gains have been made at PCV expense among the oil workers at Cabimas, Lagunillas, and other areas along the eastern shore of Lake Maracaibo in the state of Zulia, and among the refinery workers in the state of Falcón. The most important COPEI gains have been made in the strategically important refining area on the Paraguaná Peninsula in western Venezuela. The PCV, nevertheless, remains a strong minority force among the petroleum workers—second in influence only to the AD. This was evidenced by the federation's national convention in August 1958. Out of 243 delegates, 38 were either Communists or had records of Communist activities. Two PCV Central Committee members, Luis Emiro Errieta and César Millán, were elected to the 10-man federation directorate as organization secretary and assistant organization secretary, respectively. PCV members occupy important positions in the oil workers' union in the Anaco-El Tigre section of eastern Venezuela and are active in the Amuay refinery in the west.

Among other union groups in which the Communists have influence are the Graphic Arts Federation (*Federación de Trabajadores de la Industria Gráfica—FETIG*), where they are strong in 2 of the organization's 10 affiliates; the Federal District automobile workers' union (membership: 900), whose 9-man directorate contains 7 Communists; the union of workers of the General Motors' plant in the Caracas area; and the metal workers', construction workers', and radio and television workers' unions in the Caracas area.

e. RURAL LEAGUES—In outlying districts the PCV is active in *ligas campesinas* (rural leagues) which have been set up throughout Venezuela to deal with rural problems at the local level. The Party attempts to infiltrate those leagues already in operation and encourages and takes part in the establishment of leagues where they do not exist. The PCV has had little success in this field, but it is known that the Party controls a few of the *ligas campesinas*. The great majority of the leagues, however, are controlled by the AD and, to a lesser extent, by the URD.

Communist propaganda in these rural organizations centers around agrarian reform. A propaganda outlet for PCV demands for an extensive agrarian reform law was provided at the First Venezuelan Farmers' Congress (*Primer Congreso Campesino de Venezuela*) in late May and early June of 1959. Although the congress was controlled by the AD, Communists were active during the proceedings, and PCV National Secretariat member Alonso Ojeda Oleachea and 1 other Com-

munist were elected to the 13-man executive committee of the Farmers' Federation of Venezuela (*Federación Campesina de Venezuela*). After the government-sponsored agrarian reform bill was published in May 1959, it was criticized by the Communists and their sympathizers as being too mild and favoring the propertied classes.

f. CIVIC IMPROVEMENT COMMITTEES — Communists have succeeded in gaining control of some civic improvement committees, particularly in the Caracas area, and have thus been able in these cases to take credit for the efforts of these organizations in the fields of slum clearance, sanitation, and neighborhood improvement. The committees generally are called pro-improvement, pro-defense, or pro-development juntas (*juntas pro-mejoras, pro-defensa, o pro-fomento*); they are often grouped into loose federations. Although many of the committees are dominated by Communists and active sympathizers with the Party, most of them remain under the control of the AD and the other two major non-Communist parties. The PCV attempts to infiltrate these non-Communist groups wherever possible. According to one PCV leader, the improvement committees constitute one of the Party's most useful tools in its attempts to become the vanguard of the masses. Participation by Communists in neighborhood activities lends credence, in the eyes of many, to PCV claims that the Party is genuinely interested in the welfare of the Venezuelan people, and is on the side of the underprivileged classes. Widespread Communist activity in civic improvement committees in the Caracas slum areas is believed to have been partially responsible for the large PCV congressional vote in the Caracas area in the December 1958 elections.

3. Principal front groups

Communist front groups in Venezuela include a peace committee with a women's auxiliary, some rural organizations and civic improvement committees (see above, under Principal Target Groups), women's groups, and exile groups from the Dominican Republic, Portugal, and Spain. In general, however, these groups are relatively undeveloped in nature and lack the sophistication of organizational and operational pattern found in the front groups of some other Latin American countries and of the countries of western Europe. Three of the groups discussed below have been in existence for a year or less, and definitive information in depth is either spotty or unavailable on all. In addition, the PCV is attempting to form single youth and labor fronts. Although to date it has been unsuccessful in this endeavor, it has been able to penetrate existing student and labor organi-

zations to such an extent that they often follow the Communist line and participate in Soviet bloc front activities overseas.

a. VENEZUELAN COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY — This organization (*Comité Venezolano por la Paz y Democracia*—CVPD) is affiliated with the World Peace Council (WPC), an international Communist front, and participates in the activities of the parent organization. It was forced to curtail its activities during the last few years of the Pérez Jiménez regime, but expanded its operations considerably after the January 1958 revolution. The president of the committee is Gen. José Rafael Galbadón, an elderly eccentric. Although Galbadón himself is not an avowed Communist, many of the most active leaders of the committee, including well-known intellectual Carlos Augusto León and Dr. José María Sánchez Mijares, are PCV members. Galbadón and León became full members of the WPC in August 1958. The Peace Committee generally parrots the Soviet propaganda line on such subjects as atomic test suspension, disarmament, and coexistence, and sometimes also adopts causes which, although not closely aligned with Soviet foreign policy objectives, are attractive to many idealists and liberal intellectuals. One of the committee's main propaganda objectives is the transformation of Latin America into a "peace zone" which, in Communist terminology, means an area which maintains a policy of neutrality or nonalignment between East and West. The "peace zone" theme reportedly was a topic of conversation between Galbadón and Soviet Premier Khrushchev in August 1958, and was the subject of a pamphlet issued by Galbadón in early 1959 entitled "Latin America: Peace Zone." Among the essays contained in the pamphlet were articles entitled "Peace, Freedom, Coexistence"; "To Defend Truth is to Work for Peace"; "Berlin, Road to War"; and "Recalling Nixon."

