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ANNEX C

May 2, 1960

### SINO-SOVIET BLOC ACTIVITY IN TURKEY

(Prepared by CIA without inter-agency coordination as an informal document for use by the OCB Working Group and as background for the information of the OCB)

\* 60. General. Continuing pressure from the USSR for closer contacts has resulted in agreement that Turkish Premier Menderes will visit Moscow in July and that Khrushchev will return his visit at a later date. While the USSR probably continues to regard Turkey as a major obstacle to the spread of "coexistence" in the Middle East, Moscow will probably seek to exploit Turkey's acceptance to persuade Turkey's allies, especially Greece and Iran, to moderate their anti-Soviet policies. Turkey maintains diplomatic relations with the USSR and all the Eastern European satellites except East Germany.

\* 61. Economic. In 1959 there was a sharp drop in Turkey's trade with the bloc accounted for largely by increased purchases in the West following large credits made available to Turkey in 1958. In the first eleven months of 1959 bloc trade dropped to about \$74,000,000 compared with total 1958 trade of \$120,000,000. This eleven month total represented 12.5 percent of Turkey's total exports and 9.6 percent of total imports, compared with 23.7 percent of exports and 18.2 percent of imports during calendar 1958. While Turkish consumers prefer Western goods, the bloc is willing to buy marginal agricultural commodities such as low grade tobacco. No new credits were extended by the bloc. All of the \$17,100,000 in bloc credits has been obligated and \$8,500,000 drawn.

62. Subversive. There is little known Communist organization in Turkey, and Turkish Communists remain virtually neutralized by the security forces. The small flow of foreign propaganda is believed to be effectively blocked. Bloc broadcasters have been unsuccessfully trying to exploit Turkey's chronic economic difficulties. Moscow does not appear to be carrying on an active subversive campaign among Turkey's Kurds.

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\* 63. Turkish Reaction. Ankara's agreement to the Khrushchev-Menderes visits was apparently intended as a defensive move against what it regards as a Western trend toward detente with the USSR, and the government probably hopes that it will place Turkey in a favorable position to take advantage of any post-summit improvement in East-West relations. Ankara has emphasized that Turkey will continue to base its foreign policy on its military pacts with the West and that its strong pro-Western orientation will not be affected by the visits. Both the government party and the opposition Republican People's Party are strongly anti-Communist. In connection with the visits, however, Turkish officials have indicated a readiness to conclude cultural and health agreements and possibly an economic agreement with the USSR.

\* 64. The Outlook. Any significant extension of bloc political or economic influence will be to a great extent thwarted by ingrained Turkish suspicion of and hostility toward Russia and toward Communism. No basic change in Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy is anticipated, although further increases in bloc cultural contacts and possibly economic contacts seem likely. Turkey is unlikely to accept large amounts of bloc aid in the foreseeable future. Moscow's long range prospects for establishing closer economic ties probably depend to a considerable degree on Ankara's success in coping with its internal economic problems with the help of the West.

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