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SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY

*Submitted by the*  
**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**


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*on 19 July 1960. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.*

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# SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY

## THE PROBLEM

To assess the present situation and to estimate likely developments in Turkey during the next year.

## THE ESTIMATE

### I. POLITICAL

1. The military junta which overthrew the Turkish Government in a smoothly executed coup on 27 May appears to be firmly in control of Turkey, and there is no evidence of significant organized opposition to its rule. The coup had been in preparation for some months by a group of relatively junior officers who constituted themselves the Committee of National Union (CNU). It was stimulated primarily by Prime Minister Menderes' increasingly ruthless suppression of his principal opposition, Ismet Inonu's Republican People's Party (RPP), by growing signs that Menderes was preparing to use the army and security forces to crush his opponents, and by mounting disaffection for the regime on the part of students and other urban groups. Except for a handful of top officers who owed their positions directly to Menderes, the Turkish armed forces promptly gave their support to the new government, and it has received impressive indications of popular approval as well. The rank-and-file of Menderes' supporters have made no significant moves against the junta, despite its arrests of the leaders of the Democrat Party (DP), including virtually all Democrat members of the former Grand National Assembly.

2. It was probably only shortly before the coup that the CNU brought in General Gursel, recently retired as Chief of the Ground Forces, to head the operation. Soon after the coup,

the CNU promulgated a provisional constitution giving itself the powers of the Grand National Assembly until such time as a new constitution is adopted and an assembly elected under new electoral laws. General Gursel, Chairman of the CNU, was also designated head of state. The cabinet appointed immediately after the coup included three military and 14 civilian members.

3. Most members of the CNU have avoided publicity, and the group's inner workings are carried on with a secrecy which makes it difficult to obtain information on its personalities, power relationships, and basic intentions. Gursel himself is considered a forceful man, who had made known his disapproval of the Menderes regime well before the coup. Despite recurrent reports that one or another of the CNU officers exercises the real power behind the scenes, we believe that Gursel, as active operating head of the Provisional Government, is in fact the key figure and at least first among equals in the CNU. After Gursel, the most publicized figure on the CNU is Colonel Turkes.\* Another leading figure is Major General Madanoglu, who probably played a central role in organizing and executing the coup.

\* Colonel Turkes is an ardent Turkish nationalist. He was arrested by Inonu in 1944 for his activities in the Pan-Turkism movement, which aims at uniting the Turkish speaking peoples, particularly those living in the USSR, with Turkey. He has been friendly toward the US and West Germany.

4. Gursel and his colleagues originally indicated their intention to hold national elections and to restore civil government in the shortest possible time. Nevertheless, the group has clearly become more cautious about how and when to take the step, and more impressed with the difficulties of doing so. While substantial progress has been made in drafting a constitution, important questions remain to be resolved—e.g., whether to have proportional representation. Initial suggestions that a new constitution might be promulgated in July and elections held late this summer or early fall now appear premature. Elections may be put off until next spring or even later.

5. On the whole, we believe that the regime remains sincere in its desire to restore civilian government. Indications are that the CNU does not intend to establish lasting control on the pattern of Nasser's free officers. The bulk of the evidence is that the junta's efforts are still directed at the eventual transfer of power rather than the prolonged consolidation of its own. Undue delays would run counter to one of the major reasons for staging the coup—the restoration of political freedom—and would invite the strong disapproval of former President Inonu, whose leadership of the RPP and whose association with Ataturk give him enormous prestige and authority among Turkish civilian and military elements alike. Inonu has carefully avoided identifying himself and his party with the military regime.

6. There are personality clashes and some policy differences among the members of the CNU, as well as a certain amount of nervousness and lack of self-confidence. This sort of thing is inevitable at this stage in a politically inexperienced military regime. Some opposition to the regime is likely to appear from time to time. It is also probable that some senior military officers resent the power of the junta's predominantly junior membership. There is probably apprehension within the civil service over the uncertain outlook. On the present evidence, however, we do not believe that either internal disputes or possible opposition will be allowed to imperil the regime's control of the country. Nor do we believe that the government's power will be threatened by or-

ganized uprisings, for example among the Kurds or Democrat Party elements.

7. Though the CNU has declared its intention to restore civil government, its members probably differ on when this should take place and on the nature of the government to be established. There is probably disagreement between those who favor the return of Inonu and the RPP, and those who take the view that the coup was not simply aimed at installing the RPP in power. The junta almost certainly wants to avoid a single-party system, and with the DP largely disorganized and discredited, members of the present regime may attempt either to encourage such lesser forces as the Nation Party, to revitalize the DP after disposing of its former leaders, or even to sponsor a new political movement. Establishing party organizations in the provinces is an onerous job. It is more likely that CNU members with political ambitions will retire from the armed forces and seek to use their prestige to establish a position in one or another of the existing political parties.