The committee has found it convenient to carry out part of its program through the use of sympathizers in professional societies and women's and students' groups who promote participation in peace front activities by their organizations. The majority of the 20-member Venezuelan delegation to the WPC-sponsored International Disarmament Congress in Stockholm July 16-22, 1958 was composed of members of professional societies rather than of the Peace Committee itself. Represented on the delegation, besides committee members Galbadón, León, and Sánchez, were members of the College of Teachers (*Colegio de Profesores*), the Federal District Medical College (*Colegio Médico del Distrito Federal*), Caracas Radio and Television Workers' Professional Union (*Sindicato Profesional de Trabajadores de la Radio y Televisión*), now defunct, the University Front (*Frente Universitario*)

of the University of Santa María in Caracas, the Union of Venezuelan Women (*Unión de Mujeres Venezolanas*—UMV), the Venezuelan Teachers' Federation (*Federación Venezolana de Maestros*—FVM), the Municipal Council of Guárico (state of Portuguesa), and the Venezuelan Society of Architecture. Members of a support committee for the congress included former *Colegio de Profesores* president Felipe Massiani, Central University law professor Dr. Humberto Cuenca, URD supreme council member Dr. Manuel López Rivas, composer Antonio Estévez, and writer Juan Liscano Velutini. In some cases the WPC has used the propaganda tactic of listing as supporters of its activities leading intellectuals and public figures who actually have no connection with the organization. Other recent international activities of the Peace Committee include attendance by Carlos Augusto León at a meeting of the Bureau of the WPC in Moscow February 21-25, 1959, and the attendance of a Venezuelan delegation at the WPC Tenth Anniversary Meeting in Stockholm May 8-13, 1959. Data have been unavailable to date on the scope and finances of the committee.

b. WOMEN'S MOVEMENT — The Women's Movement for National Liberation and the Fight for Peace (*Movimiento Femenino de Liberación Nacional y de Lucha por la Paz*) is an auxiliary of the Venezuelan Committee for Peace and Democracy. First conceived early in 1959 and formally installed on June 6, 1959, this group does not enjoy much prominence and appears to have little significant influence. General Gabaldón is honorary president, Margot de Briceño is president, and Elsa Braun de Guevara is vice president. Margot de Briceño was on the PCV Central Committee in 1948, but is currently not an acknowledged member of the Party.

c. NATIONAL UNION OF WOMEN — This group (*Unión Nacional de Mujeres*—UNM) is the Communists' principal women's front organization. Largely as successors of the ailing Feminine Cultural Group (*Agrupación Cultural Femenina*—ACF), which had developed into a Communist front during the 1940's there were formed the Union of Venezuelan Girls (*Unión de Muchachas de Venezuela*—UMV) in 1951 and the UNM in 1953, both of which were Communist fronts. The UMV went out of existence in 1953 and many of its members joined the UNM, which became largely defunct in 1954. It was partially revived clandestinely in 1957, with representatives of the URD and the AD appearing among its members. Following the overthrow of the Pérez Jiménez regime, the UNM was reorganized, chiefly through PCV efforts, and achieved limited collaboration from the URD and the AD. The UNM president is Belén San Juan,

a PCV sympathizer. Leading Communists active in this organization are Argelia Lhaya de Martínez, Carmen Quintero, Trina Urbina, Esperanza Vera de Fuentes, and Lucinda Montero de Bravo. The UNM has sent delegations to international Communist women's conferences and to other front meetings in Venezuela and abroad. It is affiliated with the international Communist front Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF). The UNM is particularly active in the poor sections of the Federal District. There are UNM affiliates in the El Sitio, El Ciprés, and Los Eucaliptos sections of Caracas. There are also chapters in some of the states. The group agitates against atomic tests and for world peace, democratic liberties for women, and better living conditions for women and children. Data on size and finances are unavailable.

d. SOCIETY OF FRIENDS OF CHINA — This organization (*Sociedad de Amigos de China*—SAC), first came about in October 1959 when a committee of Communists and fellow travellers, most of whom had visited Communist China during the previous 18 months, was appointed to organize a society to develop political, cultural, and economic ties with Communist China. The formation of the group was designed to coincide with the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic; however, interest was lacking and the actual founding of SAC did not take place until February 20, 1960. The executive committee elected at that time consisted of Dr. Roberto Gabaldón Márquez, a suspected crypto-Communist who is the URD representative on the board of directors of the National Agrarian Institute; Ana Luisa Llovera, an AD newspaperwoman who is president of the AVP and has been associated with Communist fronts in the past; José A. Medina Sánchez, URD senator who is also associated with peace front activities; Dr. Humberto Cuenca, of the AD left wing, president of the Caracas Bar Association, president of the Venezuelan Committee to Defend the Cuban Revolution, and a well-known apologist for Communist China; and Dr. Carlos Augusto León Arocha, a member of the peace front and of the PCV Central Committee. Details are as yet unclear regarding the size of the organization, its techniques of recruitment, its finances, and its methods of operation. Its members appear to be mainly PCV militants, fellow travellers, and Venezuelans who have visited Communist China.

e. VENEZUELAN ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS — This organization of lawyers (*Asociación Venezolana de Juristas Democráticos*—AVJD), which is affiliated with the principal international Communist front organization for the legal profession, the International Association of Democratic

