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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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
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GRAIN ACREAGE 1952-1960 (MILLIONS OF ACRES)



The Soviet semi-annual plan fulfillment report suggested that the shortfalls in the livestock industry were particularly serious in terms of milk production. The rapid and sustained growth of this industry under Khrushchev's aegis thus appears to have been interrupted.

livestock sector is lagging behind the growth rates needed to achieve the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) targets, and that the output of livestock products has actually decreased in certain republics and oblasts. The editorial pointed out that pork production in the Ukraine declined by 19 percent in the last eight months. While this is likely to be offset, at least in part, by increased slaughtering in other areas, the livestock program as a whole may be expected to show little improvement in 1960, and production may actually decline.

The Soviet consumers' expectations, raised by the Seven-Year Plan goals and by Khrushchev's ambitious and unrealistic program for catching up with the United States in per capita production of livestock products will be further frustrated by this year's deficiencies. Another poor agricultural showing in the New Lands could touch off another major shake-up among the Kazakhstan party and government leaders. Also, Russian Republic (RSFSR) officials may be called to task for harvesting delays in their part of the New Lands. (CONFIDENTIAL) (Prepared by ORR)

NORTH VIETNAM PLANS OVERTHROW OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT

North Vietnam has embarked on a paramilitary and political offensive intended to overthrow South Vietnam's President Diem. Hanoi is convinced that Diem cannot cope with mounting political dissatisfaction and peasant unrest and at the same time fight wide-ranging Communist guerrilla bands. North Vietnamese leaders have told Canadian and Indian officials they expect the in-

ternal collapse of the present government in Saigon by next April.

Terrorism was given official sanction by North Vietnam's top army political official General Nguyen Chi Thanh, in the August-September issue of Hoc Tap, the party journal. Extolling violence as a technique for achieving power in Vietnam, Thanh put guerrilla terrorism

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into the context of a Communist holy war by repeatedly citing Lenin as an authority that violent revolution "constitutes the foundation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine." He also called for consolidation and development of guerrilla forces and said the masses must be "methodically instructed" in violence.

Since late 1959, the Communist guerrillas--now believed to number more than 5,000, with some estimates as high as 8,000--had already sharply intensified their activities in South Vietnam, posing a serious security problem in the provinces south and southwest of Saigon. In July alone there were 131 assassinations and 70 kidnappings of civilians and 351 "clashes" with Communist guerrillas, an increase of 80 over the preceding month.

There were indications last month that guerrilla warfare may be spreading to the previously quiescent mountainous region in the northern part of South Vietnam.

A worsening security situation would be likely to increase the burden on the South Vietnamese Army--on which President Diem has chiefly relied to meet the Communist threat--and encourage the increasingly articulate political dissatisfaction with his authoritarian leadership. Diem's continued reluctance to deal with demands from both government and opposition circles for administrative and social reforms is likely to encourage such groups to undertake measures which could play into Communist hands.

The political aspects of Hanoi's plan to topple Diem



were described in early September at the North Vietnamese third party congress, at which second-ranking party leader Le Duan, who has led guerrillas in the South himself, called for a "broad united front" combining all--including non-Communist--political opposition to Diem. As stated by Le Duan and other North Vietnamese spokesmen, the immediate objective of this "front" is a coalition government. Its ultimate goal, however, is destruction of South Vietnam's ties with the United States and "peaceful reunification" under Hanoi.

The Communists recently are reported to have made overtures to South Vietnamese dissatisfied with Diem and have tried to set

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South Vietnamese business interests against Diem by offering the government a

trade agreement which is sure to be rejected. (S)
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USSR ADOPTS MORE FAVORABLE POLICY TOWARD ALGERIAN REBELS

Khrushchev told newspapermen in New York on 7 October that his talks with Algerian rebel leaders in New York and rebel premier Abbas' reception in Moscow constitute "de facto recognition" of the Algerian rebel provisional government. Soviet policymakers probably feel that by dropping their heretofore cautious attitude, they will be able to undercut Chinese Communist criticism of failing to give adequate support to "national liberation struggles." Moscow's shift on Algeria is probably also influenced by a desire to appear responsive to moves by the rebel National Liberation Front (FLN) to increase contacts with the Communist bloc as part of the effort to "internationalize" the Algerian rebellion.

The first indication that Moscow had begun to modify its attitude toward the Algerian war followed De Gaulle's press conference on 5 September, when Soviet commentators emphasized the negative character of his remarks and suggested that "France is not actually going to agree to grant Algeria real independence." Soviet spokesmen, while continuing to urge a negotiated settlement between Paris and the rebels as the best solution, also referred with approval to the FLN's proposal for a UN-supervised referendum.

Rebel premier Ferhat Abbas, during stopovers in Moscow in late September and again from 6 to 10 October while traveling to and from Peiping, was received by Soviet Foreign Ministry officials and for private talks by Acting Premier Kosygin. On his departure on 10 October, Kosygin publicly promised that the USSR would give the rebels "all we can in assistance" to bring independence to Algeria.

Soviet assistance has been confined to medical and relief supplies sent to Algerian refugees in Morocco and Tunisia through the Soviet Red Crescent. TASS announced in late September that the Soviet Federation of Trade Unions would supply \$500,000 worth of nonmilitary equipment to the General Association of Algerian Workers and provide study grants to 120 Algerian youths for technical training in the USSR.

Moscow may extend limited military aid to the rebels, probably in the form of light arms and training of Algerian military personnel, but Soviet leaders probably wish to avoid any open rupture with France. De Gaulle has stated publicly--and the French Government has informed Moscow through diplomatic channels--that formal

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