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retained or intended to rebuild other elements of a CW program. Discoveries by UN inspectors in 1998 raised international suspicions that Iraq was withholding CW capabilities:

[Redacted]

- Analysis of unilaterally destroyed Al Husayn warhead fragments inspected by UNSCOM showed traces of VX degradation products, apparently contradicting Iraq's claim that it never weaponized VX and raising the possibility that Baghdad maintained illicit stocks of VX-filled weapons.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Postwar Assessment. Post-OIF interviews of

[Redacted] indicate that Iraq unilaterally destroyed virtually all of its undeclared chemical weapons beginning in mid-1991 and probably retained at most limited amounts of its pre-1991 CW precursors, production equipment, and documents after the mid-1990s.⁸

- As previously mentioned, one former Iraqi official stated that Iraq initially retained undeclared WMD and missile capabilities but unilaterally destroyed the remaining proscribed weapons in the summer of

[Redacted]

1991—most likely out of fear that further revelations would trigger an international military response [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Postwar debriefings also suggest that traces of VX degradation products found on unilaterally destroyed Al Husayn warhead fragments inspected by UNSCOM in 1998 might have resulted from cross-contamination that occurred when the Iraqis filled the missile warheads with alcohol using filling lines previously used for VX. Before OIF, the IC and the UN considered evidence that Iraq previously possessed VX-filled warheads to be significant, because it contradicted Iraqi declarations and strengthened suspicions that Iraq continued to hide some advanced chemical weapons.

[Redacted]

Potential Iraqi Small-Scale CW-Related Activities and Intentions (U)

Postwar information has revealed several indications that Iraq was engaged in scattered, smaller-scale efforts [Redacted]

[Redacted] that might have been

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Iraq: No Large-Scale Chemical Warfare Efforts Since Early 1990s
Iraq WMD Retrospective Series

Overturning Pre-OIF CW Judgments

A comprehensive review of intelligence acquired before and after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) leads us to conclude that Iraq did not pursue significant chemical warfare (CW) efforts after 1991. Our revised conclusions vary significantly from the judgments we made prior to OIF, largely because of subsequent events and direct access to Iraqi officials, [redacted] and documents that plausibly contradict the existence of a major CW effort while weakening or removing the pillars of our prewar assessments. Some gaps or ambiguities, however, remain in our understanding of post-1991 Iraqi actions and intentions, in part as a result of the difficult operational environment in Iraq, the destruction or looting of facilities of interest, and the operational focus on finding illicit weapons rather than disproving their existence. It is unlikely that we will ever be able to fully resolve all of the pre-OIF indications of CW activity. [redacted]

CW Program Probably Ended in 1991

A combination of direct and inferential evidence indicates that Iraq abandoned efforts to preserve an active CW capability in mid-1991, although it continued to withhold details about its CW activities for years thereafter. Interviews after OIF with several former Iraqi officials [redacted]

[redacted] indicate that Iraq destroyed and subsequently declared key elements of its CW and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs [redacted]

This assessment was prepared by the DCI Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to [redacted]

in the early to mid-1990s² in response to several crises involving inspections and threat of force, [redacted]

[redacted] and the defection of Husayn Kamil in 1995.

- One of these officials stated after OIF that Iraq retained undeclared WMD and missile capabilities immediately after Operation Desert Storm, but unilaterally destroyed the remaining proscribed weapons in the summer of 1991.
- Following Husayn Kamil's defection in 1995, Hosam Amin—who at the time was head of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate (NMD)—prepared a damage assessment that suggests Iraq retained no major undeclared CW capabilities at that time.³ In this document [redacted] Amin listed undeclared WMD activities he [redacted]

² The intent behind many Iraqi actions since 1991 remains unclear, making it difficult to determine when Iraq abandoned—at least temporarily—its overall CW ambitions. Iraq initially retained an undeclared stockpile of chemical weapons but unilaterally destroyed them in mid-1991 and hid their existence from UN inspectors until 1992. Baghdad, moreover, preserved documents useful in restarting a CW program until 1995 and retained dual-use chemical production equipment—possibly for eventual use in reconstituting a CW effort—until 1997. [redacted]