Lawyers (IADL), based in Brussels, was originally formed in 1948. During the next six years it attracted a number of non-Communist members. AVJD participated in Latin American lawyers' conferences in Brazil and Guatemala in the early 1950's but became largely inactive by 1954. In November 1959 a committee consisting of leftist independent Humberto Bello Lozano and Communist lawyers Ada Ramos and José M. Sánchez Mijares was established for the purpose of reviving the organization. In view of its recent revival, little is known about AVJD's size, recruitment techniques, key figures, finances, aims and methods of operation, or its potential degree of influence.

f. FOREIGN COMMUNIST FRONT GROUPS — At least two, and possibly five, groups composed of foreign exiles in Venezuela are Communist fronts. These are the *Libertad para España* (Liberty of Spain), an organization made up of Spanish exiles; the Dominican Patriotic Union of Caracas (*Unión Patriótica Dominicana de Caracas*—UPD), composed of exiles from the Dominican Republic and affiliated with the Caracas-based and pro-Communist Dominican Liberation Movement (*Movimiento de Liberación Dominicana*—MLD), headed by Dr. Carlos Larrazábal Blanco, Dr. Francisco Castellanos, Cecilio Grullón, and Alfonso Canto, who are also members of UPD; the Portuguese Patriotic Junta (*Junta Patriótica Portuguesa*), which has been permitted to use PCV radio and press facilities for its propaganda; and the Nicaraguan Patriotic Union (*Unión Patriótica Nicaragüense*—UPN), which is infiltrated by Communists, one of whom is Armando Amador Flores, the husband of Ana Luisa Llovera, president of the AVP. These groups generally refrain from entering into Venezuelan politics, but occasionally participate in Venezuelan front group activities. For example, in June 1959 representatives of the *Libertad para España*, the UPD, and the Portuguese Patriotic Junta spoke at a rally of the Women's Movement for National Liberation and the Fight for Peace.

Probably the largest of the exile front groups is the *Libertad para España* which was formed in February 1958, ostensibly to serve as a political complement for the non-Communist Exile Committee of the Spanish Republic (*Comité de Exilados de la República Española*). The organization publishes intermittently a bulletin and leaflets which deal mainly with the anti-Franco movement. The unity theme is apparent in these publications: their authors defend the union of all antidictatorial forces. The organization agitates for the abolition of U.S. bases in Spain and the suspension of nuclear tests in order to prevent the "annihilation" of Madrid. Among the founders of the *Libertad para*

España group are Eduardo Ortega y Gasset, 80-year-old brother of the late Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset; Francisco Martos, a Spanish Communist; José Antonio Rial Vázquez, a newspaperman employed by Caracas daily *El Universal*; Teodoro Isarria, also of *El Universal*; Antonio Aparicio, a Communist; Angel Palacio, a Communist who served as a captain under Colonel Enrique Lister, a commander of Communist troops during the Spanish Civil War; Alberto de Paz y Mateos, a theater and film director suspected of being a Communist; Antonio Granado Valdés, Central University art professor and a Socialist; Pascual Pla y Beltrán, Communist writer; Felipe Luis de Vallejo, a painter suspected of being a Communist; and Elfidio Alonso. The organization draws on the estimated 200 members of the Communist Party of Spain living in Caracas.

g. YOUTH AND STUDENT FRONT GROUPS — PCV efforts to promote the formation of single youth and student fronts under Communist control have not been successful to date. In the absence of any significant organization capable of coordinating student organizations throughout Venezuela, the dominant power among students rests with the Federation of University Centers (FCU) of the Central University in Caracas, and this organization, nominally at least, is controlled by the AD youth organization. (See above, under Principal Target Groups.)

Venezuelan student attendance at Communist front activities abroad has been heavy since the January 1958 revolution made such travel possible on a large scale. A large percentage of the students who have participated in such activities have not been avowed Communists; many, however, have been pro-Communists and/or members of the left wing of the AD youth organization. In March 1958 a five-man Venezuelan delegation including Herman Lejter, a close associate of several known Communists, attended the Constitutive Assembly meeting in Stockholm of the International Preparatory Committee for the Seventh World Youth Festival. Four Venezuelans, none of them avowed Communists, attended the Fifth World Congress of IUS in Peiping September 4-13, 1958. The leader of the delegation, Jesús Ramón Carmona (then in AD), was at the time the president of the student body organization (FCU) of Central University. Another Venezuelan student delegation attended an IUS Executive Committee meeting in Lodz, Poland, January 21-25, 1959. A large delegation numbering 234 attended the Seventh World Youth Festival in Vienna July 26-August 4, 1959.

NND 011188

Box 295

DOC: #351

PAGE 57-25

Page 29 of 38

h. LABOR FRONT GROUPS — Communists and their sympathizers in the labor movement maintain contacts with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the principal international Communist labor front, and with its Latin American subsidiary, the Latin American Confederation of Workers (*Confederación de Trabajadores de la América Latina*—CTAL). Venezuelan Communists were active in discussions in Mexico aimed at implementing the decision taken at the 21st CPSU Congress to strive for labor unity through the establishment of a new movement, less blatantly Communist than the CTAL, organized along trade union lines with departments similar to the WFTU international trade departments. If such an organization is established in the future, Venezuelan Communists can be expected to press for affiliation with it by labor groups in their country. During the past two years delegations of Venezuelan labor leaders, including, in some cases, members of non-Communist political parties such as the AD, the URD, and the COPEI, have participated in WFTU-sponsored activities abroad, including the First World Congress of Young Workers in Prague in July 1958; the Second World Conference of the WFTU Trade Union International (TUI) of Agricultural Workers in Bucharest in October 1958; the Third World Congress of Chemical Workers in Petroleum and Related Industries TUI in Leipzig in May 1959; and the WFTU First Conference of the International Commercial Workers TUI in Prague in June 1959.

