


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5 OCTOBER MEETING WITH

1. [REDACTED] (IN ALIAS "JAMES") HAD PRODUCTIVE FOUR HOUR RAPPORT BUILDING AND ASSESSMENT MEETING WITH [REDACTED] AT [REDACTED] SAFE SITE EVENING OF 5 OCTOBER. FOCUS OF THIS FIRST ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WAS TO ASSESS P/1'S MOTIVATION IN APPROACHING [REDACTED] FURTHER TEST HIS KNOWLEDGE OF ESO PERSONALITIES AND FACILITIES IN ORDER TO SORT OUT BONA FIDES ISSUES; BUILD RAPPORT; AND IF FOREGOING MATTERS SEEMED POSITIVE, BEGIN PLANNING THE FRAMEWORK FOR A WORKABLE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL CLANDESTINE RELATIONSHIP.

2. AT THE OPENING OF THE MEETING, [REDACTED] SEPARATED P/1 FROM THE FEMALE MALTESE TRANSLATOR TO ALLOW FOR MORE CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS IN ARABIC. [REDACTED] C/O [REDACTED] CONDUCTED SEPARATE ASSESSMENTS OF HER OPS POTENTIAL INDEPENDENT OF THE P/1 CASE AND LEARNED OF HER PREFERENCE FOR A REDUCED ROLE NOW THAT P/1 HAD BEEN INTRODUCED TO AN ARABIST WHO WOULD NOT REQUIRE HER TRANSLATION SERVICES. IT IS [REDACTED] UNDERSTANDING THAT THE TRANSLATOR IS WILLING, HOWEVER, TO PERFORM AD HOC INTERPRETER SERVICES IN BETWEEN SCHEDULED MEETINGS WITH TDY ARABIST IN ORDER TO ASSIST P/1 TO REPORT FAST BREAKING TERRORIST RELATED INFORMATION.

3. ONE OF OUR FIRST DISCOVERIES DURING MEETING WARM UP WAS THAT LINGUA FRANCA BETWEEN P/1 AND HIS TRANSLATOR HAS BEEN MALTESE, NOT ARABIC. P/1 IS SELF-TAUGHT IN THE LANGUAGE AND APPEARS TO HAVE A GIFT FOR ACQUIRING LANGUAGES. WE ENCOURAGED

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HIM TO RESUME TUTORIAL IN ENGLISH AS THIS COULD EVENTUALLY PROVIDE THE NEEDED FLEXIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION AND REINFORCE COMPARTMENTATION. P/1'S ARABIC IS PROVINCIAL TRIPOLITANIAN DELIVERED IN RAPID SPEECH PATTERN WHICH REQUIRED [] TO PAY CLOSER THAN NORMAL ATTENTION AND MAKE FREQUENT INTERRUPTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION. ALTHOUGH P/1 IS A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE AND STUDIED HISTORY FOR TWO YEARS AT TRIPOLI'S FATAH UNIVERSITY HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE A FUNCTIONAL ABILITY IN EITHER CLASSICAL ARABIC OR MORE WIDELY USED DIALECTS SUCH AS EGYPTIAN. THE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS MANAGEABLE.

