

WILLIAM CASEY

SIGNA SOCIETY - 7 October 1982

-- Happy to welcome you back

-- Gratify for your continuing interest in this Agency

-- Bill Katapish tells me that SIGNA has been a great support to us and I strongly support your organization. There is a great deal that retired employees can do for us -- carry the flag -- support us in public opinion -- keep an eye out for promising recruits. The problems you faced here as security officers are still with us. We worry about leaks, indiscretions, discipline. Under Bill Katapish a strong effort is made to deal with all these problems. Leaks have reached epidemic proportions. 250 were reported in 1980.

-- This hurts our national security posture, the nation's intelligence capabilities and thus the credibility of this Agency and, for that matter, of the government itself.

-- It affects our ability to recruit assets overseas

-- It is damaging to morale and discipline

-- Dries up intelligence sources

== Too much time and energy is spent in the assessment of the damage caused by leaks. We can't afford this expensive time and energy which would be so much better spent in getting the basic job of intelligence done.

-- Despite considerable emphasis by the Administration on containment, confusion still persists in equating the whistleblower with the leaker. The former serves justice; the latter, the leaker, serves only himself and his personal interests. As you know, existing espionage laws do not lend themselves to legal sanctions. Any application of existing statutes is oftentimes perceived as overkill. In addition, prosecution can involve disclosure of further classified information.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 08-Dec-2008

-- Almost with total disregard to the damage it could cause to the Intelligence Community, the press continues to publicize the leaked information, hanging onto the philosophy that it is the public's right to know and to do otherwise would be a violation of the First Amendment.

-- So-called authorized leaks contribute to cynicism and to the perception that good leaks or bad leaks are different only in the context that they help the Administration. Unfortunately, those in positions who should know better for whatever the reasons, politically or otherwise, still seem to feel the need to continue this practice of authorized leaks.

-- CIA's part in trying to prevent further leaks involves study into a wide variety of means. We are looking into new legislation focused explicitly on criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure of classified information as well as the establishment of Government-wide policy and regulations that would permit application of administrative sanctions against leakers both up to and including termination if warranted. We have made significant headway in the legislation area this past year with the passage of the Identities Bill -- high time I'm sure you agree.

-- Security education or the lack thereof seems to be at the root of the problem. We are looking into security indoctrination of all employees including appointed officials. We need to emphasize the absolute necessity of safeguarding classified information to which they are privileged to have access. We are in the process of gaining interagency cooperation and joint action on such leaks, and we are pursuing leak investigations with greater vigor and determination. We are not ruling out the use of

the polygraph. I'm a believer in the polygraph. We are stepping up our repolygraphing program as a discipline on security awareness.

-- Barnett - Indonesia

--As you know from working here, CIA's own secrecy agreement contains prepublication review requirements. In recent years we have more formally organized the prepublication review process appointing senior officials within this Agency across all Directorates to thoroughly scrutinize manuscripts submitted by former and current CIA employees to ensure that leaks do not arise in this area.

-- As you know, when I took over as Director, one of my first policy changes concerned CIA's profile with the news media. Notwithstanding the possible need for it in the earlier years when this Agency was under constant attack, I felt the time had come for us to get back to the business at hand -- collecting and analyzing intelligence so that we can provide the best possible assessments to this nation's policymakers. We still have contact with the media and on occasion, provide briefings for them on intelligence issues. However, the wide-scale, high profile posture has greatly changed. We only do so now when it is in our interest to do so, not as a public service.

-- Earlier I mentioned the differences between the whistleblowers and the true leakers. The concerns of the whistleblowers must be directed to the appropriate Inspectors General or oversight boards. Efforts need to be made to ensure that their utmost concerns with legality and waste are addressed. Providing an avenue for these individuals will help to deprive the leaker of the umbrella of responsibility that should be reserved for

only those who are trying to help the system, not destroy it.

-- I realize much of what I have said here may seem as though I am preaching to you. By being a member of SIGNA, it is already inherently a part of your past to have been involved in these problems and to know the dangers we are faced with if leaks persist. I have done so, however, to stress to you the importance I see in security for this Agency and the Intelligence Community as a whole. I can assure you that so long as I am Director, we are going to allocate whatever resources we need to at least bring it to a manageable level. As I have said, better security education is our best hope and I feel more confident that so many of us like yourselves who understand the problem are now out there in our major corporations and other facets of the U.S. Government spreading the word.