C. Non-Communist subversion

Non-Communist subversive activity to seize control of government has been almost a constant factor in Venezuelan politics. Since the death of longtime dictator Juan Vicente Gómez (1909-35), there have been successful coups d'état in 1945, 1948, a revolution in 1958, and many unsuccessful attempts at coups before and after 1958. The history of political instability since 1935 has been associated with the rise of militarism and widespread public anxiety during a period of rapid change in the social structure. At present, however, neither civilian nor military conspirators appear to possess the capability to overturn the constitutional regime. The major target areas for seizure during a coup d'état would be the crucial Caracas-Maracay-La Guaira region, in which much of the military force and most of the national economic and political leadership are concentrated, and the important oil areas in Zulia and Anzoátegui states, whose economic activities are so vital to the revenue of the government.

During the period of the recent provisional government (January 23, 1958 to February 13, 1959), the chief source of danger to the government was conspirators in the armed forces. Between the end of January and the beginning of May 1958 the military services were primarily engaged in internal adjustments in leadership and in easing inter-service hostility aroused by conflicting roles of the several services during the long January crisis which ended in the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez. Under the provisional government there were three major crises in relations between the government and the armed forces. The first one was associated with the anger of the armed forces at the ineffective government arrangements for security during Vice President Nixon's May 1958 visit to Caracas (see below, under Role of the Armed Forces in Subversion). The second crisis reflected growing discontent in high military circles with antimilitary propaganda in the press and the "full freedom for all political elements" milieu. At that time, Air Brigadier General Jesús María Castro León, the Minister of Defense, during a cabinet meeting on July 22, 1958, restated the changes in government policy deemed necessary by the armed forces. During a heated debate General Castro then issued a virtual ultimatum. He did not receive any general support from the armed forces, however, and the ultimatum merely resulted in his removal and departure abroad on special mission for the government (i.e., exile). The third major crisis took the form of a stillborn coup d'état attempted September 7, 1958 by officers of the military police school under the leadership of officers on active duty as well as several exiled officers who had secretly returned. Civilian unity and the coalition agreement among the three major non-Communist parties have been major factors in political stability, inasmuch as they represent civilian determination never again to experience such evils of absolutism and of the police state as prevailed under the Gómez and Pérez Jiménez regimes.

Since Betancourt has become President, however, new difficulties have appeared. Information on nearly all aspects of non-Communist subversion in Venezuela has been both nebulous and contradictory, but obviously there continue to be elements among both civilian and military groups who persist in preparing for a coup d'état. Increasingly their activities seem to be related to concurrent efforts supported by exiles formerly with the Pérez Jiménez government. These subversive activities are favorably viewed by the Government of the Dominican Republic, which is also fomenting unrest and the climate of conspiracy in Venezuela. The chief subversive methods currently in use are the clandestine radio, leaflets, rumor on the grand scale, introduction of weapons

in contraband trade, and secret agents (see below, under Civilian Subversive Activities and under Clandestine Organizations). A great deal of money from a few individuals, who may include Pérez Jiménez, the industrialists Antonio Ramia and Jorge Pocaterra, who have recently been suspected, and possibly Dominican dictator Generalissimo Rafael L. Trujillo Molina, is the putative source of financing. These difficulties have been associated both with the activities of *Pérezjimenista* groups and the clandestine Civic-Military Institutional Committee (*Comité Institucionalista Cívico-Militar—CICM*).

Nonetheless, by seizing groups of individuals from time to time and deporting many of them, the authorities have prevented any serious threat to the government. Resort to terrorist tactics—shootings and bombings—during October 1959 and January 1960 have indicated failure of the clandestine groups to obtain support by propagandistic methods. A well-publicized appeal in November 1959 by General Castro León to both the armed forces and civilians in Venezuela to abandon the Betancourt administration has been viewed as a confession of failure to win either civilian or armed forces support. General Castro was, moreover, courtmartialed *in absentia* and retired with loss of all retirement benefits. A number of important barriers to a successful coup exist. *Acción Democrática* is the majority party strongly based in the popular vote and organized labor. It is attempting with considerable success to equate itself with national ideals and aspirations and in so doing has developed its ties with the business community (protected markets), and it is repairing its relations with the armed forces. Coalition government is working, despite inevitable interparty friction, so that no party is known to be lending itself to conspiracy. Civilian democratic representative government is an ideal fervently supported to the point of active common defense by all the political parties, labor organizations, student groups, and economic and professional associations. Negative factors operating against the possibility of a coup d'état are the lack of organized demand by any significant element of the population for recourse to an armed-forces-based government and the absence of an emotionally charged issue which would deprive the AD of its majority support and enable conspirators to justify the overturn of President Rómulo Betancourt's administration. To these civilian-oriented elements of stability should be added the public orientation being given the armed forces by their new leadership. A number of members of the military high command have been expounding to their subordinates and to newly commissioned graduates of service schools the proper

function of the armed forces as an apolitical arm for the defense of the nation and its legally constituted institutions. Moreover, since the 1958 revolution the navy and air force have improved their positions vis-a-vis the previously dominant ground forces and are now less likely to be ready to join a movement for a military takeover at the risk of again becoming subordinated to the larger and traditionally more powerful army.

