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13 April 1961

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 06-29-2009

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The Yugoslavs charged Czechoslovakia on 7 April with using "Albanian methods" against Yugoslav diplomats in Prague. On 10 April, Belgrade complained that a counselor of its embassy in Prague had been the victim of "criminal attacks in extreme-

ly suspicious circumstances"; he had allegedly been administered narcotics.

Moscow still publicly favors maintaining correct state relations with Yugoslavia.

SOUTH VIETNAM

The Viet Cong (Communist) guerrilla organization in South Vietnam has probably suffered no serious setback either from President Diem's resounding electoral victory or from the series of relatively large-scale engagements with government forces during the weeks preceding the election.

The Communists have demonstrated steadily during the past year their capability to increase their numbers and expand the area of their operations despite military countermeasures and periodic heavy losses.

The Communists apparently believe that they can bring about Diem's downfall through a process of erosion, fostering the growth of political discontent and weakening the government's control through guerrilla harassment. The Communists can be expected to intensify these efforts over the coming months.

President Diem has argued that the internal Communist threat precludes the relaxation of political controls in South Vietnam demanded by his non-Communist opponents. He may use his sweeping electoral victory to justify further stalling on administrative reforms. Reports of increased restiveness among middle- and junior-level army officers, many of whom doubt Diem's intention to make any basic changes, indicate that he may face the renewed danger of non-Communist action against him which could be readily exploited by the Communists.

Although the Diem government issued exaggerated reports over both the size of Communist bands and the extent of casualties inflicted on the guerrillas in the recent clashes, the seriousness of the Communist threat was acknowledged by the President for the first time in a recent press conference.

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the Czechs also will soon conclude an agreement with Iraqi airline officials now in Prague.

Although the other satellites have been less active in the bloc's international civil air expansion program, their roles are increasing, and their capabilities will be enhanced by the new equipment now on order from the Soviet Union. Hungary is the only bloc country with landing rights in West Germany. Budapest recently concluded a bilateral agreement with Baghdad, and plans to implement its agreement with the UAR when it receives Soviet IL-18s.

East Germany, which has had little success in establishing air routes outside the bloc, has nevertheless managed

to gain some concessions. The government airline, Interflug, has been participating in special flights from the Scandinavian countries and Austria during the Leipzig fairs, and it has acquired landing privileges at Athens for the tourist flights it makes to the Middle East. (Prepared by ORR)

BLOC CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS WITH FREE WORLD COUNTRIES

	USSR	CZECHO	POLAND	HUNGARY	BULGARIA	RUMANIA	COMMUNIST CHINA
YUGOSLAVIA	X 1955	X 1956	X 1955	X 1956	X 1955	X 1956	
FINLAND	X 55	X 49					
AUSTRIA	X 55	X 52	X 56	X 58	X 58	X 58	
Denmark	X 56	X 47	X 57	X 58	X 58	X 58	
NORWAY	X 56	X 48					
SWEDEN	X 56	X 57	X 56	X 57	X 57	X 57	
BRITAIN	X 57	X 57					
INDIA	X 57	X 60		P			N
AFGHANISTAN	X 56						
BELGIUM	X 58	X 56	X 56	X 57	X 57	X 56	
NETHERLANDS	X 58	X 47	X 56	X 57	X 58	X 57	
FRANCE	X 58	X 54	X 56				
SWITZERLAND	P	X 47	X 59	X 59			
ITALY	P	N					
GREECE	P		X 56			N	
UAR	X 58	X 57		X 58	X 59	X 58	
IRAQ		X 60		X 60			
LIBYA	P						
LEBANON	N	N					
IRAN	P						
JAPAN	P						
USA	P						
MEXICO	P						
BURMA		P					X 55
INDONESIA							
GUINEA		N					
CEYLON							X 59

X Agreement exists (with date)
P Agreement has been proposed
N Agreement is under negotiation

* Temporary rights, not a permanent bilateral agreement.

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COMMUNIST TERRORISM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Communist terrorism in South Vietnam, a chronic problem for the Diem government, has assumed serious proportions in recent months in the southern and southwestern provinces. The growing aggressiveness of well-armed Communist guerrilla bands is pointed up by recent depredations in the Saigon area, including the pillaging of a hospital and the overrunning of a Vietnamese

militia post. President Diem is convinced that the Communists, bolstered by additional personnel infiltrated from North Vietnam, have begun a phase of all-out guerrilla war which will last a long time.

In contrast to the former pattern of small-scale terrorist action against remote villages and other undefended targets, Communist guerrillas since last

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fall have been operating in bands of up to several hundred strong and have concentrated attacks on Vietnamese security patrols and installations.


The Diem regime retains firm control in the larger towns, however.

The tacit cooperation of the local populace has been a factor in recent Communist guerrilla successes. A persistent Communist campaign of subversion and intimidation over the past several years, including the assassination of several hundred local officials, has undermined the confidence of the peasants in the government's ability to protect them. Present Communist tactics, particularly the attacks on security forces, appear aimed at accelerating this trend and lowering the military's morale.

In addition, the arbitrary police-state measures of many provincial authorities have strained the loyalty of the people. A case in point is the forced-draft approach by overzealous provincial chiefs in implementing the government's new program in the southern provinces of regrouping farmers from outlying areas in centralized settlements, known as "agro-villes," for greater protection against terrorists. This has engendered so much popular resentment that the government has ordered a slow-down in the program.

Many highly placed officials in Saigon acknowledge that political reforms are a prerequisite for real improvement in internal security. Vice President Tho, for example, years ago forecast the steady growth of Communist influence among the populace unless the government took steps to broaden its popular support. Tho reportedly now fears that the Communists will have completed their subversive work "at the roots" within the next six months unless effective countermeasures are immediately taken.

President Diem, however, apparently is still thinking more in terms of military consolidation to meet the present emergency. He is urging a 20,000-man increase in the present support level of 150,000 for the armed forces, the creation of an elite commando force of 10,000 to 20,000 men, and additional military equipment particularly suited for waging counter-guerrilla operations.



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