

The President's Daily Brief

~~Top Secret~~ 7 October 1967



50X1

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005500050001-1

50X1

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005500050001-1


50X1

**DAILY BRIEF
7 OCTOBER 1967**

1. South Vietnam

More antigovernment demonstrations appear in the offing, despite the hard-line policy against this kind of activity announced yesterday by Thieu. Specifically, student leaders plan another rally in Saigon today, and there is talk of a general strike of businesses and transportation workers in Hue. Continued pressure on the security forces could wear down their restraint, and provoke an incident around which students and Buddhists might be able to generate some real mass support.

2. Soviet Union




50X1

50X1

3. Middle East

50X1



4. Nonproliferation Treaty

Moscow remains cooperative, but pressure is building up among the non-aligned states and other critics of the treaty for early referral of the draft to the UN General Assembly. The current status of the treaty is summarized in today's Annex.

5. Panama


Two fairly powerful bombs exploded in Panama City early this week, but damage was minimal. These were more sophisticated than the Molotov cocktails used in the past. Most likely perpetrators are members of a small pro-Castro terrorist group. There are no signs that Arnulfo Arias' opposition party was involved.

50X1

6. Algeria-Morocco

The danger of new military clashes between these hostile neighbors is beginning to alarm

50X1



ANNEX

Status of the Nonproliferation Treaty

A month after offering a compromise Article III (safeguards), Moscow still is marking time and maintaining a positive attitude toward joint efforts with the US to achieve a complete text of the treaty. Soviet delegates have given the US the impression that they are prepared to be flexible about considering some interpretations and changes for which they have shown little enthusiasm in the past.

The Soviets share our reluctance to send the draft to the United Nations until the Europeans have agreed on a satisfactory safeguards article. It had been hoped that this could be done by the end of this month, but this now seems increasingly unlikely. At the moment, progress is held up awaiting EURATOM response to the proposed article. Chances are slim that a final position will be ready before late this month. Meanwhile, the non-aligned states are pressing hard for early referral of the treaty to the General Assembly where they will have a larger forum for airing their grievances against its provisions.

One of the main problems bothering the non-aligned states is the question of security assurances. This is particularly pertinent for India, worried about the growing Chinese nuclear capability, but it has also been raised by others. For their part, the Italians, West Germans, and the Japanese want the treaty to have a limited duration and the first two insist on changes in the procedures for amending the treaty. The more basic problem of nondiscrimination in peaceful uses of nuclear energy is also sure to be given wide play by Brazil, India, Japan, Italy and Sweden. These countries are also demanding that the obligations they would assume under the treaty be "balanced" by commitments by the nuclear powers to cut back their own nuclear capabilities.

In the interim, talks between the Soviet and US ambassadors in Geneva are moving ahead to map joint strategy on how to meet some of these objections.

50X1

If it appears that a complete treaty text cannot be forwarded to the UN General Assembly, the Soviets have hinted at another tack that could be taken. This would involve adjournment of the Geneva sessions after hearing presentations by the nonaligned. The Soviet and US delegations would then work out a complete text in New York and reconvene the disarmament conference there to review it.

The Soviet Union also has agreed, at US urging, not to push at the conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency for a general resolution favoring the treaty. The US feared that this would provide an occasion for countries critical of the Soviet-US draft to register their reservations and further complicate the already difficult and drawn-out negotiations.


Top Secret

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL DAILY REPORT ON NORTH VIETNAM

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

50X1



12

TOP SECRET


Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only*

7 October 1967

I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Doumer Bridge in operation: Rail and highway traffic have been restored on the Doumer bridge,

50X1



* * *

Hanoi gets more aid agreements: East Germany has joined other Communist countries in outlining its support for North Vietnam. An aid agreement

*This report carries a second section on North Vietnamese Reflections of US Political Attitudes Toward the War.

signed on 5 October provides for credits to cover East German goods and services to be delivered during 1968-1970. A trade agreement for next year calling for a substantial increase over 1967 also was signed. Under it East Germany will supply light industrial goods, trucks, medical and various consumer goods.

North Vietnam also signed a 1968 trade agreement with Communist China on 5 October. Although details are not available, the trade pact undoubtedly recognizes North Vietnam's inability to sustain exports, but assures Hanoi that necessary goods will be supplied under the traditional trade protocol. These agreements further round out the efforts of the recent aid-seeking mission led by Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi, which also produced agreements with the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Korea, Mongolia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Cuba.

* * *

Mao meets with Vietnamese Delegation: The New China News Agency reported on 5 October that Chairman Mao had that afternoon received members of the Vietnamese delegation to the National Day celebrations headed by Politburo members Le Thanh Nghi and Hoang Van Hoan. Also present were Lin Piao and Chou En-lai. The last time Mao publicly met with Vietnamese leaders was in July 1965--close to the high point in Sino-Vietnamese relations. Mao had previously received the other principal foreign visitors to the 1967 National Day ceremonies and a failure to meet with the Vietnamese delegation would have appeared as a slap in the face to Hanoi. However, the Chinese are apparently relatively satisfied with Hanoi's unyielding stance toward negotiations--Peking in fact used National Day to demonstrate it was reasonably confident of Vietnamese determination to continue the war.

* * *

Hanoi on the Chinese presence in North Vietnam: North Vietnam has extolled the extensive presence of Chinese engineering, construction, and other personnel in North Vietnam and has also publicly alluded for the first time to Chinese personnel engaging in combat on behalf of Vietnam. These

admissions were contained in an article in the party daily Nhan Dan by Minister of Communications and Transport Phan Trong Tue written on the occasion of Chinese National Day and broadcast domestically in North Vietnam on 2 October.

The article stated that the Chinese have sent many outstanding scientific and technical cadres and many skilled technical workers to "directly help the Vietnamese in the communications and transport fields as well as in many other technical areas of our economy." The article praised the Chinese railroad authority for giving "priority treatment" to trains transporting aid goods from China to Vietnam and transshipping aid from other fraternal countries. Tue also praised the Chinese for "fighting courageously" on behalf of Vietnam-- a clear and unprecedented allusion to the Chinese anti-aircraft units operating in North Vietnam.

Tue's enthusiastic and detailed expression for China's aid to Vietnam is in keeping with other recent Hanoi statements which have stressed Sino-Vietnamese solidarity. These statements probably stem from Hanoi's pleasure with the moderating developments on the Chinese domestic scene.

II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WAR

A commentary by the Viet Cong's Liberation Press Agency broadcast clandestinely in Vietnamese to South Vietnam on 4 October contained a lengthy and harshly worded attack on recent statements on the war by President Johnson and UN Ambassador Goldberg. The broadcast described "Johnson and his clique in the US administration" as a "band of cunning, deceitful, insolent, and stupid people." It further asserted that the peace offensive which the "Johnson clique has advertized for a long time" is merely an "old trick accompanied by ambiguous arguments which are disastrously indecisive."

The broadcast further asserted that the current US peace effort was put forth "for the absurd reason of continuing the war of aggression." Going on in the same vein, the broadcast recounted in vindictive language the "insolent deeds" of the US

"aggressors" and emphasized that "Johnson's deceitful arguments about peace negotiations have not been able to deceive US and world public opinion nor can they provide him with any hope of maintaining his presidency for another term." The broadcast closed by restating the Communists' determination to continue the war until a settlement on their terms can be achieved.

A Hanoi broadcast in English on 5 October contained a condensed version of the Viet Cong statement including the strongly worded references to the President and the "US peace fraud." It made no mention of the 1968 presidential election, however.

SECRET

SECRET