1. Role of the armed forces in subversion

Despite the current trend toward an apolitical military force, however, Venezuelans are accustomed to seeing the armed forces as a decisive factor in the change of governments. Upon this basis, the general public believes in the possibility of a coup d'état which would necessarily involve the support of all or part of the armed forces. Popular belief in the possibility of a violent overturn of government is accompanied by constant rumor and reinforced by politicians playing upon fears of a coup d'état in the interests of civilian political unity. Non-Communist politicians blame ex-Junta President Rear Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal, now on diplomatic assignment abroad, and even occasionally President Betancourt, for failing to purge the government of all *Pérezjimenistas* and the "residual machinery of the dictatorship." The Communist Party exists, or at least professes to exist, in a state of expectancy—always well publicized—that Venezuela will bring forth a *golpe* (coup d'état), delivered by the military, fathered by *Pérezjimenistas*, and sponsored by the United States Military Missions. Unsubstantiated reports are rife reflecting on the activities and intentions of some high-ranking leaders of the armed forces, including those publicly active on behalf of an apolitical role for the military (see below, under Clandestine Organizations).

Top-ranking military leaders have publicly reacted to the foregoing by stressing the loyalty of the armed forces to the regime and their devotion to an apolitical professional role. Congress in turn responded to the rumor campaign in the last days of its 1959 session by adopting resolutions (in the nature of advice to the Executive) designed to reduce the subversive potential of the armed forces. One resolution called for the "purification" of the armed forces to bring them into harmony with the democratic character of the new Venezuela. Another sought to abolish the military training courses and facilities at the two coeducational military *lycées* in order to make them comparable to other *lycées* so that all Venezuelan *lycée* students may be molded in the same democratic ideals. The jealous concern of Congress over the training of the armed forces even led to a resolution that the military mission agreements with the United

States be revised to include the assimilation of military mission personnel to the status of Venezuelans, subject to Venezuelan taxation and control. Such intervention in military affairs contributed to the state of military opinion prior to the 1948 coup d'etat, which the armed forces justified in part as defense of their institution.

Events since the overthrow of the Pérez Jiménez administration in 1958 have been marked by the gradual removal of military leaders who sought to continue active participation by the armed forces in the formation of government policies and programs and in the offices of government. Some of these men have been sent abroad as ambassadors and attaches or in performance of so-called special missions. Many are exiles because of participation in unsuccessful coups d'etat, because they had been bested in intraservice rivalries, or for having a reputation of being violently anti-AD. A "shake-out" of approximately 200 officers was largely accomplished by October 1958, but the practice continues on a very limited scale. In October 1959 and January 1960 a number of officers suspected of plotting and those who were too openly critical of the administration were subjected to disciplinary action.

Directly related to the outflow and transfer of military figures has been the progressive limitation of the military as a political force. The decisive period in military-civilian rivalry for predominance in the nation is currently viewed as having occurred from May 1958 in the aftermath of the Nixon incident, when United States officials in Caracas refused to acquiesce in Venezuelan military action against the provisional government, through the ouster of Castro León and many of his collaborators in July 1958. The steady movement of the military into the political background has been marked by the crises of July 22 and September 7, 1958 (see above), and by acceptance of the election and inauguration of President Betancourt, an event considered highly improbable as late as August 1958. This development has been accompanied, apparently, by growing accord between President Betancourt and his majority party and the armed forces, the result of attention to the needs of the services and acquiescence in their institutional autonomy. The trend toward separation from the AD of the radical leftwing splinter group under the leadership of Domingo Alberto Rangel should also contribute to more mutual accord between the armed forces and the AD. On April 16, 1959 Betancourt asserted that the "support of the armed forces is resolute and sincere, because their leaders are men of professional and institutional dedication and because the armed forces did not benefit from the dictatorial regime."

Under these circumstances the military conspirator at the present time is sharply limited in his ability to win support.

Nonetheless, the potential for incitement continues. On April 17, 1959 11 civilian *Pérezjime-nistas* were deported to Curaçao for subversive actions, i.e., the circulation in army garrisons of a spurious letter purporting to be from President Betancourt to Lt. Col. Hugo Trejo, whose ambitious democratic politicking had led to his "exile" as ambassador to Costa Rica in May 1958. The gist of this document indicated intention on the part of the civilian regime to impose complete subservience upon the military. During 1959 reports also began to appear that lower-ranking navy officers were discontented with top-ranking navy officers because of the latter's poor relations with their counterparts in the ground forces. Dissatisfaction with the general Venezuelan situation and with Communist growth is also reported among some younger officers in the ground forces, 30 of whom were transferred to interior garrisons in October 1959 as a punitive measure. Continued crises in confidence in the national economy during the latter half of 1959 and early 1960, augmented by the government's lack of finesse in attempted remedial action, have slightly increased the apparently very limited military support for a *golpe*. The evils of the Pérez Jiménez regime were beginning to dim before the daily reminder of visible massive public works of that administration, and the remembered aura of prosperity, as the Betancourt administration struggled to pay inherited debts, to reshape the socio-economic pattern of society and to establish firmly a democratic political process.

2. Civilian subversive activities

Expression of civilian discontent through conspiracy to overturn the government is closely related to the role of the military in society, since civilian groups under present circumstances must subvert the armed forces to accomplish their ends. Dr. Rafael Caldera, chief of the Social Christian Copei Party and president of the Chamber of Deputies in 1959, stated in a speech of June 27, 1959 that:

Venezuelans are so accustomed to seeing the army as a daily factor in their lives, so accustomed to make the army the arbiter of their political contests, that at each moment the most varied groups for the most dissimilar ends attempt to involve the army in new adventures to change our political reality.