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- The fact that the Saddam regime did not use or apparently prepare to use chemical weapons⁵ — even at key turning points, such as the fall of Baghdad and the eventual capture of Saddam — caused us to reexamine our belief that Saddam wanted WMD *at least* as a last resort to prevent his loss of power. This belief influenced our interpretation of Iraq's prewar actions and colored our judgment of the prewar intelligence [redacted]

- Physical inspections of Musayyib, documentary information obtained at the facility, and statements [redacted]

[redacted] reveal that the suspicious separately secured area at this site did not store chemical weapons but served as an administration and housing area.

- ISG [redacted] learned that Iraq used tanker trucks—including "Samarra-type" vehicles that were associated with known CW transshipments at Iraq's primary CW facility prior to 1991—to carry water for innocuous purposes at depots.

- Postwar interviews of Iraqi military officers show that the Special Republican Guard (SRG) and other special units used the Musayyib depot for routine storage of conventional weapons or materials; prior to OIF, the presence of SRG vehicles was considered a potential indicator of sensitive activity.

Suspected 2002 Transshipment Activity

[redacted]

[redacted]

what we believed to be a separately secured storage facility at Musayyib, especially in conjunction with other indicators, appeared unusual and strengthened our belief of ongoing offensive CW activity. [redacted]

[redacted]

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ISG has not been able to research as thoroughly suspicious transshipment activity at other depots. The innocuous explanations for the CW indicators observed at Musayyib, however, lead us to conclude that similar indicators observed at other depots in 2002 no longer constitute credible evidence of chemical weapons transshipments. Some ambiguities in the nature of the observed activity are likely to remain because of looting at these sites and the difficulty of pursuing additional detailed investigations.


Dual-Use Chemical Facilities

Prewar Assessment. Prior to OIF, the IC concluded that Iraq was rebuilding elements of its chemical industry to support a CW effort.

Plants that produced pesticides or other specialty chemicals could have been adapted for CW purposes relatively easily because of the similar equipment and raw materials used in these processes, potentially providing Iraq with a "breakout" production capability.

Postwar Assessment. Investigations by ISG and previously by UN inspectors have found no dedicated CW breakout capability in Iraq's chemical industry.

Company facilities told ISG that the plants made only industrial products and that they knew of no CW-related production or attempts to maintain a CW production capability at these facilities. Many of these individuals provided similar denials to UN inspectors prior to OIF, but at the time we did not view these denials as significant because of the apparent motivation for Iraqis under Saddam to conceal sensitive information.



Reports of Chemical Weapons Production or Stockpiles

Prewar Assessment. After UN inspectors left Iraq in 1998

the IC received numerous reports indicating that Iraq possessed or was producing chemical weapons, although the IC was unable to corroborate these claims.

These reports seemed more credible in the aggregate, however, because of the volume of information, the apparent corroboration among different sources of information, and our assessment—based on Saddam's historical actions related to WMD, inspections, and regime survival—of his intentions.


Postwar Assessment.

we have not yet confirmed any allegations that Iraq was producing or hiding chemical weapons.

The credibility of many of the human sources of prewar Iraqi CW allegations has been called into question in varying degrees. A few of these reports have been retracted because the sources are believed to have been directed to provide false information or

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feared Kamil could reveal to the United Nations, but he cited no CW revelations.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] high-level Iraqi officials [Redacted] have denied that Iraq had an ongoing CW effort.

[Redacted] some or all of the more senior officials should have been in a position to know about a centrally directed CW program. It is possible that these individuals are providing false information, but their denials seem credible.

[Redacted]

Several Iraqis described events that in varying ways contradict the existence of an ongoing CW effort.

[Redacted] a December 2002 meeting of senior RG commanders [Redacted] that Saddam Husayn at this meeting flatly denied the possession of WMD, to the surprise of many officials.