4. BACKGROUND: P/1 IS THE ELDEST SON (WITH TEN SIBLINGS) BORN TO A FAIRLY WELL-TO-DO TRIPOLI MERCHANT FAMILY. DURING HIS HIGH SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY DAYS HE WAS AN AVID FOLLOWER OF QADHAFI'S REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES AND BECAME AN ACTIVE MEMBER IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES WHERE HE CAME TO DEVELOP CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH IMPORTANT RC BUREAU MEMBERS SUCH AS ALI ((KILANI)), MUSA ((KUSA)), SA'ID ((RASHID)) AND IZZ-AL-DIN ((HINSHIRI)), AMONG OTHERS. HE AVOIDED MILITARY CONSCRIPTION THROUGH ENTRY INTO THE ESO IN CIRCA LATE 1984 AT THE TIME OF NUMEROUS PERSONNEL TRANSFERS FROM THE RCB TO THE ESO. HE WAS INITIALLY EMPLOYED IN THE HQS MOTOR POOL/DISPATCHER'S OFFICE. IT TURNS OUT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF HIS ESO EXPERIENCE (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF HIS DUTY IN MALTA) HAS BEEN IN ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. IN CIRCA 1985 HE ATTENDED A 65 DAY TRAINING COURSE FOR ESO ADMIN TYPES AT THE HADBA AL-KHADRA TRAINING FACILITY WHERE EMPHASIS WAS ON ORIENTATION TO INTELLIGENCE, PHYSICAL FITNESS, MARKSMANSHIP AND PHYSICAL SECURITY. THIS COURSE WAS DISTINCT FROM THE CIRCA SIX MONTH BASIC OPERATIONS COURSE GIVEN TO ESO OFFICERS HEADED FOR OPERATIONAL CAREERS. FOLLOWING TRAINING HE WAS ASSIGNED TO HINSHIRI'S CENTRAL SECURITY ADMINSTATION (IDARAT AMN AL MARKAZI) NEAR THE WIDDAN CINEMA WHERE HE FIRST WORKED IN THE FILES/ARCHIVES OFFICE AND THEN IN THE PATROLS AND SURVEILLANCE OF SMALL BUSINESSES SECTION. []

[] P/1'S CIVILIAN GRADE IN THE ESO WAS LEVEL 6, APPROXIMATELY EQUIVALENT TO A SECOND LIEUTENANT.

5. MALTA CAREER: P/1'S TRANSFER TO [] OFFICE IN MALTA, HE EXPLAINS, IS CONSIDERED AN ADMINISTRATIVE CROSS-TRANSFER FROM THE ESO, ALTHOUGH HIS SALARY IS PAID THROUGH [] WHICH HANDLES HIS OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS. P/1 ASSUMES HE IS STILL CARRIED ON THE ESO PERSONNEL ROSTER AND THAT HIS [] ASSIGNMENT IS MERELY COVER. HE LIVES IN DREAD OF REASSIGNMENT TO ESO HQS AS HE REALIZES THAT HE WILL BE IN FOR RE-VETTING. THIS PROCESS, WHICH HE HAS TWICE SAMPLED EARLIER IN HIS CAREER, INCLUDES SHORT PERIODS OF INCARCERATION AND HOSTILE INTERROGATION AT HADBA AL-KHADRA, AS A MEANS TO REINFORCE DISCIPLINE AND LOYALTY. WHILE P/1 NO LONGER FEARS IMMINENT RECALL AS HE DID WHEN HE FIRST APPROACHED [] VALLETTA, ROTATION IS INEVITABLE AT SOME STAGE AND HE WANTS TO PREPARE FOR THAT EVENTUALITY VIA THE SHAM SURGERY. IN MALTA, P/1 IS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ABD-AL-SALAM ((ZADMA)), FOREIGN OPERATIONS SECTION OF THE ESO WHEREAS THE ESO

COMPLEMENT WORKING OUT OF THE LPB AND HEADED BY CONSUL MUHAMMAD AL-((LAFI)) IS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF ABDULLAH ((SANUSSI)) AND HIS ESO "INFORMATION OR INTELLIGENCE" (ISTA'LAMAT) OFFICE.
 NOTE: P/1'S OPTIC OF ESO ADMINISTRATION AND SET UP MAY BE SOMEWHAT SKEWED BY HIS PROLONGED ABSENCE AND LACK OF SENIORITY. HE CONTINUED TO MAKE REFERENCE TO ZADMA'S ULTIMATE AUTHORITY AS DERIVING FROM HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE SECURITY BATTALIONS. HE ALSO BELIEVES, PERSHAPS CORRECTLY, THAT LINES OF AUTHORITY IN THE ESO ARE NOT CAREFULLY DRAWN AND THAT ON MALTA THE ESO PRESENCE IS NOT MONOLITHIC. [] OPERATIVES ARE NOT OFTEN INVOLVED WITH THE LPB ESO CADRES. [] IS INCREASINGLY BEING UTILIZED BY ZADMA'S OFFICE FOR PLACEMENT OF OFFICERS OVERSEAS. IN ADDITION TO THE DEPUTY SLOT (TRADITIONALLY AN ESO HAVEN), THE NEW POSITIONS OF "GROUND OPERATIONS MANAGERS" WILL HENCEFORTH BE FILLED BY ESO PERSONNEL.

