



*The President's Daily Brief*

*2 May 1973*

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*Top Secret*

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EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

**TOP SECRET**

May 2, 1973

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**TOP SECRET**

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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Egyptian officials continue to stress the need for military action against Israel in order to force intervention by the great powers and the imposition of a settlement acceptable to Arab governments.

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(Page 1) On Page 3 [redacted]  
[redacted] Egypt [redacted]  
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Recent authoritative Chinese statements on Indochina hint that Peking may be urging the Indochinese Communists to show a greater effort at compliance with the cease-fire agreements. (Page 4)

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France [redacted]  
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

EGYPT

Ever since President Sadat announced in late March that the time had come for "all-out confrontation" with Israel, Egyptian officials have been stressing the inevitability of a fresh outbreak of fighting.

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They say Egypt's objective is not a military victory, but to force the intervention of the great powers to impose a settlement that Arab governments could then live with.

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In his May Day speech yesterday, Sadat did not speak so shrilly of war as on some past occasions, but did describe the present cease-fire as working to Israel's advantage. Sadat reiterated that Egypt would move to end the "present inactivity," but added that diplomatic efforts would continue.

Sadat's tough talk has been accompanied by military moves that could be signs of an end to the cease-fire. Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq have sent jet fighters to Egypt.

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*Several factors have caused Sadat to become more militant. The diplomatic "offensive" he initiated early this year achieved nothing, serving only to underscore the bleak outlook for a political settlement. Reports of promises of new US military aid for Israel eroded Egyptian hopes that the US would pressure Israel to break the impasse in negotiations. Fedayeen terrorism, the Israeli shootdown of a Libyan airliner, and Israel's raid on Beirut have made the Egyptian outlook even gloomier.*

(continued)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*At this stage, Sadat appears to be working to give credibility to his threats. The coming discussion in the UN of the Middle East could provide him an excuse to delay exercising a military option. Later, he could manufacture other excuses. It is nonetheless possible that Sadat may be convinced that in the end only military action will generate movement toward a settlement, and Egypt's recent moves could well be preparations for such a contingency.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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EGYPT - SAUDI ARABIA

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## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

### CHINA-INDOCHINA

*Recent authoritative Chinese statements on Indochina hint that Peking may be urging the Indochinese Communists to show a greater effort at compliance with the cease-fire agreements. The Chinese pronouncements follow visits to Peking by ranking Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian officials and what seems to have been a major review of Chinese policy on Indochina.*

A People's Daily editorial on April 25, for example, and a message to the 1970 Indochina Summit participants signed by Chou En-lai referred to the Vietnam and Lao agreements as having "created conditions" for the Lao and Cambodian people "to settle themselves their internal affairs free from foreign interference."

*The Chinese may have privately advised Hanoi and the Lao Communists that there is much to be gained by moving ahead on the formation of a new Lao government. The return last week of a high-ranking Lao Communist negotiator to Vientiane may reflect this. The Chinese may have suggested too that although renewed military pressure might gain some new territory, it would also raise the threat of US retaliation.*

With respect to Cambodia, the People's Daily did not mention the hard settlement terms being pushed by the Khmer Communists, and it softened China's own demands. Instead of insisting, as Chinese spokesmen have in the past, on an end of all US "interference" in Cambodian affairs, the People's Daily demanded "that the US Government stop all bombing and all its military interference in Cambodia."

*Peking could believe that this less comprehensive demand would be more attractive to Washington and Phnom Penh.*

*Peking may be advocating a more flexible position because it fears that recent military and political developments threaten the prospects for defusing Indochina as an issue in major power politics.*

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SOUTH VIETNAM

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FRANCE

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NOTE

USSR-China: May Day passed quietly in the two major Communist capitals. In Moscow, Brezhnev's speech emphasized economic progress and the Soviet contribution to peace. Brezhnev sought to leave his listeners with the impression that the Soviet leadership views the future--domestically and internationally--with confidence. In Peking, for the second consecutive year, the festivities were low-keyed. Peking avoided making any major policy statements by forgoing the traditional speeches, slogans, and joint editorial.

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