The President's Daily Brief

10 February 1969
(Afternoon)

Top Secret

17
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LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT’S DAILY BRIEF OF
10 FEBRUARY 1969

I. MAJOR PROBLEMS

MIDDLE EAST

There is nothing of significance to report.

EUROPE

There is nothing of significance to report.

SOVIET AFFAIRS

There is nothing of significance to report.

VIETNAM

There is nothing of significance to report.

II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS

MIDDLE EAST

There is nothing of significance to report.

EUROPE

SOVIET AFFAIRS
The US Ambassador in Belgrade has been told by a high-level Yugoslav Foreign Office official that Rumania is no longer under pressure from Moscow to hold Warsaw Pact maneuvers this spring because of continuing Soviet involvement in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Ambassador in Bucharest is said to have told his Yugoslav colleague that no maneuvers would be held in Rumania until the end of the year.

The Rumanians also told the Yugoslavs that they believe developments in Czechoslovakia will cause the Moscow Conference of World Communist Parties, scheduled for this spring, to be postponed. If and when the conference is held, the Rumanians will attend but the Yugoslavs will not.

The arrival in East Berlin yesterday of Soviet Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky, supreme commander of the Warsaw
Only one new infiltration group has been noted en route to South Vietnam so far this month. This lack of activity continues the downward trend which began several weeks ago.

The decline of infiltration at this time of year--partly because of poor weather conditions--is not without precedent. The pattern of infiltration and the numbers involved in the past three months are almost identical with those for the same period last year. If the similarity continues to hold, we would expect the February total to be about the same as last year.

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The tactical military situation in South Vietnam remains unchanged. Only limited and small-scale ground action was reported.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Pact, probably heralds a meeting of Pact military representatives.
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS

PERU

Members of the coterie around Velasco have once again made it clear that the Peruvians are convinced the US will not apply sanctions in the dispute over the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company. Secure in this assumption, they are even taking in stride the fact that trade negotiations with the Soviets are not going well. The negotiators from Moscow reportedly are interested mostly in selling trucks and mining equipment, which the Peruvians do not want. The Soviets have shown no interest in buying Peruvian minerals or sugar.

BRAZIL

The military are pushing ahead with the "sanitizing" of Brazil. Nearly a fifth of the members of the national legislature have now been purged, and five state legislatures have been closed. The Brazilian National Security Council has also approved the establishment of a military-police commission to investigate "subversive or counterevolutionary acts." This could be a vehicle for making harassment of the government's real and fancied opponents less haphazard than it has been so far.

President Costa e Silva may be opposed to all this, but we are almost certain he lacks the power to reverse the trend.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

TURKEY

The Annex today deals with problems in US-Turkish relations.

COMMUNIST CHINA

The Chinese are putting new emphasis on the improvement of air defense and logistic capabilities in southern Yunnan Province. Satellite photography of late January shows work well along on extension of the runway at Ssu-mao airfield to accommodate jet fighters. When the new concrete runway is completed, Ssu-mao will become the fourth jet fighter field in the border area. China's air defenses will then be extended to cover all of the Vietnam and Laotian frontier.

At the same time, engineer units are developing a large military logistic base in the southern Yunnan salient. Of 800 barracks and storage facilities identified by aerial photography within five miles of the Laotian border, about 700 are new. These structures are not far from a Chinese road construction project under way for several months in Communist-held parts of northern Laos.

This activity on both sides of the border will make it easier for the Chinese to support Laotian Communist forces in remote parts of northern Laos, as they have been doing for some years.
LAOS

Unusually heavy US airstrikes are being targeted against North Vietnamese positions surrounding Thateng in support of the government's efforts to bring in reinforcements and vital supplies by helicopter. A number of friendly guerrilla teams will move overland to harass the Communists. The airstrikes may initially prove effective, but prospects for lifting the three-month siege are not good. Even with the arrival of the relief force, government forces are heavily outnumbered.

