




Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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# National Intelligence Daily

*Friday*  
*15 January 1982*


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
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
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
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


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


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
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② WEST AFRICA - GHANA: Reactions to the Coup

1 *The recent coup in Ghana underscores the potential for upheavals in other West African countries plagued by significant economic disparities and pressures for social change.* 


1 Most West African governments have adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward the new regime in Accra. Many leaders in the region recognize, however, that the events in Ghana could create unrest in their own countries. Liberian Head of State Doe, who hopes to accomplish a return to civilian rule by 1985 or sooner, is the most concerned. 

2 Political developments in Nigeria, which also faces long-term socioeconomic problems, often tend to follow events in Ghana. President Shagari's government also fears that Ghana could provide Libya with another foothold in West Africa. Lagos, however, has made no move to cut off oil deliveries to Ghana as it did in 1979. 

1 Leaders of Togo, Niger, and other moderate but weak states suspect Libyan involvement in the coup. They are increasingly concerned that Tripoli will attempt to meddle in their affairs. 

1 Comment: Ghana's rapid resumption of diplomatic ties with Libya is likely to lead to at least some Libyan economic and security assistance. Coup leader Rawlings, however, is not a Libyan tool, and Ghana's lack of a sizable Islamic population should impede efforts by Tripoli to gain influence. 

3  
1 The Libyans probably will maintain a low profile for now in Ghana to avoid increasing the apprehensions of neighboring governments. Libyan leader Qadhafi, moreover, does not want to risk jeopardizing his role this summer as host of the OAU summit and chairman of the group later this year. In addition, the Libyans' ability to make political inroads in Ghana and elsewhere in West Africa will be mitigated by their poor record of providing significant economic assistance.   

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(4) YUGOSLAVIA: Government Changes Forecast

*Planned government changes announced yesterday indicate that the leadership is placing a premium on expertise in the Foreign Affairs, Internal Security, and Defense Ministries, but that nomination of a lackluster party functionary as the new head of government may impede the search for economic reforms.*

Croatian party leader Milka Planinc, the only woman holding a top-level regime position, is to be the next Premier. Other nominations include Lazar Mojsov, a Macedonian and former party presidium president, as Foreign Minister; Stane Dolanc, a Slovene who was party secretary until 1979, as Interior Minister; and Admiral Branko Mamula, a Serb from Croatia now serving as Chief of Staff, as Defense Minister. Formal selections to these four-year posts will occur in May before the 12th Party Congress in June.

1-3 Comment: The ministerial candidates are certain to be confirmed. They are longtime leaders with impressive records.

Mojsov and Dolanc have held top party positions and have achieved international recognition. Mojsov served as Ambassador to Moscow and President of the UN General Assembly from 1977 to 1978.

Dolanc, a capable administrator, will have the difficult task of assisting in maintaining order in the strife-torn province of Kosovo as well as dealing with vigorous dissident movements. He is a strong advocate of vigilance against Soviet meddling in Yugoslavia.

Planinc has been unimpressive as leader of the Croatian party and will bring little economic experience to her new post. The current Premier has worked hard to reduce inflation and the hard currency debt. By appointing Planinc, the leadership seems to be de-emphasizing the Premier's role in making policy initiatives.

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SUDAN: Demonstrations in Khartoum Subside

Demonstrations protesting the recent increase in the price of sugar appear to be ending in Khartoum. Demonstrations are continuing, however, in several provincial towns, and early this week three students were killed. The number of deaths resulting from the protests now stands at 21.

1/3

Comment: President Nimeiri's decision to raise sugar prices and his handling of the protests has produced outspoken criticism in the leadership of the Socialist Union, Sudan's only legal political organization. Dissatisfaction over the regime's inability to solve economic problems has been increasingly widespread, but complaints by the Socialist Union are unusual.

①

CHINA-US: Comments on Taiwan Arms Decision

Beijing's first official press statement yesterday on the US decision on arms sales to Taiwan denounced the "unilateral" character of the move but contained no threat of retaliation. The statement was especially critical of the public handling of the issue by US spokesmen and media. [redacted]

1/2

Comment: The commentary reinforces private representations in Beijing that public statements at this time pose sensitive problems for China. The Chinese want to use their consultations with the US on arms sales in part to reaffirm that the US recognizes their sovereignty over Taiwan. Although the statement calls for an "immediate solution" of the issue, its overall tone indicates a desire to preserve room to maneuver. [redacted]