Thus, civilian conspiracy directly foments an active political role for the armed forces, and civilian reliance on the armed forces for domestic power plays constitutes civilian militarism. In Vene-

zuela civilian conspirators are found in very conservative antireform circles and among those who strongly supported Pérez Jiménez because they profited by his dictatorship. Many Venezuelans in exile, including both civilian and military figures, are conspiring to return to home and position. On the whole, probably more civilians than military have been exiled, and except for a very limited number of officers, they tend to be wealthier. Centers of conspiracy are reported to exist in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Italy, Spain, New York City, Miami, and Curaçao. The latter locale is alleged to be the major center for joint exile-Dominican Republic collaboration. Each conspiracy uncovered and each period of crisis have resulted in deportation of Venezuelan civilians for conspiracy. One political party, the Venezuelan Federal Organization (*Organización Federal Venezolana*) was discredited and disappeared because its dominant figure and secretary general, Dr. J. M. Romero de Pascuali, was involved in the July 1958 crisis. He has subsequently been charged with continued *Pérezjimenista* activities and has spent considerable time under arrest. When strong suspicion exists without adequate documentation to assure convictions in the courts, measures of exception (*alta policía*) have been invoked consistently by the executive power to decree the detention or exile of civilian conspirators without judicial trial—a practice accepted by the people as necessary to terminate resistance to democratic republican government while Venezuela remains in the shadow of military political influence and forceful overthrow of democratic government.

As has been noted, the inauguration of President Betancourt for a time ended the series of purely military difficulties which had troubled the provisional government. While military conspirators apparently made no attempts during 1959, the arrest, investigation, and exiling of eight officers in January and February 1960 showed that the danger of an attempted military coup was not over. Perhaps no longer a major element in conspiracies, the military, nevertheless, still remain an object for subversion. For the most part, only civilians have been arrested for distribution of antigovernment leaflets, have undergone trial for conspiracy, or have been unceremoniously dumped abroad. Seizure of clandestine radios broadcasting propaganda designed to subvert the armed forces and to excite interparty conflict has led only to the arrest of civilians. Again, civilians are the main figures in contraband arms trade, and only civilians have been identified as terrorists. All evidence points to the fact that some civilian conspirators exist in most sections of the nation and in most sectors of society.

The propaganda themes of civilian conspiratorial groups allege incapacity and immobility of government, growth of social anarchy, and the danger of Communism. All of these themes have formed part of the non-Communist subversives' rumor campaign. Coalition government is attacked by reviving old enmities, stimulating interparty rivalry for government jobs, and arousing fears of eventual AD repression of rival parties as it becomes increasingly predominant. Testimony given in 1959 by members of Pérez Jiménez's National Security Police during preparation of their indictment was damaging to prominent figures, and appears to have been in part an effort by the *Pérezjimenistas* to end the determined silence maintained by the new regime about past collaboration with Pérez Jiménez of many people still in important official and semiofficial posts.

3. Clandestine organizations

Mid-April 1959 saw the initial identification of the Civic-Military Institutional Committee* CICM's major activities to date have been the circulation of subversive leaflets in the major Venezuelan cities by the hundreds of thousands; the mounting of a continuous rumor campaign, which reportedly achieved its highest level in October 1959; and the possible sponsorship of the clandestine radios which broadcast anti-Betancourt programs. Some commentators claim the Communists contribute a great deal to the rumor campaign in order to keep alive the support for national unity which protects all political parties from repression.

CICM appears to be making an effort to attain the sophisticated level of clandestine activity of the parties under the Pérez Jiménez regime. Its leaders reportedly want to develop a definite ideology and program so that any new government installed by CICM action has a firm basis on which to operate. Previously, and because of the lack of a firm basis of political guidance, military members of the CICM have noted, civilian politicians have taken captive new governments established by effort of the military. To date, however, details have been wholly lacking with respect to such ideological and program planning.

Fragmentary information indicates that the CICM organization is still incomplete. It appears to consist of foreign and domestic divisions headed by a general council. The domestic division is divided into regional branches with the greatest activity being carried out in the Federal District

* Recently the name Civic Military Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Revolucionario Civico-Militar—MRCM*) has appeared. Involving many of the names associated with the CICM, the MRCM appears to be a later phase of the CICM; however, the relationship between the two is not clear.

of Caracas and the westernmost state of Zulia. Activities in other states have been reported on a minor scale. Regional branches have separately functioning civilian and military elements. The civilian sector apparently handles propaganda, terrorism, economic support, and political organization; the military sector is apparently primarily concerned with subverting military unit commanders who in turn would order their troops and materiel into the field against the government and its supporters during an effort to seize control of government (see below).

Leading figures of CICM have been alleged to be such high-ranking officers as Col. Marco Aurelio Moros Angulo (former Commanding General of the Army and now G-4 of the Joint Armed Forces Staff), Colonel Vicente Antonio Marchelli Padrón, exiled in February 1960 (former G-4 of the Joint Armed Forces Staff), Navy Captain Eduardo Morales Luengo, also exiled in February 1960 (former head of the plush armed forces club *Círculo Militar* and former Chief of Section I of the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces Staff), National Guard Major Luis Alipio Márquez (designated assistant military attaché, Italy, in October 1959), and Lt. Col. Francisco Sánchez Olivares (former G-3 of Army and now commander of the Artillery School). Of the above listed officers, Colonel Marchelli and Captain Morales were arrested for conspiracy in January 1960 and retired from the armed forces (see below). In addition, Brig. Gen. Jesús María Castro León (ex-Minister of Defense and now retired from the air force) and Colonel Oscar Tamayo Suárez (ex-National Guard Commander) have reportedly been linked with CICM from abroad. It has also been alleged that the effective head of CICM is the Venezuelan Military Attaché in Rome, Col. Jesús Manuel Pérez Morales, "exiled" from Venezuela in August 1958. Of all these names, only that of Colonel Moros has appeared consistently in reports of conspiratorial activities. Both Colonel Moros and Brig. Gen. Antonio Ignacio Briceño Linares, who commands the Venezuelan Air Force, are (without confirmation) reported to have been members of a group which allegedly gave President Betancourt an ultimatum at the end of June 1959 requiring complete autonomy for the armed forces and prohibiting the reported return to Venezuela of Rear Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal and Lt. Col. Hugo Trejo from their diplomatic posts. Both the latter are in disfavor with the armed forces. Trejo is regarded as primarily a mere political opportunist, and Larrazábal is disliked for his ambitions and activities in the field of civilian politics and for his past support in these endeavors by the Communist Party. Counterbalancing all these reports, however, is the fact that one of the most frequently alleged leaders of CICM, Colonel Moros,