6. MOTIVATION: THIS TOPIC WILL NEED TO BE CONSTANTLY MONITORED SINCE [] BELIEVES IT IS LIKELY THAT THERE MAY BE OTHER FACTORS OF WHICH WE ARE NOT YET AWARE THAT ARE DRIVING P/1 TO COOPERATE WITH [] INTELLIGENCE. IN AGREEING TO C/O [] REQUEST THAT HE AGREE TO MEET WITH A VISITING "ARABIST", P/1 COMMENTED THAT HE WAS NOT CERTAIN HE WAS PREPARED TO MEET/COOPERATE WITH [] AFTER THE FIRST HOUR


OF THE 5 OCT DISCUSSIONS WITH [] IT WAS CLEAR P/1 HAD MADE UP HIS MIND ON THIS ISSUE AND WANTED TO MAKE THE BEST ARRANGEMENT POSSIBLE THAT SATISFIED HIS PRIMARY CONCERN OF AVOIDING RECALL TO TRIPOLI AND LAYED THE FINANCIAL BASIS FOR A NEW LIFE IN THE WORLD OF PRIVATE COMMERCE IN MALTA. THE SHAM SURGERY OR MEDICALLY DISQUALIFYING IMPAIRMENT IS A NON-NEGOTIABLE DEMAND OF P/1 THAT HE IS HOPEFUL WILL EXEMPT HIM FROM HAVING TO ACCEPT AN ASSIGNMENT AT ESO HQS IN TRIPOLI. ON THE SECOND ASPECT OF HIS MOTIVATION, HE MADE A STRONG BID IN DISCUSSIONS WITH [] THAT WE PERMIT/SUPPORT HIM IN LEAVING [] AND THE ESO ALTOGETHER IN FAVOR OF SETTING UP A SMALL CAR RENTAL AGENCY ON MALTA. HE HAS SAVED APPROXIMATELY \$30,000 FROM HIS SALARY (AND WE SUSPECT ILLEGAL COMMISSIONS EARNED THROUGH HIS [] CAPACITY, PERHAPS LOW LEVEL SMUGGLING). HIS PROJECTED CAR RENTAL VENTURE HE ESTIMATES AS COSTING \$60,000 IN START UP EXPENSES. IMPLICIT, BUT NOT VERBALIZED, WAS HIS HOPE THAT WE WOULD COME UP WITH THE BALANCE SINCE SUCH A POSITION WOULD ASSURE HIM CONTINUED (HE CLAIMED ENHANCED) ACCESS TO ESO AND REVCOM VISITORS TO MALTA. [] FIRMLY EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE FAR LESS INTERESTED IN SUCH A HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSITION AND WERE QUITE SATISFIED WITH HIS CURRENT ACCESS THROUGH [] AFTER MUCH BACK AND FORTH, P/1 ACCEPTED [] MID-TERM PROPOSAL THAT P/1 REMAIN WHERE HE IS, PATCH OVER DIFFERENCES HE HAS HAD WITH ESO COLLEAGUES AND SUPERIORS AND DO WHAT HE CAN TO ENHANCE HIS UTILITY TO ESO HEADQUARTERS AND THE LPB. P/1 MADE ONE LAST BID TO "EXPAND" HIS ACCESS, NOTING THAT THE ESO IS NOT THE ONLY LIBYAN TERRORIST SPONSOR THAT [] SHOULD BE TRACKING (HE LISTED THE REVCOMS, MATHABA AND AD HOC TEAMS PUT TOGETHER BY MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY BATTALIONS). [] INSISTED THAT WE WANTED HIM TO RETAIN AND IMPROVE ON HIS CURRENT ACCESS AND WHEN THE