8. In any case, at least some members of the junta are likely to play roles of importance in future Turkish affairs. Not only are they likely to develop some taste for power and an interest in seeing that their program is not abandoned, but they are probably also uncertain about their future under any new Turkish government. They will thus almost inevitably be concerned with the course of Turkish political affairs, though opinions as to how they should make their influence felt are probably still being formed and changed. The original objectives and attitudes of those in power will remain subject to modification by the press of circumstances and the interplay of personalities. Decisions in these matters are likely to require some time, and may easily provoke dissension within the group, though we do not consider it likely to prove fatal to the junta's control.

9. The outcome of a national election will depend to a large extent on the role played by the CNU. If it merely oversees the holding of free elections, the RPP—being strong in its own right and the most likely gainer from the DP's near-disintegration—would probably

gain control of the government. If, on the other hand, the CNU actively encourages lesser parties, and particularly if proportional representation is established, the RPP's power would probably be limited. Nevertheless, if an election is held within the next year or so, we still consider the RPP the most likely winner.

## II. MILITARY

10. The coup has inevitably diverted to some extent the energies and attentions of the military from their primary mission. A number of competent officers are engaged full time in overseeing the operations of civilian ministries and in other nonmilitary duties arising from the new situation. Moreover, the removal of a handful of top military officers and reassignment of others has created some organizational dislocations, including some disruption of liaison with JUSMMAT. There are indications that the regime intends to go through with long-standing plans to reorganize the armed forces, involving the retirement of a considerable number of officers. On the whole, however, we foresee no significant weakening of Turkey's military capabilities, except in the unlikely event that the regime is forced to use the armed forces to put down some large-scale uprising against its authority.

## III. ECONOMIC

11. The provisional government's principal immediate economic problems are Turkey's weak financial position and the stagnation of business activity which began early this year. The government is attacking its economic problems with considerable determination. Competent civilians have been appointed to key economic positions and given commensurate authority. The government has taken the politically courageous step of resisting pressures for the higher agricultural subsidies which Menderes had planned. It has also announced plans to improve its financial position by selling bonds to the public and sharply curtailing government spending, rather than by raising taxes. While its retrenchment program probably will cause some discontent, this is unlikely to be a major problem unless the

present economic stagnation turns into a recession. If, as seems more likely, business confidence returns as uncertainty about government policies fades, the economic prospects for the rest of 1960 will be generally good. Harvest prospects are excellent. The stabilization program inaugurated in 1958, while only partially adhered to, has curtailed inflation, improved Turkey's export position, and enabled Turkish industry to expand production. Nevertheless, the actions taken by the new government will not of themselves overcome the weakness of Turkey's financial position and its chronic foreign trade deficit, and continued foreign aid will be necessary.

12. More important for the long run are the steps being taken to substitute an integrated economic development plan for Menderes' overambitious and uncoordinated spending program. A National Planning Office has been established to draw up this plan with the aid of experienced foreign experts and UN organs. Projects which are in their early stages have been halted until it can be determined whether they will fit into the new program. The government plans to curtail deficit financing and to minimize subsidies to state-owned enterprises. While these policies will yield only limited results in the near future, they should place Turkey's economic development efforts on a sounder if less ambitious basis. Should the RPP succeed to power, it would probably accept and continue this more restrained and realistic approach to economic development.

## IV. FOREIGN POLICY

13. Immediately after the coup, the provisional government gave assurances that it would honor Turkey's international commitments and that no change in Turkish foreign policy was contemplated. In general, we think this is likely to be the case. Turkish participation in NATO and CENTO councils has continued without interruption and with no discernable change in tactics or purpose. The same has been true with respect to Turkish participation in multilateral negotiations concerning Cyprus. The regime's decision to

reduce Turkey's contingent in Korea from a brigade to a company was taken in the face of US opposition, but we do not believe it augurs any weakening of Turkey's essential commitment to the Western Alliance. Turkey has a shortage of regular officers, and in view of the military's increased responsibilities in civil affairs, the government probably does feel that the brigade, especially its officers, is needed at home.

14. The decision about the brigade in Korea does, however, illustrate one likely difference between the present regime's attitude on foreign policy and that of its predecessor. Gursel and his colleagues, though desirous of maintaining the same basic ties with the Western Alliance as did Menderes, will almost certainly prove more independent and less readily amenable to US influence on certain issues. They will, for example, probably show more sensitivity about Turkish sovereignty in matters

arising from the presence of US troops in Turkey, and be less inclined toward informal arrangements. On the other hand, cooperation in economic matters may improve. Thus while the course of US-Turkish cooperation may be less easy than in the past, the basic relationship is not likely to be undermined.

15. The USSR is seeking to exploit the situation. Khrushchev has sent two letters to assure the new regime that Soviet aid is available, and some officials are already pointing to Soviet offers as cogent reasons for stepped-up US assistance. Basically, however, we think that the present government is as anti-Russian as its predecessor and no more likely to become neutralist. However, it might accept limited Soviet aid, as did the Menderes government. Should the RPP come to power, it, too, would probably pursue a more independent course than Menderes, at the same time preserving the broad framework of cooperation with the West.