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Emigre terrorists, particularly Croatians, have been a thorn in the side of the Yugoslav regime since its inception. They have been unable to mount a serious challenge to President Tito but may try to test the new regime after his death.

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Yugoslavia: The Emigre Problem

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The recent hijacking of a TWA aircraft by Croatian emigre terrorists underlines a problem for Yugoslavia as it prepares for the period after President Tito's death. Emigre attempts to create serious instability in Yugoslavia are likely to intensify after Tito dies or becomes incapacitated.

The emigres, badly divided even within their own nationalist sub-groups, have never been able to mount a direct, concerted challenge to Tito, but their opposition constantly nibbles at the leadership's confidence that Tito has created a unified, multinational state that will hold together when he is gone.

The regime has tried to intimidate the emigres. In the past two years there have been at least 11 unsolved murders of emigres abroad. Many, if not all, were probably ordered by the Yugoslav secret police. Yugoslav officials tend to react intemperately to emigre acts of violence, often in ways that undermine Yugoslavia's case as the victim of terrorism.

Croat Emigres

The Tito regime's most serious emigre problems are with the Croatians. Organized Croat opposition from outside Yugoslavia was led initially by the fascist Ustashe, the group that ran the pro-Nazi Independent State of Croatia during the war. Most of the key Ustashe leaders have died or gravitated into smaller, even more extreme emigre organizations. With their passing, younger emigres of the postwar generation—many of whom grew up in Yugoslavia—have replaced them.

The Croat emigre opposition is now made up of several major groups, which have defied attempts to unite them. The current umbrella organization, the Croat National Council, resulted from an effort two years ago to impose common goals and strategies, but it has had rough going because of jealousies and the rigid autonomist ideals of the four major founding groups.


At present, the Council is reportedly torn by sharp disagreements between "moderates" and "radicals" over the desire of the moderates to break totally with the movement's early fascist-Ustashe origins, and thus to attract Western sympathies.

The Croat National Committee, based in West Germany, is a much older organization that has also tried to adopt a more respectable image. It is affiliated with the Croat National Council, but, unlike the umbrella organization, its leadership endorses violence. On occasion, the National Committee has even indicated that it would accept Soviet aid—if offered—in overthrowing Tito.

Several other Croat groups are openly terrorist. They provide most of the manpower for terrorist attacks on the Tito regime.

- The Croat National Resistance and its unruly offshoot, the Drina Group, have conducted attacks on Yugoslav officials abroad and have carried out bombings and other sabotage in Yugoslavia. Yugoslav Ambassador Rolovic was assassinated in Sweden by the group five years ago.

- The Croat Liberation Movement (known by its Croatian acronym,



President Tito

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Weekly Summary


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HOP) is largely made up of younger militants with a smattering of old Ustashe hands. HOP leaders are dedicated and ruthless.

- The extremely radical Croat Revolutionary Brotherhood is regarded by moderates in the National Committee as totally unpredictable. The Brotherhood took credit for an abortive guerrilla raid into Yugoslavia in the summer of 1972.

- The Croat Liberation Army has in recent years conducted several daring—but unsuccessful—assassination operations against prominent men in Tito's regime.

Several other anti-Tito Croat groups exist, but they are generally weak and ineffective. A number of emigrants have made halting efforts to organize a nominally communist opposition abroad that might attract disaffected Croat leaders within Yugoslavia.

Serbs

While the Croats are the regime's primary concern, Belgrade is also sensitive about Serb emigres—particularly those who might exploit lingering sympathies for Draza Mihailovic's Chetniks of World War II. Except for occasional actions by a group called Fatherland, Organ of Serb Fighters for Freedom, the

Serb emigres do not often resort to terrorism.

To some extent, Tito's nervousness about Serb emigres stems from his failure to develop a strong and reliable power base in Serbia. The Serbian party has been ravaged by several major purges in the last decade, and no single leader can realistically claim to speak for Serbian interests. In this vacuum, the emigres have been able to pose ready, attractive answers without employing the desperate measures of their Croat counterparts. At least three Serb leaders in exile have been murdered in the past two years.

Terrorism

Until a few years ago, Croatian terrorist groups worked from apparent safe havens mainly in West Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Australia. Growing international revulsion against terrorism has complicated their efforts, and many terrorists have been expelled or their organizations made unwelcome in a number of Western countries.

Most of the funds for the terrorist groups are evidently donated by Croat organizations in the US and Western Europe that on their own do not undertake overt actions against Tito's government. Recurring rumors have circulated that Croat terrorists have been trying to

establish links with the Irish Republican Army and to attract financial aid from Western governments or—failing that—Libya. There is no evidence that they have succeeded.

We do not know how much support the emigres have inside Yugoslavia. The evidence of collaboration by resident Croats with the emigres is spotty. There is residual distaste among many Croats for Ustashe atrocities against Serbs during the war. The assassinations of non-Croat diplomats abroad presumably have kept alive fears that the emigres are fanatics.

Belgrade has tried to counter the emigre threat by:

- Pressing foreign governments to deny them bases of operation.
- Undermining the new "responsible" groups that pose a more difficult problem because they usually abide by the letter of the law.
- Eliminating as many troublesome emigre leaders as possible and in ways that could set the emigre groups against one another.
- Identifying and isolating any potential sources of support for the emigres either in Yugoslavia or among the 850,000 Yugoslavs temporarily employed abroad.

These measures may help to ensure that no coordinated, strong challenge to the Titoist system emerges, but they cannot stop terrorism or greatly influence the groups that finance and otherwise support the terrorists.

When Tito dies, available evidence suggests that the regime will tighten internal security controls in expectation of a wave of desperate acts by emigre terrorists. We expect that the borders will be watched closely, special counterterror operations will begin immediately, and suspected troublemakers will be arbitrarily detained.

These steps will provide no guarantees against terrorist attacks on Yugoslav installations and personnel abroad, however, and they will not prevent daring—if suicidal—actions within Yugoslavia itself.