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11 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DCI

SUBJECT: Response to DCI Comments on SLOC Paper

1. As you requested, we have revised the SLOC paper and sanitized it for issuance at the ~~Secret level~~. The paper also has been updated to reflect additions to the submarine order of battle. We reran the model, using a wider variety of assumptions than were used with the original paper.

2. Within the limits of a Secret classification, most of the points you raised are addressed in the revised paper as indicated below.

DCI Memo

Response

- a. Change definitions of naval missions.
- b. "Your study attempts too much in the way of coming to a conclusion rather than explicating the problem."

Done. Pages 5-7 of our revised draft contain a brief discussion of possible Soviet sea control operations in the Norwegian Sea and of possible sea denial operations south of the G-I-UK gap.

We are now less categorical and have attempted to show more variations in and to the assumptions and have used an additional measure of effectiveness--cargoes lost as percentage of necessary cargoes shipped.

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DCI Memo

Response

- c. "Expand the sensitivity checks." Done. See, for example, page A-10 of our revised draft.
- d. "Survival of NATO merchant ships is not a cardinal output function in the event of general war. A better measure is cargoes delivered." (Express as a percentage of cargoes shipped.) Done. See page 22 and Annex. The results, however, are affected by evident uncertainty within the Defense community (both DOD and Navy) over the amount of cargoes required. The measures used in the paper reflect a range of answers currently being used in the Pentagon and Norfolk.
- e. "Mining and attacks on harbors are not effective in a non-nuclear war. Mining by submarines would be ineffective." We have expanded our treatment to include statements to that effect which are consistent with how these issues are handled in NIE 11-14.
- f. What preparations should they be taking for interdiction? Would we recognize them? Did the Japanese know before WWII that we planned on interdicting their SLOC, or did we know that the Germans were planning on that? Anti-SLOC training can best be accomplished in home waters in the final approach to and firing at a convoy. Soviet preparations for wartime operations have not included investment in a force structure--submarines with large torpedo capacity--or training optimized for interdiction. Neither deficiency would preclude the Soviets conducting a sea denial operation but would affect their capability to do so. The discussion of training
- Those assertions no longer seem relevant and most of the discussion on preparations has been deleted.

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
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DCI Memo

Response

g. Don't we give the Soviets credit for building RORSAT?

Yes and no. We assumed in the capabilities assessment that the Soviets would find and attack as many targets as they had torpedoes within the 15-day period on station. The RORSAT is unable, however, to fully provide such coverage,



h. Are Soviet submarines, which are noisy and carry relatively few torpedoes, really specialized for ASW and ACW?

Soviet submarines are indeed noisy and therefore poor ASW platforms, although they probably are the best available to the Soviets. Their writings for the last decade or so indicate that they regard SSNs as their best weapon for use against Western SSBNs.

This was deleted from the paper.

Regarding carriers, the torpedo loadings are secondary armament for the SSGs and SSGNs likely to be given ACW as a primary task and reflect their belief that the first salvo in a modern war would be critical. (See pages 14-15.)

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DCI Memo

Response

- i. Soviet ASW planning factors are optimistic. What's the source?
- The statement on Soviet perceptions of their ASW requirements was derived from two DDO [redacted] reports [redacted].
[redacted]
- Both are translations of articles written in 1966 for Military Thought, a classified journal published until 1971 by the Soviet General Staff. We agree that the planning factors they used were too low. This is not in the revised paper because of its lower classification.
- j. Is our availability data consistent with NIEs and our other readiness study?
- Yes, in general. NIE 11-14 estimates 60 percent of the Soviet attack submarine force to be operational, with varying degrees of effectiveness.
- k. On page 10 you talk about 10% of their submarines that are operationally ready being available because of other force commitment. Nowhere in the study do I find how you came to that calculation.
- The calculations used to arrive at this number are explained in NIE 11-14, Section IV and represent a best estimate of force allocation given the various competing requirements.
- l. Soviet submarines probably would interdict closer to Europe.
- See pages 15-16 and Annex for affects on results if attacks were carried out close to Europe.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

DCI Memo

[redacted] Response

m. Aircraft might be able to extend range by refueling more than once.

It would be possible but not practical as explicated in [redacted] memo to you which addressed this issue [redacted].

n. What are wartime shipping levels going to be?

See page 22. The answer to this is evidently unclear but authoritative sources give figures of 2,000 to 6,000 per month.

o. What if our CVAs don't go into the Norwegian Sea?

See pages 24-25.

[redacted]

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
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