has managed to survive, apparently unscathed, several "shakeouts" and has been consistently active in publicizing and encouraging the growth of support by the armed forces for the new regime.

Only a few civilian leaders have been reported for CICM and their importance has not been established. In the October 1959 terrorist outbreak a number of men were identified and detained or shipped out of the country. Of these the most important figures appear to be Antonio Reyes Andrade, Luis Eduardo Chataing, Hernán Escarrá Quintana, Dr. J. M. Romero de Pascuali, and two prominent escapees—Brig. Gen. (ret.) Nestor Prato and Carlos Savelli Maldonado. Identified as CICM propagandists are Antonio Daza Morro, Marcos Reyes Andrade, and Julio Pirela. Almost all of these men were closely connected with the Pérez Jiménez regime. As has been noted, the majority of CICM activities appear to be carried out only by civilians, the role of the military sector apparently being confined to the fostering of subversion in the armed forces. In this connection, the picture of non-Communist subversion in Venezuela continues both nebulous and contradictory. One view is that CICM policy is to conserve and protect its military elements, and to commit them to action only if a coup d'état should be attempted. Another view is that CICM is essentially a civilian organization engaged in the dual effort of creating an unstable situation in Venezuela through propaganda and terrorism and of subverting the military. It is also alleged that CICM has attracted the support of civilians representing a major section of private financial power. In November and December 1959, however, the financial interests which allegedly are supporting CICM were engaged in public endorsement of the Betancourt administration in an effort to resolve favorably the crisis in economic confidence.

Peak 1959 activities of CICM occurred in the days immediately preceding May 1, the period June 5 to 18, June 29 to July 5, and October 4 to 15. These periods of tension have excited one or more of the following reactions: resolutions against coups d'état and of support of the government by such organizations as state assemblies, labor unions, and chambers of commerce; abundant editorializing; review of the machinery for mobilization of civilian organizations; pronouncements by political leaders; addresses to the nation by President Betancourt; and threats of general strike in support of the government.

CICM opened 1960 with a new terrorist campaign which led to vigorous reaction on the part of Congress, political parties, and organized labor. A 15-minute general strike was organized for January 13 to demonstrate labor's solidarity with the government. Tension was added to the concern

aroused by terrorist actions by arrest of fugitive rancher Rafael Enrique Jaramillo, who may have been linked with the terrorism and conspiracy activities. The situation was further aggravated by a January 11 riot caused by hoodlums and delinquents who took over a demonstration of some unemployed workers. Among the many arrested were found members of the URD and PCV parties. The government promptly despatched 213 to work camps in the interior and 61 to reform schools. It followed this vigorous action by capturing on January 19 Carlos Savelli Maldonado, along with much information which has compromised the security of CICM. Twenty officers and 72 civilians were subsequently arrested. It is believed that the identity of some other top military members of CICM has been determined. A military board of inquiry investigated the arrested officers and as a result navy Captain Eduardo Morales Luengo and army Colonel Vicente Marchelli Padrón, were retired, along with Colonel Carlos Camacho Paz, Major Luis Rafael Cardier Rodríguez, and Captain Carlos Gustavo Angola González. Major Gonzalo Suárez Romero, Lieutenant Gonzalo Abreu Molina, and Captain Ruben Apento Bolívar were subjected to disciplinary action.

Public concern has been intensified by inter-party friction over coalition government problems in the states, which reached a high point in September and October 1959, and over apportionment of offices in such unity organizations as the National Rural Workers' Federation (*Federación Campesina Nacional*). Effectiveness of the rumor campaign has been augmented by its duration and by the PCV's public daily gloom over danger of a coup d'état. On the other hand, the rumor campaign has had the effect of impressing the political parties with the necessity to bridle their rivalry in order to maintain sufficient concord and unity to guarantee stability of constitutional government.

Similar to CICM, conceivably a segment of it, is a group called Pro National Armed Forces (*Pro Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales*—PROFAN), alias Pro Nationalist Activist Front (*Pro Frente Activista Nacionalista*). Its existence was reported in June 1958; its regulations were revealed in *El Nacional* of Caracas on July 24 at the end of the July 1958 crisis; and it suffered a serious blow in the failure of the abortive coup on September 7, 1958. PROFAN claims to be a clandestine internal organization with foreign branches. Its members allegedly belong to the armed forces, the professions, and the business community. The only individual still openly identified with PROFAN is Dr. Nestor Moratinos, now resident in the Dominican Republic. Neither CICM nor PROFAN appear to be Pérezjimenista organizations as such, but ap-

parently represent discontented military and civilian elements in general.