In north Laos, Communist terrorists withdrew today from Muong Soul after killing one US military attaché and wounding another. This attack seems more illustrative of the sporadic terrorism the Communists manage to carry out in Laos than indicative of a concerted Communist effort against government forces at Muong Soul.
TURKEY

SIGNIFICANCE: Turkey has great strategic importance for the US—both because substantial American investment and prestige is committed there and because it is the southeastern anchor of NATO. During the past two decades, the US has given Turkey over $5 billion in economic and military aid, and has trained and equipped the bulk of its military establishment which totals about half a million men. US installations in Turkey are of major importance to our mutual defense effort. Through them we have been able to stage strategic forces and from them we have monitored Soviet missile and space developments. Nonetheless, and despite the accumulation over the years of substantial goodwill in Turkey, the US faces complex problems in its relations with Turkey, of which anti-American incidents of recent months are but surface manifestations. Many of these problems really stem from the underlying frustration and xenophobia of a people which is still about 45-percent illiterate, over 70 percent dependent on agriculture, and with some 42 percent under the age of 15.

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American prestige and influence in Turkey reached its zenith in the mid-fifties. The 1960 military revolution was the major turning point. The forces of rebellion were aroused by the government's increasing repressiveness, and fostered by the mounting frustration of the political
opposition. Some of this animosity toward the ancien-regime rubbed off on the US. In the postrevolution period, the Turks began to reappraise their foreign relations, and this reappraisal has been accelerated by new frustrations growing out of the persistent Cyprus dispute.

For the past two years, the US and Turkey have been mutually reviewing in detail the fifty-four agreements which undergird our bilateral relations. Many of these were concluded during the heyday of the pre-1960 Bayar-Menderes administration and never received parliamentary ratification. Major differences have now been reconciled, and hopefully a new consolidated agreement will be ready for signature within a few months. A considerable domestic storm could develop, however, if as now seems quite likely, the government decides not to put the agreement through the formal parliamentary ratification.

The revolution of 1960, largely a reaction to Menderes' tight control, ushered in a period of activity by the long-dormant political left, which has increasingly plagued both the conservative government of Prime Minister Demirel and Americans in Turkey. For the first time in modern Turkish history, socialism and communism became accepted topics for discussion and debate. The Communist Party per se remains banned, but the self-styled Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP) was organized and gained limited parliamentary representation. The TLP has attracted many known and suspected Communists and has launched a coordinated program of action and propaganda aimed at undermining the government, driving
the American military presence from Turkey, and pulling Turkey out of NATO.

Leftist extremism has also fostered the emergence of an extreme right which will almost certainly lead to further polarization, especially among the volatile youth. The rightists have organized a group of youth "commandos" as mobile shock "troops" to counter leftist activities. Clashes have already occurred between these two extremist factions in an atmosphere of increasing violence and instability.

In the last five years Cyprus has become a major factor in US-Turkish relations. It has periodically raised the spectre of Turkish military intervention, war between Greece and Turkey, and irreparable damage to the entire southeast flank of NATO. The Turks have several times planned to restore Turkish honor and protect the Turkish Cypriot community by military intervention. Many Turks blame the US for repeatedly forestalling them.

The US also faces the problem of sharply cutting economic and military aid without endangering the already substantial investment in Turkey. Largely under American tutelage, the Turks have made significant strides in economic development and have projected current and future plans on anticipated foreign assistance. They feel they have an even firmer US commitment to support the Turkish military establishment, which is largely committed to NATO.

Other problems include Turkish labor disputes involving US military installations, and the continuing jockeying for
position between the US and the USSR at the Turkish Straits. The first invites direct confrontation with the militant left; the latter raises the possibility of renewed Soviet efforts to alter the Montreux Convention.

Turkish-American relations have indeed entered a potentially delicate period of transition. Friendship for the US remains widespread, but the Turks are taking a close look at the forces at work in NATO, in East-West relations, and in US-Turkish bilateral relations.