[Redacted] reported incidents in which Iraq's leadership considered restarting a CW effort, suggesting that no such effort existed at the time:

[Redacted] Uday Husayn several weeks before OIF requested [Redacted]

Dr. Imad Husayn Al-Ani—a former CW official—produce an unspecified CW agent for the Fedayeen Saddam to use against Coalition forces. Al-Ani reportedly delayed and ultimately responded that Iraq had neither the infrastructure nor the raw materials needed for such an effort.

[Redacted] hat Saddam Husayn [Redacted]

asked him how quickly Iraq could produce CW agents. Huwaysh claims that he researched the issue and later responded to Saddam that it would have taken six months [Redacted]

Post-OIF Findings Counter Prewar Judgments

[Redacted]

Postwar information—including document exploitation, site inspections, and many debriefings of relevant Iraqi officials [Redacted] is more compelling than the prewar allegations of several sources and, in some cases, directly invalidates this prewar information. Debriefings of detainees and other experts have provided credible explanations for most of the gaps and inconsistencies that troubled us and UN arms inspectors before OIF.

[Redacted]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY




DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE



Iraq WMD Retrospective Series

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**Iraq: No Large-Scale Chemical Warfare
Efforts Since Early 1990s**
Iraq WMD Retrospective Series [REDACTED]

Key Findings (U)



A comprehensive review of intelligence acquired before and after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) leads us to conclude that Iraq probably did not pursue significant chemical warfare (CW) efforts after 1991. Our revised conclusions vary significantly from the judgments we made prior to OIF, largely because of subsequent events and direct access to Iraqi officials [REDACTED] and documents that contradict the existence of a major CW effort while weakening or removing the pillars of our prewar assessments.

- A combination of direct and inferential evidence indicates that Iraq abandoned efforts to maintain a hidden CW capability in mid-1991.
- Postwar information—including document exploitation, site inspections, and many debriefings of relevant Iraqi officials [REDACTED] is more compelling than the prewar allegations of several sources and, in some cases, directly invalidates this prewar information. Debriefings of detainees and other experts have provided credible explanations for most of the gaps and inconsistencies that troubled us and UN arms inspectors before OIF.
- Although we believe the weight of evidence now argues strongly against the existence of a large-scale, centralized Iraqi CW effort after 1991, uncertainties remain in our post-OIF exploitation. As a result, we have considered several scenarios in which we might have missed or underestimated post-1991 Iraqi CW activities. [REDACTED]

Postwar information has revealed several indications that Iraq was engaged in scattered, smaller-scale efforts [REDACTED] that might have been CW related. Iraq also was conducting dual-use research geared toward developing an indigenous production capability for numerous chemicals, some of which can be used in a CW program. Statements by detained high-level officials of Saddam Husayn's regime suggest that Iraqi leaders did not maintain a formal reconstitution plan but never abandoned their intentions to ultimately resume a CW effort once international scrutiny had subsided. [REDACTED]

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Scope Note (U)

This is the second¹ intelligence assessment (IA) in the CIA's *Iraq WMD Retrospective Series* that addresses our post-Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) understanding of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery system programs. These IAs reevaluate past assessments and reporting in light of the investigations carried out by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). [redacted]

This IA seeks to address the existence of an undeclared Iraqi chemical warfare (CW) effort or chemical weapons stockpile in the period between 1991 and 2003. It is not intended to provide a comprehensive review of the post-OIF CW threat. [redacted]


[redacted] It goes beyond the ISG's efforts to investigate Iraq's CW activities by reexamining in greater detail the pre-OIF intelligence basis for our judgments on Iraqi CW efforts. Although the conclusions of this IA are consistent with ISG's findings—as reflected in the DCI's Special Adviser on Iraq's WMD September 2004 *Comprehensive Report* and other products—the review of historical reporting and assessments helps to provide additional context to support this reassessment. [redacted]

¹ For the first in the series, see DI Intelligence Assessment WINPAC IA 2004-030HCX

[redacted] 4 January 2005, *Disposition of Iraqi Scud-Type SRBMs*. [redacted]

Small-Scale CW Threats Remain (U)

Coalition forces in Iraq potentially face a threat from chemical weapons even absent a large Iraqi CW program.