4. Foreign non-Communist subversive activities

Among foreign countries and groups only the dictatorial government of the Dominican Republic has been engaged in fomenting discontent in Venezuela, although the Communist Party of Venezuela adds the United States to this category, and others blame much of the Venezuelan economic underdevelopment on the United States as a negative force for discontent. Some allegations that the Spanish Government also has been involved in anti-Betancourt conspiracies have appeared occasionally. Longstanding personal enmity between Betancourt and Generalissimo Trujillo of the Dominican Republic as well as a history of stormy relations during periods of democratic government in Venezuela, forms the background for the present impasse between the two countries. Relations deteriorated between 1940-45 over the problem of Dominican exiles in Venezuela and Venezuelan press commentary. Between 1945 and 1948 a Revolutionary Junta headed by Rómulo Betancourt (see this Chapter, SECTION 53 under Political Parties) led a drive to form an anti-dictator bloc in Middle America, the Caribbean, and northern South America. Venezuela refused to accept recognition by the Dominican Government in 1945 and relations were not restored until the military seized control in Venezuela in 1948 (for full details, see this Chapter, SECTION 55). Restoration of democratic government in Venezuela in 1958 reestablished the strong anti-dictator bias of Venezuelan foreign policy.

Dominican use of the diplomatic pouch to import subversive propaganda into Venezuela, the introduction of subversive literature at Dominican ports into vessels and airplanes going to Venezuela, and the arrest and identification of Dominicans working in Venezuela as agents of the Dominican Government contributed to a severance of relations between the two countries on June 12, 1959. Since that time the Dominican radio stations have continued to beam anti-Betancourt broadcasts to the Venezuelan populace and to report invasion or imminent invasion of Venezuelan territory by liberation forces. Venezuelan armed forces are alert to possible invasion by armed subversive forces.

At the same time, the Dominican Government has employed U.S. firms for its anti-Venezuelan propaganda and seeks to influence U.S. attitudes and policy toward Venezuela. The Venezuelan press has reported the training of frogmen in Ciudad Trujillo to sink the Venezuelan Navy or to sabotage oil installations in Lake Maracaibo, and it has labelled as Dominican agents the large

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NND 011188

Box 295

PAGE 57-31

DOC: #351

Page 35 of 38

number of Dominican women employed as cabaret singers, dancers, and prostitutes in the Caracas area.

Official Venezuelan sources in the Netherlands Antilles consistently report the presence and fraternization of Venezuelan exiles and Dominican agents in the islands. The Venezuelan press has made similar sensational reports. There is also a growing body of evidence of direct collaboration between the Dominican dictator and the Venezuelan exiles most closely linked with Pérez Jiménez, chiefly through the former Venezuelan Ambassador in the Dominican Republic, Luis Chafardet Urbina. The Dominican Government also countenances subversive planning and propaganda

by Venezuelan exiles resident in the Dominican Republic. Both Dominicans and Venezuelans readily assume that the other country is "eager" for direct hostile action. Venezuelan statements about the Dominican Republic, the quest by the government of Venezuela for inter-American sanctions against dictatorial governments, and the scant limitations imposed on Dominican exiles in Venezuela contribute to the difficult situation involving the relations between the two countries. Dominican involvement in the October 1959 and January 1960 unrest and terrorism in Venezuela appears to be documented and the Venezuelan Government is reportedly preparing an official publication dealing with Dominican efforts to subvert Venezuelan society and its government.

NND 011188
Box 295
DOC: #351
Page 36 of 38

D. Comments on principal sources

The information in this Section was drawn primarily from official U.S. sources and the Venezuelan press. Press comment on conspiracy and possible coups d'etat greatly assisted in the preparation of the Subsection on non-Communist subversion. Articles from the Venezuelan Communist press, particularly *Qué es el Partido Comunista de Venezuela* (What is the Venezuelan Communist Party) and a PCV indoctrination essay, *Curso "A"* (Course "A"), published in *Tribuna Popular*, were especially useful sources of data on the Venezuelan Communist Party organization and principles.

In general, the information on PCV organization, finances, propaganda facilities, and electoral and paramilitary activities in the Caracas and Maracaibo areas is considered to be adequate. There is, however, an overall lack of precise data on PCV and Communist youth organization, including the composition of the youth organization by age groups; data are almost wholly lacking on the reported clandestine organization of the PCV. Information on the sources and distribution of PCV finances, on the size, composition, and distribution of PCV membership, and on the relations between the PCV and the U.S.S.R. was incomplete. Specific deficiencies also include the statutes of the PCV and of the Venezuelan Communist Youth organization; the extent of Communist penetration of neighborhood improvement societies and rural leagues (*ligas campesinas*); the degree of Communist penetration among teachers and students in the school system as a whole, including primary

school, secondary school, and university levels; a comprehensive analysis of Communist influence in organized labor; the size, organization, and finances of the Venezuelan Committee for Peace and Democracy; the size and finances of the National Union of Women; the size, character of membership, techniques of recruitment, finances, and methods of operation of the Society of Friends of China; the size, techniques of recruitment, key figures, finances, aims, methods of operation, and degree of influence or potential influence of the Venezuelan affiliate of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers; and the key figures of the Dominican Patriotic Union and the Portuguese Patriotic Union. Details are similarly lacking on the size, key figures, and finances, and on any internal differences or rivalries among the leadership of the following Communist-dominated organizations: the Venezuelan Journalists' Association, the Federation of Workers of the Federal District and the State of Miranda, and the Petroleum Workers' Union of Maracaibo. Although the gaps in details concerning Communist subversive activities in Venezuela are numerous, such information as has been adduced in the Section is deemed to be essentially accurate.

Information on non-Communist subversion in Venezuela is at the present time nebulous and contradictory. Definitive detail is lacking on doctrine, organization, leadership, financing interrelationship between groups, and the full scope of clandestine planning and activities pursuant to such planning.

NND 011188
Box 295
DOC: #351
Page 37 of 38

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