TIME CAME FOR HIS NATURAL ROTATION WE WOULD CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES THAT WOULD KEEP HIM FROM HAVING TO SERVE IN TRIPOLI. FIRST PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR HIM TO TRANSFER TO ANOTHER [] SLOT, MAYBE ATHENS OR ISTANBUL. P/1 SAID THAT WOULD BE FINE BUT REITERATED HIS REJECTION OF RECALL TO TRIPOLI FOR MORE THAN A TWO WEEK CONSULTATION PERIOD. AT THIS POINT, P/1 SAID IT WAS NOT ONLY THE RE-VETTING HE FEARS BUT THE LIKELY PROSPECT THAT HE WOULD BE COERCED TO UNDERTAKE TERRORIST OPERATIONS IF HE IS CLOSE AT HAND AND AVAILABLE TO THE HQS "PLANNERS". UNTIL YOU HAVE LED AN OPERATION (DIRT 'AMALIYA), YOU HAVE NOT ACHIEVED THE OFFICIAL SEAL OF APPROVAL, ACCORDING TO P/1. HE WAS SOMEWHAT REASSURED WHEN [] EXPLAINED THAT WE WOULD USE OUR EXTENSIVE CAPABILITIES TO WATCH FOR INDICATORS THAT HE IS ABOUT TO BE RECALLED.

7. IN THE TIME REMAINING, [] TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON P/1'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ESO AND TERRORIST PRESENCE ON MALTA. WE ASKED HIM WHAT HE KNEW OF WEAPONS CACHES THAT WE WERE CERTAIN THE ESO HAD ON THE ISLAND. P/1 STATED THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY AWARE OF ONE CACHE OF EIGHT KILOS OF ORANGE COLORED EXPLOSIVES (NO DETONATORS) THAT HAD BEEN STORED FOR MANY MONTHS AT THE [] OFFICE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THESE EXPLOSIVES HAD FIRST ARRIVED CIRCA 1985 WHEN ABD-AL-BASIT ((MAGRAHI)) WAS IN MALTA. SOME MONTHS AGO P/1 WAS ASKED TO HELP TRANSFER THE EXPLOSIVES TO THE LPB OFFICE OF ESO REPRESENTATIVE MUHAMMAD AL-LAFI. ASKED WHERE THE GOODS WERE IN THE OFFICE, P/1 REPLIED THEY HAD NOT BEEN PLACED IN A SAFE, MERELY LOCKED IN ONE OF THE DESK DRAWERS. RECALLING AN EARLIER REPORT FROM [], [] ASKED IF ANOTHER LARGER CACHE WAS NOT STORED IN A PRIVATE VILLA OWNED (SPECIFICALLY NOT LEASED) BY THE LPB IN THE SALIMA DISTRICT. P/1 SAID HE COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT ARMS OR EXPLOSIVES WERE STORED THERE BUT WAS AWARE THAT LAFI HAD BEEN DIRECTED BY ESO HEADQUARTERS TO PURCHASE HIS SALIMA RESIDENCE. OTHER LPB OFFICIAL QUARTERS ARE LEASED, NOT OWNED.

8. ESO ARRIVALS TO MALTA: IN ADDITION TO INFORMATION P/1 HAS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY TO C/O [] HE SAID THAT HE HAS HEARD INFORMALLY THAT ONE OR MORE ADDITIONS ARE SOON TO BE MADE TO THE ESO PRESENCE IN MALTA. HE EXPECTED MUHAMMAD AL-((ATI)), FORMERLY THE HEAD OF SHIPPING SECURITY AT ESO HQS, TO ARRIVE ON SATURDAY 8 OCTOBER FOR AN INDETERMINATE STAY. ANOTHER SENIOR ESO OFFICER TO ARRIVE PCS SOON IS COL. ALI ((SAMI'I)), WHO HAD BEEN DIRECTOR OF ESO ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE AND SOMEHOW INVOLVED IN THE DA'WA ISLAMIYA STRUCTURE. P/1 DID NOT KNOW WHAT COVER SAMI'I WOULD OCCUPY IN MALTA. P/1 REPORTED THAT THE NEW [] DEPUTY STATION CHIEF (THE SENIOR ESO POSITION IN THE OFFICE) IS KHALIFA SANUSSI ((ABDULLAH)), FORMERLY WITH [] IN PARIS. AN ACTIVE LIBYAN COOPTEE OF THE ESO ON MALTA WITH ESPECIALLY CLOSE TIES TO NASIR ((ASHUR)) IS MUSTAFA AL-((HASUNI)), DIRECTOR OF THE ROTS CO. LTD. WE DID NOT GET THE PRODUCT LINE FOR "ROTS" AND ASSUME IT IS AN ACRONYM.

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