⑧

PHILIPPINES: Urban Terrorism Threat

Two anti-Marcos terrorist groups have warned several foreign embassies not to participate in the International Film Festival that begins on Monday because of plans to bomb the International Film Palace. One group, the radical April 6th Liberation Movement, was responsible for a series of bombings in Manila in 1980, including an attack at the meeting of the American Society of Travel Agents. That bombing also was preceded by advance warning. The Movement has been linked to US-based opposition. [redacted]

1/3

Comment: The Movement may be targeting interests associated with the Marcos family. The construction of the International Film Palace and the holding of the festival are pet projects of Mrs. Marcos. [redacted]


The President reportedly has not yet called for any extraordinary security precautions, possibly because he is confident that the Movement was effectively quashed by the end of 1980. Moreover, the group has not followed through on other threats against visiting dignitaries. [redacted]

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(10) FRANCE: Economic Decrees


$\frac{1}{2}$  The government has issued two decrees that shorten the workweek from 40 to 39 hours, lengthen the standard paid vacation from four to five weeks, and reduce social security charges for firms that hire additional workers by September 1983. President Mitterrand secured limited authority from the Socialist-dominated National Assembly last November to act unilaterally on urgent social measures. The decrees are aimed at stemming growing leftist concern that Paris is moving too slowly in implementing promised social and economic policies. 

Comment: Although Paris hopes that the new measures will create between 50,000 and 100,000 new jobs, the government would need to create another 150,000 jobs merely to prevent unemployment from rising above the current 8-percent level. Economic growth is likely to be closer to 2 percent than the 3-percent target set by Paris for this year, and unemployment is widely expected to rise. 

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The United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.



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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

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USSR - NORDIC STATES: Soviet Interference

*Recent Soviet actions in the Nordic States have damaged Moscow's credibility, but Soviet efforts to shape the outcome of the presidential election in Finland probably will continue even if this intensifies anti-Soviet sentiments.*

The grounding in Swedish waters of an intelligence collection submarine, which probably was armed with nuclear torpedoes, has adversely affected a broad range of Soviet interests in Northern Europe. Swedish determination to preserve its armed neutrality has been strengthened, and domestic opposition in Denmark and Norway to plans for increasing defense spending may have been diminished.

1-4 The submarine incident also has raised doubts about the USSR's commitment to arms control. The Nordic States are concluding that Moscow has a lower threshold for using nuclear weapons on its submarines in the Baltic than previously believed.

In addition, the incident has undermined the credibility of Soviet pledges not to use nuclear weapons against states that renounce them. Moscow's call for a Nordic Nuclear Weapons - Free Zone probably will be less effective, and Scandinavians are likely to become more insistent on including Soviet nuclear weapons in and around the Baltic and on the Kola Peninsula.

Soviets Expelled

The activity of Soviet officials stationed in the region also has damaged Moscow's image. Soviet involvement in local peace movements has led to the expulsion of a Soviet diplomat from Denmark and to recent Norwegian

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press reports of the imminent expulsion of Soviet officials. The USSR received adverse publicity earlier from the expulsion of a Soviet official from Norway in April. [redacted]

Moscow probably will try to restore its credibility among Nordic audiences by diverting attention to US-Soviet INF negotiations and to its allegations of a US and NATO threat to European stability. The Soviets are likely to revive charges that US cruise missiles in Europe would violate Nordic airspace en route to Soviet targets and thereby risk involving Northern Europe in a US-Soviet nuclear exchange. The Kremlin also may charge that stockpiling NATO weapons at Danish sites could draw Denmark into a nuclear conflict. [redacted]

Election in Finland

1-4 Obvious Soviet efforts to shape the outcome of the Finnish presidential election being held in stages this month are increasing apprehension about Soviet intentions in Northern Europe. Moscow nevertheless will continue to encourage the election of a successor to President Kekkonen who is likely to keep Helsinki's foreign policy carefully attuned to Soviet interests. Greater emphasis on defense throughout the Nordic States and stronger conservative showings in recent Norwegian and Danish elections probably have led the Soviets to take an even greater interest in the outcome of this election. [redacted]

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The Soviet Ambassador to Finland and the KGB's Finnish affairs expert in Helsinki were summoned to Moscow in late November, apparently to devise a more effective strategy for influencing the balloting for the first round of the presidential election on Sunday and Monday and the electoral college's deliberations on 26 January.

1-4  
Although *Pravda's* praise of Center Party candidate Karjalainen failed to help him gain that party's presidential nomination, Moscow remains hopeful that Karjalainen will emerge as a compromise candidate in the event of a deadlock in the electoral college. Soviet officials continue to emphasize Karjalainen's extensive experience in bilateral trade negotiations and to warn against the strong anti-Kekkonen sentiment that has developed in the former President's own party.

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