Conclusions (U)

We have seen no credible indications that Iraq pursued any significant CW efforts after 1991, and it is unlikely that any militarily effective stockpiles of Iraqi chemical weapons remain. Small numbers of forgotten, discarded, or demilitarized chemical weapons from Iraq's pre-1991 stockpile continue to surface, however, and pose a modest potential threat to Coalition forces.



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CW related. Iraq also was conducting dual-use research geared toward developing an indigenous production capability for numerous chemicals, some of which can be used in a CW program. Statements by detained high-level officials of Saddam's regime suggest that Iraq's leaders did not maintain a formal reconstitution plan but never abandoned their intentions to ultimately resume a CW effort once international scrutiny had subsided.

ISG investigations show that Iraq was developing a comprehensive program for the production of chemicals—some with CW applications—that were difficult to import under UN sanctions. Although the motivations behind this program remain unclear, Iraq considered these chemicals to be of strategic importance. Most of these chemicals were relevant to the industrial or agricultural sectors.

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~~TOP SECRET~~**Prewar Assessments (U)**

The Intelligence Community (IC) assessed prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom that Iraq was rebuilding a dual-use infrastructure that it could divert quickly to chemical warfare (CW)-related production. Stockpile estimates suggested that Iraq had at least 100 tons—and possibly as much as 500 tons—of several CW agents, much of which it had produced since late 2001. These judgments were derived from allegations made by a range of human sources, suspicious Iraqi activities and gaps in Baghdad's declarations, and strong inferential information [redacted]


- Elements of Iraqi CW declarations that the IC and United Nations judged were false or incomplete led analysts to conclude that Baghdad was trying to preserve elements of its pre-1991 CW program, probably including some chemical agents and weapons.
- Numerous reports [redacted] Iraq possessed or was producing chemical weapons in the period leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, although the IC was unable to corroborate these claims.
- [redacted] suspicious activity or potential dual-use capabilities at several Iraqi chemical facilities that suggested Iraq might be conducting illicit activities—possibly CW related—in parts of its chemical industry.
- Iraq had sought foreign equipment and chemicals that would enable it to produce CW agents on a small scale [redacted]
- [redacted] Iraq had deployed chemical munitions into the military logistic chain. [redacted]

By early 2003 [redacted] suggested that Iraq was succeeding in concealing its CW program from UN inspectors. These reports supported previous IC assessments that a decision to use weapons of mass destruction would come when Saddam Husayn felt his personal survival was at stake—although we were unlikely to know when Saddam reached that point—and that the likelihood of Iraqi WMD use would increase as US forces approached Baghdad. [redacted]

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Coalition forces in Iraq potentially face a threat from chemical weapons even absent a large, centralized Iraqi CW program.





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
- Iraqi opposition groups and individuals were motivated to exaggerate the threat posed by Iraq because of their hatred of the regime and to encourage international intervention.
- A closer review of prewar information suggests that some sources passed incorrect information—perhaps inadvertently




Dual-Use Procurement Activity

Prewar Assessment. Prior to OIF, analysts assessed that Iraq was seeking equipment and chemicals that would have enabled it to produce CW agents on a small scale. (U)

Postwar Assessment. We have been unable to credibly link any purchase attempts since 1991 to an Iraqi CW effort.



reported during postwar debriefings that Iraqi possession of chemical weapons was "common knowledge" until they witnessed Saddam flatly deny possession of WMD at a December 2002 meeting.



Residual Pre-1991 Stocks

Prewar Assessment. Iraq's initial failure to declare all of the chemical agents, weapons, and raw materials it produced or imported prior to 1991 and later its inability to adequately account for the materials it claimed to have destroyed unilaterally were key elements in our post-1991 judgments that Iraq maintained hidden stocks of chemical weapons and

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